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Abstract 
The management of organisational information security (InfoSec) has gained importance due 
to the rise of new and sophisticated cyberthreats with technical measures alone no longer 
comprising effective organisational InfoSec. In addition to technical measures, organisations 
need to transform their employees into InfoSec-aware end-users who actively contribute to the 
maintenance and improvements of organisational InfoSec. It is imperative to develop a positive 
InfoSec climate in the workplace where priority of InfoSec-related matters is understood and 
recognised by all employees. 
The concept of an InfoSec climate focuses on the interactions between employees and their 
work environment, including the InfoSec behaviours performed by colleagues and by direct 
supervisors. These interactions promote the priority of InfoSec in the organisation. Improving 
the understanding of these interactions enables scholars and practitioners to design 
management models and strategies to develop people-centric InfoSec workplaces where 
employees receive InfoSec-related resources in a positive InfoSec climate. These interactions 
provide a social network within the workplace and their impact on the formation of an InfoSec 
climate is the focus of this thesis. Previously, most behavioural InfoSec studies have focused 
on the cognitive and behavioural aspects of employees as separate individuals. 
This thesis investigates the factors and mechanisms that contribute to the formation of an 
InfoSec climate by conducting a canonical action research (CAR) project in collaboration with 
a large construction enterprise in Vietnam. The business objective of this CAR project focused 
on improving the organisation’s InfoSec environment. A social network analysis (SNA) 
approach was used to examine the impacts of employees’ networks of InfoSec-related 
interactions on the formation of their perceptions of an InfoSec climate. The adoption of SNA 
methods also supported the achievement of the business objective. 
The CAR project consisted of four research stages which began with diagnosing InfoSec issues 
and understanding the critical factors and methods for effective InfoSec implementation in the 
Vietnamese context. At the end of the diagnosis stage, the project team decided to improve the 
InfoSec environment through a diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. In the action planning stage, 
SNA methods were employed to identify influential champions. These champions then 
received InfoSec training in the action taking stage and carried out the diffusion of InfoSec 
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knowledge at the end of this iteration. In the evaluation and reflection stage, SNA was 
performed to quantitatively evaluate the changes in the InfoSec environment and to examine a 
theoretical model which described the formation of employees’ perceptions of the InfoSec 
climate. 
The evaluation’s findings indicated that the InfoSec environment of the organisation had 
achieved the intended improvements, including the selected champions emerging as prominent 
sources of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence and employees’ provision of InfoSec support 
becoming more active after the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. The SNA findings 
further indicated that employees received InfoSec influence from colleagues they trusted and 
from those that provided them with work advice, organisational updates, personal advice and 
InfoSec support. Employees’ number of InfoSec influencers, department membership and 
champion status were identified as the factors that facilitated the InfoSec influence between 
them and contributed to improved perceptions of the InfoSec climate. In addition to the 
structural mechanisms of the InfoSec influence network, which contributed to InfoSec climate 
formation, employees’ perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours 
also had different formation mechanisms. 
This research provides contributions to practice, theory and methodology. It demonstrates the 
practical adoption of SNA approach to improve organisational InfoSec, through employing the 
approach’s methods and metrics to evaluate an InfoSec environment and to identify InfoSec 
champions. The research elaborates on the formation mechanisms of an InfoSec climate and 
extends theoretical knowledge on this formation process. The examination of theories about 
networks and social influence also suggests the influential traits of InfoSec champions. The 
methodological contributions focus on the separate and combined use of SNA methods with 
the CAR approach to investigate behavioural InfoSec-related phenomena. The research also 
proposes further improvements to the CAR approach. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Information security (InfoSec) has become a priority for organisations in recent years, 
accompanying the increasing adoption of technology trends such as cloud computing (Ballabio 
2013), mobile devices and consumer technologies for work purposes (Harris, Ives & Junglas 
2011; Singh 2012) and big data (Constantine 2014; Everett 2015). In a survey by PwC (2016), 
59 per cent of more than 10,000 information technology (IT)/InfoSec executives reported their 
investment in InfoSec has been affected by the digitalisation of their businesses. In a survey 
conducted by EY (2017), 53 per cent of 1,735 C-suite leaders and IT/InfoSec executives 
reported an increased InfoSec budget, yet 87 per cent stated a lack of confidence in their 
organisation’s InfoSec. Reports by other InfoSec institutes have also found a pattern of 
increased organisational InfoSec budgets over the last three years (Cisco 2017; Filkins 2016; 
Ponemon Institute 2016). 
The recent worldwide increase in InfoSec spending was in response to the growing number of 
InfoSec threats associated with the adoption of mobile devices and cloud infrastructure, but 
was also prompted by security concerns regarding employees (Cisco 2017; EY 2017; Ponemon 
Institute 2016; PwC 2016; Symantec 2017). While the InfoSec threats from the adoption of 
mobile devices and cloud computing are linked to emerging technology trends and 
management practices such as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), IT consumerisation and 
digitising workplace (Crossler et al. 2014; Harris, Ives & Junglas 2011; Miller, Voas & 
Hurlburt 2012; Niehaves, Köffer & Ortbach 2012; Thomson 2012; White 2012), InfoSec issues 
related to employees persist in modern organisations. Employees have been consistently 
regarded by scholars as the weakest link in organisational InfoSec (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & 
Benbasat 2010a; Crossler et al. 2013; Guo et al. 2011; Ifinedo 2014; Safa, von Solms & Futcher 
2016; Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich 2001; Warkentin & Willison 2009). In the context of ongoing 
worldwide efforts to improve organisational InfoSec, this thesis seeks to develop a practical 




1.1 Research Overview 
I adopted a canonical action research (CAR) approach and collaborated with a large 
construction enterprise in Vietnam—TTT Corporation (TTT)—to improve their organisational 
InfoSec. In doing so, I examined the practical applications of social network analysis (SNA) 
methods to identify and utilise champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge with the aim 
to increase employees’ provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence in the workplace. 
Throughout the thesis I demonstrated the previously unexplored use of SNA methods to 
investigate the impacts of employees’ social networks on their InfoSec perceptions—a factor 
overlooked by traditional behavioural InfoSec research. In particular, I investigated the factors 
and mechanisms of the formation process of the InfoSec climate represented by employees’ 
perceptions of their colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours (Chan, Woon & 
Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
The thesis offers organisational contributions concerning the application of SNA to evaluate 
and improve an InfoSec environment with network-based interventions by leveraging 
influential champions to diffuse InfoSec knowledge. Moreover, the thesis extends current 
knowledge about the determinants of employees’ InfoSec influence and the formation process 
of an InfoSec climate. Finally, this thesis provides methodological recommendations about the 
combined and separate uses of SNA methods and the CAR approach. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
The requirements for effective InfoSec management have extended beyond investing solely in 
technical measures (Anderson & Moore 2009; von Solms 2001), demanding attention be paid 
to socio-organisational facets of the workplace (Crossler et al. 2013; Willison & Warkentin 
2013). Consequently, it is crucial for organisations to gain the knowledge of how employees 
perceive organisational InfoSec and how they perform InfoSec behaviours (Padayachee 2012; 
Sommestad et al. 2014). 
Recent studies have investigated a wide range of employees’ InfoSec perceptions and 
behaviours such as InfoSec compliance (Herath & Rao 2009a; Lee, Larose & Rifon 2008; 
Siponen, Pahnila & Mahmood 2007; Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila 2014; Vance, Siponen & 
Pahnila 2012) or InfoSec avoidance (Liang & Xue 2010). Other studies have examined reasons 
for employees’ careless mistakes or intentional misbehaviours (D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012; Guo 
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& Yuan 2012; Siponen & Vance 2010; Workman, Bommer & Straub 2008). These studies 
identified the antecedents of both desirable and undesirable InfoSec behaviours, thereby 
enabling practitioners to formulate appropriate strategies to manage these behaviours. 
However, there remains a gap in the current body of knowledge on behavioural InfoSec which 
demands further investigation. 
The reason for this gap lies in prior studies’ focus on InfoSec behaviours and cognition of 
employees as separate individuals, overlooking the effects and features of the interactions and 
relationships between employees. Although InfoSec-related interactions and relationships have 
been examined by some studies, such as employees’ sharing of InfoSec advice (Safa, von 
Solms & Futcher 2016), social learning (Warkentin, Johnston & Shropshire 2011) or social 
influence (Herath & Rao 2009a; Ifinedo 2014), these interactions and relationships were also 
conceptualised as employees’ cognitive factors. Therefore, the individual employees were the 
main unit of analysis in these studies. 
The features of InfoSec-related interactions and relationships as a network have not been 
captured by prior studies, resulting in the omission of critical factors such as the roles of 
employees in these InfoSec-related networks and their social cliques. By shifting the research 
focus to the interactions and relationships that tie employees together, the effects of 
individuals’ personal characteristics on their interactions or relationships can be identified. This 
enables holistic examination of InfoSec-related phenomena while accounting for 
characteristics of both the sender and receiver of an interaction or a relationship, instead of 
focusing on either of these ends as has been done in previous behavioural InfoSec research 
(i.e., studying how an individual employee perceives the environment and acts on his or her 
own perceptions). 
By shifting the research focus onto the networks of InfoSec-related interactions and 
relationships this thesis does not solely aim at filling the current knowledge gap, but undertakes 
a problematisation approach (Alvesson & Kärreman 2007; Alvesson & Sandberg 2011; 
Sandberg & Alvesson 2010) to explore new research directions in the behavioural InfoSec 
field. The problematisation approach provides the method to identify and critically examine 
the assumptions of predominantly adopted theories, providing a basis for interesting and novel 
research questions. This problematisation approach will be elaborated on in the next chapter. 
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Exploring the proposed research directions requires a method to effectively analyse the 
networks of InfoSec-related interactions and relationships (e.g., provision of InfoSec support 
and InfoSec influence). SNA methods are most appropriate for analysing these networks 
(Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Hanneman & Riddle 2005; Otte & Rousseau 2002). I 
employed the SNA methods to design the interventions in a CAR project to enhance the 
InfoSec environment of a collaborating organisation. The potential of using SNA methods for 
advancing scholarly knowledge was examined by applying these methods to test a theoretical 
model that described the formation of the collaborating organisation’s InfoSec climate. The 
decision to study the formation of an InfoSec climate as the thesis’ focal theoretical interest 
was in line with the collaborating organisation’s business objective, which aimed at improving 
their employees’ perceptions of the InfoSec environment. The perceptions of InfoSec climate 
describe how employees perceive their colleagues and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours 
(Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). The 
motivations for this CAR project were, therefore, influenced by the collaborating 
organisation’s business objective. 
The research project was conducted in Vietnam, a developing country in Southeast Asia. In 
terms of internet penetration, Vietnam was ranked 13th in the world in 2016 with 52 per cent 
of the country’s population having access to the internet (Internet Live Stats 2016). However, 
the current InfoSec landscape in Vietnam requires urgent attention. Vietnam was among the 
top five countries most vulnerable to computer viruses (Kaspersky 2014). A recent whitebook 
on IT in Vietnam (Vietnam MIC 2014) reported that only 30 per cent of organisations in the 
country had implemented InfoSec policies and protective measures. In 2016 and 2017, 
numerous InfoSec incidents impacted companies and crucial infrastructures in Vietnam 
including the country’s international airport (Blake 2016; Lich 2016; Tuoi Tre News 2017). 
Recently, the Vietnamese Minister of Information and Communication pledged the dedication 
of resources and support until 2020 to improve the country’s IT and InfoSec infrastructures 
(VietNamNet Bridge 2017). That InfoSec-related topics are pressing issues to organisations in 
Vietnam further motivated this thesis to explore the practical applications of SNA methods as 
an effective and efficient tool to improve organisational InfoSec in Vietnam. 
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1.3 Research Scope and Objectives 
1.3.1 Research Objectives 
I employed a CAR approach which pursues two types of objectives—scholarly and business 
objectives. The scholarly objectives were to investigate the formation of an InfoSec climate 
and explore the applications of SNA methods for improving organisational InfoSec. The 
business objective of the collaborating organisation was to improve their InfoSec environment. 
1.3.2 Research Context 
For this CAR project, I collaborated with an industry partner, TTT1, one of the largest 
construction enterprises in Vietnam in operation since 1992. TTT focuses on delivering interior 
design and fitting to multinational clients in Vietnam and Myanmar, while its sister company, 
Gamma Chairs2, specialises in manufacturing and exporting high-quality furniture worldwide. 
TTT attracts 100 to 300 projects annually and employs more than 300 permanent full-time 
employees at three offices in Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi, and more than 800 skilled workers 
at the factory complex and various construction sites in Vietnam and Myanmar. TTT is 
respected by clients and competitors as an innovative construction enterprise in the interior 
design and fitting market in Vietnam. TTT prides itself on being the first construction company 
in Vietnam to adopt technologies such as customer relationship management and enterprise 
resource planning systems to support its operations. Most recently, the company pioneered the 
emerging eco-friendly architecture practices in Vietnam. 
Due to rapid growth, the top management at TTT started to improve the company’s digital 
operations and corporate image. In doing so, they decided to pursue excellence in InfoSec 
governance—InfoSec issues, which included employees’ inefficient and insecure use of 
confidential information and IT applications, had been identified by their staff. For example, 
the disorganised files and folders on the company’s servers can hinder critical business 
processes such as project bidding and increase the risk of leaking confidential information. 
When I approached TTT and presented my thesis proposal, the top management found the 




proposal aligned with their business objectives and agreed to collaborate with me in this 
research project. 
1.4 Research Questions 
In line with the research objectives formulated above, this thesis seeks to answer the following 
research questions: 
RQ1: What are the factors and mechanisms that contribute to the formation of an 
InfoSec climate? 
RQ2: How can SNA methods be used for improving organisational InfoSec? 
1.5 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis fall into three groups, 1) organisational contributions, 2) 
theoretical contributions and 3) methodological contributions. 
This thesis produced organisational improvements in the InfoSec environment at TTT by 
increasing the provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence between employees. SNA 
methods were applied to conduct a risk assessment to quantitatively evaluate the InfoSec 
environment and to identify influential champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. TTT 
benefitted from the research, including through improved understanding of InfoSec 
implementation and receiving the materials and procedures developed from this thesis as a 
starting point for future InfoSec improvements. TTT also received a group of experienced 
champions who can continue to diffuse InfoSec knowledge in the future. Overall, the thesis 
demonstrated the applications of SNA methods to improve InfoSec environment with network-
based interventions and provided the selection criteria for appointing influential InfoSec 
champions. 
The thesis offered theoretical contributions by extending current knowledge about the 
determinants of InfoSec influence and about the mechanisms and factors that contributed to 
the formation of InfoSec climate. Specifically, I applied SNA methods to identify employees’ 
background characteristics and socialisation that increased their likelihood to exert InfoSec 
influence over each other. By doing so, I examined the theory of social power bases (Raven 
2008) in the InfoSec context and advanced knowledge about the selection criteria for InfoSec 
champions—a neglected and under-researched topic with important implications. I further 
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explored the forming mechanisms of an InfoSec climate, offering explanations beyond the 
theoretical relationships between employees’ socialisation, social influence and climate 
perceptions (Ashforth 1985). Findings from SNA revealed the specific types of socialisation 
that indirectly contributed to the formation of an InfoSec climate through facilitating InfoSec 
influence between employees. Moreover, the InfoSec influence network had structural 
mechanisms which affected the occurrence of InfoSec influence, and employees’ climate 
perceptions were also found to have unique and changing tendencies over time. 
Methodological contributions concerning the combined and separate uses of the CAR approach 
and SNA methods were drawn from my reflection on the CAR process. I found that SNA 
methods can enhance the effectiveness and rigour of the CAR approach by helping researchers 
diagnose the organisational situations, design network-based interventions and provide 
network measures to quantitatively evaluate the intervention’s effectiveness. The use of SNA 
methods further facilitates action researcher–research client collaboration via the effective 
communication of network visualisations. I further compared the CAR approach with the 
collaborative practice research (CPR) approach (Mathiassen 2002) and proposed 
improvements to the CAR approach based on this comparison and on my reflection of the CAR 
project. 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters, illustrated in Figure 1.1 and summarised below. 
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Figure 1.1. Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 introduces key elements such as research context, motivation, scope and objectives 
and research questions. Chapter 2 reviews the extant literature with a focus on employees’ 
InfoSec behaviours and perceptions. The chapter also explains the problematisation approach 
that motivates and shapes the thesis’ research direction. Chapter 3 describes the research design 
and methods, focusing on the adoption of the CAR approach and the SNA methods. Chapter 4 
presents a detailed profile of TTT, the collaborating industry partner in this CAR project. The 
chapter also discusses the initial meeting between myself and TTT’s stakeholders from which 
the joint project properly commenced. Together, Chapters 2 to 4 establish the theoretical 
background and context of this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 describes the diagnosis stage of the CAR project consisting of two research actions. 
First, I performed a risk assessment with the department managers at TTT to diagnose the 
InfoSec issues in the workplace. Second, I conducted a case study with six external InfoSec 
experts in Vietnam to understand the critical factors and methods for InfoSec implementation 
in the Vietnamese context. These two actions were carried out as preparatory steps which 
provided feedback to the design of the InfoSec change program for TTT. 
Chapter 6 presents the action planning stage of the CAR project, where the decision and actions 
to identify the influential champions for the InfoSec change program were taken in 
consideration of the project’s situation. At the end of this stage, 50 champions were identified 
using SNA methods and appointed for the InfoSec change program. Moreover, the networks 
of the provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence before the change program were 
analysed as a baseline for the evaluation of improvements. 
Chapter 7 describes the action taking stage of the CAR project, where the appointed champions 
received the InfoSec training to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge for the 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge to colleagues in their departments. 
Chapter 8 presents the evaluation and reflection stage of the CAR project, which took place 
four months after the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge launched at the end of the action taking 
stage. This evaluation and reflection stage evaluated the changes in the networks as 
representative of the provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence after the change 
program. I also performed a longitudinal SNA to explain the formation of employees’ InfoSec 
climate perceptions at TTT. 
Chapter 9 discusses the CAR project’s research contributions, grouped into three categories—
organisational contributions, theoretical contributions and methodological contributions 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature and introduces the major concepts, theories and 
frameworks in the behavioural InfoSec field. The chapter begins a review of the development 
of the InfoSec research field from solely focusing on technical measures to aiming to achieve 
effective InfoSec governance of all factors related to people, processes and technology. The 
theories that explain several types of employees’ InfoSec behaviours are then reviewed and 
emerging trends in the behavioural InfoSec research field are discussed. The chapter then 
discusses my adoption of the problematisation approach (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011) to 
explore new research directions in this field. The knowledge gained from this literature review 
combined with the problematisation process motivated an investigation into the formation of 




Figure 2.1. Structure of Chapter 2 
2.1 Overview of InfoSec Field 
The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines InfoSec as 
‘the protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability’ (Kissel 2013, p. 94). InfoSec practitioners and researchers have also widely 
referred to the confidentiality, integrity and availability triad as a canonical definition of 
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InfoSec, referring to the objective of preserving these three facets of information (Anderson 
2003; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Huang, Lee & Kao 2006; ISO 2017; Parsons et al. 2010; 
Saint-Germain 2005; von Solms & van Niekerk 2013; Stanton et al. 2005). Moreover, InfoSec 
is often interpreted as concerning risk management activities (Blakley & Mcdermott 2002; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006). 
The definition of InfoSec has changed over the past decade as the InfoSec research field has 
grown in importance and expanded its domains. For example, von Solms and von Solms (2005) 
state that the scope of InfoSec has grown beyond the protection of data, information and 
software to include critical business and legal implications. Similarly, InfoSec research is no 
longer considered a discipline solely focused on InfoSec technologies, but one that also 
comprises topics related to economics, psychology and management areas (Anderson & Moore 
2009; Crossler et al. 2013). The various dimensions of InfoSec research are discussed in the 
next section. 
2.1.1 The Dimensions of InfoSec Research 
Von Solms (2001) identified 13 dimensions of the InfoSec discipline—strategic/corporate 
governance, governance/organisational, policy, best practice, ethical, certification, legal, 
insurance, personnel/human, awareness, technical, measurement/metrics and audit. Da Veiga 
and Eloff (2007) developed an InfoSec governance framework that covered six major InfoSec 
domains—leadership and governance, security management and organisation, security 
policies, security program management, user security management and technology protection 
and operations. Wu and Saunders (2011) compared da Veiga and Eloff’s (2007) work with the 
framework described by the NIST’s Special Publication 800 series and incorporated the budget 
dimension into the existing InfoSec framework. 
Zafar and Clark (2009) reviewed and matched the InfoSec research topics published in the 
Basket of Eight’s information systems journals with the IBM Information Security Framework 
(IBM 2006). They then categorised InfoSec research into nine themes—InfoSec governance, 
privacy, threat mitigation, transaction and data integrity, identity and access management, 
application security, physical security, personnel security and InfoSec economics (Zafar & 
Clark 2009). Blake and Ayyagari (2012) conducted text analysis to identify the topics of 
InfoSec research by examining publications’ contents. Based on the keywords derived from 
these publications, Blake and Ayyagari (2012) found 10 InfoSec research topics—security 
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design and management, confidentiality and integrity, behavioural aspects of security, user-
level security, preventive and detective controls, database security, assessment, research 
methodology, information protection and reuse and privacy. Most recently, Silic and Back 
(2014a) combined Zafar and Clark’s (2009) InfoSec themes with the ISO27002 model and 
determined 13 InfoSec research themes (shown in Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. InfoSec Research Themes 
Main theme Sub-themes 
Risk assessment Risk analysis Risk estimation 
Risk identification and 
management 
Risk evaluation 
Privacy Policy, practices and controls Data, rules and objects 









Governance structure  
Framework and standards  
Asset management Site management Physical asset management 
Human resources security Workforce security Workforce education 
Organisational culture  
Physical and environmental 
security 
Physical asset management Deterrence 
Environmental security Detection 
Identification  
Human response  
Communications and 
operations management 
Operational procedures and 
responsibilities 
System planning and 
acceptance 
Third party delivery 
management 
 
Access control Identity proofing Identity lifecycle 
management 
Access control  
Information systems 
acquisition, development and 
maintenance 





Information security incident 
management 
Network segmentation and 
boundary protection 
Content checking 
Vulnerability management Incident management 
Business continuity 
management 




Database security Systems integrity 
Knowledge management 
Compliance Compliance program Standards, laws and 
regulations Information security policies 





Adopted from Silic and Back (2014a, p. 290). 
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Overall, there are several overlapping InfoSec domains and dimensions in the previous research 
frameworks and industry standards. Von Solms (2006) summarises the development of the 
InfoSec field as having progressed through four ‘waves’. The first wave focused on the 
technical InfoSec issues and their preventive measures, the second wave addressed the policies 
and management of organisational InfoSec, the third wave covered best practices and 
emphasised the development of InfoSec culture, and the fourth wave focused on developing 
effective InfoSec governance frameworks that oversee all InfoSec-related matters (von Solms 
2006). Based on four major InfoSec issues—access to InfoSec, secure communication, security 
management and development—Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007) found InfoSec research 
that contributed to these four issues fall into the organisational, conceptual and technical levels. 
The organisational level concerns aspects of human employees such as their behaviours and 
the policies to manage these employees. The conceptual level focuses on implementation-
independent specification for InfoSec such as the techniques for modelling InfoSec constraints. 
The technical level addresses the implementation of technical measures such as encryption 
algorithms (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). 
An important dimension of InfoSec research is end-users. The management of end-users’ 
InfoSec awareness and compliance with InfoSec policies is an integral part of InfoSec 
governance, which is the focus of the fourth wave development of the behavioural InfoSec 
field (von Solms 2006). Studies concerning end-user InfoSec contribute to the organisational 
level of workplaces’ InfoSec (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). The research theme focusing 
on end-user InfoSec is mentioned across research frameworks and industry standards under the 
names of personnel/human (von Solms 2001), user security management (da Veiga & Eloff 
2007), personnel security (Zafar & Clark 2009), people (Wu & Saunders 2011) and human 
resources security (Silic & Back 2014a). 
The research domain of end-user InfoSec is complex, containing various topics on end-users’ 
psychology and behaviours (Anderson & Moore 2009; Silic & Back 2014a; da Veiga & Eloff 
2007; Wu & Saunders 2011) and it has emerged as a critical subfield of InfoSec research 
(Crossler et al. 2013). This thesis, with the aim of understanding and influencing the formation 
of an InfoSec climate through the applications of SNA methods to enhance employees’ 
provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence, contributes to this behavioural InfoSec 
research field. 
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2.1.2 The Development of the Behavioural InfoSec Field 
End-users had been examined in the context of InfoSec before being recognised as a critical 
domain of InfoSec research and InfoSec governance. For example, end-users’ InfoSec 
behaviours were categorised as a form of organisational InfoSec threats, which can be internal 
(e.g., disgruntled employee, bad data entered and modified data) and external (e.g., hackers 
and competitors) (e.g., Loch, Carr & Warkentin 1992; Loch & Carr 1991; Wilson, Turban & 
Zviran 1992; Wood & Banks Jr 1993). Insider threats received the most attention at that time 
and Straub (1990) developed the well-known general deterrence theory (GDT) in the InfoSec 
context, that internal InfoSec violations can be deterred by end-users’ perceptions of the 
sanctions for their potential violations. Goodhue and Straub (1991) proposed and tested a 
theoretical model for end-users’ psychological satisfactoriness of InfoSec measures, finding 
little about the predictors of such satisfactoriness. The theoretical models proposed by Straub 
(1990) and Goodhue and Straub (1991) were the first attempts to understand end-users’ 
perceptions of InfoSec-related matters. 
End-users’ psychological factors and processes related to InfoSec gradually received more 
attention from practitioners and researchers. Of these factors, end-users’ InfoSec awareness 
emerged as a key topic discussed in many academic publications and industry guidelines (e.g., 
Gaunt 2000; Hawkins, Yen & Chou 2000; Guttman & Roback 1995; Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich 
2001; Siponen 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Thomson & von Solms 1998; Wood 2000). Kabay (1994) 
looked beyond insider threats and discussed a variety of psychological factors and processes 
(i.e., persuasion, compliance, group and prosocial behaviours) and suggested taking these 
factors and processes into consideration when implementing InfoSec policies. Harrington 
(1996) found that codes of ethics could affect specific InfoSec abuses (e.g., sabotage, fraud and 
viruses) and suggested InfoSec managers implement ethics codes to strengthen their effects 
through top management support and continuously reminding end-users about the 
consequences of InfoSec abuses. Adams and Sasse (1999) argued that end-users should not be 
viewed as the enemies of organisational InfoSec and emphasised user-centred InfoSec practices 
to motivate end-users’ cooperation in maintaining organisational InfoSec. 
Dhillon and Backhouse’s (2001) literature review called for more research on the socio-
organisational concepts related to InfoSec. End-user InfoSec awareness remained an under-
researched area of human-related InfoSec concepts. From 2000 onwards, theoretical 
frameworks and models for determining the socio-organisational factors of end-users’ InfoSec 
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behaviours were developed and validated, enriching the knowledge on this area (e.g., Aytes & 
Connolly 2004; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Doherty & Fulford 2005; Leach 2003; Lee, 
Lee & Yo 2004; Schultz 2002; Stanton et al. 2003). Of particular importance was Stanton et 
al.’s (2005) research, which classified InfoSec behaviours into six types according to end-
users’ expertise (expert or novice) and their intention (malicious, neutral or benevolent), the 
taxonomy of which is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Taxonomy of End-Users’ InfoSec Behaviours 
Adopted from Stanton et al. (2005, p. 127). 
InfoSec behaviours can be intentional destruction or detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering 
or naive mistakes, and aware assurance or basic hygiene, depending on end-users’ level of 
technical skills (Stanton et al. 2005). Stanton et al. (2005) provided several examples for each 
of these InfoSec behaviours, such as sabotage or stealing data (intentional destruction), sending 
spam messages (detrimental misuse), configuring company’s network (dangerous tinkering), 
setting weak passwords (naive mistakes), InfoSec compliance (basic hygiene) and notifying 
InfoSec vulnerabilities (aware assurance). Based on this taxonomy of end-users’ InfoSec 
behaviours, future research can focus on identifying the antecedents and consequences of each 
type of InfoSec behaviours. 
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2.1.3 Studies on InfoSec Behaviours 
From 2005 onwards, a substantial number of studies identified the antecedents and 
consequences of end-users’ InfoSec perceptions and behaviours contributing to the effective 
management of InfoSec. Most studies emphasised end-users’ compliance or compliance 
intention, while some investigated InfoSec violations or intention to commit InfoSec abuses. 
For example, Siponen, Pahnila and Mahmood (2007) determined the antecedents of end-users’ 
intention to comply and actual compliance. These antecedents were end-users’ perceptions of 
the InfoSec threats, perceived protective measure’s effectiveness (i.e., response efficacy), self-
efficacy and perceived sanctions. Further research (Pahnila, Siponen & Mahmood 2007) 
identified end-users’ attitude towards InfoSec, normative beliefs, perceived facilitating 
conditions, habits and rewards as additional factors of actual compliance and compliance 
intention. These findings were replicated and expanded on by later studies (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010a; Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin 2010; Lee, 
Larose & Rifon 2008; Ng, Kankanhalli & Xu 2009; Son 2011; Vance, Siponen & Pahnila 
2012). Other factors contributing to end-users’ InfoSec compliance and compliance intention 
were also determined, such as moral reasoning and values (Myyry et al. 2009), national culture 
(Dinev et al. 2009), management support (Posey, Roberts et al. 2011), perceived technical 
protection (Zhang, Reithel & Li 2009) and social learning (Warkentin, Johnston & Shropshire 
2011). 
Alongside the focus on predicting InfoSec compliance and compliance intention, other types 
of end-users’ InfoSec behaviours and perceptions were investigated. For example, researchers 
explored characteristics of InfoSec policies and their impacts on end-users’ engagement with 
policies (Boss et al. 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010b; Foltz, Schwager & 
Anderson 2008; Shaw et al. 2009). Liang and Xue (2010) examined the effects of end-users’ 
threat and coping appraisals on their InfoSec avoidance behaviour, and Rhee, Kim and Ryu 
(2009) focused on the antecedents of self-efficacy and its impacts on end-users’ technical 
InfoSec practice, intention to strengthen InfoSec and care for InfoSec behaviours. 
With regard to undesirable InfoSec behaviours, Workman, Bommer and Straub (2008) found 
that threat and coping appraisals can reduce end-users’ omission of InfoSec measures. D’Arcy 
and Hovav (2008) and D’Arcy, Hovav and Galletta (2009) investigated end-users’ InfoSec 
misuse and found that InfoSec training and monitoring, InfoSec awareness, moral judgement, 
self-efficacy and virtual status deterred such misuse and its behavioural intention. Hovav and 
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D’Arcy (2012) found similar findings, but the results were varied across the American and 
Korean samples, suggesting the impact of cultural values on deterrent effects. Further, studies 
have identified the antecedents of malicious and non-malicious InfoSec misbehaviours, such 
as perceived benefits (Hu et al. 2011), neutralisation techniques (Siponen & Vance 2010), 
perceptions of organisational justice and computer monitoring (Posey, Bennett et al. 2011), 
perceived lack of attributed trust (Posey, Bennett & Roberts 2011), attitude, workgroup norm, 
perceived risks and sanctions (Guo et al. 2011) and self-justification (Kajtazi et al. 2013). 
2.1.4 Current Trends in Behavioural InfoSec Research 
By 2012, the behavioural InfoSec field had achieved some level of maturity as systematic 
reviews and opinion articles begun to appear and consolidate research findings within the field 
(e.g., Crossler et al. 2013; Guo 2013). For example, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) synthesised 
prior researches adopting GDT (Straub 1990) which had produced inconsistent findings about 
the deterrent effects on InfoSec misbehaviours, and D’Arcy and Herath (2011) suggested 
exploring contingency variables to explain such inconsistency. 
Padayachee (2012) forwarded a taxonomy which summarised the factors motivating InfoSec 
compliant behaviours. This taxonomy followed self-determination theory’s (Deci & Eghrari 
1994; Gagné & Deci 2005) premises that human behaviours are driven by the five types of 
motivation—external regulation, introjection, identification, integration and intrinsic 
motivations (see Figure 2.3). 
Amotivation describes the state of lacking motivations which leads to having no intentions for 
performing behaviours (Gagné & Deci 2005). People feel motivated and develop behavioural 
intentions when they realise rewards and punishments (i.e., external regulations), while others 
may feel motivated to take actions as their self-esteem and ego are involved in performing the 
tasks (i.e., introjected regulations). 
It must be noted that people motivated by introjected regulation are still controlled by a form 
of extrinsic motivation (e.g., performing a behaviour because that behaviour makes the person 
feel worthy) (Gagné & Deci 2005). With identified regulation people have greater freedom as 
they are motivated to perform behaviours which match their goals and identities (e.g., being a 
doctor implies having to take care of patients). Moreover, people motivated by integrated 
regulation fully understand that their behaviours are integral parts of their personal identities 
(e.g., people who work as nurses while being comfortable with taking care of others in general) 
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(Gagné & Deci 2005). Opposite to amotivation is intrinsic motivation, the state of being 
motivated to perform behaviours solely by the enjoyment and autonomy of doing so. The 
enjoyment in performing behaviours distinguishes intrinsic motivation from integrated 
motivation (Gagné & Deci 2005). 
Based on Gagné and Deci’s (2005) self-determination theory, Padayachee’s (2012) taxonomy 
categorised the antecedents of InfoSec behaviours into extrinsic motivation (e.g., deterrence, 
rewards, social climate, threat and coping appraisals) and intrinsic motivation (e.g., 
commitment, competence and ethical). Further, amotivation (e.g., apathy, resistance, low self-
control and incompetence) can lead to undesirable InfoSec behaviours (Padayachee 2012). 
 
Figure 2.3. The Self-Determination Continuum 
Adopted from Gagné and Deci (2005, p. 336). 
Sommestad et al. (2014) and Silic and Back (2014a) both conducted systematic InfoSec 
literature reviews, with the former focused specifically on behavioural InfoSec. Sommestad et 
al. (2014) produced a list of the best predictors of InfoSec compliance and noncompliance 
(actual and intention to perform) (i.e., absolute Beta coefficient of impact on InfoSec 
compliance and misuse ≥ 0.25) and worst predictors (i.e., absolute Beta coefficient of impact 
≤ 0.10), as summarised in Table 2.2. 
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Intention to perform 
behaviour 
Compliance Incompliance Compliance Incompliance 
Attitude   8 2 
Perceived behavioural control   1 1 
Descriptive norm   1  
Subjective norm   8 2 
Intention to comply 2    
Intention to misuse  1   
Perceived celerity of sanctions    1 
Perceived certainty of sanctions 1  2 2 
Perceived severity of sanctions 1  2 2 
Perceived cost of noncompliance 1  1  
Self-efficacy 2  5  
Response cost   2  
Response efficacy   4  
Perceived benefits of 
noncompliance 
1  2 1 
Perceived vulnerability   3  
Perceived severity of incident   2  
Threat appraisal   1  
Attachment    1 
Involvement    1 
Organisational commitment   1 1 
Perceived extrinsic benefits    1 
Perceived formal risk    3 
Perceived informal risk    4 
Perceived intrinsic benefits    1 
Perceived risk of shame    3 
Awareness program    1 
Computer monitoring    1 
Conservation 1  1  
Conventional reasoning 1  1  
Habits   1  
InfoSec policies    1 
InfoSec policy fairness   1  
InfoSec policy quality 1  1  
Moral beliefs    3 
Neutralisation    2 
Openness to change 1  1  
Perceived identity match    1 
Perceived InfoSec climate 1    
Perceived justice of punishment   1  
Perceived legitimacy 1    
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Perceived usefulness   1  
Perceived value congruence 1    
Preventive security software    1 
Satisfaction   1  
Self-defence intention  1   
Visibility   1  
Adopted from Sommestad et al. (2014, pp. 52–56). The table contains 46 variables extracted from 29 studies 
conducted between 1996 and 2011 which Sommestad et al. (2014) deemed acceptable for inclusion in their review. 
The figures indicate the number of studies that examined these variables. 
Sommestad et al.’s (2014) and Padayachee’s (2012) reviews both contained three theoretical 
models predominantly adopted by prior studies—the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) 
(Ajzen 2011a), GDT (Straub 1990) and protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers 1975). 
Less commonly adopted theories were social control theory (Hirschi 1969) and rational choice 
theory (Paternoster & Simpson 1996). The literature reviews focusing on InfoSec behaviours 
conducted by Lebek et al. (2014) and Warkentin and Mutchler (2014) confirmed TPB, GDT 
and PMT as the key theories most frequently adopted in the behavioural InfoSec field. 
While several studies from 2011 onwards continued to examine and extend the predominantly 
adopted theoretical models (Burns et al. 2017; Hanus & Wu 2016; Ifinedo 2014; Siponen, 
Mahmood & Pahnila 2014; Sommestad, Karlzén & Hallberg 2015a, 2015b; Vance, Siponen & 
Pahnila 2012; Warkentin et al. 2016), others explored the contributing factors of InfoSec 
behaviours which reflect more of end-users’ personal characteristics. For example, Kajzer et 
al. (2014), Shropshire, Warkentin and Sharma (2015), McCormac et al. (2016) and Öğütçü, 
Testik and Chouseinoglou (2016) investigated end-users’ unique personalities and their 
impacts on InfoSec perceptions and behaviour. 
A closer examination of current trends reveals another change of focus in the behavioural 
InfoSec field; there is now more focus on end-users’ interactions with the InfoSec environment. 
Willison and Warkentin (2013) adjusted the security action cycle originally developed by 
Straub and Welke (1998) to add ‘pre-kinetic events’. The original security action cycle (Straub 
& Welke 1998) described four security actions—deterrence, prevention, detection and 
remedies—shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. Security Action Cycle 
Adopted from Straub and Welke (1998, p. 446). 
The adjustment of the security action cycle proposed by Willison and Warkentin (2013) added 
the pre-kinetic events component before the deterrence action (shown in Figure 2.5). They 
explained that pre-kinetic events can result from the interaction between employees and their 
organisation, including employees’ positive perceptions of a workplace where potential 
perpetrators do not have any motives to commit InfoSec violations. Pre-kinetic events also 
include the negative perception of organisational injustice, disgruntlement or dissatisfaction 
and neutralisation (i.e., mechanisms of moral disengagement that justify employees’ 




Figure 2.5. Extended Security Action Cycle 
Adopted from Willison and Warkentin (2013, p. 5). 
In line with Willison and Warkentin’s (2013) research, end-users’ perceptions of organisational 
injustice under the work environment’s effects were investigated by other studies (Posey, 
Bennett & Roberts 2011; Posey, Bennett et al. 2011). These studies found that various types of 
perceived organisational injustice can result from unjust computer monitoring and 
unpredictable management style, leading to computer abuse. Baskerville, Park and Kim (2014) 
and Kim, Park and Baskerville (2016) examined potential perpetrators’ evaluation of their 
workplaces’ vulnerabilities which motivate their InfoSec violations. They found that potential 
perpetrators’ perceived liberty and evaluation of the workplace’s facilitating conditions (e.g., 
an overall lax attitude about InfoSec and lack of sophisticated technical protection) could 
motivate perpetrators’ intention to commit the violations (Baskerville, Park & Kim 2014; Kim, 
Park & Baskerville 2016). Kirlappos, Parkin and Sasse (2014) coined the concept of ‘shadow 
security’ to refer to InfoSec workarounds that are unknown to top management and formal 
InfoSec authority. They further found that these InfoSec workarounds were invented and 
propagated within departments and via informal InfoSec inductions delivered by employees’ 
direct supervisors. 
The recent focus on the impacts of end-users’ interactions with their workplace on desirable 
InfoSec behaviours is evident in recent research. For example, Warkentin, Johnston and 
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Shropshire (2011) found positive effects of social learning with colleagues on end-users’ self-
efficacy and InfoSec compliance intention. Humaidi and Balakrishnan (2015) found that 
transformational and transactional leadership increase perceptions of severity and benefits of 
InfoSec measures subsequently leading to InfoSec compliance. Kim and Kim (2016) found 
social pressure can motivate end-users’ acquisition of InfoSec knowledge, increasing their 
intention to comply with InfoSec policy. Recent research has also revisited the impacts of 
InfoSec-related climates on end-users’ InfoSec behaviours. For example, Jaafar and Ajis 
(2013) and Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) examined end-users’ climate perceptions of the 
observable features of InfoSec environments, which comprise the InfoSec practices performed 
by colleagues and direct supervisors. Such climate perceptions motivate end-users’ actual 
compliance and compliant intention (Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). Similarly, 
Yazdanmehr and Wang (2016) found an ethical climate can increase end-users’ perceptions of 
norms and InfoSec compliance. 
2.2 Refinement of Research Focus 
After acquiring an understanding about the key topics and emerging trends in the behavioural 
InfoSec field, I proceeded to generate potential research ideas for this thesis. The aim of the 
research was to achieve a balance of practical usefulness and theoretical novelty. To this end, 
I adopted the problematisation approach (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011). 
2.2.1 The Problematisation Approach 
Sandberg and Alvesson (2010) argue that gap spotting, or formulating specific research 
questions by examining an overlooked area, is the most common way to generate research 
questions. Specifically, Sandberg and Alvesson (2010) identified three versions of gap 
spotting, namely 1) confusion spotting which aims at finding contradictory evidences, 2) 
neglect spotting that identifies an area which lacks (good) research and 3) application spotting 
which seeks shortage of theories or perspectives. While the use of gap spotting can be 
motivated by the combined effects of institutional conditions, professional norms and the 
researcher’s identity, Sandberg and Alvesson (2010) further argue that the benefit of gap 
spotting in terms of achieving theoretical novelty is rather limited. They propose the 
problematisation approach to ‘disrupt the reproduction and continuation of an institutionalised 
line of reasoning’ (p. 32) to enable researchers to reach ‘new and interesting points of 
departures for theory development’ (p. 33). 
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The central principles of problematisation focus on familiarising oneself with the common 
assumptions about the subject to be problematised and then questioning the accepted 
assumptions of existing theories (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011; Sandberg & Alvesson 2010). 
However, they caution that researchers should not necessarily deny every assumption to the 
extent of creating a scientific revolution. On this basis, they explain that there are five types of 
assumptions that can be problematised by researchers to generate interesting research 
questions—in-house, root metaphor, paradigm, ideology and field assumptions. 
In-house assumptions represent the reasoning accepted as unproblematic by supporters within 
a school of thought. Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) gave an example of an in-house assumption 
with the concept of leadership, defined by trait theories as comprising a set of personal features 
such as knowledge, skills and attitudes. In this case, questioning this assumption means 
defining leadership by the social context and less by a leader’s personal traits. The second type 
of assumption, root metaphor, refers to the underlying and broad impression of a subject matter. 
Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) provided an example of a root metaphor assumption which 
views organisations as a unitary set of cultural values and beliefs held by the organisation 
members. As such, problematising efforts question the assumption about such unity and 
uniqueness by bringing in the concepts related to differentiation and ambiguity (Alvesson & 
Sandberg 2011). 
Paradigm assumptions refer to accepted notions at the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological levels of research focusing on the problematised subject (Alvesson & Sandberg 
2011). Ideology assumptions are those that follow political, moral and gender-based beliefs 
about a subject. Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) highlighted that challenging paradigm 
assumptions may result in the key ingredient for generating interesting research questions. 
They gave an example about the dualist ontology that prevalently views professional 
competence as two separate aspects, namely, a set of the worker’s attributes and a set of work 
activities. On this basis, the researcher challenges this assumption by adopting an interpretive 
perspective which argues that competence is constructed via lived experience as an inseparable 
relation between the person and their work. The last type of assumption, field assumption, can 
be shared across paradigms, schools of thought and disciplines. An example of this assumption 
is the widely shared belief that humans make rational decisions which can be challenged by 
forwarding the alternative argument that humans operate within bounded rationality (Alvesson 
& Sandberg 2011). 
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2.2.2 Problematising Key Theories in Behavioural InfoSec 
I adopted the problematising approach (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011) and reflected on the 
predominantly adopted theories in the behavioural InfoSec field to identify their assumptions. 
The predominantly adopted theories (see Section 2.1.4) are the TPB (Ajzen 2011a), PMT 
(Rogers 1975) and GDT (Straub 1990). These theories are summarised in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Predominantly Adopted Theories about Desirable InfoSec Behaviours 
Theory Main factors Examples 
Theory of planned 
behaviour 
• Attitude (towards security 
policy, security practices) 
• Subjective norms (from 
colleagues, direct supervisors, 
top management) 
• Perceived behavioural control 
(self-efficacy, perceived 
controllability) 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 
(2010a); Herath and Rao (2009a, 
2009b); Hu et al. (2012); Ifinedo 
(2014); Lee and Kozar (2008); Rhee, 
Kim and Ryu (2009); Safa and Von 




• Threat appraisal (severity, 
vulnerability, rewards) 
• Coping appraisal (response cost, 
response efficacy, self-efficacy) 
Herath and Rao (2009a, 2009b); Lee, 
Larose and Rifon (2008); Li, Zhang 
and Sarathy (2010); Mohamed and 
Ahmad (2012); Siponen, Pahnila and 
Mahmood (2007); Siponen, 
Mahmood and Pahnila (2014); 
Vance, Siponen and Pahnila (2012) 
General deterrence 
theory 
• Perceived severity of sanctions 
• Perceived certainty of receiving 
sanctions 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 
(2010a); Herath and Rao (2009a, 
2009b); Siponen, Pahnila and 
Mahmood (2007) 
2.2.2.1 Theory of planned behaviour 
TPB posits that people are inclined to perform a behaviour based on their attitude, dominant 
subjective norms and perception of their control over the behaviour (Ajzen 2011a). TPB has 
been widely examined in the context of behavioural InfoSec (Lebek et al. 2014; Sommestad et 
al. 2014; Warkentin & Mutchler 2014). Sommestad et al. (2014) found that attitude was 
examined in many studies as the predicted variable and perceived behavioural control and 
subjective norms were both considered as the best predictors of compliance and misuse (Beta 
coefficients of 0.25 and above). 
2.2.2.2 Protection motivation theory 
Similar to TPB, PMT has also been employed in many behavioural InfoSec studies (Lebek et 
al. 2014; Sommestad et al. 2014; Warkentin & Mutchler 2014). PMT was originally developed 
to explain peoples’ response to fear appeals (Rogers 1975) and the theory was extended by 
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Rogers in 1983 to understand the effects of persuasive communication on behaviours, 
especially by focusing on the cognitive processes that mediate behavioural changes (Boer, 
Seydel & Norman 1996). In addition to behavioural intention as PMT’s focal construct, the 
theory has two main components which are the cognitive evaluations of the threat and the 
coping solution. 
PMT postulates that when people encounter a threat, their evaluation of the threat’s severity 
and their own vulnerability against the threat affect the decision to perform the prescribed 
coping solution (Rogers 1975). It is expected that the more people perceive the threat’s severity 
and their vulnerability, the more they would think favourably of performing the coping 
solution. In behavioural InfoSec research, these perceptions are contextualised to account for 
computer threats such as malware infection and InfoSec incidents (e.g., Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan 2015; Herath & Rao 2009a; Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila 2014; Vance, 
Siponen & Pahnila 2012). 
The revised version of PMT added the rewards factor which refers to the perceived benefits of 
not performing the coping solution (Norman, Boer & Seydel 2005). Norman, Boer and Seydel 
(2005) hypothesised that even though people may recognise the threat’s severity and their own 
vulnerability to the threat, the perceived benefits of performing the risky behaviour can 
attenuate the other two perceptions. Researchers also contextualised perceived rewards to fit 
the context of behavioural InfoSec research, such as end-users’ perceived convenience of not 
exercising care when downloading electronic files or not checking whether installed anti-virus 
software is updated (e.g., Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan 2015; Vance, Siponen & Pahnila 
2012). 
The second cognitive process evaluates two facets of the coping solution—response efficacy 
and response cost. Specifically, PMT postulates that people are motivated to adopt the 
recommended behaviour when they find the behaviour effective for mitigating the threat 
(Rogers 1975). In contrast, they may feel reluctant to adopt the behaviour if it appears too 
burdensome or has high response cost. In addition to evaluating the coping solution, PMT 
hypothesised that people also assess their own ability in completing the recommended task 
(i.e., self-efficacy) (Rogers 1975). In the context of behavioural InfoSec research, the coping 
solution appraisal usually refers to the organisation’s InfoSec policies or protective measures 
such as anti-virus software (e.g., Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan 2015; Herath & Rao 2009a; 
Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila 2014; Vance, Siponen & Pahnila 2012). 
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2.2.2.3 General deterrence theory 
GDT focuses on employees’ perceptions of the facets of organisational sanctions for InfoSec 
violations—certainty of detection and severity of the sanctions (Straub 1990). According to 
this theory, potential InfoSec perpetrators feel discouraged from committing InfoSec violations 
when they perceive that their malicious behaviours can be easily detected and the consequential 
sanction will be severe (Straub 1990). 
GDT has been applied by behavioural InfoSec researchers to predict both compliance and 
noncompliance (Lebek et al. 2014; Sommestad et al. 2014) and the theory has been further 
extended by other studies. For example, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) conducted a literature 
review on the research adopting GDT and proposed investigating additional variables such as 
virtual status, self-control, self-efficacy and moral beliefs. Guo and Yuan (2012) found that 
personal and workgroup sanctions, in addition to formal sanctions, impact employees’ 
intention to commit InfoSec violations. Researchers also adopted GDT to explain the 
motivations of desirable InfoSec behaviours. For example, Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 
(2010a) found that employees’ perception of sanctions increases perceived cost of 
noncompliance, increasing their favourable attitude towards compliance. GDT was also 
combined with PMT (Herath & Rao 2009a) and TPB (Herath & Rao 2009b) to predict 
employees’ intention to comply with InfoSec policies. 
2.2.3 Reflecting on the Literature and Generating Research Directions 
After reviewing the theories predominantly adopted in the behavioural InfoSec field (i.e., TPB, 
PMT and GDT) (Lebek et al. 2014; Sommestad et al. 2014; Warkentin & Mutchler 2014), I 
proceeded to identify these theories’ assumptions and problematise them before proposing an 
alternative perspective and new research directions. 
Ajzen (2011a) discusses that TPB has three underlying assumptions. First, the theory assumes 
that a person’s attitude towards a behaviour, perceived behavioural control and perceived social 
norms all feed into the person’s behavioural intention. The second assumption posits that 
people’s behavioural, normative and control beliefs are formed without much cognitive effort 
and in a biased fashion, because people often receive incomplete information for their decision-
making. The third assumption is about the theory’s theoretical sufficiency, or whether more 
predicting variables could be added to the existing model to further explain behavioural 
intention and actual behaviour. In this regard, Ajzen (2011a) explains that the theory was 
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explicitly left open for the inclusion of additional variables, but researchers are advised to 
carefully consider such inclusion. 
GDT assumes that potential violators need to be aware of sanctions before feeling discouraged 
to commit computer abuses (Straub 1990). D’Arcy and Herath (2011) state that GDT has 
another implicit assumption, that sanctions are perceived the same by all people, yet this 
assumption was disproved (D’Arcy, Hovav & Galletta 2009; D’Arcy & Hovav 2008). As for 
PMT, the theory assumes that people recognise an existing fear and evaluate the threat and 
coping solution before feeling motivated to perform a behaviour (Rogers 1975). 
TPB, PMT and GDT were predominantly adopted by behavioural InfoSec research, placing 
emphasis on the individual’s cognitive processes. The theories assume that people would 
evaluate their personal characteristics and the intended behaviour before arriving at a decision 
to take actions. Since people operate within their bounded rationality, there is a need to explore 
contingency variables that determine the decision-making process (Hu et al. 2011). Therefore, 
one way to contribute to the body of knowledge is by adopting new theoretical frameworks or 
extending current ones to identify additional variables which impact end-users’ InfoSec 
behaviours. 
The assumption focusing on individuals’ cognitive processes leads to another common 
methodological assumption shared among these theories. This methodological assumption 
treats individual respondents as the main unit of analysis and puts emphasis on these individual 
respondents’ unique characteristics such as perceptions and behaviours. Not only the studies 
adopting TPB, PMT and GDT follow this methodological assumption, but also those 
examining theories and frameworks less commonly adopted in the behavioural InfoSec field. 
For example, social control theory (Hirschi 1969) and rational choice theory (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010a; Paternoster & Simpson 1996) also focus on the internal 
cognitive processes which involve individuals’ evaluation of their attachment to the social 
context, or of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the actions to be taken. 
Similarly, studies about end-users’ perceptions of InfoSec policies’ characteristics, satisfaction, 
openness to change, perceived usefulness and other predictors (listed in Table 2.1) (Sommestad 
et al. 2014) appear to follow this methodological assumption. 
With their sole focus on the internal cognitive process and seeing individuals as the main unit 
of analysis, I contend that prior research has overlooked features of the individuals’ 
30 
surrounding context which could impact their perceptions and behaviours. In an organisational 
setting it is reasonable to expect that not every employee has the same level of access to 
resources and opportunities (Ibarra & Andrews 1993). This presents a situation similar to the 
concept of bounded rationality where employees develop different perceptions and decide to 
take actions based on limited information acquired from the sources they interact with. 
It is difficult to accurately investigate end-users’ various levels of interactions with each other 
and their access to InfoSec-related resources by following the assumption which emphasises 
individuals’ cognitive processes and by solely collecting data about their perceptions. For 
example, a person’s self-reported perception of their access to a large amount of InfoSec 
support may not be perceived as equally large by others. Likewise, individuals probably have 
varied exposure to the sanctions which deter their potential violations, especially in work 
environments where there are many opportunities to commit violations without being detected. 
Therefore, researchers cannot derive the characteristics and patterns of the workplace dynamics 
from such incomparable individuals’ perceptions. This limitation obscures the reasons why 
there are end-users whose InfoSec perceptions and behaviours are more favourably developed 
or less desirable than others. 
In line with the growing research interest in investigating the workplace’s impacts on end-
users’ InfoSec perceptions and behaviours, I propose an alternative perspective that places less 
emphasis on individuals’ characteristics and focuses on the InfoSec-related interactions 
between these individuals. My proposal presents a paradigm shift in the behavioural InfoSec 
field which moves researchers from individuals’ perspectives to understand what they think 
and perceive and why they act to a new position where researchers observe individuals as 
interrelated entities. 
To this end, I suggest the adoption of the SNA approach to study phenomena related to end-
users’ InfoSec perceptions and behaviours. The key feature of a SNA approach is that it treats 
the network ties, which often represent social interactions and relationships between people, as 
the main unit of analysis (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Hanneman & Riddle 2005; Otte 
& Rousseau 2002). SNA methods provide the analytical capabilities to investigate the 
structural patterns of the networks representing people’s interactions and to analyse effects of 
the network ties on individuals’ characteristics such as their perceptions or behaviours. 
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The technical details about the chosen SNA approach and its methods are elaborated on in 
Chapter 3. The history of the development of SNA and its applications are presented in Section 
2.4. The next section discusses the focal theoretical concepts of this research—InfoSec climate 
and its formation process. The SNA methods provide the analytical capabilities to investigate 
these concepts with a focus on the social interactions and work environment, in line with the 
problematisation’s outcomes. 
2.3 Overview of InfoSec Climate and its Formation Process 
The review of current trends in behavioural InfoSec research and the problematisation process 
suggested pursuing a new research direction which studies the impacts of the work environment 
on end-users’ InfoSec, through investigating via SNA methods the InfoSec-related interactions 
between these end-users. To this end, I choose to apply SNA methods to investigate the 
formation of an InfoSec climate or end-users’ perceptions of their organisation’s shared 
InfoSec practices (Lowry & Moody 2013). Specifically, these include end-users’ perceptions 
of the InfoSec behaviours performed by their colleagues and direct supervisors (Chan, Woon 
& Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
Despite its importance, InfoSec climate is an under-researched area in the behavioural InfoSec 
field, as shown by the modest number of studies on the concept (Lebek et al. 2014; Sommestad 
et al. 2014). InfoSec climate provides a perceptual measure which evaluates the priority of 
InfoSec in the workplace (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Lowry 
& Moody 2015) while representing the surfacing manifestation of the more abstract InfoSec 
culture (Kuenzi & Schminke 2009; Parsons et al. 2015). From the business perspective, 
evaluating InfoSec climate allows top management to determine whether their employees 
perceive InfoSec practices as an integral part of their workplace and to devise appropriate 
strategies for InfoSec management. 
2.3.1 Organisational Climate 
InfoSec climate is a specific type of organisational climate that comprises employees’ shared 
perceptions of salient organisational features such as policies, practices and procedures that 
provide cues about expected and rewarded behaviours in the workplace (Schneider, Ehrhart & 
Macey 2013). Organisational climate was labelled ‘one of the fuzziest concepts’ (Guion 1973, 
p. 121) as there were two schools of thought that defined this concept as referring to the 
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physical and objective attributes of an organisation or the organisation members’ psychological 
perceptions of what they observe at the workplace (James & Jones 1974). 
The study of organisational climate originated from the need to investigate how workplaces 
impact employees’ behaviours (Forehand & von Haller 1964). Forehand and von Haller (1964) 
provided an early definition of the concept as comprising the workplace’s stimuli and 
constraints that are recognised by employees. They proposed five dimensions of organisational 
climate—organisation’s size, structure of authority, organisation’s complexity, leadership 
patterns and goal directions (Forehand & von Haller 1964). Since its inception, the concept of 
organisational climate has grown in popularity due to its ‘undoubtedly important’ roles to the 
‘discovery and development of environmental factors at work that facilitate human well-being 
and productivity’ (Guion 1973, pp. 120–121). 
The literature review conducted by James and Jones (1974) identified three approaches to 
measuring organisational climate: 1) the multiple-organisational attribute, 2) perceptual 
measurement-organisational attribute and 3) perceptual measurement-individual attribute 
approaches. Of these, the first approach views organisational climate as being constituted by 
objective characteristics that distinguish one organisation from another (e.g., size, complexity 
and leadership style). In contrast, the latter two approaches see the nature of organisational 
climate as perceptual. They differ from each other; the perceptual measurement-organisational 
attribute approach regards organisational climate as an attribute of the organisation and focuses 
on the consensus among the perceivers. The perceptual measurement-individual attribute 
approach argues that the construct is personalistic and represented by individuals’ perceptions 
of the organisational characteristics that are important to them. James and Jones (1974) referred 
to the organisational climate conceptualised by the perceptual measurement-individual 
attribute approach as ‘psychological climate’ and found that this definition of organisational 
climate had been receiving more attention than the others. 
Schneider and Reichers (1983) considered the categorisation of different approaches to define 
organisation climate as an advance of climate research. They explained psychological climate 
as the individual’s perceptions of a work context, whereas organisational climate was the 
people’s summated perceptions. By reviewing studies, Schneider and Reichers (1983) noticed 
that organisational climates for different organisational aspects such as safety, innovation, 
service, performance and achievement were investigated. Since employees could be involved 
in thousands of relevant events indiscriminately of relevance at their workplace, they argued 
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that ‘to speak of organisational climate per se, without attaching a referent is meaningless’ (p. 
21). Therefore, Schneider and Reichers (1983) categorised organisational climates into 
‘climates for something’ or focused/molecular climates and generic/molar climate. Further, 
they advised climate researchers to be ‘very clear conceptually about the kinds of climates they 
wish to assess’ to overcome the generic nature of the climate concept and improve utility of 
the research through enhanced clarity (Schneider & Reichers 1983, p. 23). 
These discussions about the nature and content of organisational climates guided the theoretical 
definition of InfoSec climate in my research. I examine InfoSec climate as an employee’s 
perceptions of the important InfoSec practices that reflect the expected and rewarded InfoSec 
behaviours in the workplace, consistent with Schneider, Ehrhart and Macey’s (2013) definition 
of organisational climate. This definition is also consistent with those of other behavioural 
InfoSec studies (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013; 
Lowry & Moody 2013) discussed in the next section. Moreover, InfoSec climate is recognised 
as a facet-specific type of organisational climate rather than a generic one. On this basis, its 
formation process is assumed to follow the forming mechanisms of organisational climates as 
described elsewhere (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983). 
2.3.2 InfoSec Climate 
There are few studies that examine InfoSec climate perceptions. Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli 
(2005) and Jaafar and Ajis (2013) defined InfoSec climate as employees’ perceptions of the 
InfoSec state of their organisations, which can be derived from observing the InfoSec practices 
of top management, direct supervisors and peers. Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) defined InfoSec 
climate as the perceptual medium that explains the link between the objective characteristics 
of the workplace and employees’ InfoSec behaviours in the organisation. These definitions of 
InfoSec climate are similar since they are based on the concept of safety climate, even though 
Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) disagreed with Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) and Jaafar and 
Ajis (2013) in terms of conceptualising and measuring InfoSec climate. 
By comparing the similar nature, goals and practices of workplace safety and InfoSec, Chan, 
Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) adapted the dimensions of safety climate to measure InfoSec 
climate perception and its components. Specifically, they found employees’ socialisation with 
colleagues, and their observations of the InfoSec practices performed by top management and 
direct supervisors, all contribute to the perceived InfoSec climate. The measurement items used 
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to capture InfoSec climate included the perceived standard of the workplace’s InfoSec and how 
concerned employees believed their top management, direct supervisors and co-workers were 
about InfoSec. Only Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) explicitly separated employees’ 
observed workplace features (i.e., their level of socialisation with peers, observed InfoSec 
practices of top management and direct supervisors) from their climate perceptions (i.e., how 
concerned they believed their peers, top management and direct supervisors were about 
InfoSec). 
Jaafar and Ajis (2013) examined a theoretical model similar to the model in Chan, Woon and 
Kankanhalli’s (2005) study. However, Jaafar and Ajis (2013) posited employees’ perceptions 
of InfoSec behaviours performed by colleagues, direct supervisors and top management to have 
direct impacts on employees’ InfoSec compliance, rather than having these effects mediated 
by perceived InfoSec climate as postulated by Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005). 
Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) also adapted the dimensions of safety climate to conceptualise 
InfoSec climate. However, Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) did not separate employees’ perceptions 
of InfoSec behaviours of colleagues, direct supervisors and top management and their 
perceived InfoSec climate as done by Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005), and did not 
examine the direct impacts of those perceptions on employees’ InfoSec compliance as was 
done by Jaafar and Ajis (2013). Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) modelled InfoSec climate as a 
second-order construct which was formed by employees’ perceptions of top management’s 
attention to InfoSec, security enforcement, awareness program and policies. Goo, Yim and Kim 
(2014) did not include socialisation with colleagues as a component of their modelled InfoSec 
climate construct; InfoSec climate as a second-order construct was examined for its impacts on 
affective and normative commitments, security avoidance and compliance intention. 
2.3.3 The Formation of InfoSec Climate 
Schneider and Reichers (1983) identified three perspectives which explain how organisational 
climates can be formed—structuralist, selection-attraction-attrition and interactionist 
perspectives. While the structuralist and selection-attraction-attrition perspectives respectively 
focus on the objective characteristics of the organisation and the arriving of employees with 
similar attributes at a common workplace that give rise to organisational climates, the 
interactionist perspective offers a blended explanation for the emergence of organisational 
climates (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983). Specifically, the interactionist 
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perspective posits that perceived climates emerge as a result of employees’ efforts to 
understand the workplace and their roles (Ashforth 1985). The interactionist’s explanation of 
the formation of organisational climates (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983) was 
supported by recent climate studies including those that focus on safety climate (e.g., 
Schneider, Ehrhart & Macey 2013; Zohar 2010) which InfoSec climate was originally 
modelled after (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014). 
The interactionist perspective draws on symbolic interactionism (Sandstrom, Martin & Fine 
2014) which explains that meanings are socially constructed by individuals’ interactions and 
negotiations (Ashforth 1985; Weick 1995). On this basis, organisational climates do not differ 
across workplaces because of their different objective characteristics (as explained by the 
structuralist perspective) or because of the different compositions of similar members (as 
explained by the selection-attraction-attrition perspective), but by the unique meanings of the 
workplaces constructed by the members (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983). This 
perspective also explains the learning process used by newcomers to blend into the new 
environment and contribute to its climate by learning the organisation’s logistics, role 
expectations, tacit norms, power structures, policies and so forth (Ashforth 1985; Morrison 
1993). This process, which includes employees’ social interactions, observation, reactions and 
establishment of their social roles in the environment, is referred to as socialisation (Ashforth 
1985). 
Ashforth (1985) further elaborated on the contributing role of employees’ socialisation to the 
formation of organisational climates by highlighting the roles of informational and normative 
influences. Employees respond to their constant need to evaluate their skills and beliefs by 
comparing themselves with colleagues who are similar, valued and accessible. Such 
comparisons facilitate the social influence which provides information to help individuals 
understand and predict events in the work environment (i.e., informational influence) which in 
turn contributes to the development of a shared climate (Ashforth 1985). Conversely, 
normative influence refers to the social influence that contributes specifically to the 
institutionalisation of organisational climates by relying on tacit norms and affect (Ashforth 
1985). 
Studies on InfoSec climate research is scarce (Lebek et al. 2014; Padayachee 2012; Sommestad 
et al. 2014) with only three studies at present (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & 
Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). The conceptualisation or dimensions of InfoSec climate are 
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not consistent across these studies either. My research will, therefore, measure InfoSec climate 
on two dimensions—the InfoSec practices performed by an individual’s colleagues and their 
direct supervisors. There are two reasons for this decision. First, these dimensions were 
included in all three identified InfoSec climate studies (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, 
Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). Second, the work practices of colleagues and direct 
supervisors as salient features of the workplace have been consistently used to measure 
perception of safety climate (Clarke 2006; Flin et al. 2000, 2006; Guldenmund 2000; O’Connor 
et al. 2011; Zohar 2014), on which InfoSec climate was modelled. The measurement of InfoSec 
climate and the theoretical model explaining its formation are discussed in Chapter 6. 
2.3.4 InfoSec Climate and InfoSec Culture 
The distinction between organisational climate and culture as theoretical constructs was 
regarded as a confusion and topic of debate (Denison 1996; Moran & Wolkwein 1992). 
Schneider (1987) argued that climate and culture were complimentary topics, of which the 
former reflected organisational practices such as reward, support and expectations, while the 
latter referred to the underlying assumptions and values held by employees. Moran and 
Wolkwein (1992) described the relationship between climate and culture as two distinctive 
concepts in detail. Specifically, they defined organisational culture as consisting of three levels 
ranging from ‘creations’, i.e., organisational rites and rituals, ‘values’, i.e., equity and respect 
for individuals, to the highest level which was ‘basic assumptions’, i.e., the ideologies and 
philosophies of the organisation. Organisational climate, as represented by the visible level of 
supportiveness, achievement orientation or autonomy, operates in between the first and second 
levels of culture, i.e., ‘creations’ and ‘values’ (Moran & Wolkwein 1992).  
Moran and Wolkwein's (1992) definition of organisational culture is similar to that provided 
by Schein's (2010) organisational culture model, which also consists of three levels: (1) 
artefacts, (2) espoused beliefs and values and (3) underlying assumptions. The artefacts level 
concerns the visible features of the work environment, including its technology, office layout 
and behaviour patterns, which can be easily observed but provide little information about the 
reasons behind group behaviours (Schein 2010). The next level of organisational culture 
contains espoused beliefs and values, which can be the organisation’s strategies, goals and 
philosophies; the underlying assumptions, as part of the highest level of culture, are the ultimate 
source of values and actions, including unconscious perceptions, thoughts and feelings (Schein 
2010). Moreover, Schein (2010) defined organisational climate as being comprised of the 
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visible behaviours performed by organisational members, which operates as an artefact of a 
deeper cultural level. 
More recent research focusing on facet-specific organisational climates acknowledged the 
distinctive features of climate and culture as discussed above (Glisson 2007; Kuenzi & 
Schminke 2009; Patterson et al. 2005; Schneider et al. 2013; Sopow 2006). For example, Flin 
et al. (2000) and Zohar (2013) regarded safety climate as the surface measures of safety culture, 
including the employees’ attitudes and perceptions that indicate the values and beliefs about 
organisational safety. On the other hand, although literature reviews in the behavioural InfoSec 
field have recognised the existence of studies on InfoSec culture and InfoSec climate (Karlsson, 
Åström & Karlsson 2015; Padayachee 2012; Sommestad et al. 2014), there is little research to 
clarify the difference between these concepts. Of these few studies, Parsons et al. (2010) noted 
that InfoSec climate and InfoSec culture have many overlapping features while citing 
Schneider’s description of climate as being the manifestation of culture that exists at a higher 
level of abstraction (Schneider 1987). 
The concept of InfoSec culture emerged as part of the Third Wave of InfoSec research that 
focused on the institutional aspects of organisational InfoSec (von Solms 2000). By adapting 
Schei n’s (2010) organisational culture model, behavioural InfoSec researchers have analysed 
InfoSec culture at three levels, namely artefacts, espoused values and shared tacit assumptions 
(Alhogail 2015; Furnell & Thomson 2009; Thomson et al. 2006; van Niekerk & von Solms 
2010). van Niekerk and von Solms (2010) further proposed InfoSec-related knowledge as a 
separate fourth level of InfoSec culture thereby highlighting its critical impact on InfoSec 
culture, rather than including knowledge as part of the other three levels. Additionally, 
researchers have proposed alternative conceptualisations of InfoSec culture, such as by 
adapting the organisational culture framework proposed by (Detert, Schroeder & Mauriel 
2000). Based on this framework, Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver (2002) and Ruighaver, Maynard 
& Chang (2007) developed the organisational security culture model which consisted of eight 
dimensions: (1) the basis of truth and rationality, (2) the nature of time and time horizon, (3) 
motivation, (4) stability versus change/innovation/personal growth, (5) orientation to work, 
task, co-workers, (6) isolation versus collaboration/cooperation, (7) control, coordination and 
responsibility and (8) orientation and focus–internal and/or external. 
Ruighaver et al. (2007) discussed in detail each of those eight dimensions of InfoSec culture in 
their research. In brief, these dimensions, in their order of appearance, refer to: (1) how the 
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organisation evaluates InfoSec, (2) the short- and long-term InfoSec strategies, (3) employees’ 
motivation to perform InfoSec behaviours, (4) the organisation’s tolerance for InfoSec-related 
changes, (5) InfoSec training and infrastructures, (6) InfoSec governance and collaborative 
processes, (7) level of InfoSec controls and (8) the organisation’s considerations of internal 
and/or external factors when managing InfoSec. Compared to the three-level conceptualisation 
of InfoSec culture that follows Schein’s (2010) model, Ruighaver et al.’s (2007) organisational 
security culture model provides a more detailed description of InfoSec culture, which enables 
a qualitative assessment of InfoSec culture. Further, da Veiga and Eloff (2010) proposed 
another conceptualisation of InfoSec culture adapted from Schein’s (2010) work, and they 
examined each level of culture at three tiers, namely organisational, group and individual. For 
instance, they posit that InfoSec-related components and activities at the organisational tier 
such as strategy, governance and risk management can affect the InfoSec culture’s artefacts, 
values and assumptions at the organisational tier. By examining the three levels of InfoSec 
culture at three tiers, da Veiga and Eloff (2010) developed a quantitative survey to measure 
and analyse InfoSec culture. 
The literature reviewed in this section suggests that InfoSec climate is as an overlapping part 
of InfoSec culture. Consistent with Schein’s (2010) organisational culture model, InfoSec 
climate, which is comprised of the observable InfoSec-related socialisation among employees 
in the workplace (Chan et al. 2005), can be argued to represent the visible artefacts level of 
InfoSec culture. This InfoSec-related socialisation also reflects several dimensions of InfoSec 
culture, as defined by Ruighaver et al.’s (2007) organisational security culture model. These 
are the dimensions of (5) orientation to work, task, co-workers, (6) isolation versus 
collaboration/cooperation and (7) control, coordination and responsibility. For example, the 
increased InfoSec-related socialisation would indicate a heightened level of the employees’ 
InfoSec awareness, an organisation’s orientation that favours InfoSec collaboration and shared 
decision making about InfoSec-related matters. With regard to organisational climate’s 
implications in practice, Moran and Wolkwein (1992) discussed that practitioners can make 
immediate changes in the work environment, e.g., changes in key staff, that quickly affect the 
organisation’s climate but not its culture. Likewise, Denison (1996) argued that organisational 
climate is temporal and subject to the direct manipulation of influential individuals, whereas 
culture is rooted in history and sufficiently complex to resist such manipulation. As a result, 
influencing the InfoSec climate in TTT, through improving the employees’ sharing of InfoSec 
support and stimulating InfoSec-related discussions, and evaluating the changes in the InfoSec 
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climate are achievable within the short timeframe of this thesis. Provided the close link between 
organisational climate and culture (Parsons et al. 2010; Schein 2010), improving the InfoSec 
climate at TTT contributes to shaping a positive InfoSec culture in the future as well.  
2.4 Applying SNA Methods to Study Organisational Phenomena 
While SNA methods have been adopted in earnest in social sciences (Borgatti & Foster 2003; 
Otte & Rousseau 2002) adoption has been extremely modest in the behavioural InfoSec field. 
A search for behavioural InfoSec studies that adopted SNA methods was conducted in 
scholarly search engines and databases (i.e., Google Scholar, Scopus, IEEE Xplore and 
ScienceDirect) by using the following keywords: 
• ‘social network analysis’ and ‘security behaviour’ or ‘security behavior’ 
• ‘social network analysis’ and ‘security perception’ 
• ‘social network analysis’ and ‘security compliance’ 
The searches returned only two relevant studies; one was a conceptual research-in-progress 
(Yoo & Sanders 2013) and the other a Master’s thesis which presented the idea of using SNA 
to diffuse InfoSec awareness (Corona 2008). 
2.4.1 The Development of SNA 
SNA as a research approach is defined by four key features: 1) the focus on ties that link social 
actors, 2) the use of systematic empirical data, 3) graphic imagery and 4) mathematical models 
(Freeman 2004). The history of development of the SNA approach has complicated origins 
(Scott 2011). The Development of Social Network Analysis by Freeman (2004) provides a full 
and comprehensive chronicle about the development of SNA. 
The view of social life as a structure that consists of ties connecting actors has implicitly been 
recognised for some time. Auguste Comte proposed clearly in 1853 an explicit definition of 
society as being composed of social interconnections and individuals (Freeman 2004). Various 
German sociologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century embraced Comte’s 
structural perspective. Simmel (1908/2011, p. 23) explained that ‘society exists where a 
number of individuals enter into interactions’ which formally established the foundation for 
SNA (Freeman 2004). In particular, Simmel (1908/2011, pp. 24–25) wrote, 
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A collection of human beings does not become a society because each of them has an 
objectively determined or subjectively impelling life-content. It becomes a society 
only when the vitality of these contents attains a form of reciprocal influence; only 
when one individual has an effect, immediate or mediate upon another, is mere spatial 
aggregation or temporal succession transformed into society. If, therefore, there is to 
be a science whose subject matter is society and nothing else, it must exclusively 
investigate these interactions, these kinds and forms of sociation. 
Another foundational contribution was the development of the sociometry approach in the 
1930s, developed by Moreno, Jennings and Lazarsfeld (Freeman 2004). The sociometry 
approach introduced the idea of studying social structures as lines and points and in this way 
specifically aimed at studying organised groups and the position of group members (Moreno 
1934). The sociometry approach integrated the four key features of SNA (which had previously 
been used separately) and further advanced the SNA field (Freeman 2004). 
Simultaneously, American researchers Warner and Mayo at Harvard University also 
investigated network concepts by conducting the famous ‘Yankee City’ (Warner & Lunt 1941) 
and bank wiring room studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939). By analysing the systematic 
data about interactions and visualisation of the networks they found numerous ‘clique’ 
structures (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939; Warner & Lunt 1941). Compared to the sociometry 
approach (Moreno 1934) the only missing SNA feature from these studies was the 
mathematical model (Freeman 2004). 
Several studies continued to advance key network concepts and shape the modern SNA field. 
This includes work about social cliques (Luce & Perry 1949), structural balance (Cartwright & 
Harary 1956) and the applications of graph theory in analysing networks (Frank, Norman & 
Cartwright 1965). From 1950, there were a number of social network studies (Barnes 1954; 
Bott 1955; Mitchell 1969) which focused on uniting the separate research traditions and 
developing a formal methodology for SNA (Scott 2011). The field rapidly expanded in the late 
1970s (Scott 2011). 
2.4.2 SNA and Organisational Research 
The use of SNA methods for investigating organisational phenomena, such as those related to 
employees’ InfoSec perceptions and practices, is of importance to this research. To this end, 
Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun (1979) proposed a research agenda to use SNA methods to study 
relationships within and between organisations that would shed light on the changes in 
organisational structures and individuals’ leadership behaviour. Fombrun (1982) suggested that 
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researchers may employ three strategies to analyse organisational networks: 1) the nodal 
strategy that studies how individuals’ power, innovation, or job satisfaction is affected by their 
network position, 2) the dyadic strategy that studies quality of relationships or relationship 
changes and 3) the triadic strategy that studies organisation design and evolution. 
Borgatti and Foster (2003) categorised organisational network studies into four types which 
focus on 1) structural capital, 2) resource access, 3) convergence and 4) contagion (i.e., the 
creation of shared perceptions by interactions). Structural capital research aims at determining 
the benefits that an actor or a group receives from their network position or from having a 
personal network within a specific structure. The resource access type of research seeks to 
understand actors’ success in a network, but puts more emphasis on the flows of resources than 
on the network typology. Convergence studies rely on the concepts of centrality and structural 
equivalence to explain the commonalities between similar network environments. Contagion 
researches aims at explaining how shared perceptions and behaviours are shaped through 
interactions. 
Carpenter, Li and Jiang (2012) proposed another categorisation of organisational network 
research which covers social capital and network development research at the interpersonal and 
interorganisational levels. Social capital research focuses on understanding the effects of 
networks, such as centrality indices and network structures on the individual or organisation, 
while network development research examines the networks’ structural patterns and evolution 
of network structures. They also posited that for each of these network research types, the 
networks’ characteristics can be studied as a predicted variable or predictor. 
In addition to generating theoretical understanding about networks in the organisational 
context, SNA has been widely applied as part of the interventionists’ toolkit to design, facilitate 
and evaluate change programs (Cross et al. 2006; Cross, Parker & Borgatti 2002; Hatala 2006; 
Valente et al. 2015). For example, prior studies have applied SNA methods to implement 
interventions that improved knowledge exchange and information sharing (Cross, Parker & 
Borgatti 2002; Hatala & Lutta 2009; Parise 2007), developed communities of practice (Cross 
et al. 2006) and facilitated changes in workplaces’ cultural values (Johnson-Cramer, Parise & 
Cross 2007). This research approach focusing on the use of SNA methods for conducting 
interventions also resulted in methodological contributions including the strategies (Valente 
2012; Valente & Davis 1999; Valente & Pumpuang 2007) and metrics for network 
interventions (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013). 
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2.4.3 Adopting SNA Methods to Investigate Formation of an InfoSec Climate 
My research objective, investigating the formation of InfoSec climate, falls into the contagion 
or social capital category of network research (Borgatti & Foster 2003; Carpenter, Li & Jiang 
2012). Employees’ perceptions of an InfoSec climate can be shaped through their socialisation 
within the workgroup, especially by the normative and informative types of social influence 
(Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Schneider & Reichers 1983). By adopting 
the network perspective, I can conceptualise employees’ socialisation as network ties which 
transmit social influence from one employee to another. Moreover, the effects of these ties 
representing social influence on employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate as nodal 
characteristics can be examined by inferential SNA methods. The SNA approach to design and 
monitor network-based interventions are especially useful for supporting the collaborating 
industry partner in my research to achieve their business objective which aimed at improving 
their organisation’s InfoSec environment. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed the InfoSec research literature, with my research focusing on the 
dimension that concerns end-users’ InfoSec behaviours and perceptions. The literature review 
presented how this dimension has grown in both importance and complexity to the extent that 
it emerged into a research subfield called behavioural InfoSec research. The review continued 
to explore contributions to this field, with many recent studies found to focus on exploring the 
workplace’s impacts on end-users’ InfoSec behaviours and perceptions. 
Motivated to arrive at a new research direction, I applied the problematisation approach to 
examine the assumptions of the theories predominantly adopted in the behavioural InfoSec 
field. I found that the extant behavioural InfoSec literature had focused on individuals’ unique 
cognitive processes and overlooked the interactions between individuals. Consequently, I 
proposed to adopt SNA methods to investigate such interactions and their impacts on end-
users’ InfoSec-related characteristics, aligned with recent research focusing on the InfoSec 
workplace’s effects. 
Among the concepts related to end-users’ InfoSec behaviours and perceptions I chose to 
investigate the formation of an InfoSec climate. Despite its practical importance, InfoSec 
climate is an under-researched concept in the behavioural InfoSec field which describes the 
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priority of InfoSec in a workplace and motivates end-users’ InfoSec compliance. Moreover, 
the formation of an InfoSec climate involves end-users’ socialisation as network ties which 
offers the ideal opportunity to apply SNA methods and examine the unexplored applications 
of these SNA methods in the behavioural InfoSec field. The remainder of the chapter, therefore, 
focused on the concept of InfoSec climate, SNA methods and how they fit together. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methods 
This chapter discusses the research design of my thesis. The chapter begins with a description 
of the selection process for a suitable research approach, identifying action research (AR) as 
the most suitable approach for this thesis. Next, the characteristics of the AR approach, 
especially its various forms, are discussed. The canonical action research (CAR) approach was 
selected because it has important features for achieving both the business and scholarly 
objectives of this research. The chapter then elaborates on the CAR approach, as well as the 
strategies and criteria for achieving CAR rigour and concludes by discussing features of SNA 
as the primary research method of my thesis and providing an overview over my CAR project. 
The structure of this chapter is summarised in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Structure of Chapter 3 
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3.1 Selecting a Suitable Research Approach 
There are numerous research designs and methods that a researcher can potentially apply to 
analyse the formation of an InfoSec climate and to explore the applications of SNA methods 
in behavioural InfoSec research. One approach to understanding the formation of an InfoSec 
climate is to identify the factors that impact employees’ perceptions of an InfoSec climate 
either quantitatively or qualitatively. Quantitative techniques such as structural equation 
modelling (Byrne 2010; Kline 2011) can be employed to evaluate the effects of theoretically 
grounded factors on an InfoSec climate. This approach is similar to those applied by prior 
InfoSec climate studies (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & 
Ajis 2013). Identifying the factors that impact the perceptions of an InfoSec climate explains 
how an InfoSec climate is formed. 
Common qualitative approaches to understand the formation of an InfoSec climate include case 
study or grounded theory approaches. A thoroughly executed explanatory case study based on 
one or multiple workplaces, where the existence of an InfoSec climate is predominant, can 
produce lessons learned about the best practices and mechanisms that give rise to an InfoSec 
climate. The case study approach can be employed to effectively investigate complex social 
phenomena and result in the development of new theories (Dubé & Paré 2003; Eisenhardt 
1989; Gerring 2004). Similarly, researchers adopting a grounded theory approach follow a 
systematic process of discovering and verifying theoretical concepts from which they can 
develop a ‘thorough theoretical explanation of social phenomena under study’ (Corbin & 
Strauss 1990, p. 5). Such a theory development process can identify the mechanisms, processes 
and factors related to the formation of an InfoSec climate. 
Understanding the formation of an InfoSec climate ideally requires a longitudinal research 
design which evaluates the changes of the InfoSec climate from one stage to another then 
determines the factors and mechanisms underlying that forming process. While the mentioned 
research approaches can be designed as a longitudinal study and accommodate the elements of 
SNA methods to explore these methods’ applications, undertaking any of these approaches will 
position the researcher away from the studied phenomenon as an external observer—the 
researcher will barely be able to deeply investigate the formation of the InfoSec climate. 
A significant aspect considered for this research was the fact that the approached industry 
partner, TTT (who granted full access to the company to conduct research), had never 
47 
implemented InfoSec improvements before. As a result, there was barely an InfoSec climate in 
their workplace to examine. The option to seek another organisation with a more mature 
InfoSec climate was considered, but organisations that had achieved InfoSec maturity may not 
have detailed memories of the past development of their InfoSec climate. I found an excellent 
opportunity to collaborate with TTT and enhance their InfoSec climate by using SNA methods, 
and to explore the formation of an InfoSec climate from the perspective of an insider who 
monitors that forming process. Performing AR would allow me to be directly involved in the 
longitudinal transformation of the InfoSec climate at TTT and to understand the critical 
mechanisms associated with the formation of an InfoSec climate. Therefore, I opted for TTT 
as collaboration partner and an AR approach as most suitable. 
3.2 The Action Research Approach 
AR in social psychology originated from the development of action-based research in the 1940s 
(Baskerville 1999; Baskerville & Myers 2004; Bradbury-Huang 2010; Wallace 1998). After 
World War II, scientists collaborated with therapists in research projects that developed therapy 
for social illnesses by intervening in the patient’s being or surroundings (Baskerville & Myers 
2004). AR focuses on studying complex social processes by introducing changes and observing 
their effects from which solutions to practical problems and scientific knowledge can be 
achieved (Baskerville 1999; Baskerville & Myers 2004). Despite previous scepticism of the 
scientific nature of AR, this research approach has received acceptance in the academic 
community (Goldkuhl 2012a). 
3.2.1 Action Research in Information Systems and InfoSec Fields 
AR plays a crucial role in information systems research. Some of its key contributions include 
the soft systems methodology (Checkland 1988) and the ETHICS approach (Mumford 1995) 
to information systems development (Avison et al. 1999). Bradbury-Huang (2010) argued that 
AR has even greater merits than some qualitative methods by conducting research with 
practitioners rather than about practice, especially since the outcomes concerning practice are 
‘not something that practitioners can or even wish to make practical use of’ (p. 94). Another 
benefit of the AR approach is the enhancement of competencies and knowledge of all involved 
stakeholders (i.e., the researchers and practitioners) as a result of the collaborative work 
(Baskerville 1999). Considering the business objective of TTT to improve their InfoSec 
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environment and the scholarly motivation for this research, the adoption of an AR approach 
was expected to produce the most benefits. 
AR has previously been adopted by studies in the behavioural InfoSec field and produced 
important findings. GDT, which explains why employees refrain from violating InfoSec policy 
as they realise organisational sanctions for InfoSec violations, was an outcome of the AR 
conducted by Straub (1990). More recent AR in the behavioural InfoSec field includes 
Puhakainen and Siponen’s (2010) research which developed and evaluated an InfoSec training 
design based on pedagogical theories, and Tsohou et al.’s (2013) study which examined the 
introduction of InfoSec awareness programs in an organisational context. 
3.2.2 Epistemological Foundation of Action Research 
AR embraces the notion that knowledge is socially constructed via interventions and 
interactions with the research participants (Baskerville 1999; Baskerville & Wood-Harper 
1998; Coughlan & Coughlan 2002; Wallace 1998). Klein and Myers (1999) argued that 
different forms of AR may accept the assumptions of various philosophical frameworks. 
Baskerville (1999) discussed that AR requires adoption of an interpretivist’s perspective during 
an intervention as the researchers rely on their own observations, personal values and prior 
knowledge to design and conduct the intervention. Further, Baskerville (1999) recommended 
that researchers should take into account the social values of the participants and their 
perceived meanings of the interventions to make the investigation meaningful. This 
incorporation of the researchers’ observations into the design and implementation of the 
interventions, which subsequently influence the research outcomes, represents the adoption of 
an interpretive approach in AR (Baskerville 1999). 
AR is rooted in pragmatism (Baskerville & Myers 2004; Goldkuhl 2012b; Heikkinen et al. 
2012; Jarvinen 2007; Oquist 1978; Reason 2006) due to the core nature of AR which aims to 
make useful changes in the reality of the participants while contributing new knowledge to 
theories, corresponding with pragmatism’s union of theory and practice. The pragmatist 
epistemology posits that knowledge arises from human actions while knowing something 
requires value-directed and purposive change (Oquist 1978). As such, AR requires 
implementation of problem-based interventions and study of the consequences as knowledge, 
thus bridging the relationship between knowledge and action (Oquist 1978). Accordingly, I 
acknowledge pragmatism as the epistemological foundation of AR in this thesis. 
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3.2.3 Core Characteristics of Action Research 
In addition to the discussed benefits, the AR approach has caveats and core characteristics that 
researchers need to be aware of. Baskerville (1999) noted the four characteristics of AR as 1) 
aims at understanding an immediate and complex social situation, 2) simultaneously supports 
problem solving and extends scientific knowledge with the researcher introducing an 
intervention, 3) is performed collaboratively and improves competencies of all actors and 4) is 
primarily applicable for understanding change processes in social systems. The involvement of 
actions and the collaboration with practitioners distinguish AR from other research approaches 
(Bradbury-Huang 2010). 
Goldkuhl (2012a) cautioned that the active engagement with practitioners to jointly solve 
practical problems in AR may result in consulting work which can jeopardise the goal to 
generate scientific knowledge. This risk requires researchers to follow certain tenets to avoid 
such mistake—maintaining a balanced motivation and commitment to both producing 
scientific knowledge and making practical changes through iterative experiments (Hult & 
Lennung 1980) and fostering collaboration and deliver theory-based solutions (Baskerville 
1999; Baskerville & Myers 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Solely interviewing or 
observing the social phenomena without the insights associated with iterative actions does not 
warrant an AR project (Avison et al. 1999). 
My collaborative AR project with TTT to enhance their InfoSec environment posed a challenge 
as it involved multiple stakeholders—top management, department managers and operational 
staff across different departments. Further, it was TTT’s first experience of implementing an 
InfoSec change program and top management had great expectations for the program’s 
outcomes. The change program had to be effective, efficient and feasible within the limited 
resources and time frame of a PhD candidature. These factors indicate the presence of a 
problem requiring investigation and solution. Further, as a PhD candidate I was motivated by 
the scholarly goal to produce knowledge addressing the identified theoretical gaps rather than 
the solely business-orientated objective of solving TTT’s InfoSec problem. This demanded a 
carefully planned approach, reinforcing AR as appropriate for the project. 
3.2.4 Forms of Action Research 
There are many forms of AR that could be employed for this project. Baskerville and Wood-
Harper (1998) identified 10 forms of AR categorised based on four criteria—the type of the 
50 
process model, the structure’s nature, the researcher’s involvement and the primary goals of 
the AR. These AR forms are summarised in Table 3.1 and are elaborated on to justify the 
selection of the appropriate approach for this project. 
The process models specify how AR should be conducted. The iterative and reflective models 
follow cyclical processes while the linear model emphasises sequential actions (Baskerville & 
Wood-Harper 1998). Baskerville and Wood-Harper (1998) argued that the distinction between 
the first two process models (i.e., the iterative and reflective models) is that the first model 
focuses more on diagnosing practical problems, whereas the second model aims to discover 
the differences between the theory followed by the researcher (i.e., the espoused theory) and 
the theory that emerges from actions (i.e., the theory-in-use). The linear process model puts 
less emphasis on diagnosing problems and may best be used for solving problems that are 
clearly identified (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998).  
The types of structure guide how AR actions should be carried out. In the rigorous structure 
research actions are executed in an orderly manner which follows a sequential or cyclical 
process (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998). In the fluid structure research actions are loosely 
defined and performed (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998). 
Three distinguished forms of researcher involvement indicate the roles of the researcher in an 
AR project. While collaborative work between the researcher and practitioner is the 
predominant form, the facilitative and experiment forms set distinctive roles for the researcher 
and practitioner. The facilitator-researcher is only expected to provide expert advice, while the 
practitioner is responsible for determining the interventions and vice versa in experimental AR 
projects (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998). 
Finally, AR projects must consider their primary goals to select the appropriate AR form that 
targets their goals. As shown in Table 3.1, goals can be oriented towards organisational 
development, contributing to system design, prioritising the production of scientific knowledge 
or simply conducting a training. 
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Table 3.1. Action Research Forms 
 Process model  Structure  Typical involvement  Primary goals 
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 ●  
 
X  X  
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●    
Adopted from Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998, p. 96. 
Key: ● signifies a dominant characteristic, + signifies characteristics that will dominate in different studies, X signifies characteristics that may occur together in the same study. 
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3.2.5 Selecting the Appropriate Action Research Form 
The primary objectives of the AR project in this thesis were producing scientific knowledge 
about the formation of an InfoSec climate, exploring the application of SNA methods in the 
behavioural InfoSec field and assisting TTT in improving their InfoSec environment. With 
these objectives in mind, AR forms which do not prioritise both producing scholarly knowledge 
and supporting organisational development were identified as inappropriate for this project. 
These inappropriate AR forms were participant observation and process consultation. 
Similarly, the information systems prototyping, action learning and multiview forms solely 
focus on a single objective (i.e., system design or training) while disregarding the goal of 
producing scientific knowledge. Consequently, these AR forms were considered unsuitable for 
the AR project with TTT. 
Since intervening in employees’ InfoSec knowledge and InfoSec climate in the workplace 
could drastically impact business operations, the top management at TTT preferred making 
informed decisions after theoretical and pragmatic considerations were thoroughly discussed. 
I agreed that maintaining a collaborative relationship between the researcher and TTT’s top 
management was prudent and would remove potential bias in planning and executing research 
actions. 
The CAR form, which prioritises fostering a balanced collaboration between the involved 
stakeholders, satisfied these requirements of the envisioned AR project. The canonical form 
offered an iterative structure to ensure that the research actions were systematically carried out 
and it provided researchers with opportunities throughout the iterative cycles to reflect on and 
refine the actions during the research. Consequently, the canonical form was chosen as the most 
appropriate AR form for this project. 
3.3 Canonical Action Research Design 
This research project follows the four core characteristics of CAR: 1) an iterative process model 
and 2) a rigorous AR structure, which focuses on 3) active collaboration between the researcher 
and the industry partner (i.e., TTT) with the joint aim to conduct an InfoSec change program 
contributing to 4) organisational development and the production of scientific knowledge as 
primary objectives (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998; Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). In 
addition to the four characteristics of CAR, a researcher–client agreement (RCA) (alternatively 
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called client–system infrastructure) is a key component for a CAR project (Baskerville 1999; 
Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). 
3.3.1 Research Environment and Control Structure 
A RCA is the foundation of any AR project. The RCA outlines the agreed roles of the 
researcher and the industry partner and establishes the research environment (Baskerville 1999; 
Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). The RCA helps the involved stakeholders set their 
responsibilities and expectations which subsequently indicate the entry and exit of the 
researcher and legitimise further research actions if needed (Baskerville 1999). 
An RCA for this project, which detailed the responsibilities and anticipated outcomes of the 
CAR project, was signed by me as the researcher and by the General Director of TTT (see 
Appendix A). The agreement stated the researcher’s intention to anonymously publish the 
lessons learned from the AR project in the form of scholarly literature and the industry partner’s 
explicit commitment to support the project (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). The 
agreement confirmed the researcher’s and the collaborating partner’s acknowledgement of the 
scholarly objective to generate academic knowledge and the business objective to practically 
improve the organisational situation. As a result, the agreement prevented conflicts of interest 
and distinguished the AR project from consulting work (Baskerville 1999; Davison, 
Martinsons & Kock 2004). 
In addition to the RCA, Avison, Baskerville and Myers (2001) recommended considering the 
three aspects of project initiation, determination of authority and degree of formalisation to 
maintain AR rigour and ethical actions. An AR project may be initiated by the researcher’s 
need to investigate a theoretical problem and search for a research setting for that purpose (i.e., 
research-driven) or by the industry partner who confronts a problem that needs to be solved 
(i.e., problem-driven) (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001). This project was originally 
initiated by my scholarly motivation to investigate the formation of an InfoSec climate and 
TTT was approached as a host organisation which allowed the investigation. Before my 
approach and presentation of the research proposal to TTT the objective to enhance the InfoSec 
environment, albeit deemed later as critical by TTT’s top management, was not considered an 
utmost concern of company or requiring urgent assistance from an external party. Therefore, 
this AR project’s initiation is considered as research-driven. 
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The authority of an AR project determines the action warrants (i.e., determining the 
stakeholders who are authorised to execute the interventions) and the processes to negotiate or 
cancel the AR project (i.e., who are authorised to terminate the project) (Avison, Baskerville 
& Myers 2001). This authority can be classified into client domination, identity domination 
and staged domination (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001). Client domination does not grant 
the researcher the authority to implement research actions without the approval of the client. 
Identity domination refers to AR projects where one or more of the researchers are members 
of the client’s organisation which provides the research team the authority to design and 
execute research actions.  
The authority’s pattern of this CAR project is staged domination—power domination flexibly 
migrates between the researcher and the collaborating industry partner as the project progresses 
(Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001). At the beginning of the project I had the authority to 
propose the appropriate approach for the InfoSec change program that satisfied my scholarly 
motivation and resulted in the adoption of SNA methods throughout the course of the CAR. 
As the project progressed to the next stage where specific implementation methods were 
selected, the industry partner and I had balanced action warrants. To specifically define the 
power structure of this CAR project, a project team was established to carry out the 
implementation of the InfoSec change program. The leaders of the project team consisted of 
the Vice Director of the business solutions provider (BSP) department at TTT and myself as 
the researcher. Additionally, the General Director was granted the highest authority, including 
the right to terminate the project upon negotiation with me. 
The degree of formalisation of an AR project may be formal, informal or evolved. The first 
structure requires written agreements which provide descriptions such as problem situation, the 
scope of the AR project and the team composition (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001). 
Informal control structures for AR do not have written agreements and there may be little 
shared understanding between the involved stakeholders about the project’s scope and issues. 
In AR projects with an evolved structure there are changes in terms of the project’s degree of 
formalisation as the situation develops. In some cases the formal agreements can also be signed 
by the researchers and the research clients on the basis of ‘do not worry about this it is just 
formality’ (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001, p. 36). 
Except for the signed RCA and the oral presentations that were conducted in the milestone 
meetings at the end of stages to report outcomes, most agreements and discussions between 
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TTT and myself were not formally documented throughout the CAR project. The Vice Director 
of the BSP department and I, and occasionally top management, discussed the research actions 
for each stage and kept emails as meeting records which detailed our agreements on the actions. 
On this basis this CAR project’s degree of formalisation was informal or semi-formal. 
3.3.2 Active Collaboration 
The canonical form of AR prescribes the type of involvement as collaborative—the researcher 
and the collaborating industry partner make equally important contributions to the AR project 
(Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). In this project, the project team met with top management 
in the milestone meetings at the end of the stages during which the research outcomes were 
reported and discussed. The project team also sought support from top management for 
research actions in these meetings if needed. The decision-making in this CAR project involved 
myself as the researcher proposing the course of action that would serve both the scholarly and 
the business agendas. Then the collaborating industry partner and I discussed to reach a 
consensus on the appropriate actions to be taken and the types of support expected from the 
industry partner. On this basis we collaboratively shared the responsibility of designing and 
executing the interventions. 
3.3.3 Iterative Process Model 
In line with the canonical form this project adopted a five-stage iterative process model 
(Baskerville 1999; Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012), with 
the stages of (1) diagnosing, (2) action planning, (3) action taking (intervention), (4) evaluating 
and (5) specifying learning or reflection. These five stages are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
In a recent development of the CAR iterative process, Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012) 
introduced two additional components, the focal and instrumental theories. Focal theories 
establish the intellectual ground that guides the interventions, while instrumental theories are 
tools and theoretical models which theorise the intervention’s process and how the intervention 
arrives at its outcomes (Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012). Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012) 
provide examples of focal theories such as TPB (Ajzen 2011b), whereas instrumental theories 




Figure 3.2. CAR Process 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012, p. 769). 
Key: Rectangles represent the CAR process stages. Rounded-corner rectangles represent instrumental and 
focal theories. Solid lines with arrows indicate the cyclical CAR paths. Dashed lines with arrows represent 
the links between theories and CAR process stages. 
The objective of the diagnosis stage is to clearly understand the situation which involves 
identifying the nature of the problem and its causes. Moreover, it requires taking into account 
the outcomes of the research actions performed in the previous iteration. Diagnosing the 
organisational and research issues is imperative for CAR projects (Davison, Martinsons & 
Kock 2004), especially for this project since TTT had little InfoSec-related experience and 
scant knowledge of their InfoSec situation. The initial meeting with TTT’s stakeholders to 
discuss their current InfoSec environment is detailed in Chapter 4. The first stage of this CAR 
project, described in Chapter 5, was dedicated to diagnosing the InfoSec issues in TTT and 
understanding the best practices for effective InfoSec implementation in the Vietnamese 
context. The latter objective was achieved by conducting a case study with InfoSec experts in 
Vietnam who had successfully implemented the InfoSec standard ISO 27001 in their 
companies. 
The diagnosis stage allows the researcher and industry partner to formulate the intervention in 
the next action planning stage described in Chapter 6. The research actions should be based on 
the agreements between the researcher and industry partner (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 
57 
2004). During the action planning stage of this CAR project the project team jointly discussed 
and agreed on the research actions to be performed. 
The planned intervention is then carried out in the third stage described in Chapter 7. This 
taking of action presents the actual intervention. It is recommended that change strategies are 
employed to assist the intervention, which includes the use of influential agents to diffuse the 
intended change or to empower individuals and to help them to adopt the change (Baskerville 
1999; Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). In this CAR project we employed SNA methods to 
identify influential InfoSec champions who then conducted the change program by diffusing 
InfoSec knowledge and increasing InfoSec-related socialisation. We also used SNA methods 
to monitor the effectiveness of the change program. 
The intervention’s outcomes are evaluated in the fourth stage to determine whether they have 
met the initial expectations and objectives. Researchers analyse the change process jointly with 
the industry partner to understand the mechanisms and factors that have resulted in the 
outcomes (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). The fifth and final stage, reflection or 
specifying learning, allows the project stakeholders to reflect on the performed actions and the 
discovered knowledge and, more importantly, decide whether or not the AR project should be 
concluded (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). It may be necessary to continue the project if 
the project objectives have not yet been met (Baskerville 1999; Davison, Martinsons & Kock 
2004). The evaluation of and reflection on the outcomes of this CAR project are elaborated in 
Chapter 8. 
3.4 Achieving Canonical Action Research Rigour 
Rigour in research can be evaluated by examining the research project against various criteria 
of the adopted research approach. Research rigour generally refers to the methodological 
soundness and trustworthiness of the findings generated from that approach (Dubé & Paré 
2003; Krefting 1991; Thomas & Magilvy 2011). Since this CAR project employed multiple 
research methods for each stage, including a case study (see Chapter 5) and various SNA 
methods (see Chapters 6 and 8), the criteria for rigour of each method will be discussed in their 
respective stage. This section focuses on the components that maintain the overall rigour of the 
CAR project as a holistic structure which holds the separate methods together. 
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Several strategies and recommendations exist to achieve rigour of CAR projects. One way of 
achieving CAR rigour is by closely following the established power structure which covers the 
three aspects of initiation, authority and formalisation (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001) as 
elaborated in the previous section. Baskerville (1999) presented seven strategies to maintain 
AR rigour which emphasised careful planning and the adoption of the iterative model and 
generalising results to similar settings where the theory can be reasonably applied. Similarly, 
Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) argued that CAR rigour has two components, carefully 
planned and executed research iterations and continuous engagement in problem diagnosis so 
that the project members can always determine the relevant actions to be taken. Davison, 
Martinsons and Kock (2004) proposed five principles which serve as a checklist of CAR rigour. 
These strategies and principles are described in the following sections. 
3.4.1 Seven Strategies for Achieving Action Research Rigour 
The seven strategies suggested by Baskerville (1999), which focus on the design and 
implementation of the project, are: 1) consider the paradigm shift, 2) establish a formal research 
agreement and 3) a theoretical problem statement, 4) plan for data collection, 5) maintain 
collaboration and learning with the industry partner, 6) encourage iterations and 7) generalise 
research findings accordingly. 
The first strategy highlights the nature of AR which deviates from the traditional positivist 
philosophy and thus advises researchers to ensure that the research questions can be 
appropriately answered by conducting AR (Baskerville 1999). The second strategy addresses 
the use of formal agreements (i.e., RCA) to collect the participants’ consent and warrant the 
researchers’ authorities to take actions in the research context (Baskerville 1999). Similarly, 
the third strategy requires that the theoretical framework guiding the AR project must be 
documented and explicitly presented, so that the project can be distinguished from consulting 
work. Baskerville (1999) noted that empirical data in AR projects can be collected in multiple 
ways such as audio-taped observations, interviews, experiments and cases written by the 
participants. He further advised researchers to make careful plans for the data collection 
methods. 
The fifth and sixth strategies focus on the process of conducting the AR project. Researchers 
are advised to avoid assuming a consultant’s authoritative role and dominating the planning 
phases (Baskerville 1999). Moreover, action success and failure should be equally appreciated 
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and further actions should be taken until the immediate problem is alleviated. Finally, 
Baskerville (1999) argued that the generated results from the AR project should be 
generalisable to contexts similar to the immediate research setting or where the outcome can 
apply. 
3.4.2 Five Principles of Canonical Action Research Rigour 
Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) advised researchers to follow five key principles to 
achieve CAR rigour—the RCA, the cyclical process model (CPM), a guiding theory, change 
through action and learning through reflection. These five principles are similar to the seven 
strategies suggested by Baskerville (1999). For example, Baskerville’s (1999) strategies about 
the research agreement, theoretical problem statement and planned data collection are 
discussed in Davison, Martinsons and Kock’s (2004) first three principles of CAR. 
Baskerville’s fourth and fifth strategies concerning maintaining collaboration with the client 
and promoting iterative actions are comparable to Davison, Martinsons and Kock’s (2004) 
fourth and fifth principles. 
Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) offered a checklist of criteria to achieve research rigour 
which are related to their five principles (summarised in Table 3.2). This CAR project with 
TTT followed the principles and strategies suggested by Baskerville (1999) and Davison, 
Martinsons and Kock (2004). While Baskerville’s (1999) strategies effectively serve as a 
holistic framework, Davison, Martinsons and Kock’s (2004) checklist was used to evaluate the 
rigour of this CAR project. This evaluation will be elaborated on in Chapter 9. 




Did both the researcher and the client agree that CAR was the appropriate 
approach for the organisational situation? 
Was the focus of the research project specified clearly and explicitly? 
Did the client make an explicit commitment to the project? 
Were the roles and responsibilities of the researcher and client organisation 
members specified explicitly? 
Were project objectives and evaluation measures specified explicitly? 
Were the data collection and analysis methods specified explicitly? 
Cyclical process 
model 
Did the project follow the cyclical process model or justify any deviation 
from it? 
Did the researcher conduct an independent diagnosis of the organisational 
situation? 
Were the planned actions based explicitly on the results of the diagnosis? 
Were the planned actions implemented and evaluated? 
Did the researcher reflect on the outcomes of the intervention? 
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Was this reflection followed by an explicit decision on whether or not to 
proceed through an additional process cycle? 
Were both the exit of the researcher and the conclusion of the project due to 
either the project objectives being met or some other clearly articulated 
justification? 
Theory Were the project activities guided by a theory or set of theories? 
Was the domain of investigation and the specific problem setting, relevant 
and significant to the interests of the researcher’s community of peers as well 
as the client? 
Was a theoretically-based model used to derive the causes of the observed 
problem? 
Did the planned intervention follow from this theoretically-based model? 




Were both the researcher and the client motivated to improve the situation? 
Were the problem and its hypothesised cause(s) specified as a result of the 
diagnosis? 
Were the planned actions designed to address the hypothesised cause(s)? 
Did the client approve the planned actions before they were implemented? 
Was the organisation’s situation assessed comprehensively both before and 
after the intervention? 




Did the researcher provide progress reports to the client and organisational 
members? 
Did both the researcher and the client reflect upon the outcomes of the 
project? 
Were the research activities and outcomes reported clearly and completely? 
Were the results considered in terms of implications for further action in this 
situation? 
Were the results considered in terms of implications for action to be taken in 
related research domains? 
Were the results considered in terms of implications for the research 
community (general knowledge, informing/re-informing theory)? 
Were the results considered in terms of the general applicability of CAR? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
3.4.3 Adopting the CPM to Guide the Execution of CAR Stages 
To further ensure rigour, I employed the CPM to guide the research activities within the five 
stages of this project, i.e., diagnosis, action planning, action taking, evaluation and reflection. 
Consequently, each of these stages would have their own diagnosis to assess the current 
situation, selection of theories to establish the intellectual background underlying the research 
actions, and the evaluation of and reflect on the outcomes resulting from the actions performed 
within that stage. Following the steps prescribed by the CPM in each stage would allow me to 
organise and report these stages in a coherent manner. Moreover, iteratively diagnosing the 
current situation and reflecting on theories through the stages would enable the project team to 
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maintain a balanced focus on finding the relevant solutions to the practical problems and on 
producing scholarly knowledge. 
3.5 Social Network Analysis as the Primary Research Method 
Based on the premise that AR adopts the interpretive view, Baskerville (1999) argued that 
qualitative data and methods are typically employed in AR projects. Davison, Martinsons and 
Kock (2004) extended this view and argued that the triangulation of several methods and types 
of data is beneficial for CAR projects. Moreover, Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) 
recommend prioritising methods relevant to the immediate context and its problems as this 
improves the intervention’s benefits and ensures that the intervention is properly planned by 
following a thorough diagnosis. 
Following my scholarly motivation and the above recommendations I selected SNA methods 
as the primary method of enquiry for this CAR project. Specifically, the adoption of SNA 
enabled me to determine the factors and mechanisms that contributed to the formation of 
InfoSec climate, thus achieving my scholarly objective. Moreover, these methods allowed me 
and TTT to identify the InfoSec champions for the InfoSec change program and evaluate the 
change program’s effectiveness with quantitative network measures. 
SNA as a research approach puts emphasis on analysing networks—structures made of any 
interactions or relationships (termed ties or edges) between network actors (termed nodes or 
vertices). Network actors can be human or non-human. Throughout this CAR project I 
demonstrated the adoption of SNA to study the network of relationships between InfoSec 
vulnerabilities, threats and departments (i.e., non-human actors) (discussed in Chapter 5) and 
the networks representing socialisation between employees at TTT as human actors (discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 8). 
SNA methods enable sophisticated investigations into the network ties which allow the social 
context of the actors to be analysed in depth (Otte & Rousseau 2002). Therefore, the SNA 
approach aligns closely with my scholarly motivation of exploring the formation of an InfoSec 
climate as a function of employees’ socialisation, social influence and climate perceptions. 
SNA methods have been widely used in organisational research (Borgatti & Foster 2003) and 
recent studies in the information systems field have also employed SNA methods (Kane et al. 
2014; Sykes, Venkatesh & Gosain 2009; Zheng et al. 2010). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
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behavioural InfoSec studies have not yet empirically applied SNA methods and SNA was only 
referred to by two conceptual studies (Corona 2008; Yoo & Sanders 2013). 
Researchers can examine the complete whole network composed of the nodes and their ties or 
the personal networks of individual nodes (i.e., ego networks) (Borgatti & Foster 2003; Otte & 
Rousseau 2002). At each level of analysis researchers can use specialised software to compute 
network measures and use them in several ways. Similar to the traditional research approaches, 
researchers using SNA methods can also perform descriptive and inferential network analyses. 
3.5.1 Descriptive Network Analysis 
Researchers describe and analyse networks through their visualisations enabled by software 
tools or descriptive statistics (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). Some examples of tools to 
visualise networks are NetDraw (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2002), Gephi (Bastian, Heymann 
& Jacomy 2009) and Cytoscape (Shannon et al. 2003). Some of these tools include algorithms 
which visualise the network in different layouts. For example, NetDraw allows grouping the 
nodes based on their characteristics such as department membership and gender and many 
visualising tools can assign unique shapes and colours to the nodes based on attributes such as 
age, seniority, centrality measures and psychometric properties. By analysing network 
visualisations researchers can identify the key nodes and the distinctive clusters within the 
network. For example, the widely cited study of Adamic and Glance (2005) demonstrated the 
use of network visualisation to explore the nature of political blogs, showed as two separate 
clusters consisting of the right-wing (red) and left-wing (blue) individuals (see Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3. Using Network Visualisation to Understand the Like-Minded Nature of 
Political Bloggers 
Adopted from Adamic and Glance (2005, p. 4). 
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Consistent with the levels of analysis, descriptive network statistics can describe features of 
the whole network, the nodes in the network and the personal networks of the nodes (i.e., ego 
networks) (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). Researchers use descriptive network measures 
to describe characteristics of the networks such as its density of connected ties or the variations 
in the numbers of ties possessed by the nodes. The descriptive network measures used in this 
research are discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. 
3.5.2 Inferential Network Analysis 
The SNA approach provides several inferential methods for testing hypotheses and statistically 
evaluating network features. There are two major approaches to test hypotheses with SNA 
methods. The first involves calculating the network statistics as nodal attributes then using 
them in regression analyses along with other variables such as demographics, perceptions or 
behaviours. This approach is especially useful for ego network research where data can be 
collected from the general population with random sampling techniques (Crossley et al. 2015). 
Network ties are relational data recorded in an adjacency matrix as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
The existence of a tie between a pair of nodes is indicated by a cell in the matrix on the left of 
the figure, which has a value of ‘1’. To indicate directions of ties the rows of the matrix denote 
the senders of ties while the columns denote the receivers. For example, the matrix in Figure 
3.4 informs that node 1 sends a tie to node 3, whereas node 3 does not send any ties to node 1. 
 
Figure 3.4. Illustration of Relational Data 
Testing hypotheses involving network ties requires methods that can appropriately handle 
relational data indicating these ties. Such relational data violates the independence assumption 
of standard statistical tests and renders their use inappropriate (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 
2013). This led to the development of specialised inferential analysis methods that are used for 
testing hypothesis about the occurrence of network ties, such as the quadratic assignment 
procedure tests, autocorrelation modelling method, exponential random graph modelling 
(ERGM) method and stochastic actor-oriented modelling method (SAOM). 
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The simplest method for network hypothesis testing are the quadratic assignment procedure 
tests available in the UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002) and the R package 
called ‘sna’ (Butts 2008). Researchers perform quadratic assignment procedure’s correlation 
or multiple regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between multiple types of network 
ties or predict a type of ties by using other types (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). Further, 
individuals’ attributes such as gender, age or affiliation can also be converted to the network 
form and used as variables in these tests. This can be done by creating matrices of matching 
values (e.g., 1 = same gender, 0 = different gender) or calculating the age differences between 
pairs of nodes. 
Another method to evaluate the likelihood of occurrence of network ties is called ERGM. 
ERGM offers greater benefits than quadratic assignment procedure’s multiple regression 
analysis as it allows predicting network ties by using a wider range of predictors which include 
not only ties but also the nodes’ attributes and the networks’ structural features. For example, 
researchers employing the ERGM method can test the effects of an employee’s age or seniority 
on the number of interactions or relationships possessed by that employee, or the tendency of 
two nodes to interact or have a relationship with each other when they have multiple shared 
partners in between. ERGM can be performed by using the PNet software (Lusher, Koskinen 
& Robins 2012) or the package ‘ergm’ in R (Butts et al. 2014). 
Researchers may want to focus more on the nodes’ attributes rather than the ties between them. 
In this case, methods such as network autocorrelation modelling (Leenders 2002) and SAOM 
(Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010) can be chosen. For example, Zheng et al. (2010) used the 
network autocorrelation modelling method to analyse the effects of advice and friendship 
networks on clinicians’ adoption of a healthcare information system together with factors of 
the technological acceptance model (Venkatesh et al. 2003). A detailed instruction for 
performing the autocorrelation modelling method is elaborated on by Leenders (2002). 
Finally, SAOM is a means to evaluate the changes in both network ties and actor’s attributes 
between several points in time. Performing SAOM is similar to the ERGM method as 
researchers specify and evaluate a model with terms which describe the mechanisms governing 
the changes of network ties and attributes over time (Ripley et al. 2017). While both the 
autocorrelation (Leenders 2002) and SAOM methods (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010) are 
capable of analysing nodal attributes and are thus suitable for investigating the formation of 
InfoSec climate, I chose to perform SAOM in this CAR project. The SAOM method allows 
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not only examination of the changes in nodal attributes, but also the changes in the formation 
of network ties (Ripley et al. 2017; Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010) which are not the 
autocorrelation method’s focus. Therefore, employees’ socialisation and social influence—the 
key mechanisms that lead to climate formation (Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 
2005; Schneider & Reichers 1983)—can be conceptualised as networks and simultaneously 
analysed with the changing InfoSec climate by using the SAOM method, presenting a complete 
picture of how an InfoSec climate can be formed. 
3.5.3 Applying Social Network Analysis to Design and Implement Interventions 
In addition to performing descriptive and inferential analyses researchers also employed SNA 
methods to design and implement network-based interventions to improve organisational 
situations (Cross, Borgatti & Parker 2002; Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; Hatala & Lutta 
2009; Valente 1996; Valente et al. 2015; Valente & Davis 1999). For example, interventionists 
often used sociometric questionnaires to collect respondents’ nominations for interactions or 
relationships with each other in the same community to detect opinion leaders who can drive 
the intended change programs (Cross, Borgatti & Parker 2002; Cross, Parker & Borgatti 2002; 
Valente & Davis 1999). Network-based interventions in the organisational context often aim 
at improving work collaboration and communication among employees which involve the use 
of human resource (HR) development practices (Cross et al. 2004; Cross, Borgatti & Parker 
2002; Parise 2007; de Toni & Nonino 2010). Moreover, network features such as density, 
reciprocity, centralisation and transitivity can be evaluated to reflect improvements that result 
from such interventions (Cross et al. 2004; Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; Hatala & Lutta 
2009). 
Valente (2012) summarised four types of social network-based strategies for designing and 
implementing interventions—individuals, segmentation, induction and alteration strategies. 
The first strategy focuses on making use of the opinion leaders, whose network centrality 
measures are high, to act as change agents which facilitate change programs. The second 
strategy employs group-detection algorithms to find segments of actors in a network and 
suitable change programs can be tailored and introduced to each segment. The third strategy 
creates cascading intervention to be implemented by seed members in the network following 
snowballing methods. The fourth strategy alters (i.e., creates or removes) network ties and/or 
nodes for the intervention’s purposes. 
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This CAR project employed the first strategy by using opinion leaders to improve the InfoSec 
environment at TTT through a diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. The process of using the SNA 
methods to identify and train champions for the diffusion is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
network measures used to evaluate the networks at TTT before and after the diffusion are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. 
3.6 Structure of the CAR Project with TTT 
This CAR project adopted the iterative CPM discussed in Section 3.3.3 and illustrated in Figure 
3.3. The project started with an initial meeting with the top management at TTT where we 
established the RCA, formed the project team and determined the project’s power structure. In 
this meeting I also gathered some details of the current InfoSec environment at TTT. This initial 
meeting is discussed together with a company profile of TTT in Chapter 4. 
The diagnosis stage (discussed in Chapter 5) was dedicated to performing a risk assessment 
which diagnosed the InfoSec environment and issues at TTT. As mentioned earlier, I performed 
SNA to analyse a network of the InfoSec risks identified from a risk assessment with the 
department managers at TTT. Moreover, I conducted a descriptive case study with InfoSec 
experts outside of TTT to understand the critical factors and methods to effectively implement 
InfoSec improvements in the Vietnamese context. The project team considered this action as 
necessary as it offered practical considerations for planning and executing the InfoSec change 
program at TTT. 
In the action planning stage (discussed in Chapter 6) I applied SNA to investigate the InfoSec 
environment at TTT before the change program took place. A descriptive analysis was 
performed to examine the networks of employees’ socialisation. These networks presented 
employees’ provisions of work advice and/or organisational updates, provisions of personal 
advice and/or trust in colleagues’ expertise, provisions of InfoSec advice and troubleshooting 
support and InfoSec influence. The ERGM method was then employed to determine the factors 
that enabled employees to exert InfoSec influence over other employees. This led to the 
identification of the influential InfoSec champions who would carry out the diffusion of 
InfoSec knowledge as a part of the InfoSec change program. Moreover, the SNA in this stage 
provided the baseline results which would be compared against the post-intervention outcomes 
to evaluate the change program’s effectiveness. 
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The action taking stage (see Chapter 7) focused on designing the training materials and 
delivering the InfoSec training to the selected champions. Key elements for effective InfoSec 
training and an experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec training approach were used in this 
stage to guide the research actions. After the training, the champions performed the diffusion 
of InfoSec knowledge. 
In the evaluation and reflection stage (see Chapter 8) I performed SNA to investigate and 
evaluate the changes in the InfoSec environment after the change program. The SAOM method 
was employed in this stage to analyse the InfoSec influence network and its impacts on the 
formation of an InfoSec climate. The project team and top management also evaluated the 
effectiveness of the change program as reflected by the changes in the InfoSec-related 
networks. At the end of this stage the project was declared finished when top management and 
the project team agreed that both the scholarly and business objectives of the project had been 
met successfully. This meant that the InfoSec environment at TTT had been improved and I 
had produced scientific knowledge about the formation of an InfoSec climate and about the 
applications of SNA methods in behavioural InfoSec research. 
Overall, the CAR project resulted in three types of research contributions, including 
organisational improvements, theoretical implications and practical recommendations 
(Checkland & Holwell 1998). These contributions together with an evaluation of the rigour of 
the CAR project based on Davison, Martinsons and Kock’s (2004) five CAR principles are 
discussed in Chapter 9. The four stages of this CAR project and its timeline are summarised in 
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.5. Summary of the CAR Project (Diagnosis and Action Planning stages) 
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Table 3.3. Project Timeline 
 Date Research activities 
Initial stage June 2014 I approached TTT’s top management for the first 
time and heard about their business objective to 
improve InfoSec environment. 
June to 28 
November, 2014 
I attempted to set up a meeting with TTT’s top 
management. 
I presented the CAR approach to TTT and explained 
how this approach could bring benefits to both 
parties. 
Top management signed the RCA and allocated the 
Vice Director of the BSP department to the CAR 
project. 
December 2014 
to February 2015 
Vietnam celebrated New Year in December and 
Lunar New Year in February which lasted for two 
weeks. TTT was busy with end-of-year operations, 
and top management advised the project team not to 
conduct research activities during these periods since 
the distraction could affect the project’s momentum. 
Diagnosis 
Stage 
February to April 
2015 
I reviewed and discussed best practices for 
implementing InfoSec improvements with the Vice 
Director of the BSP department. 
April to 17 June, 
2015 
The project team conducted risk assessment 
activities, and I conducted the case study with the 
InfoSec experts at the same time. 
10 July, 2015 The project team presented results from the risk 




July to 4 
November, 2015 
The project team jointly designed and refined the 
questionnaire which asked employees about their 
interactions and perceptions of InfoSec climate. 
5 November to 2 
December, 2015 
The project team launched the questionnaire for the 
first time. 
December 2015 
to 14 January, 
2016 
The CAR project was halted due to New Year and 
Vietnamese Lunar New Year periods again. 
I presented SNA findings to top management after 
the Lunar New Year break. We decided the list of 




14 to 24 
February, 2016 
The project team and top management finalised 
training materials. The project team conducted the 
adjusted experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec 
training for the selected champions. 
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24 February to 8 
April, 2016 
The project team asked the champions to prepare 
InfoSec proposals which detailed the InfoSec issues 
in their departments and their proposed solutions. 
More discussions took place between the project 
team, top management, and champions to achieve a 
consensus on the diffusion methods. 
8 April to 8 
August, 2016 
The champions carried out the diffusion of InfoSec 
knowledge by conducting InfoSec training or 





8 August to 19 
September, 2016 
The project team launched the questionnaire to 
collect data about employees’ interactions and 
climate perceptions after the diffusion. 
September to 3 
October, 2016 
I analysed post-intervention data and presented 
findings to top management. We agreed that the 
scholarly and business objectives have been met, and 
the CAR project was agreed to conclude. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the rationale for choosing CAR approach as this thesis’ research methodology, 
to achieve both my scholarly objective to produce scientific knowledge and TTT’s business 
objective to improve their InfoSec environment, was presented. Before deciding to adopt the 
CAR approach I reviewed other AR approaches and the characteristics of AR in general and 
found the CAR approach could satisfy the stated objectives. Moreover, I elaborated on the key 
components of a CAR project such as the roles of the researchers and industry partners, the 
RCA, the project’s authority structure, the five-stage process to conduct a CAR project and the 
principles to ensure CAR rigour. The chapter also introduced the SNA methods employed as 
the primary research method throughout this CAR project and concluded with an overview 
over the CAR project’s iterations. 
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Chapter 4: Canonical Action Research Client’s Profile––TTT 
Corporation 
This CAR project took place in TTT, a large interior design and construction enterprise in 
Vietnam. This chapter provides a descriptive profile of TTT’s history and its business, 
including an explanation of TTT’s business needs that contributed to the development of the 
research questions and partially motivated this research. This chapter further discusses 
outcomes of the initial meeting between me as the researcher and TTT’s key stakeholders (top 
management and the Vice Director of the BSP department). The structure of this chapter is 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Structure of Chapter 4 
4.1 Overview of TTT Corporation 
TTT was established in 1992 as an interior design and construction company in Vietnam. The 
organisational chart of TTT is shown in Figure 4.2, where Mr Thong Le Ba is the General 
Director who oversees the daily operations at TTT. 
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Figure 4.2. Organisational Chart of TTT 
Adopted from TTT company brochure. 
At the time of the CAR project, TTT employed a workforce of 311 office staff and more than 
800 skilled workers. TTT had 20 department (see Table 4.1) of which the project management 
and construction departments (see Figure 4.3) had the largest number of employees; together 
with the architect department these departments form the backbone of TTT’s business. These 
project management and construction departments, along with other operational departments 
such as business development, tender and procurement, are located at TTT’s headquarters in 
Ho Chi Minh City, the most urban city in southern Vietnam. 
Table 4.1. List of TTT Office Buildings and Departments 
Building Department (number of employees) 
Headquarters 
After Sale Services (7) Accounting (9) 
Administration (15) Business Development (12) 
Business Solutions Provider (5) Construction (89) 
Board of Directors (9) Estimation (7) 
Human Resource (4) Information Technology (4) 
Marketing (2) Project Management (29) 
Purchasing (10) Quality Control and Assurance (2) 
Tender (3)  
Architect division Architect (69) Sourcing (8) 
Factory division Factory (58) Gamma (sister company) (17) 
Ha Noi representative office Ha Noi Office (7)  
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In addition to the project management and construction departments TTT had two departments 
located in separate office buildings. These were the architect department in a separate office in 
central Ho Chi Minh City and the factory department in Binh Duong, a suburb on the outskirt 
of Ho Chi Minh City. A sister company of TTT called Gamma was established in 1999 with 
an expertise in producing and supplying high-quality office chairs and other furniture. Gamma 
is located in the same area as TTT’s factory department in Binh Duong (see Figure 4.4). There 
was also a representative office in Ha Noi, the main city in northern Vietnam. Overall, TTT 
had four offices in Vietnam and was in the process of opening a branch in Myanmar. 
 
Figure 4.3. The Project Management and Construction Departments in the 
Headquarter Building 
 
Figure 4.4. The Factory Division in Binh Duong 
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4.2 TTT Corporation’s Goods and Services 
TTT identifies itself in the Vietnamese construction industry as the leading design and building 
contractor specialised in delivering interior design and turn-key construction projects with a 
focus on office buildings for local and international corporates. TTT attracts 100 to 300 projects 
annually with primary clients being multinational corporations and local firms. To date, TTT 
had completed over 1,650 office interior fit-out projects and more than 450 decoration projects 
for hotels, resorts and serviced apartments. 
The architect department itself has completed over 100 architectural designs, more than 1500 
interior designs and over 500,000m2 of office designs. This department had earned TTT many 
international and national awards including 15 National Architectural Awards, four Ho Chi 
Minh City Architectural Awards, two international awards and one Vietnam Construction 
Quality Gold Cup (TCKT 2011; TTT Corporation 2017; Vinh 2015). Additionally, TTT ships 
furniture manufactured in its factory department and its sister company Gamma worldwide. 
4.3 Initial Canonical Action Research Meeting with TTT 
To investigate the relationship between an InfoSec climate and dynamics in the workplace, I 
presented my research proposal and delivered a presentation about my research to large 
enterprises in Vietnam in need of improving their InfoSec environments. Among the 
enterprises that responded to my proposal, TTT recognised the alignment between their 
business objective and my scholarly goals. As a result, an initial meeting was arranged and 
served to create an understanding between me and TTT’s key stakeholders. The following 
sections explain TTT’s motivations to improve their organisational InfoSec and the 
establishment of the RCA for this CAR project. 
4.3.1 TTT Top Management’s Motivations to Improve InfoSec 
From the initial meeting I understood the reasons that motivated TTT to enhance their InfoSec 
environment and to enlist academic advice from the researcher. The top management at TTT 
anticipated that the InfoSec improvements would enhance the company’s overall performance 
by enabling a better customer service level, a more professional brand image and efficient 
operations while mitigating the existing InfoSec risks in their workplace. 
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Mr Thong Le Ba, the General Director, and the Director of the HR department were especially 
interested in making daily operations more ordered and able to accommodate the rapidly 
increasing amount of information that employees received and processed each day. The 
confidential and critical information included records of existing and potential 
clients/suppliers/contractors, bid documents and intellectual property such as furniture designs 
and architectural blueprints. Further, international and local clients have been demanding 
organisations in Vietnam to comply with InfoSec and privacy regulations before entering into 
collaborations. These strategic and operational objectives were the primary reasons that led the 
top management at TTT to invest resources into enhancing their InfoSec workplace. 
4.3.2 Vice Director of the BSP Department’s Motivations to Improve InfoSec 
The top management had decided in advance that the BSP department under the leadership of 
its Vice Director would continue to manage and maintain the InfoSec improvements 
anticipated from this CAR project. Therefore, Mr Tung Doan Van, Vice Director of the BSP 
department and responsible for the information systems at TTT (e.g., project server, customer 
relationship management and enterprise resource planning systems), also attended the initial 
meeting. He described the current technical infrastructure and InfoSec issues at TTT as follows. 
According to Tung, most of the computers in TTT were running on the operating systems 
Windows 7. SharePoint and a project server were deployed to provide a collaborative 
workspace where employees can monitor projects’ progresses and share files with each other. 
With regard to InfoSec measures, the BSP department and the IT department jointly manage 
employees’ accounts with various access rights allocated to specific roles and departments. A 
virtual private network, a local area network, a firewall and the WPA2 encryption standard 
were also in place. To protect the information systems from malicious emails and computer 
viruses TTT implemented anti-spam and anti-virus solutions. All computers are set up for 
automatic updates and the company servers are scheduled to perform periodic backups to 
prevent data loss. 
The BSP department also provides employees with a list of approved software that they can 
download and install on their computers. TTT’s employees are required to change their 
account’s password every 42 days and passwords must meet requirements which include 8 
characters and a combination of at least one capital letter, one number and one special 
characters (e.g., @, $ or #). New passwords must not be the same as the last three passwords. 
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Employee’s login account details provide access to three main services at TTT. First, 
employees can log in to their network account and gain access to the shared file directories of 
their departments and a common file directory of the whole company named ‘TEMP’. Second, 
this account provides access to an employee’s email account. Third, TTT has an intranet web 
portal where employees can view the company’s public announcements and events, training 
materials and staff list. Employees can create and submit support tickets to the IT department 
for technical enquiries. 
Despite the available InfoSec infrastructure described, Tung displayed concerns about InfoSec 
threats related to employees’ InfoSec knowledge and behaviours. He described threats that 
stem from employees’ undetected use of pirated software and their adoption of mobile devices 
such as personal laptops, smartphones, tablets, portable drives and personal USBs. All of the 
attending directors and vice director believed that most of their employees had low InfoSec 
awareness and knowledge because InfoSec had never been emphasised as a priority by the 
company or its policies. The consequences of low InfoSec awareness and knowledge were 
evident in the poor information practices performed by employees in their daily work. As 
observed by top management these included employees frequently sharing passwords with 
each other and storing passwords in insecure places, and disorganised work directories and 
folders on the file server. 
Although TTT offered a private cloud system for sharing internal files employees had a habit 
of sharing files through the ‘TEMP’ file directory mentioned above. To share the files 
employees would upload the files to this file directory and recipients would copy the uploaded 
files to their local machines. This habit posed a critical InfoSec risk as many employees forgot 
to delete the shared files in the ‘TEMP’ directory, and sometimes the confidential files 
remained available to not only the recipients but all TTT employees. In addition to the risk of 
exposing confidential files to many employees, forgetting to delete the shared files resulted in 
a disorganised ‘TEMP’ file directory and consumed a lot of its disk space. 
Reflecting on these InfoSec threats, the Vice Director expected that InfoSec improvements 
would need to focus on enhancing employees’ InfoSec knowledge and behaviours. Moreover, 
he advised that the CAR project should not aim at altering the current technical infrastructure 
as such modification would require careful planning and potentially significant investment. 
The General Director also agreed with this advice. 
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4.3.3 The Researcher–Client Agreement and Appointment of the Project Team 
I elaborated on the CAR approach and its principles to the General Director, Vice Director of 
the BSP department, Director of the HR department and Director of the IT department during 
the initial meeting, including the importance of establishing a RCA and a formal project team. 
A RCA details the mutual understanding between the researcher and the collaborating industry 
partners about the organisational situation, the boundaries of the problem and the project’s 
objectives, the planned research methods and the commitment and responsibilities of the 
involved parties (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Through the RCA the researcher ensures 
that the clients understand the cyclical approach of CAR and its principles which promote 
changes through actions and learning through reflection (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). 
The Directors of the HR and IT departments, the Vice Director of the BSP department and I 
decided that the General Director had the highest authority and the right to terminate the CAR 
project. The General Director agreed to maintain high commitment to the project and provide 
the necessary support for research activities such as data collection, attending a milestone 
meeting at the end of each stage and signing off on the project at its conclusion. This project’s 
authority structure was similar to many AR projects in which the external action researchers 
rarely have the ultimate authority over the project (Avison, Baskerville & Myers 2001). 
The General Director, despite having the highest authority to terminate the CAR project if 
needed, stated that he would not get involved in making decisions related to the specific 
research actions throughout the project. Such decision-making was to be collaboratively 
performed by me as the researcher and the Vice Director of the BSP department (co-leaders of 
the project, hereafter referred to as the project team) to ensure that both the practical needs of 
TTT and my scholarly objectives would be equally satisfied. 
The agreed structure of authority was favourable for me as it afforded the freedom to co-design 
and co-implement the appropriate research actions with the Vice Director while receiving 
support from top management. However, TTT’s business objective, to enhance the InfoSec 
environment in TTT, remained unclear at this stage. The project team had to design and 
implement the necessary actions in the diagnosis stage, which thus focused on diagnosing and 
understanding clearly the InfoSec issues at TTT, to outline the specific directions for the CAR 
project. 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the profile of TTT, the industry partner (or research client in CAR 
terminology) which collaborated with me in this CAR project. The initial meeting with TTT’s 
key stakeholders led to the formation of the project team comprising the Vice Director of the 
BSP department and myself. TTT believed that there were InfoSec issues in their workplace 
and the top management recognised the potential benefits from improving TTT’s InfoSec 
environment. Further, they understood the CAR approach and approved the project to 
commence after the initial meeting. As a result, an RCA which documented the mutual 
understanding between the researcher and the client with regard to the project’s critical 
components was also prepared. The project team further decided the research actions in the 
diagnosis stage to focus on diagnosing InfoSec issues at TTT and setting clear directions for 
the business objective to improve TTT’s InfoSec environment. 
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Chapter 5: Diagnosis Stage—Understanding InfoSec Issues at TTT 
and InfoSec Implementation in the Vietnamese Context 
This chapter discusses the diagnosis stage of the project. The structure and performance of this 
stage followed the CPM steps suggested by Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004)—diagnosis, 
action planning, action taking, evaluation and reflection. Since the project team did not possess 
up-to-date knowledge of the current InfoSec environment of TTT, this stage was used to 
perform a full diagnosis of TTT’s InfoSec issues. Moreover, it was also necessary to understand 
the critical factors and methods to implement InfoSec improvements in the Vietnamese context, 
to develop the change program to improve TTT’s InfoSec environment. 
Two research actions were performed in this stage to achieve the stated objectives. First, the 
risk assessment was conducted with the department managers at TTT to understand the current 
InfoSec issues. Second, a case study was undertaken with six external InfoSec experts to 
understand the best practices for InfoSec implementation in the Vietnamese context. Each of 
these research actions had their own action planning, action taking and evaluation stages. The 
evaluation of these actions’ outcomes will be discussed at the end of this chapter. The structure 
of this chapter is shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1. Summary of Chapter 5 
5.1 Diagnosis 
The previous chapter described the profile of the collaborating industry partner and elaborated 
on the initial meeting that commenced the CAR project. Through the initial meeting the project 
team made several crucial achievements including gaining top management’s support, 
establishing the project team and acquiring a brief understanding of the current InfoSec 
environment at TTT. The top management entrusted decision-making to the project team. 
Despite the technical measures already been in place, the Vice Director of the BSP department 
proposed to plan a change program focused on improving employees’ InfoSec knowledge and 
behaviours. 
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A key principle of CAR recommends that researchers consider the research client’s opinions 
when designing the research actions while at the same time conducting an independent 
diagnosis of the situation (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Researchers engaged in AR 
may assume the roles of a resource person who provides expert advice and bring in external 
resources to jointly solve the identified problems (Baskerville & Wood-Harper 1998; 
Greenwood & Levin 2007; Park 1999). On this basis, I performed this diagnosis stage to 
diagnose the critical InfoSec issues at TTT and compared the diagnosed outcome with the 
opinions of the Vice Director about the InfoSec threats. The outcome of such a risk assessment 
would provide the directions for designing and implementing an appropriate intervention to 
improve TTT’s InfoSec environment. 
An intervention being designed solely based on contributions from the project team and TTT’s 
employees may create biases that could jeopardise the intervention’s effectiveness. This 
motivated me to seek expert insights into the critical factors and best practices for InfoSec 
implementation in the Vietnamese context. The project team agreed that external expert 
insights would be useful for accurate planning and design of the intervention and would help 
minimise erroneous actions, especially since this was TTT’s first attempt at implementing an 
InfoSec-related intervention. 
Following the extended CAR principles (Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012) the project team 
selected focal and instrumental theories to guide the actions in this stage. The focal theory 
provides the intellectual basis for the research activities while the instrumental theory directs 
how these activities are carried out (Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012). Consistent with my 
scholarly objective the project team agreed to use the theoretical propositions concerning the 
formation of InfoSec climate as the focal theory for this stage and the whole CAR project. The 
adoption of these theoretical propositions offered a systematic approach to analyse the InfoSec 
environment at TTT by focusing on evaluating the core components of InfoSec climate. 
Specifically, these components were the observable InfoSec practices performed by employees 
and their direct supervisors (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar 
& Ajis 2013) and the socialisation between employees that facilitates their sense-making 
activities and contributes to the formation of an InfoSec climate (Ashforth 1985; Dang-Pham, 
Pittayachawan & Bruno 2015; Schneider & Reichers 1983). 
Two CAR research actions were performed in this stage. The three CPM steps for the internal 
risk assessment with department managers at TTT—action planning, action taking and 
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evaluation—are discussed in the following sections. Then, the same three CPM steps for the 
second research action, exploring the critical factors and best practices for InfoSec 
implementation in Vietnam, will be discussed. Although these research actions were 
exploratory, they would focus on elements of InfoSec climate such as employees’ InfoSec-
related socialisation and perceptions as highlighted by the chosen focal theory. Finally, a 
concluding section is dedicated to present the summarising step of the CPM, namely, 
specifying learning which reflects on the outcomes of these research actions. 
5.2 Internal Risk Assessment with Department Managers 
5.2.1 Action Planning 
Research on InfoSec implementation has emphasised the importance of involving stakeholders 
in organisational risk assessment and acquiring their insights into InfoSec issues (Spears 2006). 
For example, Karyda, Kiountouzis and Kokolakis (2005) specified three important stages for 
implementing InfoSec policies—the formulation, implementation and adoption stages. Of 
these, the formulation stage holds a vital role in the implementation of InfoSec policies as it 
determines the quality of the policies’ contents which need to be actionable and relevant to the 
work context (Karyda, Kiountouzis & Kokolakis 2005). Spears and Barki (2010) employed 
Markus and Mao’s (2004) theoretical framework about information systems users’ 
involvement in the InfoSec context, and found that increased user participation results in 
greater acceptance of InfoSec measures in the implementation phase. NIST (2011) also 
highlights the critical role of risk assessment which reveals InfoSec threats and governs the 
whole implementation of InfoSec improvements. Similarly, the international standard for 
InfoSec management, ISO 27001, advocates a risk-based approach to implement and monitor 
InfoSec improvements (ISO 2017). The importance and anticipated benefits of risk assessment 
activities, as recommended by prior studies and industry standards, justified the performance 
of a risk assessment in this diagnosis stage. 
The project team agreed to use materials of the ISO 27001 standard for the risk assessment 
activities in this stage. A risk register spreadsheet was retrieved from the ‘ISO 27k’ website3, 
an active professional forum where ISO 27001 experts frequently share resources and advice 
pertaining to the implementation of ISO 27001 standard. To diagnose the issues related to 
                                            
3 http://www.iso27001security.com/index.html (accessed 1 September 2017). 
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InfoSec climate at TTT while remaining consistent with the scholarly motivation, the project 
team agreed to use graph theory (Barnes & Harary 1983) as the instrumental theory of this 
stage. 
Graph theory enables the use of SNA concepts to analyse the relationships between InfoSec 
threats, vulnerabilities and their sources in the form of a network consisting of nodes and ties 
(Otte & Rousseau 2002; Scott 2012; Wasserman & Faust 1994). Further, researchers can rely 
on these network-related concepts to calculate quantitative network measures which indicate 
the importance of the InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities in the risk network. On this basis, the 
use of SNA methods would practically support the project team to understand the nature of the 
InfoSec risks while enabling exploration of the applications of SNA methods in a risk 
assessment. 
5.2.2 Action Taking 
The project team then jointly designed and performed the risk assessment process as follows. 
The risk assessment involved the managers from 18 of 20 departments in TTT, excluding the 
board of directors and a small representative office in Ha Noi that had only eight employees. 
The project management and construction departments argued that their departments had 
overlapping confidential files and procedures and, accordingly, they would face similar InfoSec 
threats. Thus, these departments asked to jointly participate in the risk assessment as one group. 
This request was approved by the project team. 
The department managers first listed the information assets of their department (e.g., customer 
records, blueprints and databases) and their details, such as the asset’s formats (i.e., hard or soft 
copy), levels of confidentiality, integrity, availability and whether the asset contained personal 
data or customer data. This step was consistent with the Asset Identification stage in the ISO 
27001 risk management framework (ISO 2017). Once all information assets had been 
documented, the department managers were invited to participate in two brainstorming 
sessions where they attempted to think of as many InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities in TTT 
as possible. The completed lists of information assets, threats and vulnerabilities were the 
prerequisites for the department managers to proceed with completing the risk register 
spreadsheet. 
In the risk register spreadsheet (shown in Figure 5.2) the department managers were asked to 
assign the three most likely InfoSec threats to each information asset they had identified and 
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then determine the three most likely vulnerabilities. An additional activity required the 
department managers to rate the likelihood and impact of the InfoSec threats. On this basis, the 
spreadsheet automatically calculated the mean risk level for each information asset. The 
purpose of the risk register spreadsheet was to systematically develop a risk profile for each 
department which could be revisited and revised in the future. 
 
Figure 5.2. Sample Risk Register Spreadsheet 
The project team then presented the summarised risk assessment findings to TTT’s top 
management using SNA methods. The relationships between InfoSec vulnerabilities and 
threats and departments as the sources of these vulnerabilities and threats were conceptually 
described as 1) the departments have their information assets exposed to one or many InfoSec 
threats and 2) these threats result from one or many vulnerabilities. 
The risk network (see Figure 5.3) visualised the departments (on the right and in dark magenta), 
the vulnerabilities (at the bottom and in pink) and the InfoSec threats (at the top and in light 
green). By treating these concepts as connected nodes, I computed their degree centrality, or 
the sum of ties possessed by a node, to detect centrally important nodes in the network 
(Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). The sizes of the labels were set as proportional to their 
degree centrality. A large department node means that the department was exposed to many 
threats. A large threat node can affect many departments, and a large vulnerability node can 
result in many threats. The calculation of the nodes’ degree centrality was performed by using 
the SNA software package UCINET version 6 (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002) and the 
visualisation by using Gephi (Bastian, Heymann & Jacomy 2009). 
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Figure 5.3. Network of InfoSec Risks in TTT 
Converting the risk register sheet’s data to the relational form of a network enabled me to 
analyse the similarities between the nodes based on their connections. To this end, I calculated 
Jaccard coefficients for every pair of the department nodes which denote the percentage of the 
common ties shared by any two departments (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). A high Jaccard value 
between two departments indicates that those departments were exposed to similar InfoSec 
threats. The Jaccard coefficient was the preferred measure to evaluate ties similarity as its 
calculation only accounts for presenting ties (Hanneman & Riddle 2005), meaning that 
similarities between the nodes are not inflated by sharing the absence of ties. The analysis of 
the similarities and dissimilarities of the nodes is discussed in the next section. 
5.2.3 Evaluation 
Analysing the visualisation of the InfoSec risk network in Figure 5.3 enabled the project team 
to identify the departments in TTT exposed to the most InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, I calculated the degree centrality measures of the nodes in the InfoSec risk network 
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which allowed me to rank the nodes based on their importance. These centrality measures and 
their meanings are presented in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.1 presents the vulnerability nodes in the InfoSec risk network and the number of threats 
which would result from them. The vulnerabilities ‘lack of SETA [security education, training 
and awareness] programs’ and ‘low ISS [information systems security] awareness’ would lead 
to the highest numbers of threats (13 and 12 threats respectively). Other important 
vulnerabilities were inappropriate file management system, lack of ISS [information systems 
security] audit and the lack of or unclear policies about InfoSec procedures. Except for the lack 
of secure lockers, the identified vulnerabilities were either human- or policy-related. This 
finding indicated the critical types of vulnerabilities that currently threatened TTT’s InfoSec 
environment. 
Table 5.1. Vulnerability Nodes in the InfoSec Risk Network 
Vulnerability Number of resulting 
threats 
Lack of SETA [security education, training and awareness] programs 13 
Low ISS [information systems security] awareness 12 
Inappropriate files management system 9 
No ISS [information systems security] audit 8 
No policies about sharing and transferring files across departments 8 
Unclear policies about storing and managing files 8 
Unspecific policies about sanctions 8 
Low awareness about legal responsibilities 7 
Outdated and fragmented ISS [information systems security] policies 6 
Complex and confusing allocation of access rights 5 
Lack of secure lockers 4 
No policies about BYOD [Bring Your Own Device]/mobile devices 
usage 
4 
Unclear policies about publishing/announcing information via emails 
and documents 
4 
Unclear policies about using assets and sharing information with 
external parties 
4 
Using shared printers 4 
Cracked software 3 
Lack of business resilience/recovery solutions 3 
Lack of monitoring cameras 3 
Lack of monitoring entries/visiting 3 
No cyberattacks/intrusion defence 3 
No dedicated office space for negotiating sensitive info 3 
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No insurance for information loss 3 
Unapplied policies about destroying files 3 
Inappropriate fire prevention 2 
No policies about internet usage 2 
No policies about social media usage 2 
Unclear policies about office space at construction site 2 
Lack of security guards 1 
No insurances for job responsibilities 1 
No policies about email usage 1 
Unsafe location for servers 1 
Next, the project team analysed the threat nodes and their degree centrality values. The threat 
nodes, which lay between the vulnerabilities and departments (see Figure 5.3), had their 
importance measured by two types of degree centrality. First, these nodes had in-degree 
centrality measures which indicated the number of departments in TTT that these threats could 
affect. Second, the out-degree centrality reported the number of vulnerabilities that these threat 
nodes resulted from. 
Similar to the previous analysis, the critical threats which were highly ranked based on their 
degree centrality include those that involve human actors such as employees, cleaners or clients 
of TTT (see Table 5.2). The department managers felt especially concerned about insider 
threats caused by employees and cleaners. Additionally, they also considered working with the 
external clients as risky, given the high numbers of client-related vulnerabilities. This finding 
suggested that the prevention of these InfoSec threats was not effective. Blackouts and internet 
disconnection were also deemed important. These issues could disrupt normal business 
operations (i.e., affect the availability and integrity of the data), but was not considered as a 
threat to confidentiality of data. 
Table 5.2. Threat Nodes in the InfoSec Risk Network 
Threat Number of affected 
departments 
Number of originating 
vulnerabilities 
Employees transfer or sell information to 
outsiders 
16 16 
Employees cause loss or damage information 10 15 
Employees copy information, record audio, 
or take photos illegally 
9 13 
Blackout, disconnected or unstable 
connection, disrupted server 
5 10 
Cleaners steal or copy information 5 9 
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Clients record audio or take photos in the 
office 
5 11 
Clients steal and copy information 5 11 
Fire and water hazards destroying assets 4 4 
Rodents and bugs physically damage 
hardcopies 
4 5 
Cleaners cause loss or damage hardcopies 3 7 
Espionage by supplier, subcontractor, 
journalist 
3 8 
Hackers steal or damage information 3 7 
Visitor or family members steal or copy 
information 
3 8 
Visitors or family members record audio or 
take photos in the office 
2 5 
Employees steal information after exiting 
TTT 
1 2 
Factory workers leak info illegally 1 3 
Service providers staff cause loss of assets 1 3 
Vendor steals or sees confidential data via 
remote access 
1 3 
Table 5.3 presents the departments in TTT (excluding the Director Board and the Ha Noi 
representative office) and the number of InfoSec threats that could affect them. Gamma, as a 
sister company of TTT, had the highest number of threats, followed by the departments at TTT 
headquarters that hold key roles in TTT’s business. 
Table 5.3. Department Nodes in the InfoSec Risk Network and Number of Threats 
Building Department (number of threats) 
Headquarter 
Purchasing (7) After Sale Services (6) 
Administration (6) Project Management and Construction (6) 
Accounting (5) Business Development (4) 
Business Solutions 
Provider (4) 
Quality Control and Assurance (4) 
Estimation (3) Information Technology (3) 
Human Resource (2) Marketing (2) 
Tender (3)  
Architect division Sourcing (6) Architect (5) 
Factory division Factory (6) Gamma (sister company) (11) 
Figure 5.4 summarises the Jaccard coefficients between pairs of departments; green cells show 
low similarities and yellow and red cells show greater similarities in terms of exposure to the 
same InfoSec threats. 
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Figure 5.4. Similarities between Departments in Terms of Exposure to InfoSec Threats 
The similarities in the departments’ exposure to InfoSec threats revealed interesting patterns. 
For example, pairs of departments such as estimation and tender and project 
management/construction and factory or architect were found to face many similar InfoSec 
threats. In contrast, departments such as IT and quality control and assurance did not share 
similar threats with the other departments. These contrasting patterns suggested that the similar 
exposure to InfoSec threats was associated with the work relationships between the 
departments in daily operations which may lead to sharing and co-ownership of information 
assets. For example, the estimation and tender departments are both in charge of drafting bid 
documents and costing strategies for the company. The employees in the estimation department 
were responsible for calculating the estimated costs of a project before the costs were 
transferred to the tender department’s employees to review and to prepare the documents and 
strategies for project bidding. Likewise, the departments of project management/construction, 
architect and factory work closely with each other in projects. The collaboration between the 
project management/construction and the factory departments is especially more intense as 
employees of the factory department need to ensure the timely supply of high-quality furniture 
and any necessary replacements upon a project’s demands. On the other hand, employees in 
the IT department rarely get involved in these departments’ operations. Due to the intensive 
collaboration which involves frequent communication and circulation of information assets, 
departments would face similar InfoSec threats and confidential information might be leaked 
in the collaborative processes. 
During the risk assessment process, the project team also exchanged qualitative feedback with 
the department managers. Most department managers confirmed top management’s belief that 
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InfoSec had not been receiving attention from many employees. Some managers confessed to 
vaguely understand that InfoSec issues were related to the infection of computer viruses from 
malicious websites and emails that could affect the company’s information systems somehow. 
The BSP department had installed anti-virus software on the company’s computers and 
recommended all employees to occasionally check for the software’s updating status. However, 
the department managers commented that most of their employees neither knew how to 
perform such actions nor had the habit of performing this InfoSec practice. The department 
managers further reported several InfoSec incidents caused by employees, including forgetting 
printed documents in the printing area and carelessly disclosing bid profiles and costing 
strategies to external clients. While the latter type of incidents would pose a substantial risk to 
TTT, the department managers believed that it was mainly due to employees failing to 
recognise the confidentiality of the information that they shared with the clients which led to 
unintentional leakage. 
A positive InfoSec climate is reflected by the InfoSec practices actively performed by 
colleagues and direct supervisors and the socialisation about InfoSec matters between 
employees (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
The reported InfoSec incidents and employees’ poor InfoSec awareness in general suggested 
that an InfoSec climate was lacking at TTT. Moreover, the project team also found there were 
no proper communication and training programs to alleviate the problem. The highlighted 
human-related InfoSec issues in the InfoSec risk network motivated our intention to design and 
implement a change program that focused on improving employees’ InfoSec knowledge. TTT 
top management, after reviewing the risk assessment findings, agreed with this intention. 
Finally, the project team observed positive reactions from the department managers during 
their participation in the risk assessment activities. The discussions with the managers were 
lively and they contributed thoughtful insights into their departments’ information assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities. Some managers admitted that they were glad to see the company 
had finally invested considerable effort into conducting a formal project to address the InfoSec 
issues. The buy-in gained from the top management and department managers established a 
solid foundation for the next CAR activities. 
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5.3 Exploring Critical Factors and Methods for Effective InfoSec 
Implementation in Vietnam 
5.3.1 Action Planning 
In addition to diagnosing TTT’s InfoSec environment, the project team agreed that the 
researcher would consult external experts to understand the critical factors and best practices 
for effective implementation of InfoSec improvements in Vietnam. The knowledge of these 
critical factors and best practices was anticipated to guide the change program at TTT and 
minimise erroneous actions. The task to determine the critical factors and best practices for 
InfoSec implementation in the Vietnamese context was exploratory in nature. This called for 
the adoption of a case study approach which involved interviewing InfoSec experts in Vietnam 
and conducting thematic analysis to identify the success factors of InfoSec implementation. 
Case study as a research method is ‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009, p. 13). The implementation of InfoSec involves 
both complexity (Merete, Albrechtsen & Hovden 2008) and is also contextual as it concerns 
various organisational and cultural factors (Crossler et al. 2013; Saint-Germain 2005). Further, 
the project team decided to interview InfoSec experts who had experience implementing the 
international InfoSec standard ISO 27001 to ensure these experts had practical knowledge that 
could be considered when designing the change program at TTT. 
The rigour of case study research is evaluated based on multiple criteria in each stage of 
conducting the study. The first criterion is to clearly define a research question and the case 
study’s design (Dubé & Paré 2003; Riege 2003). With regard to the research question, this 
diagnosis stage aimed at identifying the critical factors of InfoSec implementation in the 
Vietnamese context by interviewing ISO 27001 InfoSec experts.  
Describing the unit of analysis in case study research is challenging as there are various 
terminologies used to define a case study and its components. In this matter, Gerring’s (2004) 
definitions of case study elements are quite concise. Gerring (2004, p. 342) explained a case 
study as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
(similar) units’. A unit represents a phenomenon which comprises a sample of cases and each 
case comprises several variables (Gerring 2004). Based on this terminology, the phenomenon 
or unit of interest for the case study embedded in this CAR project was the implementation of 
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ISO 27001 standard in the Vietnamese context, from the perspectives of the InfoSec experts as 
studied cases. The objective was to explore the critical factors of ISO 27001 implementation 
which were the variables of the case study. The case study of this stage belonged to the category 
of a single-unit case study suitable for focusing on the depth of the phenomenon via internal 
comparisons (Gerring 2004). 
5.3.2 Action Taking 
Dubé and Paré (2003) further recommend a criterion for case study’s rigour which is to clearly 
explain the data collection process. Over a period of one month, invitations were sent to InfoSec 
experts in charge of ISO 27001 implementation projects in their firms in Vietnam. I approached 
InfoSec experts via online social platforms and forums for professionals including LinkedIn 
and Facebook’s community pages of Vietnamese IT experts and through personal contacts and 
referrals.  
Of the seven InfoSec experts who agreed to be interviewed, one expert from a multinational 
hardware manufacturing corporation refused to participate after consulting with their external 
affairs department. Overall, most of the invited experts displayed concerns about answering 
topics related to organisational InfoSec even though ethics clearance (see Appendix B) and 
measures to protect the participants’ anonymity had been explicitly demonstrated. These 
concerns were consistent with Kotulic and Clark’s (2004) discussion on the intrusive nature of 
InfoSec research that commonly results in a low response rate from industry stakeholders. 
Semi-structured audio-recorded interviews in Vietnamese were conducted in person and online 
with six InfoSec experts (see Table 5.4). The interview questions (see Appendix C) were 
designed by myself and two academics in the information systems field following the 
responsive interview’s format suggested by Rubin and Rubin (2011). The interviews lasted for 
an average of one hour and brief analysis was performed after every interview to add or modify 
the questions for the next interview. 
Table 5.4. Backgrounds of Interviewed InfoSec Experts 
ID Occupation InfoSec-related experience Industry 
EX1 Consultant/IT Auditor 3 years Banking and financial services 
EX2 IT Manager 14 years IT services 
EX3 Consultant 5 years Banking 
EX4 Information Security Officer 7 years IT services 
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EX5 Deputy IT Director 10 years Banking 
EX6 Data Security Manager 3.5 years Engineering and electronics 
I transcribed the interviews myself and used the qualitative analysis software NVivo 11 to 
analyse the transcripts. Within-case and cross-case analyses were performed to search for major 
themes to support internal validity (Dubé & Paré 2003; Riege 2003). The analysis process was 
as follows. When I was conducting the interviews, I took note of the concepts that appeared 
critical for InfoSec implementation. Next, I briefly reviewed the notes after each interview to 
determine whether the critical factors identified from the previous interview appeared again in 
the current one and, where necessary, asked the interviewees additional questions for further 
elaboration. I analysed then each case (i.e., the interview with each InfoSec expert) separately 
and coded the critical factors for InfoSec implementation in NVivo. The findings were 
compared across cases and I identified the consensus and divergences from the cross-case 
analysis. Finally, validity was achieved by having the informants review the case study report 
(Dubé & Paré 2003; Riege 2003) and quotes were used as evidence when writing discussions 
to improve rigour (Dubé & Paré 2003). 
5.3.3 Evaluation 
Since I chose to interview experts experienced in implementing the ISO 27001 standard, the 
implementation process described by them followed the Plan-Do-Check-Act framework of this 
standard (illustrated in Figure 5.5). An InfoSec specialist implementing the ISO 27001 standard 
would begin with a risk assessment and design the InfoSec measures in the Plan stage, followed 
by the Do stage where the designed measures are implemented. Then, in the Check stage, they 
would perform the auditing and evaluation of the implementation’s effectiveness and, in the 
Act stage, reflect on the evaluation and maintain the improvements (Gikas 2010; ISO 2017). 
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Figure 5.5. ISO 27001 Standard’s Plan-Do-Check-Act Framework 
Adopted from Gikas (2010, p. 136). 
The critical factors for InfoSec implementation in Vietnamese context, which emerged from 
the within- and cross-case analysis on the interviews with the experts, were grouped into three 
themes. The first two themes focused on the critical factors that were recommended to be 
accounted for during the design and communication of the InfoSec implementation, and the 
third theme focused on the methods and tools to implement InfoSec in the workplace. 
The grouping of the interviewed content’s themes was based on the experts’ common 
descriptions of a step-by-step InfoSec implementation process. For example, the critical factors 
‘practical, precise, and applicable InfoSec controls’, ‘collaboration between InfoSec team and 
department managers’ and ‘top management’s financial and authoritative support’ were 
consistently suggested by the experts when they discussed the Plan stage of the ISO 27001 
implementation process. These factors focused on designing the implementation. Therefore, 
they were assigned to the first theme about the design of an InfoSec implementation. 
Other critical factors, such as ‘incentives of compliance’, ‘cost of compliance’, ‘InfoSec 
training’ or ‘sanctions’ were mentioned when the interviewed experts discussed the Do, Check 
and Act stages of such implementation process. Moreover, when asked about the factors to be 
considered during these stages, the experts focused on the InfoSec-related contents that need 
to be communicated to end-users and how such communication should be facilitated. 
Consequently, this resulted in the second and third themes: 1) the factors that need to be 
considered during communication (e.g., Vietnamese and organisational cultures and the 
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communicated contents such as benefits and rewards) and 2) the methods or means to 
effectively communicate these contents. 
The concepts, regarded as critical factors, were those that had many coded instances (i.e., the 
concept was explicitly mentioned many times by different experts). Table 5.5 summarises these 
critical factors and their themes, the number of experts who mentioned them and their number 
of coded utterance. Details of these critical factors supported by direct quotes are elaborated in 
the following sections. 
Table 5.5. Critical Factors for InfoSec Implementation in Vietnamese Context 
































The three characteristics of InfoSec 
measures that affect the feasibility and 






The financial (e.g., allocation of budget 
for recruiting InfoSec personnel) and 
authoritative support (e.g., announcing 
the InfoSec policies and measures) from 
the top management that is essential for 







A requirement for effectively 
implementing InfoSec improvements, 
especially in the design stage when the 
InfoSec team acquires feedback from the 
department managers to make the 



















Benefits of InfoSec 
compliance 
The incentives (e.g., recognition, 
InfoSec knowledge) that can be 
communicated to employees to motivate 
their InfoSec compliance. The incentives 
can be explained as the benefits of 
InfoSec compliance for the 
organisations or for the individual 
employees. 
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Costs of InfoSec 
compliance 
The costs of complying with InfoSec 
policies and procedures (e.g., time and 
efforts) that needs to be considered 








The undesirable consequences that can 
be communicated to employees to 
motivate their InfoSec compliance. The 
undesirable consequences can be 
explained as affecting the organisations 
and/or the individual employees. 
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Sanctions 
The punishments for InfoSec violations 
or careless behaviours. Some experts 
cautioned that mentioning sanctions too 
frequently may make employees feel 





Every employee is responsible and 
accountable for organisational InfoSec 
by default. However, they may not 
realise their InfoSec roles and 
responsibility and the organisations need 






Traits of the Vietnamese culture (e.g., 
high collectivism and large power 
distance) and of the organisational 
culture (e.g., hierarchical nature) that 
need to be considered when 
















The different approaches to conduct 
InfoSec training and the considerations 




The audits and tests that are performed 
periodically to evaluate employees’ 





The factors related to the work 
interactions (e.g., formal authority and 
peers’ influence) and the use of opinion 
leaders that help persuade employees to 






The measures such as posters, desktop 
screens, non-disclosure agreements and 




5.3.3.1 Critical factors for designing InfoSec implementation 
This section describes the critical factors which contribute to an effective designing of an 
InfoSec implementation. Specifically, practitioners are advised to design InfoSec measures that 
are practical, concise and applicable for the work context, especially by closely collaborating 
with the department managers and by gaining financial and authoritative support from top 
management. 
5.3.3.1.1 Practical, concise and applicable InfoSec measures 
Most InfoSec experts emphasised three important characteristics to focus on when designing 
effective InfoSec measures which need to be practical, concise and applicable for each 
organisational context with its unique characteristics. 
We had representatives of the departments to participate in the design process for the 
InfoSec policy and to give their feedback to make the policy more practical and 
applicable in the company’s context. (EX2) 
If you enforce an InfoSec policy without taking into account the policy’s relevancy to 
the company, then it will be very difficult to persuade people to follow it. (EX3) 
EX2 stressed that failures in InfoSec implementation often result from rigidly applying generic 
standards onto the organisation without thoughtful consideration. All interviewed experts 
recommended that InfoSec controls should be designed in a way that they are perceived by 
employees as useful and relevant to their department’s operations and their own work. EX3 
highlighted that all InfoSec controls must ultimately aim at meeting the expectations of top 
management, who are often the main sponsor investing in the implementation of InfoSec 
programs. Overall, the design and selection of the InfoSec controls to be implemented need to 
account for the needs and requirements of stakeholders at all levels. 
5.3.3.1.2 Top management’s financial and authoritative support 
In the context of InfoSec implementation top management hold a vital role by providing their 
sponsorship, which affects the acquisition of the human and technical resources for an effective 
implementation. EX3 discussed a major challenge in top management often lacking knowledge 
of InfoSec controls and thus not willing to invest into InfoSec improvements. EX3 cited a case 
of an InfoSec implementation project in which top management of the company believed that 
the installation of a firewall alone would suffice for the company’s InfoSec. EX3 found it 
99 
challenging to persuade top management to acquire more advanced InfoSec measures as they 
did not appreciate the benefits of InfoSec improvements. Similarly, EX6 emphasised the 
importance of informing top management about the benefits of InfoSec improvements to gain 
their support. 
Top management’s buy-in is extremely important for InfoSec implementation. (EX3) 
The second stage [designing the InfoSec implementation] is very important. The key 
activity in this stage is to present your implementation plan to the board of 
management, and you must convince them that the proposed InfoSec measures are 
crucial for the company and receive their support. (EX6) 
EX5 complained that top management in his firm saw InfoSec as consisting solely of technical 
measures. Therefore, his IT department did not receive a sufficient budget for a competitive 
salary package to attract InfoSec talents. Further, due to the budget constraint and top 
management’s underestimation of InfoSec, it was not possible to conduct mandatory InfoSec 
training for all employees, but only on demand for a handful of departments. Moreover, the 
training was performed on EX5’s own initiative and top management had reportedly never 
shown interest in maintaining the training periodically. 
Large enterprises in Vietnam do have InfoSec departments that are dedicated to take 
care of InfoSec issues, but they mainly focus on the hardware, software, or network 
security…they have not yet realised the importance of the people and process 
components of InfoSec management. That’s why they are not very supportive when it 
comes to training and enforcing procedures. (EX5) 
EX2 shared a similar experience in his early career, when top management ignored an InfoSec 
risk because they were not willing to allocate resources to mitigating that risk. This ignored 
risk subsequently led to an InfoSec breach. 
Most top management of companies in Vietnam have not yet developed a mindset that 
sees InfoSec as important. It is understandable, since the companies in Vietnam still 
remain at the level of thinking about how to survive, rather than how to improve. 
(EX2) 
Apart from top management’s allocation of resources to InfoSec implementation, their formal 
authority and critical roles were also discussed by the interviewees. Such authority could be 
used to enforce participation in InfoSec projects and to legitimise the implemented InfoSec 
controls. EX3 shared an experience of co-leading an implementation project with a company’s 
representative who failed to have the other departments complete their assigned tasks on time. 
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After slow progress for three months, EX3 requested top management increase their presence 
in the project by attending the project meetings which immediately alleviated the issue. 
5.3.3.1.3 Collaboration between InfoSec team and department managers 
EX3 discussed that while top management contributes to InfoSec implementation by 
legitimising and enforcing InfoSec controls, InfoSec staff and department managers also play 
critical roles in designing InfoSec controls. EX6 discussed a previous InfoSec implementation 
project in which he required each department to jointly perform a risk assessment and to design 
the InfoSec controls with his InfoSec team so that the controls were aligned with department’s 
operations and important assets. 
The HR department has to manage personal information such as payrolls, so they 
need to be trained how to handle these confidential data. The sales department does 
not keep much personal data so they would not need to care much about privacy, but 
they often exchange information with third parties. Because of that they have to learn 
how to communicate information securely. (EX6) 
EX6 highlighted that only the participation of the department managers was required, not all 
employees, since gathering opinions from operational staff would make the project 
unnecessarily complex and hinder implementation. He remarked, ‘It is impossible to design a 
process that satisfies everyone’. EX1 shared this view and explained that seeking department 
managers’ insights would suffice for the InfoSec implementation as these managers have a 
thorough understanding about the business operations and a strategic vision that operational 
staff would not possess. 
5.3.3.2 Critical factors for communicating InfoSec 
After the InfoSec measures are designed and support from top management is acquired, the 
designed InfoSec measures and InfoSec-related contents must be effectively communicated to 
employees. EX2 highlighted the importance of communicating InfoSec to employees: 
The main reason why employees are not motivated to comply with InfoSec policies is 
because you only force them to comply without explaining the reasons for 
compliance. When it lacks explanations, employees tend to create their own 
[negative] reasons, such as the companies want to restrict their freedom to use 
computers at work with the InfoSec policies. (EX2) 
This section presents the critical factors or the important InfoSec-related contents that 
practitioners are advised to communicate to employees during InfoSec implementation. 
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5.3.3.2.1 Benefits of InfoSec compliance 
All InfoSec experts suggested informing employees about the benefits of InfoSec compliance 
to secure their acceptance of the implemented InfoSec controls. For example, EX1 listed the 
prevention of the productivity loss from an InfoSec breach as an advantage of InfoSec 
compliance. EX5 added gaining InfoSec knowledge as another benefit, by which employees 
can improve their knowledge and develop good InfoSec habits to protect their personal 
computers. EX3 mentioned a case where a company asked employees to participate in an 
InfoSec awareness test and those who achieved high scores had their names listed in the 
company’s Hall of Fame. In this case, EX3 suggested that recognition can be another incentive 
for compliance. 
EX6 argued that InfoSec compliance is not a voluntary decision, but an expected behaviour of 
organisation members and, therefore, does not require any incentives. While the InfoSec 
experts found it difficult to think about any personal benefits that employees could gain from 
InfoSec compliance, they suggested explaining to employees the incentives for InfoSec 
compliance which affect both themselves and their organisations. For example, EX1 suggested 
explaining that employees’ InfoSec compliance would contribute to the protection of their 
departments’ information assets and to their collective productivity. However, EX2 and EX3 
contended that some employees would not care about the collective benefits of InfoSec: 
The problem is, when someone said: ‘If you don’t comply with information security 
then you will risk the reputation of the company’, then who cares? ‘In the worst 
scenario, I’d just quit the company.’ That’s how most of them would think. (EX2) 
EX4 suggested a solution by establishing a mutual understanding about the benefits of InfoSec 
compliance for the organisations and for employees: 
All benefits of compliance received by the company should be explained to the 
employees. When the company receives the benefits, then such benefits would be 
shared with the employees. For example, having good InfoSec makes our clients see 
us as more trustworthy, and they would give us more projects to work on. The 
company’s revenue would then be generated and even increased, and so would the 
salaries or bonuses of the employees. (EX4) 
5.3.3.2.2 Costs of InfoSec compliance 
All experts recognised that InfoSec compliance can be perceived as time-consuming and 
cumbersome for many employees, and that such costs of compliance pose a major obstacle to 
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achieve employees’ InfoSec compliance. EX6 suggested that the costs of compliance can be 
minimised during the formulation stage where the design and selection of the InfoSec controls 
take place, while EX2 believed that the cost of compliance is inevitable regardless of how the 
InfoSec controls are designed: 
There is no way that information security compliance is convenient. It is simply 
sacrificing the employees’ convenience to secure the company’s important assets. It’s 
like keeping the valuables inside your house safe; it will be so much convenient if you 
don’t have to lock the doors and windows when going outside, but you have to 
because you are afraid that your stuff will be stolen. (EX2) 
5.3.3.2.3 Undesirable consequences of InfoSec violations or negligence 
Similar to the incentives for InfoSec compliance, the undesired consequences of InfoSec 
negligence or violation can be explained as affecting both the individual employees and their 
organisations to justify the importance of InfoSec controls. For example, EX1 suggested raising 
employees’ InfoSec awareness by informing them of the consequences of not following an 
InfoSec policy. 
There are several ways to motivate compliance by raising the employees’ awareness 
that InfoSec incidents can impact their work directly. For example, if you work in the 
Accounting department then you need to lock your computer before leaving your desk. 
If you don’t, anyone can easily delete your work on the balance sheets which usually 
take a lot of time and effort to prepare. (EX1) 
In addition to disciplinary actions as another personal undesired consequence of InfoSec 
negligence, all experts suggested placing emphasis on the InfoSec threats that target the 
organisation. EX3 and EX6 recommended that organisations should publish weekly news 
about InfoSec attacks and use them as case studies to raise employees’ InfoSec awareness. EX6 
highlighted that InfoSec threats at all levels of seriousness should be explained to employees. 
5.3.3.2.4 Sanctions 
The experts discussed the role of sanctions as a tool to enforce InfoSec compliance, which is 
used by practitioners and organisations that adopt the enforcement approach. Interestingly, 
EX1 and EX2 considered avoiding sanctions in the event of an InfoSec breach as an incentive 
for InfoSec compliance. Specifically, employees involved in InfoSec incidents could avoid 
sanctions if they present evidence of their compliance with prescribed InfoSec procedures. 
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While the interviewed experts agreed that communicating sanctions was necessary, they also 
cautioned: 
Sanctions are communicated clearly in my company. If an employee violates the 
InfoSec policy then they will receive a warning for the first time. If they continuously 
receive warnings then they can have their salary and bonus reduced, or even get their 
contract terminated. (EX2) 
I always told my clients to avoid resorting to sanctions. What has happened has 
already happened; the primary objective of effective InfoSec controls is to prevent 
InfoSec incidents from happening. (EX3) 
Both EX1 and EX4 discussed that even mentioning sanctions without careful considerations 
could result in negative effects: 
The more we emphasise sanctions, the more the employees will resist. Of course not 
everyone would protest against it, but I understand how the employees in my company 
feel...You would react when you are threatened, and that’s natural. (EX4) 
5.3.3.2.5 Roles and responsibility 
Although it is helpful to establish the incentives for InfoSec compliance and undesired 
consequences of InfoSec negligence, all experts shared the view that InfoSec compliance 
should be recognised by employees as part of their work roles and responsibility. 
Being an employee of the company means that you have to follow its policies by 
default. (EX2) 
Everyone should know that they are responsible and accountable for the 
organisation’s InfoSec. (EX3) 
We don’t implement a rewarding system for InfoSec compliance in our company, 
because it is part of the policy and directives sent from our headquarters in Germany. 
Every employee must be aware of their responsibility in ensuring information security 
and comply with the policy. (EX6) 
The experts also agreed that the roles of InfoSec and responsibility for it involve not only 
personal compliance, but also the duty to educate other employees on InfoSec matters, 
especially if an employee holds a senior position. For example, EX1 had taken the ‘train the 
trainers’ approach and appointed department managers as champions whose roles then included 
acting as InfoSec role models and diffusing InfoSec knowledge among members of their 
departments. If these champions failed one of these tasks they would be held accountable for 
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it. In this context, EX6 highlighted the common issue that many Vietnamese employees are not 
aware of their personal InfoSec role and often expect that their colleagues’ InfoSec compliance 
is sufficient for the organisation InfoSec. 
5.3.3.2.6 Vietnamese and organisational cultures 
All experts stated that the unique national and work cultures of Vietnam influence the use of 
tools and measures to implement InfoSec improvements. Therefore, they recommended 
practitioners to be aware of these cultural traits and make use of them to support the 
implementation of InfoSec improvements. For example, EX4 suggested using formal leaders 
at the appropriate levels of authority, depending on the hierarchical structure of the workplace, 
to inspire and motivate InfoSec compliance. 
It depends on the culture of each organisation. There are companies where the top 
management are very close to the employees; so if these top executives can lead by 
example in their workplaces then it would be very effective. But if the power distance 
is too large then the immediate direct managers are more influential. (EX4) 
EX2 and EX6 posited that the industry that an organisation belongs also impacts how 
employees perceive the role of InfoSec, responsibility for it and the usefulness of InfoSec 
controls. 
People who work in the banking sector would feel more comfortable with the security 
measures in place such as CCTVs and computer monitoring software. Because if a 
security incident occurred, they could show the recorded evidences that they were not 
responsible for the incident. (EX2) 
With regard to the Vietnamese culture, EX3, EX4 and EX6 complained about the low InfoSec 
awareness and knowledge of Vietnamese employees in general which affect the 
implementation of InfoSec improvements: 
Vietnamese employees in general don’t care about information security risks, since 
information security matters are rarely mentioned in educational programs and also 
in daily life. Vietnamese laws about information security are not clear and well-
communicated to the citizens. That’s why these people don’t treat information 
security matters seriously. (EX6) 
EX3 argued that Vietnamese employees favour following the norms, reflecting the high 
collectivism in Vietnamese culture (Hofstede 2001), and suggested relying on this trait to 
diffuse InfoSec knowledge in the workplace. However, other experts believed that high 
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collectivism in a workplace with large power distance could jeopardise the consistent quality 
of InfoSec awareness and behaviours. 
In some Vietnamese firms, information security policies are announced by the top 
management but enacted differently within each department, since the employees in 
these departments only follow their co-workers and direct managers but not those at 
the top level. (EX1) 
5.3.3.3 Methods and tools to communicate InfoSec 
The interviewed experts categorised the implementation of InfoSec improvements into the 
persuasion and enforcement approaches. These two approaches should be flexibly applied to 
ensure employees’ acceptance of the implemented InfoSec measures by communicating the 
InfoSec-related contents discussed in the previous section. Such communication aims at 
helping employees realise the priority of InfoSec which reflects top management’s vision and 
explains to employees how InfoSec compliance would be personally meaningful to them. The 
tools and methods the experts recommended for communicating InfoSec are discussed below. 
5.3.3.3.1 InfoSec training 
Training was mentioned as the most common method to convince employees’ InfoSec 
compliance by improving their InfoSec awareness and knowledge. Another purpose of training 
is to explain the enforcement mechanisms to employees to prevent any denial of responsibility. 
In interviews the experts presented 1) a large-scale approach training all employees in the same 
way, 2) a small group training approach targeting employees with similar roles and preferences 
and 3) the train the trainers approach which leverages champions’ influence to diffuse InfoSec 
knowledge. 
EX2 explained that the large-scale approach is generic and suitable for training newly hired 
staff, especially in large enterprises where there might be hundreds of new employees joining 
annually. The disadvantage of the large-scale approach is its generic nature which can be 
addressed by the small group approach. For example, EX2 argued that there exist groups of 
employees who have various levels of technical knowledge and needs and, thus, training should 
be tailored accordingly. Likewise, EX3 suggested that step-by-step instructions are especially 
useful for blue-collar workers whose computer proficiency might be low. Train the trainers 
was considered a form of the small group approach which leveraged the social influence of the 
key players to persuade others’ InfoSec compliance. 
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The experts identified three critical factors of an effective training program, namely, the 
continuity and consistency of the program, employees’ involvement in the training and the 
selection of the trainers. While the first characteristic is widely recommended by InfoSec 
standards such as ISO 27001, achieving the other characteristics requires more effort and a 
strategic vision from the InfoSec implementation team. 
Most of the experts agreed on one method to encourage employees’ involvement, which is 
making the training fun and interactive through facilitating open discussions and using small 
gifts or recognitions as incentives for employees’ participation. EX3 highlighted that 
employees need to practise the handling of InfoSec issues in realistic scenarios relevant to their 
daily work. EX5 emphasised that employees must be encouraged to engage in discussions 
about InfoSec-related matters with the trainers during the training by actively questioning the 
trainers and exchanging information until employees truly understand the InfoSec issues. On 
the other hand, the experts disagreed about the selection of the InfoSec trainers. For example, 
EX3 advocated the use of external InfoSec trainers: 
Internal trainers cannot train well for several reasons. For example, if you and I have 
been hanging out as colleagues, then suddenly you became my trainer, it’s hard for 
me to see you as a teacher. However, when the company hires an expert from the 
outside with formal qualifications and experience, then it feels different. The external 
expert also has their unique way of teaching, and their experience also differs from 
what is happening in the company. That uniqueness triggers the learners’ interest in 
learning with them. I also can’t take my training lightly when learning with a stranger 
since I know he or she would not easily tolerate my mistakes. But to you who just went 
out for coffee with me, the effect won’t be the same. (EX3) 
EX5 rejected the idea that companies should rely on external trainers, especially those based 
in Vietnam: 
To me, as long as the internal trainers are knowledgeable and the employees’ 
discipline is high, then they can conduct the training well. In fact, many InfoSec 
consulting firms in Vietnam are not even certified for delivering the programs that 
they offer to deliver. They can do all the fanciful presentations about their programs 
and fascinate the small and medium businesses, but large enterprises like us are 
demanding—we don’t pay for their second-rate services and let them learn on the 
job. (EX5) 
5.3.3.3.2 Monitoring and evaluation 
All experts recommended continuous monitoring and evaluation for implementation of InfoSec 
improvements. This includes the use of incident management systems to automatically monitor 
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employees’ computers, periodical audits and online tests on the intranet to assess employees’ 
InfoSec awareness and knowledge. 
The basic measure to evaluate organisational InfoSec is the number of incidents, such 
as the number of detected virus, malware, DDOS, or when some internal employees 
tried to scan ports...we can monitor and record those incidents. (EX2) 
My company applies the 5S principles of the Japanese workplace organisation 
method. We also have a team that does periodical audits on things such as whether 
the desks and work documents are kept tidied. (EX5) 
Similar to conducting InfoSec training, EX4 suggested designing InfoSec tests as fun quizzes 
which reduce employees’ perceived pressure of being formally evaluated and increase their 
voluntary participation. In contrast, EX1, EX2 and EX5 recommended making InfoSec tests 
compulsory and to have employees complete them with satisfactory scores. When being asked 
about the possibility of employees cheating in the InfoSec tests to achieve the satisfactory 
scores, EX1 did not see cheating as a serious issue. He explained that even when employees 
memorise answers from the last test or help their colleagues complete the test, such repeated 
cheating would help employees unconsciously learn about InfoSec. Both EX3 and EX6 
suggested that audits should be carried out by internal staff since they understand the 
organisations’ vulnerabilities and threats better than external auditors. EX6 argued that 
periodically conducting audits also displays the organisations’ commitment to maintaining 
good InfoSec which could make employees realise that InfoSec is important and prioritised. 
5.3.3.3.3 Work interactions and social influence 
The experts put forward that InfoSec can be communicated via both formal training and 
employees’ work interactions within the workplace. Most experts agreed that formal authority 
and organisational structures play a significant role in communicating InfoSec via daily work 
interactions. For example, although EX2 acknowledged that Vietnamese employees tend to 
follow the norms created by their colleagues’ behaviours, he argued that organisations should 
not allow informal norms to prevail over formal communication channels such as through 
InfoSec staff or authoritative managers. On this basis, all experts except EX5 saw informal 
opinion leaders and norms as contributing little to communicating InfoSec: 
Having informal opinion leaders is not practical. If there are so many formal and 
informal information security leaders in a workplace, then who should listen to 
whom? (EX2) 
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We don’t use opinion leaders to persuade information security compliance. Since the 
nature of information security is being predominantly perceived as highly technical, 
you need to leave the persuasion to only a few technical persons to gain people’s 
trust. There would not be many people in an organisation who fit that role. (EX3) 
Honestly speaking, I don’t see colleagues’ behaviours and attitudes as important, 
because information security compliance ultimately depends on one’s own 
awareness. If they are well-trained and have good awareness then they can perform 
the information security behaviours well, even when they work in an environment 
where the majority fail to do so. (EX6) 
I think having opinion leaders is beneficial. If there are some key employees who are 
seen by others as role models, and they can showcase that they perform InfoSec 
practices well then that positive image will spread within the workplace. (EX5) 
The experts’ lack of consensus on the use of informal opinion leaders suggested that such a 
tactic may be feasible in practice, but only when certain requirements are met. To this end, I 
probed into these requirements by enquiring about the desirable characteristics of an effective 
InfoSec opinion leader. 
EX2 and EX3 both explained that InfoSec leaders must possess a balanced set of knowledge 
of both InfoSec and business matters and good leadership and communication skills. All 
experts emphasised the effective practice of leading by example to motivate other employees’ 
InfoSec compliance. As department managers are in the position where they constantly develop 
and display leadership, they were considered as potential candidates for the diffusion of 
InfoSec knowledge. EX2 further suggested making use of department managers’ close 
relationship with other department members to better convince them about InfoSec compliance 
and to deliver clearer InfoSec instructions which might complement the InfoSec training. 
5.3.3.3.4 Agreements, technical restrictions and reminders 
The use of formal agreements and reminders was mentioned by the experts as the means to 
reinforce employees’ InfoSec compliance. For example, the experts reported the use of the 
non-disclosure agreements to inform employees about the role of InfoSec and their 
responsibilities. Although contracts and agreements can clearly communicate InfoSec 
requirements to employees, EX2 stated that employees can be overloaded by and ignore the 
information in those agreements. 
Employees need to receive frequent InfoSec-related information via emails or via 
their line managers, and they have to sign their agreements to InfoSec policies and 
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prescribed procedures. At the same time, we also have measures to promote InfoSec-
related matters such as posters and desktop screens. (EX2) 
EX1 and EX5 suggested using technical restrictions to enforce InfoSec compliance such as 
blocking online social media or websites, managing access rights to files and folders or setting 
automatic reminders for changing passwords. 
Together with persuading the employees to comply with information security policies, 
there are technical measures such as assigning access rights and blocking websites 
or Facebook to further mitigate information security risks. (EX5) 
Posters, desktop screens, banners and announcements were also considered by the experts as 
effective means for reminding and promoting the importance of InfoSec compliance. While 
EX2 thought that the deployment of these tools was easy, he also contended that measuring 
their effectiveness in communicating InfoSec would be difficult. As such, he recommended 
practitioners to not overly rely on these tools. 
5.4 Reflection 
In this diagnosis stage I performed two research actions: 1) diagnosed the InfoSec issues at 
TTT and 2) investigated the critical factors and best practices for implementing InfoSec 
programs in the Vietnamese context. The risk assessment revealed that TTT currently 
encountered many issues related to employees’ inadequate InfoSec knowledge. Moreover, the 
identified factors and best practices were found useful for designing the InfoSec change 
program at TTT. The following sections present my reflection on the findings resulting from 
the research actions and determine the next course of action. 
5.4.1 Reflection on the Issues Related to InfoSec Climate at TTT 
After reviewing the InfoSec issues at TTT, the project team and top management reached a 
consensus that the envisioned InfoSec change program should focus on improving employees’ 
InfoSec knowledge and awareness. Reflecting on the focal theoretical concept of InfoSec 
climate (Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Schneider 
& Reichers 1983), we concluded that no InfoSec climate currently existed at TTT because 
InfoSec had never been treated as a priority in the workplace. Additionally, the identified issues 
from the risk assessment such as the lack of InfoSec training and employees’ insecure InfoSec 
behaviours indicated that InfoSec-related activities had not taken place at TTT. In line with the 
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theoretical explanations about the formation of InfoSec climate the project team determined 
that the InfoSec change program needed to increase the InfoSec-related socialisation between 
employees to form a positive InfoSec climate. Moreover, we concluded that TTT could also 
leverage this socialisation to diffuse InfoSec awareness and knowledge in the workplace. To 
this end, the interviews with the InfoSec experts offered the critical factors and methods to 
effectively communicate InfoSec to employees. 
5.4.2 Reflection on the Critical Factors and Methods for Implementing an InfoSec 
Change Program at TTT 
The critical factors and methods for InfoSec implementation in the Vietnamese context, 
identified through the interviews with the InfoSec experts, mirrored those recommended by 
prior research. For example, prior studies emphasised the impact of clarity and applicability of 
InfoSec controls on InfoSec compliance (see e.g., Boss et al. 2009; Höne & Eloff 2002; Karyda, 
Kiountouzis & Kokolakis 2005; Ruighaver et al. 2007). Spears (2006) and Spears and Barki 
(2010) also highlight the importance of user participation during InfoSec implementation, 
especially in the risk assessment stage. The project team successfully gained buy-in from the 
department managers by involving them in the risk assessment. The top management also 
realised the analytical capabilities of SNA methods through the analysis of the risk network 
and supported the use of these methods to analyse and improve the InfoSec-related socialisation 
between employees. As such, I found the current situation favourable for the subsequent 
implementation of the InfoSec change program. 
The project team considered the experts’ suggestion to make use of the daily work interactions 
and social influence, which leveraged the high collectivism of Vietnamese culture, to 
encourage employees’ InfoSec compliance. Top management also agreed with following this 
persuasive approach as the work culture at TTT had been relying on persuasion to facilitate 
employees’ acceptance of organisational changes rather than enforcing changes with strict 
rules. This reinforced the project team’s intention to enhance the InfoSec environment in TTT 
by improving the InfoSec-related socialisation which would contribute to the formation of a 
favourable InfoSec climate. To this end, the project team took note of the experts’ 
recommended criteria to select InfoSec leaders suitable for the persuasive diffusion of InfoSec 
knowledge. According to the experts, InfoSec leaders should have a balanced mindset of 
business and InfoSec matters, leadership and communication skills and the ability to lead by 
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example. This subsequently suggested that the project team would need to conduct InfoSec 
training for the selected leaders. 
Recognitions and tangible rewards were recommended by the experts and by prior research as 
incentives that motivate employees’ InfoSec compliance (Boss et al. 2009; Pahnila, Siponen & 
Mahmood 2007; Ruighaver, Maynard & Chang 2007). Moreover, the experts suggested 
explaining the benefits of InfoSec compliance and undesired consequences of InfoSec 
negligence, which impact both employees and their organisations, to help employees fully 
understand the importance of InfoSec. The use of sanctions as a deterrent of misbehaviours 
originated from GDT (Straub 1990) and as employees’ motivation to comply with InfoSec 
policies was supported by empirical studies (see e.g., Guo & Yuan 2012; Herath & Rao 2009a; 
Siponen, Pahnila & Mahmood 2007). Likewise, sanctions were identified by the experts as a 
critical factor for implementing InfoSec programs. Contrary to my initial belief that an 
enforcement approach would be most suitable for ensuring InfoSec compliance in the 
Vietnamese context where many employees are not familiar with InfoSec, the experts put 
emphasis on persuading employees to comply with InfoSec policies. Although the experts 
recognised sanctions as necessary, they advised to not overly emphasise sanctions when 
communicating InfoSec to employees since this may result in negative effects by making 
employees feel threatened. The project team decided to take these insights into account when 
deciding the communicated InfoSec-related contents in this project. 
5.4.3 Reflection on the InfoSec Implementation Approach at TTT 
The project team and top management identified from the interviews three approaches to 
communicate InfoSec to employees—the large-scale, small group and train the trainers 
approaches. The large-scale approach is generic in nature and particularly useful for training a 
large number of employees in a timely manner. This approach was deemed least favourable by 
the project team, since TTT neither had a tried-and-tested InfoSec training program nor the 
experience to ensure the success of a one size fits all solution. Moreover, each of the 
departments at TTT had their own operations and subculture, meaning that a generic 
implementation approach would ineffective. 
The small group approach, which divides the organisation’s population into smaller groups of 
employees (e.g., based on computer expertise or work roles) and tailors the training programs 
according to the participants’ common characteristics, was considered to have more potential 
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than the large-scale approach. The train the trainers approach is a special form of the small 
group approach which makes use of opinion leaders to diffuse InfoSec knowledge to their local 
communities. Train the trainers approach was considered as most favourable since it satisfied 
the need to flexibly customise InfoSec training programs to suit different contexts. Moreover, 
the approach aligned with TTT’s organisational culture which relied on interpersonal influence 
and persuasion. This approach offered more benefits than the small group approach since it not 
only improves InfoSec awareness of employees in general, but also provided TTT with a group 
of opinion leaders who would continue to maintain the InfoSec climate in the long run. The 
adoption of this approach was also most feasible, given the limited resources and time frame 
of a PhD candidature. Finally, I considered that performing SNA to identify the informal 
InfoSec leaders would create more opportunities to produce new scholarly knowledge. 
Therefore, the project team and top management agreed to follow the train the trainers approach 
to implement the InfoSec change program at TTT. The research actions of the next action 
planning stage were also decided to focus on identifying these influential trainers or InfoSec 
leaders. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the commencement of the CAR project in collaboration with TTT, in 
which two research actions of the project’s diagnosis stage were performed. First, risk 
assessment activities, inspired by the InfoSec standard ISO 27001, were conducted with the 
department managers in TTT to diagnose the current InfoSec issues in their work environment. 
The risk assessment’s results clearly indicated that the major InfoSec issues were related to 
employees’ inadequate InfoSec awareness and knowledge. Moreover, the project team 
established that an InfoSec climate did not currently exist at TTT’s workplace as the priority 
of InfoSec and InfoSec-related activities had never been promoted. As a result, these findings 
suggested that the InfoSec change program should increase employees’ InfoSec-related 
socialisation to form a favourable InfoSec climate while leveraging this socialisation to diffuse 
InfoSec knowledge to employees. I demonstrated the analytical capabilities of the SNA 
methods to top management by visualising and analysing the InfoSec risk network. Conducting 
the risk assessment with the department managers also helped me acquire their buy-in for the 
InfoSec change program. 
The second research action aimed at understanding the critical factors of InfoSec 
implementation in the Vietnamese context. A case study and interviews with six external 
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InfoSec experts (in charge of implementing the ISO 27001 standard for their companies in 
Vietnam) were conducted. The motivation of this second research action was to increase the 
project team’s knowledge of implementing InfoSec improvements, contributing to the effective 
design of the project’s subsequent interventions. Thirteen critical factors and methods were 
identified from the interviews with the InfoSec experts, consistent with the findings of prior 
research. The experts further recommended three approaches to communicate InfoSec to 
employees, of which the project team chose the train the trainers approach which leverages 
opinion leaders to diffuse tailored InfoSec knowledge to small groups of employees. The 
summary of this chapter’s diagnosis stage is shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6. Summary of the Diagnosis Stage 
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Chapter 6: Action Planning Stage—Investigating InfoSec 
Environment before the Change Program and Identifying 
Champions for InfoSec Diffusion 
This chapter discusses the action planning stage of the CAR project. The stage began with a 
diagnosis which took into considerations the project team’s previous intention to follow the 
train the trainers approach to diffuse InfoSec knowledge in TTT. Next, I reviewed the relevant 
theories to support the identification of the influential trainers or InfoSec champions and 
research actions were taken in the action taking stage. 
ERGM was performed to determine the characteristics that made an employee capable of 
influencing another employees’ InfoSec behaviours. The results of this analysis were discussed 
at the end of this stage. Based on the identified characteristics of InfoSec-influential employees 
50 champions were selected. The chapter concludes by presenting the reflections on the 
iteration’s outcomes. Figure 6.1 summarises the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 6.1. Structure of Chapter 6 
6.1 Diagnosis 
The risk assessment described in Chapter 5 identified the major InfoSec issues at TTT—
employees’ inadequate InfoSec knowledge and InfoSec awareness. Findings from the 
interviews with InfoSec experts, who oversaw InfoSec implementation for their companies, 
revealed the critical factors and methods to improve InfoSec environments in the Vietnamese 
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context. These findings presented the best practices that the project team considered for 
designing the InfoSec change program at TTT. 
The project team together with top management decided at the end of the diagnosis stage that 
the InfoSec change program should focus on improving the InfoSec-related socialisation 
between employees to improve the InfoSec climate at TTT. This was in line with the theoretical 
explanations about the formation of InfoSec climate (Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & 
Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Schneider & Reichers 1983) and would allow the 
project team to leverage the socialisation to diffuse InfoSec knowledge and awareness. The 
project team and top management had also decided to follow the train the trainers approach 
that leverages influential opinion leaders in the workplace to diffuse InfoSec knowledge. The 
decision to follow this approach was aligned with the organisational culture of TTT, which 
relied on interpersonal influence and persuasion, and with the limited time frame of the project. 
Even though the project team and top management had agreed to follow the train the trainers 
approach to diffuse InfoSec knowledge, we did not know how to identify the opinion leaders 
who would perform the diffusion. We discussed that the department managers could take the 
leader role and rely on their formal authority to perform the diffusion, but such a diffusion task 
would add an extra burden to their heavy workload. The department managers were busy with 
their managerial tasks which left them little time to provide other employees with immediate 
InfoSec support. Moreover, it would be more beneficial in the long term to have operational 
staff acting as InfoSec champions and maintaining the diffusion of InfoSec in their 
departments. We also anticipated that having department managers and operational staff share 
the responsibility to diffuse InfoSec knowledge would also increase the speed of diffusion and 
improve the collaboration between the department managers and the operational staff. As such, 
we decided to select both department managers and operational staff at TTT to be the opinion 
leaders for the diffusion. 
The project team and top management decided to adopt SNA methods to identify the InfoSec 
champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. For TTT, it was imperative to have an 
evidence-based design of the intervention and a set of well-defined criteria for evaluating the 
intervention’s effectiveness. To this end, the adoption of SNA methods was justified as these 
methods produce quantitative measures that characterise the potential InfoSec leaders’ social 
prominence and the structural features of the InfoSec-related socialisation. Based on these 
measures, potential InfoSec leaders for the train the trainers approach would be selected. The 
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top management had acknowledged the analytical capabilities of the SNA methods for the 
identification of non-human entities such as InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities and they were 
willing to support the adoption of these methods to analyse the InfoSec-related socialisation 
between employees. The adoption of SNA methods, which enabled the identification of 
InfoSec champions regardless of their formal and informal status, also made the InfoSec 
implementation feasible in the context of the project’s limited resources and time frame. 
Further, performing SNA contributed to my scholarly objective of exploring the applications 
of SNA methods in the behavioural InfoSec field. 
6.2 Action Planning 
Based on the knowledge about the use of SNA methods to identify the critical threats and 
vulnerabilities in the diagnosis stage, the project team and top management planned to select 
InfoSec champions who held prominent positions in TTT’s networks of work and InfoSec-
related interactions. This plan required careful considerations to determine the relevant 
networks for analysis. 
In line with the objective to identify the champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge and 
CAR’s principles (Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012) I selected the focal and instrumental 
theories that supported the mentioned plan. The focal theories should focus on the 
characteristics and behaviours that enable an employee to be recognised by other employees as 
InfoSec influencers, while the instrumental theories should inform the methods to identify these 
influential employees in a workplace. By reviewing these theories, I also aimed to determine 
the relevant networks of the work interactions which facilitate employees’ recognition of each 
other as InfoSec influencers. 
The next sections review the literature to identify the relevant networks and employees’ 
characteristics that facilitate InfoSec influence between employees. After the relevant networks 
and employees’ characteristics were identified, I designed a questionnaire to capture these 
networks and characteristics. Consistent with my scholarly objective, I also designed questions 
to capture employees’ perceptions of an InfoSec climate. 
6.2.1 Theoretical Background for Social Influence 
Social influence and its role in the behavioural InfoSec field have been confirmed in a number 
of studies (Lebek et al. 2014; Padayachee 2012; Sommestad et al. 2014). For example, many 
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studies have identified subjective norms to motivate employees’ InfoSec compliance 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010a; Ifinedo 2014; Leonard, Cronan & Kreie 2004; Safa 
et al. 2015). This concept belongs to TPB (Ajzen 2011b), which posits that a person’s decision 
to perform InfoSec behaviours is affected by the social influence exerted by the people deemed 
important to them. Other effects related to social influence such as social bonds and group 
sanctions were also found to affect InfoSec behaviours (Guo & Yuan 2012; Ifinedo 2014). 
However, these studies only confirmed the effects of social influence on InfoSec behaviours or 
perceptions; they did not determine the characteristics that make employees capable of 
influencing other employees’ InfoSec perceptions and behaviours. Thus, practitioners have 
limited knowledge about the methods for creating the social influence that shapes desirable 
InfoSec perceptions and behaviours in organisations. 
Kelman (1961) discussed that social influence operates through three processes—
internalisation, compliance and identification. Internalisation focuses on the behaviour’s 
characteristics rather than on the human influencer, and thus the examination of this process is 
less relevant to this CAR project’s objective to find the personal characteristics of influential 
individuals. Compliance occurs when a person accepts the influence in the belief that doing so 
would result in a favourable reaction from the influencer, while identification refers to the 
individual’s acceptance of the influence to maintain their relationship with the social groups 
and a sense of identity (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004; Kelman 1961). The motivation of 
compliance is often the need to avoid a punishment or receive a reward (Burnkrant & 
Cousineau 1975), which has been studied in the InfoSec context (Guo & Yuan 2012; Siponen, 
Mahmood & Pahnila 2014). Likewise, prior InfoSec studies have investigated the relationship 
between a person’s identification of an InfoSec behaviour and their intention to perform 
InfoSec behaviours in the form of organisational commitment (Lebek et al. 2014). 
The theory of social power bases (French & Raven 1959; Raven 2008) elaborates on the types 
of power bases that make a person appear influential to others—expert, referent, reward, 
coercive and legitimate power. Reward and coercive powers are consistent with Kelman’s 
(1961) framework of social influence, which refers to a person’s ability to give rewards and/or 
punishments for a behaviour. This ability influences other people to comply with the prescribed 
behaviour. Referent and legitimate powers are represented by a person’s status, deemed by the 
influenced targets as deserving of their acceptance of the influence. Such status of an influential 
person may come from their impression as an admirable role model, a formal authority or a 
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required obligation by default as dictated by social norms. Finally, expert power may be 
automatically granted by acquired qualifications of an expert or by interactions in the 
workplace that help the influenced targets recognise the influencer’s superior expertise. 
The theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) outlines the specific traits and abilities that 
enable a person to exert social influence over other people. The theory also outlines behavioural 
cues of interpersonal influence, such as employees’ provision of information, that are 
observable. Thus, influential champions could be identified by the project team based on these 
behavioural cues and monitor their observable changes to evaluate the champions’ diffusion. 
The theory of social power bases has not appeared in recent studies in the behavioural InfoSec 
field (Lebek et al. 2014; Padayachee 2012; Sommestad et al. 2014; Warkentin & Mutchler 
2014), suggesting an opportunity for generating new scholarly knowledge by examining the 
theory. On this basis, the project team agreed to adopt the theory of social power bases as the 
focal theory of this stage. 
6.2.2 Conceptualising Characteristics and Interactions of InfoSec Influencers 
The theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) explains how a person can exert influence over 
another person by possessing certain traits and abilities. The theory posits that a person’s 
influential status is created by the abilities to inform others with their knowledge (i.e., 
informational and expert powers), acquire others’ compliance by using rewards or punishment 
or simply appear as a role model (i.e., referent power) (Raven 2008). From a network 
perspective, these abilities can be analysed in the form of the socialisation (ties) between 
employees (nodes) in a network. 
SNA studies have examined social influence that occurs via direct communication with others 
(Burt 1987; Leenders 2002) which can be facilitated via instrumental and expressive networks 
(Ibarra & Andrews 1993; Saint-Charles & Mongeau 2009; Umphress et al. 2003). Instrumental 
networks refer to the provisions of job-related resources such as work advice, while expressive 
networks refer to the provisions of non-work resources such as friendship and social support 
(Johnson-Cramer, Parise & Cross 2007; Fombrun 1982; Ibarra 1993; Parise 2007; Saint-
Charles & Mongeau 2009; Tichy, Tushman & Fombrun 1979). 
In this research, instrumental networks consisted of the provision of work advice that helps an 
employee overcome a work problem or improve their work efficiency (i.e., professional 
advice), and of the provision of organisational updates about the changes in work procedures 
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and policies (i.e., job-related information). The project team took into consideration the sharing 
of organisational updates because InfoSec requirements are often introduced to employees as 
an embedded component in their regular work processes, especially to instruct how 
organisational resources should be used (Ifinedo 2012). Employees actively seek experts in 
their instrumental networks to reduce uncertainty and make sense of the work environment 
(Saint-Charles & Mongeau 2009). Through providing work advice and organisation updates, 
the providers demonstrate their informational or expert power, and thus exert social influence 
over the receivers of these advice and updates (Raven 2008). 
Expressive networks play significant roles in facilitating the social functions of organisations 
by complementing the job-related instrumental networks (Johnson-Cramer, Parise & Cross 
2007; Ibarra & Andrews 1993). Expressive networks allow individuals to choose role models 
and referents that subsequently influence perceptions and behaviours due to their social power 
bases (Raven 2008). Individuals tend to have their perspectives about job and organisation 
influenced by others as they engage in expressive networks of interpersonal trust (Ibarra & 
Andrews 1993; Umphress et al. 2003; Zhou, Siu & Wang 2010). In this context, McKnight 
(2002) proposed four main types of trusting beliefs—1) competence, 2) benevolence, 3) 
integrity and 4) other traits such as predictability, openness, carefulness and attraction—where 
a trustworthy person demonstrates that they are competently reliable and capable of providing 
social support. 
The project team also investigated the provisions of InfoSec advice and InfoSec 
troubleshooting support as networks (Dourish et al. 2004; Safa, von Solms & Futcher 2016; 
Warkentin, Johnston & Shropshire 2011). We decided to examine employees’ provisions of 
InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support as these InfoSec-related resources assist employees 
in successfully performing the InfoSec practices required by the company. The providers of 
InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support possess both an informational power base (Raven 
2008) and the opportunities to exert InfoSec influence over other employees via direct 
communication (Leenders 2002). Moreover, these networks represented employees’ InfoSec-
related socialisation that contributes to the formation of InfoSec climate (Chan, Woon & 
Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
In addition to the influence arising from the active provisions of organisational resources, social 
influence can occur through the sharing of physical locations and affiliations that facilitate such 
provisions (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Ibarra & Andrews 1993; Lusher, Koskinen & 
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Robins 2012). Borgatti and Cross (2003) found that sameness of gender and physical proximity 
result in information seeking among employees. A homophily effect, which results in people 
choosing to associate and be influenced by each other, is explained by similarities in 
demographics such as age and occupation (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001). Further, 
a legitimate power base is often gained from the formal authority of seniority at work (Ibarra 
& Andrews 1993; Raven 2008). Similarly, employees with longer tenure are often considered 
to possess more work knowledge which allows them to influence others, especially newcomers, 
more easily (Borgatti & Cross 2003). 
Based on the discussed theoretical background about employees’ characteristics and 
socialisation that lead to social influence, I developed a network questionnaire for collecting 
data. To improve validity of the questions, I consulted the opinions of the Vice Director of the 
BSP department and of top management to ensure the questions would capture the intended 
networks. The questions also provided examples of what was considered as work-related 
advice, personal advice or InfoSec-related resources so that the respondents could understand 
and answer the questions accurately. The details about the questions to collect network data 
are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Employees’ background characteristics (i.e., age, gender, department membership, seniority 
and tenure) were downloaded from TTT’s HR database. The network of InfoSec influence was 
included as the predicted outcome of this stage’s analysis to identify influential InfoSec 
champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge by determining the characteristics that make 
a person influential in the InfoSec domain. 






(provisions of job-related 
resources) 
Give work advice 
network 
Who do you usually ask for advice (e.g., 
look for or improve solutions, get referrals 
or confirmation) about work? 
Give organisational 
updates network 
From whom do you usually get the latest 
updates or changes (e.g., new policies, 
processes and systems) in TTT? 
InfoSec support network 
Give InfoSec advice 
network 
Who would explain the importance of 
InfoSec to you and/or teach you how to 
perform InfoSec behaviours and/or use 
InfoSec technologies? 
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(provisions of InfoSec advice 





When you encountered an InfoSec problem 
(e.g., lost or damaged data, computer virus 
infection, etc.), whom would you seek help 
from? 
Expressive network 
(provisions of trust and 
personal support) 
Give personal advice 
network 
When you want to discuss or ask for 
advice about personal life issues, whom 
would you talk to? 
Trust in expertise 
network 
Who do you think would be most able 
(because of education, experience, 
qualities) to take over your work if you 
were too busy or absent? 
InfoSec influence network 
InfoSec influence 
network 
In general, your decision to perform 
InfoSec behaviours, use technologies 
and/or exercise InfoSec care, etc. in daily 
work would be influenced by whom? 
6.2.3 Measuring InfoSec Climate Perceptions 
This section elaborates on the concept of InfoSec climate and its measurement in this project. 
Two sets of questions were designed based on prior studies to capture respondents’ perceptions 
of InfoSec climate and these questions were added to the same questionnaire containing the 
questions listed in Table 6.1. The analysis of InfoSec climate is not described in this action 
planning stage; it is described in the final evaluation and reflection stage, where longitudinal 
data about employees’ networks and InfoSec climate was captured after the champions’ 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
The concept of InfoSec climate refers to employees’ perceptions of the InfoSec behaviours 
performed by their colleagues and direct supervisors which indicate the organisation’s priority 
of InfoSec (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Lowry & Moody 2013). Chan, Woon and 
Kankanhalli (2005) were the first researchers who defined InfoSec climate by adapting the 
relevant and established concept of safety climate which focuses on the observable practices 
that inform how much organisations prioritise to ensure workplace safety (Zohar 2014). Zohar 
defined safety climate as follows: 
[…] safety climate relates to shared perceptions with regard to the priority of safety 
policies, procedures, and practices and the extent to which safety compliant or 
enhancing behavior is supported and rewarded at the workplace. (Zohar 2014, p. 
318) 
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Building on this and Campbell and Beaty’s (1971) work on organisational climate, Chan, Woon 
and Kankanhalli (2005), defined InfoSec climate as: 
Perceived information security climate is defined as the employee’s perception of the 
current organizational state in terms of information security as evidenced through 
dealings with internal and external stakeholders (Campbell & Beaty 1971). 
Perceptions of the climate are derived from observance of organizational 
management, superior, and peer attitudes. (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005, p. 25) 
Both InfoSec and safety climate are specific forms of the climates that coexist within an 
organisation, each of which focuses on a particular organisational facet (Schneider & Reichers 
1983). For example, prior studies have investigated specific organisational climates such as 
involvement climate, service climate, innovation climate, justice climate and others (Kuenzi & 
Schminke 2009). Despite having different foci, these climates share commonalities in their 
nature as perceptual constructs that describe collective phenomena (Kuenzi & Schminke 2009). 
While behavioural InfoSec studies have predominantly investigated employees’ individualistic 
cognition and behaviours, InfoSec perceptions and behaviours also have collective 
characteristics (Dourish & Anderson 2006). The concept of InfoSec climate highlights such 
collectivistic nature as it explains that employees’ perceived priority of InfoSec in the 
workplace is shaped by the InfoSec practices that they observe from their colleagues and 
supervisors (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
Since each employee’s interpretation of the surrounding InfoSec environment is subjective, 
InfoSec climate is perceptually constructed rather than representing objective InfoSec features 
of the workplace. Moreover, InfoSec climate emphasises the perceptions of the observable 
InfoSec environment rather than the underlying assumptions, beliefs or values of an InfoSec 
culture deeply ingrained in the organisation (Furnell & Thomson 2009; van Niekerk & von 
Solms 2010; da Veiga & Eloff 2010). 
Following the existing operationalisation of InfoSec climate (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 
2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013) and its relevant safety climate (Brondino, 
Silva & Pasini 2012; Brondino, Pasini & Costa 2013; Kines et al. 2011; Lingard, Cooke & 
Blismas 2009; Zohar & Luria 2005), the project team developed two sets of questions to 
capture employees’ climate perceptions of their colleagues and direct supervisors’ InfoSec 
behaviours (summarised in Table 6.2). The rating scales of all questions had seven points, 
ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’, to measure the frequency of the observed InfoSec 
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behaviours and from ‘Never’ to ‘A great deal’ to measure the intensity of the observed InfoSec 
behaviours. 











How frequently do your 
direct supervisor(s) mention 
about InfoSec matters to you 
and your colleagues? (SUP1) 




Chan, Woon and 
Kankanhalli (2005); 
Goo, Yim and Kim 
(2014); Jaafar and Ajis 
(2013) 
How much do your direct 
supervisor(s) ask that you and 
your colleagues in the work 
unit perform InfoSec 
behaviours? (SUP2) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Kines et al. (2011); 
Zohar and Luria (2005) 
How frequently do your 
direct supervisor(s) discuss 
InfoSec threats with you and 
your colleagues? (SUP3) 




Chan, Woon and 
Kankanhalli (2005); 
Goo, Yim and Kim 
(2014); Jaafar and Ajis 
(2013) 
How serious, strict, or careful 
are your direct supervisor(s) 
when it comes to protecting 
InfoSec? (SUP4) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Zohar and Luria (2005) 
How frequently do your 
direct supervisor(s) allow you 
and your colleagues to 
overlook InfoSec when 
rushing deadlines? (SUP5) 
(reversed) 




Brondino, Silva and 
Pasini (2012); 
Brondino, Pasini and 
Costa (2013); Kines et 







How much do your 
colleagues perform InfoSec 
behaviours in their daily 
work? (COL1) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Kines et al. (2011) 
How much do your 
colleagues care about 
InfoSec? (COL2) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Jaafar and Ajis (2013) 
How much training and 
updates about InfoSec do 
your colleagues receive? 
(COL3) 
 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
 
Goo, Yim and Kim 
(2014) 
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How much do your 
colleagues prioritise InfoSec 
when they are rushing 
deadlines? (COL4) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Chan, Woon and 
Kankanhalli (2005); 
Jaafar and Ajis (2013); 
Lingard, Cooke and 
Blismas (2009) 
How much do your 
colleagues pay attention to 
and perform InfoSec 
behaviours, even when they 
are not being supervised? 
(COL5) 
Never; Very Little; 
Little; Somewhat; 
Much; Very much; 
A great deal 
Brondino, Pasini and 
Costa (2013); Chan, 
Woon and Kankanhalli 
(2005); Lingard, Cooke 
and Blismas (2009) 
The questions or items were designed to be consistent with those employed by prior studies. 
The questions which focused on climate perceptions of direct supervisors addressed the 
supervisors’ behaviours such as updating respondents on InfoSec procedures or discussing 
InfoSec matters with respondents and their colleagues (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, 
Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). The questions about climate perceptions of colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours aimed at measuring respondents’ perceived intensity of such behaviours 
which involve discussing InfoSec issues or taking InfoSec seriously even when rushing work 
deadlines. 
While Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) named the construct of colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours as ‘co-worker socialisation’, I decided to name this construct ‘perception of 
colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours’ as this term describes more accurately the items which belong 
to the theoretical construct. Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) used the term ‘co-worker 
socialisation’ as they conceptualised the InfoSec-related socialisation as a perceived InfoSec 
behaviour which they defined as the ‘daily interactions that the individual has with co-workers’ 
(Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005, p. 24). In this project, the concept of socialisation was 
operationalised as networks which represented employees’ provisions of instrumental 
resources, of expressive resources and of InfoSec support. My operationalisation of employees’ 
socialisation refers to the actual provisions of organisational resources that take place between 
the respondent and their colleagues, rather than the socialisation between other employees 
perceived by the respondent as a third-party observer. 
6.2.4 The Instrumental Theory to Identify Influential InfoSec Champions 
To analyse the socialisation and InfoSec influence that were expressed as networks, the project 
team selected graph theory (Barnes & Harary 1983) as the instrumental theory. We used graph 
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theory as an instrumental theory to perform two analyses: 1) computing employees’ centrality 
measures in the InfoSec-related networks to identify the influential champions and 2) analysing 
the relationship between the networks representing employees’ socialisation and the InfoSec 
influence network. 
Valente and Davis (1999) recommended the sociometric approach, as facilitated by graph 
theory (Barnes & Harary 1983), for selecting opinion leaders to support the implementation of 
changes in a community. The theory about opinion leadership identifies key members who can 
accelerate the diffusion of ideas based on the nominations that they receive from other 
community’s members (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999). This sociometric approach 
was applied in empirical researches (e.g., Cross et al. 2006; Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; 
Valente 2012) to select opinion leaders for organisational changes by counting the received 
nominations and calculating the individuals’ centrality measures. Consequently, opinion 
leadership theory (Valente & Davis 1999) served as the second instrumental theory in this 
stage, which informed the use of network centrality to select the InfoSec champions. 
I planned to perform ERGM as a research method to explore employees’ characteristics and 
interactions that contributed to their InfoSec influence. Performing an ERGM analysis involves 
specifying and evaluating a model that explains the formation of network ties. With the 
adoption of ERGM method I sought to statistically determine the characteristics and 
interactions that made an employee in TTT be nominated by other employees as their InfoSec 
influencers. Moreover, the use of ERGM enabled such statistical analysis while accounting for 
the unique structural features of the focal networks. This produced findings about employees’ 
influential characteristics and interactions that are relevant to TTT context. 
Figure 6.2 summarises the theoretical model of this stage, which described the relationships 
between the variables to be analysed with the ERGM method. Employees’ socialisation was 
represented by the three networks of their provisions of instrumental resources, expressive 
resources and InfoSec support. Consistent with the theory of social power bases (Raven 2008), 
I assumed the providers of these resources would exert influence over the receivers by 
demonstrating their social powers. Thus, the networks of provisions of resources would co-
occur with the InfoSec influence network. Finally, employees’ background characteristics such 




Figure 6.2. Theoretical Model of the Action Planning Stage 
The detailed action plan of this stage is as follows. First, the project team would launch the 
survey to collect data about employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate, their nominated 
providers of instrumental resources, expressive resources and InfoSec support and the InfoSec 
influencers that they recognised in the workplace. Second, I would perform analyses on the 
captured networks and employees’ background characteristics to 1) assess the current networks 
of socialisation at TTT and 2) identify influential InfoSec champions. These analyses would 
be the descriptive analysis to examine the networks’ structural features and the ERGM analysis 
to determine the factors that enabled an employee to exert InfoSec influence over another 
employee. The selection of champions would be based on the findings derived from the ERGM 
analysis and on employees’ network centrality. 
6.3 Action Taking 
6.3.1 Data Collection 
The questions summarised in Table 6.1 were incorporated into an online questionnaire sent to 
all TTT’s employees in November 2015. The participants were asked to select themselves from 
a dropdown list containing the names of 311 employees at that time, followed by the request 
that they nominate a maximum of seven colleagues they interact with as per the asked 
questions. The number of seven nominations was based on the recommendation about the 
number of nominees in Asian organisations required for meaningful network analysis 
(Merluzzi & Burt 2013). To minimise the intrusive nature of the network questionnaire, which 
asked employees to nominate their social relationships (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013), the 
General Director sent an email to all employees which clearly explained that employees’ 
responses would be used strictly for research purposes. Further, top management would not 
have access to the collected responses. 
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The project team retrieved responses from 264 of 311 employees (85%). The collected 
networks and background information were used for the ERGM analysis to determine the 
contributing characteristics of InfoSec influence and to visualise and evaluate the networks. 
The demographics of these 264 employees were presented as follows. The number of male 
employees is higher than the number of female employees (see Figure 6.3). Of these 
employees, 231 were operational staff, 31 were managers and two were directors (see Figure 
6.4). 
 
Figure 6.3. Gender Ratio (n = 264) 
 
Figure 6.4. Seniority Ratio (n = 264) 
Figure 6.5 summarises the age distribution of the 264 employees, showing that a majority of 
the respondents were relatively young. The average age of the sample was about 41 years old 
with a standard deviation of 11.63. The four youngest respondents were 22 years old and the 
oldest respondent was 62. 
 
Figure 6.5. Age Distribution (n = 264) 
94
170















































22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 53 55 56 58 59 61 62
(n = 264; mean = 40.51; standard deviation = 11.63)
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Figure 6.6 presents the distribution of tenure in the sample. Similar to the age distribution, the 
tenure data indicates that many employees had only recently joined TTT. This tenure 
distribution reflects the nature of the construction industry in Vietnam where the turnover rate 
is high and employees frequently change jobs. The average tenure in TTT is about 11 years 
with a standard deviation of 6.92. There were 65 employees who had just joined TTT (i.e., zero 
years tenure) and the two most senior employees had been with TTT for 23 years. 
 
Figure 6.6. Tenure Distribution (n = 264) 
Figure 6.7 presents the number of employees per department in the collected sample. The 
sample comprised 20 departments, with the construction department having the highest number 
of respondents (82), followed by the architect, factory and project management departments. 
This distribution is good reflection of TTT’s population, reinforcing that the analysis of this 
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Figure 6.7. Number of Employees per Department (n = 264) 
6.3.2 Descriptive Analysis 
This section visualises and analyses four networks that represent the provisions of instrumental 
and expressive resources, InfoSec support and InfoSec influence. The analysis of these 
visualisations focused on the characteristics of the nodes and their clusters which were formed 
by their provisions of resources and InfoSec influence represented by network ties. 
6.3.2.1 Node’s centrality and clusters 
To characterise the prominence of a node, I calculated the out-degree centrality i.e., the sum of 
the outgoing ties sent from a node to its direct neighbours (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). 
Since the networks in this research represented the outflows of resources, or the behaviour 
about sending resources from one individual to another, out-degrees was calculated to evaluate 
a node’s direct provisions of resources or influence. The calculation was performed by using 
the software UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002) for descriptive SNA. 
After computing out-degree centrality of the nodes, I visualised these measures where larger 
nodes with larger labels represented having more direct influence and provisions of resources 
in their networks. The nodes representing employees were coloured according to their 
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from. By using this colouring system, the project team could detect prominent nodes and their 
areas of influence. 
Analysing the nodes’ centrality and clusters in the visualisations revealed patterns that reflected 
the work operations and influences in TTT. The instrumental network (Figure 6.8) shows that 
employees sought work advice and organisational updates from colleagues who work in the 
same department. There were distinctive clusters of employees in the estimation, after sale 
services, accounting and factory departments who actively interacted with each other but not 
with employees outside their department. There was one large cluster that comprised 
employees from the project management and construction departments. This clustering pattern 
was consistent with operations in TTT where these two departments closely collaborated to 
manage and deliver projects. Similarly, the project team observed the after sale services, 
business development and estimation departments were tied to each other. In practice, these 
departments’ duties focused on providing customer services to both potential and current 
clients pre-contract and post-project. Overall, these clusters suggested that employees chose to 
give instrumental resources to and seek them from other employees whose work was relevant 
to them. 
The project team also identified the prominent employees in this network of the provision of 
instrumental resources based on the nodes’ out-degrees. There were several employees within 
each cluster who gave work advice and/or organisational updates to many others. Of these, 
node #9 of the administration department and node #144 of the HR department stood out in the 
network due to their high out-degrees. A separate analysis of the ‘give organisational updates’ 
network confirmed that these nodes were nominated by many other employees for being the 
central sources of information about the company’s policies and work procedures. 
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Figure 6.8. Instrumental Network 
The expressive network (Figure 6.9) resembled the instrumental network (Figure 6.8). There 
were some interesting patterns which depicted the informal interactions between employees at 
TTT. While the number of clusters remained similar to the instrumental provision network, the 
positions of the employees in the project management department were different. Rather than 
forming a large cluster and mixing with the construction department, the project management 
employees were found to be separated into two subclusters (i.e., led by nodes #2 and #54). 
These clustering patterns showed that employees in the construction department could easily 
seek personal advice and trust their colleagues in the same department for their expertise. In 
contrast, there were two social cliques in the project management and construction 
departments, and members of these cliques socialised with different peers. The project 
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management and construction employees in the clique led by node #2 tended to exchange 
expressive resources with those in the factory department. Members of the clique led by node 
#54 chose to socialise with employees of smaller departments such as after sale services, 
administration and HR. 
 
Figure 6.9. Expressive Network 
Another interesting pattern was the relationships between the accounting department and the 
architect department. While employees in the accounting department liaised with the factory 
department in the instrumental network, they tended to exchange personal advice and trust with 
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those in the architect department. A common feature of the two networks (see Figures 6.8 and 
6.9) was the distinctive clusters of employees in the factory and architect departments who 
consistently interacted with each other. Their consistent interactions can be explained by the 
fact that employees in these departments worked in their own buildings away from the 
headquarters where other departments were located. Therefore, the physical proximity 
facilitated their tendency of socialisation. 
 
Figure 6.10. InfoSec Support Network 
With regard to the network representing the provision of InfoSec support (Figure 6.10), 
employees of the IT and BSP departments appeared to hold prominent roles as they were 
nominated by many other employees as the sources of InfoSec advice and troubleshooting 
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support. The IT department looked after the company’s technological infrastructures while the 
BSP department focused on delivering training and implementation for information systems 
(e.g., enterprise resource planning and customer relationship management systems). In Figure 
6.10, the project team also observed that IT and BSP employees had their own areas of 
providing InfoSec support, such as employees #240, #230 and #48 nominated by departments 
in the headquarters and #176 and #115 nominated by the factory and architect departments 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6.11. InfoSec Influence Network 
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Figure 6.11 presents the visualisation of the InfoSec influence network which resembled the 
visualised InfoSec support network. Employees of the IT and BSP departments held influential 
roles in this network. They also attracted nominations from three distinctive areas including 
headquarters and the factory and architect departments. The high similarity between the 
InfoSec influence network and the InfoSec support network suggested that these two types of 
interactions would be more likely to co-occur with each other. 
6.3.2.2 Network statistics 
I calculated network statistics (summarised in Table 6.3) to quantitatively analyse the 
networks’ structural features. This analysis allowed a more accurate comparison of the features 
across the networks. 












Density (the ratio of existing ties 
over all possible ties) 
0.011 0.014 0.012 0.008 
Average degree (the average 
number of ties per node) 
3.023 3.727 3.098 2.045 
Out-degree centralisation (the 
variation in the out-degree 
centrality scores among all nodes) 
0.149 0.051 0.610 0.351 
Reciprocity (the ratio of 
reciprocated ties) 
0.098 0.348 0.010 0.007 
Transitivity (the extent to which 
the nodes tend to cluster together) 
0.188 0.211 0.500 0.305 
Density characterises the connectedness of the whole network (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 
2013; Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Density is calculated by taking the ratio between the 
observed ties and the maximum number of all possible ties. This measure has meaningful 
implications in practice. For example, a densely connected communication network is desirable 
for information to effectively reach all the nodes (Rowley 1997). Conversely, thinner networks 
with more structural holes grant the nodes access to more unique information and increase each 
node’s bargaining power (Halgin & Borgatti 2012). In the context of diffusing information, 
dense networks facilitate the spread of innovative ideas and norms resulting in similar 
behaviours of nodes in the network (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; Rowley 1997). 
137 
Of the four networks, the expressive network had the largest density. This meant that providing 
personal advice and trusting other employees for their expertise were more common than other 
forms of socialisation in TTT. In contrast, the InfoSec influence network had the lowest 
density, meaning that such influence rarely occurred between random pairs of employees. Even 
though networks are considered as dense or sparse differently depending on the subjective 
context and expert judgments, a network having a density value of 0.15 or above can be 
considered as densely connected (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013). In this case, even the most 
connected expressive provision network only had a density value of 0.014, indicating that the 
operations in TTT were rather silo-based. 
In terms of average degree (i.e., the average number of ties per node), the expressive network 
had the highest value. This indicated that the provision of personal advice and trust in expertise 
were the most common among the four examined interactions. Moreover, an employee 
provided personal advice and/or trust with at least three colleagues on average. The InfoSec 
influence network had the lowest value of average degree, which suggested that InfoSec 
influence was rare. These findings were consistent with the network density values discussed 
above. 
Out-degree centralisation describes the variation in the out-degrees within a network (Borgatti, 
Everett & Johnson 2013). Evaluating out-degree centralisation informs the hierarchical level 
of a network, since a high value of out-degree centralisation indicates a large gap between the 
lowest and the highest number of outgoing ties possessed by the nodes (Ahuja & Carley 1998). 
In line with the visual analysis, the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks had out-
degree centralisation values (0.610 and 0.351 respectively) much higher than those of the 
instrumental and expressive networks. The hierarchical structures in these InfoSec-related 
networks could be observed in the network visualisations (Figures 6.8 and 6.9). There were 
only a handful of IT and BSP employees who received many nominations from other 
employees for being capable of exuding InfoSec influence and InfoSec support. 
Reciprocity reflects the tendency of a node to return a tie to another connected node (Borgatti, 
Everett & Johnson 2013). High reciprocity in an information sharing or learning context 
informs the tendency of members actively exchanging ideas, whereas low reciprocity implies 
that there are many one-way communications. As the expressive network was the most densely 
connected it was not surprising to see that it also had the highest reciprocity value (0.348). In 
contrast, the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks had the lowest reciprocity values, 
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which indicated that the provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence tended to be 
unidirectional. 
Transitivity reflects the tendency of the nodes to cluster together, which follows the saying 
‘friends of my friends are my friends’ (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). Another 
interpretation of transitivity is that it reflects the tendency of actor A to establish a connection 
with actor C if both are connected with an intermediate actor B (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 
2013). As shown in Table 6.3, the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks had the 
highest values for transitivity, which was understandable since most of the nodes tended to 
cluster around the IT and BSP staff. 
6.3.2.3 Triad census 
Triad census is a concept related to network transitivity. To elaborate on triad census, I 
examined the triadic configurations or the structures of a three-node set (i.e., a triad) 
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). The three types of triadic structures of the four examined 
networks—local, transitive and intransitive—are summarised in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 
respectively. Each triadic configuration is assigned a unique code such as 003, 012 and 102, 
following the Mutual-Asymmetric-Nulls naming convention (Holland & Leinhardt 1976). The 
statistics of each configuration report the number of times the configuration appeared in each 
of the four networks. 














2,840,207 2,824,223 2,852,506 2,902,844 
012 
 
175,241 159,951 145,350 116,933 
102 
 
9,608 42,784 813 385 
021D 
 
3,633 870 30,934 10,394 
021U 
 
772 916 709 415 
Local structures are the configurations of three nodes that describe basic patterns of the 
network, such as ‘003’ (a null triad), ‘012’ (one tie among three nodes) and ‘102’ (a reciprocal 
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dyad). All networks shared similar amounts of ‘003’ and ‘012’ configurations. The expressive 
network had the highest number of reciprocity between two nodes (i.e., ‘102’ configuration) 
followed by the instrumental network. 
The InfoSec-related networks were rarely reciprocal. In other words, the provision of InfoSec 
support and InfoSec influence were both mostly unidirectional. This finding was consistent 
with these networks’ reciprocity values reported in the previous section. The configuration 
coded ‘021D’ describes triadic dominancy, where there is one node sending out ties to the other 
two while not receiving any ties in return. It was interesting to observe that the InfoSec support 
and InfoSec influence networks had more of this structure than the instrumental and expressive 
networks. This observation matched these networks’ high out-degree centralisation values. The 
InfoSec influence network had the smallest number of ‘021U’ coded configuration, indicating 
that an employee hardly had their InfoSec practices influenced by two people at the same time 
compared to other networks. 














307 190 594 179 
120D 
 
32 58 7 0 
120U 
 
35 79 114 55 
300 
 
0 20 0 0 
There are four types of transitive configurations, as shown in Table 6.5, where resources flow 
among all members of the same triad. The configuration coded ‘030T’ represents triad closure, 
or the tendency of a node to send a direct tie to another one that shares a common node in 
between, which closes a triad. This configuration reflects a hierarchy in a triad as there is one 
member that only sends out ties to the other two. The InfoSec support network had the highest 
number of this configuration which reflected its transitive and hierarchical nature. 
The configuration coded ‘120D’ also reflects a hierarchy within a triad, but there is an exchange 
of resources between the two receivers. The InfoSec-related networks ranked quite low in terms 
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of having this configuration, which further reinforced their hierarchical nature and that 
reciprocal ties only occurred between the receivers. These InfoSec-related networks ranked 
higher in terms of the configuration coded ‘120U’, which referred to the situation where two 
employees, such as IT or BSP employees, exchanged InfoSec advice and troubleshooting 
support while providing these resources to a third employee. The configuration coded ‘300’ 
describes complete transitivity; only the instrumental network and especially the expressive 
network had this configuration. It showed a situation where all three members shared 
instrumental and/or expressive resources with each other. 














1,510 1,159 723 575 
111D 
 
128 619 16 12 
111U 
 
355 725 98 72 
030C 
 
2 8 0 0 
201 
 
17 158 0 0 
120C 
 
8 47 0 0 
210 
 
9 57 0 0 
Triadic configurations are intransitive due to having a certain degree of inequality in their 
connections, where actor A fails to establish a connection with actor C via actor B (Hanneman 
& Riddle 2005). The InfoSec-related networks only had the intransitive configurations coded 
‘021C’, ‘111D’ and ‘111U’. The configuration coded ‘021C’ describes a two-path structure, 
or the tendency of a node to maintain indirect connections to another one via an intermediate 
node. Since the InfoSec support network had a high amount of the triad closure configuration, 
as previously discussed, its small number of two-path configurations confirmed the transitive 
nature of this network. Since the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks also had low 
amounts of the intransitive configurations coded ‘111D’ and ‘111U’, these networks would be 
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highly transitive. The high transitivity implied that employees formed clusters by providing 
each other with InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence. Further, the project team could 
make use of such transitive nature to facilitate the provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence. 
6.3.3 Exponential Random Graph Modelling 
After examining the descriptive characteristics of the networks, I conducted ERGM to 
determine employees’ characteristics and socialisation that contributed to InfoSec influence 
and to identify the influential InfoSec champions. I performed the ERGM analysis by following 
the recommendations of Hunter et al. (2008), Goodreau et al. (2008) and Desmarais and 
Cranmer (2012) in regard to ensuring the robust analysis of exponential random graph models. 
Details about the ERGM method, its estimation process and the raw results of the ERGM 
analysis are in Appendix D. 
Three exponential random graph models were specified and analysed—Model 1, Model 2 and 
Model 3. Model 1 only accounted for the background characteristics of employees and their 
impacts on the likelihood of occurrence of InfoSec influence ties. Model 2 extended Model 1 
by evaluating the impacts of not only employees’ background characteristics, but also of their 
socialisation (i.e., the provisions of instrumental resources, expressive resources and InfoSec 
support between employees). Model 3 extended Models 1 and 2 by evaluating the impacts of 
both employees’ background characteristics and socialisation, while accounting for the unique 
structural characteristics of the InfoSec influence network such as reciprocity and transitivity. 
Table 6.7 summarises the results of the three mentioned exponential random graph models 
which indicated the impacts of employees’ characteristics (e.g., age, gender and seniority) and 
socialisation (e.g., provision of InfoSec support) on the likelihood of the occurrence of InfoSec 
influence ties (i.e., the likelihood that an employee would exert InfoSec influence over another 
employee). The results also indicated the structural tendencies of the InfoSec influence 
network, which were reciprocity, in- and out-degree variations of nodes and transitivity. 
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Table 6.7. ERGM Results 
Effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
InfoSec influence between random employees –2.96*** (0.40) –4.66*** (0.57) –4.17*** (0.56) 
Influencer is female –1.27*** (0.12) –0.83*** (0.18) –0.36** (0.15) 
Influenced employee is female –0.24** (0.12) –0.16 (0.16) –0.15 (0.16) 
Employees have the same gender 0.02 (0.12) –0.05 (0.16) –0.03 (0.16) 
Employees have the same department 1.10*** (0.09) 0.47*** (0.15) 0.76*** (0.15) 
Influencer’s age –0.09*** (0.01) –0.07*** (0.02) –0.02 (0.01) 
Influenced employee’s age  0.001 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Employees have different ages –0.01 (0.01) –0.02 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01) 
Employees have the same seniority 0.06 (0.13) –0.27 (0.18) –0.18 (0.19) 
Influencer is a manager 1.48*** (0.15) 0.72*** (0.20) 0.31 (0.19) 
Influencer is a director 1.51*** (0.41) 1.88*** (0.46) 1.35*** (0.30) 
Influenced employee is a manager 0.30** (0.14) –0.03 (0.19) –0.03 (0.19) 
Influenced employee is a director 0.54 (0.47) 0.24 (0.64) 0.38 (0.61) 
Influencer’s tenure 0.23*** (0.02) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Influenced employees’s tenure –0.01 (0.01) –0.03 (0.02) –0.03** (0.02) 
Employees have different tenures –0.08*** (0.01) –0.05*** (0.02) –0.04** (0.02) 
Employees provide each other with instrumental 
resources 
 1.98*** (0.21) 1.93*** (0.19) 
Employees provide each other with expressive 
resources 
 0.91*** (0.22) 1.14*** (0.21) 
Employees provide each other with InfoSec 
support 
 5.33*** (0.12) 4.31*** (0.14) 
Variation in out-degrees   –3.16*** (0.39) 
Variation in in-degrees    –1.03*** (0.38) 
Triad closure (network’s tendency of being 
transitive) 
  0.50*** (0.10) 
Two-path (tendency to maintain indirect influence)   –0.07*** (0.03) 
Reciprocity (tendency to reciprocate influence)    –1.74 (1.19) 
Control for the number of ‘sinks’ (out-degrees = 0)   –1.10*** (0.39) 
Control for the number of ‘sources’ (in-
degrees = 0) 
  –0.95** (0.44) 
Control for the number of ‘isolated’ employees   –0.19 (0.39) 
Akaike Information Criterion 5438 2763 2609 
Bayesian Information Criterion 5584 2937 2856 
Note: Statistically significant results are bolded; results’ standard errors are in brackets; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
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The results in Table 6.7 are in log-odds and can be converted to probabilities in percentage by 





Each of the three examined ERGM models had a baseline probability for an employee to 
influence another employee’s InfoSec practices when no specific background characteristics 
or forms of socialisation were considered (i.e., an InfoSec influence between two random 
employees). By using the provided formula, the calculated baseline probabilities that 
employees would exert InfoSec influence in random pairs were 4.93 per cent (Model 1), 0.93 
per cent (Model 2) and 1.52 per cent (Model 3). Overall, these low probabilities indicated that 
it was rare for random employees to influence each other’s InfoSec behaviours which matched 
with the descriptive analysis above. 
When there was a specific characteristic (e.g., the influencer was female or the influenced 
employee was a manager) or a provision of resources between the employees (e.g., the 
influencer provided the influenced employee with InfoSec support) the baseline probability 
would change accordingly. Table 6.8 shows some scenarios and uses the results from Model 3 
to calculate the probabilities for employees having various characteristics to exert InfoSec 
influence over each other. For example, when both employees worked in the same department 
the probability that an InfoSec influence tie occurred between these employees would increase 
from 1.52 per cent to 3.2 per cent (Model 3). If two employees had the same department 
membership and one of them gave InfoSec support to the other, then the total log-odds of 
InfoSec influence tie’s occurrence between them would increase from –4.17 to 0.9 (–
4.17 + 0.76 + 4.31) which corresponded to an increase in probabilities from 1.52 per cent to 
71.09 per cent. 
Table 6.8. Scenarios and Probabilities of Exerting InfoSec Influence 
Scenario Log-odds Probability 
Random employees exerted InfoSec influence 
over each other 
–4.17 1.52% 
Employees in the same departments exerted 
InfoSec influence over each other 
(–4.17 + 0.76) = –3.41 3.20% 
Employees in the same departments exerted 
InfoSec influence over each other, and these 
employees also provided each other with 
InfoSec support 
(–4.17 + 0.76 + 4.31) = 0.9 71.09% 
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Some effects of employees’ background characteristics (e.g., department manager status of the 
influencer and influenced employee) became non-significant in Model 2 and/or Model 3 when 
they were evaluated together with the effects of employees’ socialisation. An explanation for 
this phenomenon was that these effects (e.g., being a department manager) became less 
important in terms of creating InfoSec influence ties when the socialisation took place. 
The project team considered the effects that remained significant in all three models as critical 
selection criteria for influential champions. The effects that remained significant in both 
Models 1 and 2 could also be considered when selecting potential InfoSec champions. Effects 
that were only significant in Model 1 (e.g., gender of the influenced employee) and effects that 
caused minor changes in the probabilities of occurrence of InfoSec influence ties (e.g., tenure 
of the influencer, which caused a slight increase from 0.94% to 1.1%) were considered as trivial 
and unsuitable to be selection criteria. The results in Table 6.7 are elaborated on below. 
6.3.3.1 Effects of background characteristics on InfoSec influence 
I evaluated the impacts of five background characteristics of an employee—gender, age, 
department membership, seniority and tenure—on the occurrence of InfoSec influence ties. 
The evaluated effects focused on the characteristics of the influencers, influenced employees 
and pairs of employees (i.e., whether the pairs had similar or different characteristics). The 
results indicated that female employees were less likely than male employees to influence and 
be influenced by other employees. The significant and negative effects of being a female 
influencer on InfoSec influence were consistent across the three models, whereas the effect of 
the influenced employees being female was only significant in Model 1. Having the same 
gender was not found to affect InfoSec influence nor was having different ages. Older 
employees were less likely to influence other employees’ InfoSec behaviours. Nonetheless, the 
effect of age on InfoSec influence was ignorable, which caused minor changes of –0.41 per 
cent (Model 1) and –0.07 per cent (Model 2). 
Employees with long tenures had a higher chance to exert InfoSec influence over other 
employees, as shown in the consistently significant and positive log-odds of 0.23 (Model 1), 
0.16 (Model 2) and 0.06 (Model 3). However, two employees having similar tenures would be 
less likely to influence each other’s InfoSec behaviours. These findings indicated the positive 
impact of tenure-based hierarchy on the occurrence of InfoSec influence ties. The effect of 
tenure on InfoSec influence over the influenced employees only achieved significance in 
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Model 3 which included structural effects such as reciprocity and transitivity. This indicated 
that tenure’s effect of the influenced employees became important to InfoSec influence only 
when the InfoSec influence network’s structural characteristics were considered. 
Department membership and seniority greatly increased the occurrence of InfoSec influence 
ties. Employees who worked in the same department doubled the chance of influencing each 
other’s InfoSec behaviours from a baseline probability of 1.52 per cent to 3.2 per cent (Model 
3). The change in probabilities caused by sharing the same department membership was largest 
in Model 1 (a change of 8.54%), then dropped to lowest in Model 2 (0.55%) and increased in 
Model 3 (1.68%). The effect of sharing department membership decreased when employees’ 
socialisation was examined in Models 2 and 3. When information about structural 
characteristics of the InfoSec influence network were accounted for in Model 3, such as 
transitivity or the network’s clustering tendency, having the same department membership 
became more important in determining the occurrence of InfoSec influence ties, explaining the 
increase in the change of probabilities. This was consistent with the analysis of InfoSec 
influence network (see Figure 6.11) where clusters of employees of the same departments could 
be visually identified. 
Being a department manager or director also enabled an employee to influence other 
employees’ InfoSec behaviours. It was worth highlighting that only the effect of being a 
director remained significant across the three models, even when the effects of employees’ 
provisions of resources were examined in Model 3. This indicated that the directors in TTT 
had a strong influence over other employees’ InfoSec behaviours, whereas the impact of being 
department manager on InfoSec influence was negated by those of the provisions of resources. 
6.3.3.2 Effects of socialisation on InfoSec influence 
Three forms of socialisation (i.e., the provisions of instrumental resources, expressive resources 
and InfoSec support) were investigated for their impacts on InfoSec influence. The ERGM 
results indicated that all three of these socialising activities increased the likelihood of InfoSec 
influence between employees. The provision of InfoSec support, which comprised InfoSec 
advice and/or troubleshooting support, had the largest impact on InfoSec influence. When an 
employee gave InfoSec advice and/or troubleshooting support to another employee, the 
likelihood for that employee to influence the receiver’s InfoSec behaviours increased from 0.94 
per cent to 66.15 per cent (Model 2) and from 1.52 per cent to 53.49 per cent (Model 3). 
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The provision of instrumental resources (i.e., giving work advice and/or organisational 
updates) and the provision of expressive resources (i.e., giving personal advice and/or trusting 
for expertise) both increased the likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence. We also noticed the 
changes in impacts of these three socialisation forms on InfoSec influence, of which the 
impacts of the provisions of instrumental and expressive resources increased, whereas the 
impact of the provision of InfoSec support decreased. These changes were caused by the 
inclusion of the InfoSec influence network’s structural features in Model 3. 
6.3.3.3 Effects of network’s structural characteristics on InfoSec influence 
Model 3 analysed the structural characteristics of the InfoSec influence network, which focused 
on its out- and in-degree variations, reciprocity and transitivity. The analysis of these 
characteristics not only described the network’s structure in more detail, but also provided 
additional explanations for the formation of InfoSec influence ties. 
Controlling for employees’ background characteristics and socialisation, the results of the 
InfoSec influence network’s out- and in-degree variations were significant and negative in 
Model 3. Such results indicated homogeneity in employees’ tendencies to influence and to be 
influenced by other employees, or the overall similarities in employees’ number of outgoing 
and incoming InfoSec influence ties. 
Transitivity reflects employees’ clustering tendency in the network which can also impact the 
formation of InfoSec influence ties. Model 3 analysed transitivity of the InfoSec influence 
network which was described by the ‘triad closure’ and ‘two-path’ effects. A positive ‘triad 
closure’ effect and a negative ‘two-path’ effect, as shown in the ERGM results, confirmed that 
the InfoSec influence network was transitive. This also indicated that employees were more 
likely to receive direct InfoSec influence ties from those who indirectly influenced their 
InfoSec behaviours via multiple in-between employees. Employees’ tendency to close the 
triads and form InfoSec influence clusters encapsulated the saying ‘a friend of my friend is also 
my friend’. 
Model 3 also examined employees’ tendency to reciprocate InfoSec influence ties; the result 
showed that this effect was non-significant. This indicated that there was no pattern with regard 
to reciprocity in the InfoSec influence network. The result was consistent with the descriptive 
statistics of the InfoSec influence network (see Table 6.3) which showed that the InfoSec 
influence network had a low rate of reciprocity. 
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6.3.4 Calculating Network Centrality of InfoSec Champions 
Unlike the background characteristics, such as department membership and seniority, that were 
observable and readily available to be used as selection criteria for InfoSec champions, 
identifying potential champions who actively socialised in the networks of provisions of 
resources required a method to quantitatively measure such socialisation. 
Opinion leadership theory, the second instrumental theory in this stage, suggested that 
champions’ positions in the networks can amplify their influence over others (Liu et al. 2017; 
Valente & Davis 1999). Valente and Davis (1999) and Valente and Pumpuang (2007) proposed 
several procedures for recruiting opinion leaders, of which allowing all community members 
to nominate the leaders (i.e., the sociometric procedure) could overcome the shortcomings of 
the other recruitment procedures. Once the nominations are collected, program teams can 
calculate the leaders’ network centrality measures that reflect their influence in the community 
(Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999). Opinion leadership theory specified that opinion 
leaders can be selected based on three measures of network centrality—degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality and closeness centrality (Liu et al. 2017). Degree centrality was defined 
and analysed in Section 6.3.2. Betweenness centrality counts the number of times a node serves 
as the bridge that connect pairs of nodes together, and closeness centrality is the sum of the 
number of hops required for a node to reach all other nodes (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). 
Following opinion leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999), I calculated the 
out-degree centrality of all employees in the networks of provisions of instrumental, 
expressive, InfoSec support resources and exerting InfoSec influence to measure employees’ 
level of socialisation and their direct influence in these networks. I also considered calculating 
employees’ betweenness centrality and closeness centrality as suggested by Liu et al. (2017); 
however, Borgatti (2005) discussed the caveats of these two centrality measures—their 
calculations only account for the shortest paths between the nodes. As such, these measures 
only reflect the nodes’ influence in the networks where all nodes are assumed to know and 
travel on the shortest paths to reach each other. While this assumption is relevant in situations 
where following the shortest paths is emphasised (e.g., shipping goods from one location to 
another location), it is less realistic for transmissions via random paths such as the diffusion of 
information (Borgatti 2005). The transmissions of advice, trust, troubleshooting support and 
InfoSec influence among employees would not always follow the shortest paths. Therefore, I 
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decided that betweenness centrality and closeness centrality would not be appropriate measures 
for representing employees’ influence in the networks examined in this project. 
The popularity or influence of a node can also be measured by the nodes’ connections with 
others that are well-connected (Borgatti 2005). An employee who cannot directly influence 
many employees can still be considered as influential if that employee can influence and 
leverage their colleagues who are influential. This indirect popularity is measured by Beta 
centrality which describes employees’ indirect influence (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). 
Considering employees’ Beta centrality is a prudent approach that prevents missing out 
influential employees while providing more options when selecting champions. Thus, I 
calculated the Beta centrality of all 264 employees in the networks using the software UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002) then used these measures together with employees’ out-
degree centrality to select the influential champions. 
6.4 Evaluation 
The criteria for selecting champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge were identified 
through the ERGM analysis. A potential champion would: 
• be a director or department manager 
• work in the same department of other employees 
• have longer tenure than other employees 
• have high out-degree centrality and/or Beta centrality in the networks of: 
o provision of instrumental resources (i.e., work advice and/or organisational 
updates) 
o provision of expressive resources (i.e., personal advice and/or trust for expertise) 
o provision of InfoSec support (i.e., InfoSec advice and InfoSec troubleshooting 
support) 
o InfoSec influence 
Since the abilities to socialise and provide other employees with resources had large impacts 
on InfoSec influence, I considered these abilities as essential criteria for selecting InfoSec 
champions. Therefore, I recommended TTT to select employees who possessed high centrality 
measures in the instrumental, expressive, InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks to 
be InfoSec champions. 
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The ERGM results suggested that being a director could greatly influence other employees’ 
InfoSec behaviours. However, there were not enough directors in TTT who could devote their 
time to take care of each department’s InfoSec environment and to actively diffuse InfoSec 
knowledge. As a result, the project team concluded that selecting employees who were 
department managers in the same department with the influenced targets would be a more 
sensible solution. Although tenure could also improve an employee’s ability to exert InfoSec 
influence, this trait was not considered as a selection criterion due to its small effect on exerting 
InfoSec influence. 
The project team and top management selected 50 champions based on these criteria for the 
departments in TTT. Each department had one to two champions on average. Large 
departments such as project management, architect, construction and factory, had six to seven 
champions. The 50 champions and their characteristics are summarised in Table D.4 in 
Appendix D. 
As part of the evaluation activities, the project team and top management jointly examined the 
visualisations of the networks of provisions of instrumental, expressive, InfoSec support and 
InfoSec influence. The top management agreed with the project team that the networks of 
instrumental and expressive provisions were reflective of TTT’s work operations. They also 
recognised that both InfoSec-related networks (see Figures 6.10 and 6.11) were sparse and thin, 
and the IT employees and Vice Director of the BSP department stood out in the networks with 
many connections. Although the architect and factory departments operated in two separate 
locations, employees in these departments sought InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support 
from and were influenced by IT employees who worked at headquarters. 
It appeared that even for the informal communication of InfoSec matters the structures of the 
InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks in TTT followed a ‘command-and-control’ 
model, where IT and BSP employees acted as both the formal and informal authority which 
provided InfoSec-related resources to all employees. The Vice Director of the BSP department 
and top management commented that although the current command-and-control management 
model could be useful for maintaining the dissemination of consistent InfoSec advice and 
troubleshooting support, there would be more disadvantages. This management model relied 
on a handful of IT and BSP staff and was prone to the risk of cascading failure if erroneous 
advice were distributed or if one of the IT or BSP staff were to leave TTT. Moreover, the IT 
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and BSP staff could be overloaded by all the queries and requests concerning InfoSec, which 
would leave them less time to attend other important duties. 
6.5 Reflection 
6.5.1 Reflection on the Use of Theory of Social Power Bases 
The theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) served as the focal theory of this stage, which 
suggested the traits and abilities that could be used to select the influential InfoSec champions. 
In line with this theory, I analysed and found employees’ provisions of instrumental resources, 
expressive resources and InfoSec support increase the likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence. 
This relationship between employees’ socialisation and InfoSec influence was based on the 
theory’s premises that when employees provide these resources, they exert influence over other 
employees by demonstrating their informational, expert and referent powers (Raven 2008). 
Raven (2008) posits that the powers to reward and punish can enable individuals to exert 
influence over other people. These powers are relevant in the InfoSec context as employees’ 
compliance with InfoSec policies has been found to be motivated by rewards (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010a; Pahnila, Siponen & Mahmood 2007; Siponen, Mahmood & 
Pahnila 2014) and sanctions (D’Arcy & Herath 2011; Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b). Thus, these 
powers’ impacts on the InfoSec influence over employees’ InfoSec behaviours are worth 
examining. However, the testing of these powers’ impacts on exerting InfoSec influence was 
not possible in this project, as TTT did not have any formal policies that informed employees 
about rewards and sanctions. 
Reviews of behavioural InfoSec literatures (Lebek et al. 2014; Padayachee 2012; Sommestad 
et al. 2014; Warkentin & Mutchler 2014) did not report any prior studies that examined the 
theory of social power bases, especially for selecting InfoSec champions. As such, the ERGM 
analysis in this stage produced new knowledge concerning the behaviours of InfoSec 
influencers in the work context. 
6.5.2 Reflection on the Selection of InfoSec Champions 
I followed the recommendation of the action planning stage’s instrumental theory, opinion 
leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999), to select champions based on their 
out-degree centrality. The theory also suggested to use betweenness centrality and closeness 
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centrality when selecting influential leaders (Liu et al. 2017), but I decided not to use these 
measures in this stage because of their caveats (see Section 6.3.4). To compensate the limitation 
of out-degree centrality which focuses only on direct provisions of resources and direct InfoSec 
influence, I calculated employees’ Beta centrality to capture their indirect influence in the 
networks (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). 
I found the decision to use which centrality measures for identifying opinion leaders to be 
dependent on the practical context of the change program. Given the unique context of this 
project, which concerned the diffusion of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence, I considered 
opinion leadership theory as partially applicable for the selection of champions. Practitioners 
and researchers who follow the approach that leverages opinion leaders should critically select 
the suitable centrality measures that can appropriately capture leaders’ influence. While it was 
outside of this project’s scope to employ statistical tests to determine the suitable centrality 
measures for capturing employees’ InfoSec influence, I believed that pursuing this research 
direction would produce useful insights. 
The ERGM results indicated that employees’ background characteristics and socialisation 
increased the likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence. This suggested that practitioners and 
researchers should consider other traits and abilities, in addition to their network centrality, 
when selecting the champions. Prior studies that focused on the selection of InfoSec champions 
were scarce. Of these studies, Chipperfield and Furnell (2010) suggested appointing InfoSec 
champions who are in senior positions, trustworthy and able to deliver InfoSec messages 
tailored to specific audiences in the workplace. My findings about the positive impacts of 
employees’ seniority, having the same department memberships and provisions of expressive 
resources such as trust were in line with Chipperfield and Furnell’s (2010) recommendations. 
Moreover, Gabriel and Furnell (2011) discussed the potential use of personality tests to select 
champions. It would have been interesting to select the champions at TTT based on their 
personality traits per Gabriel and Furnell’s (2011) discussion, but this approach would place 
extra burden on employees to complete a personality test in addition to the main survey. 
The ERGM results in this stage extended current knowledge about the selection of InfoSec 
champions by revealing the structural mechanisms that facilitated InfoSec influence. While 
these structural mechanisms increased the likelihood for employees to exert InfoSec influence, 
the inclusion of their effects in the exponential random graph models negated other effects of 
employees’ background characteristics on their influential status. This implied that the 
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importance of employees’ traits for selecting InfoSec champions depended on the unique 
network structures of the work environments. 
Overall, the stage’s findings suggested that the selection of InfoSec champions should be based 
on a combination of multiple factors—employees’ background characteristics and behaviours, 
employees’ network centrality and the structural features of the networks that represented the 
focal work environments. 
6.5.3 Reflection on Further Actions 
Having reached a consensus with the top management on the selected InfoSec champions, the 
project team could move to the next action taking stage. The original objective to follow the 
train the trainers approach and have the champions diffuse InfoSec knowledge, as stated in the 
diagnosis stage (see Chapter 5), remained unchanged. 
A major research activity in this action planning stage was to analyse the networks representing 
the provisions of organisational resources and the InfoSec influence network to understand 
more about the current work environment at TTT. Further, these networks and their descriptive 
statistics served as the baseline findings that would be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
InfoSec champions’ activities and the InfoSec change program in a later evaluation and 
reflection stage. Given the command-and-control model currently visible in the InfoSec-related 
networks, an objective of the InfoSec change program was determined to increase the density 
of these InfoSec-related networks. The change program should also reduce these networks’ 
centralisation by having the appointed InfoSec champions diffuse InfoSec knowledge and 
emerge as the new sources of InfoSec support and influence. 
At the beginning of this stage, the potential for employees to refuse to answer the sensitive 
questionnaire which asked employees about whom they socialised with in the workplace was 
a concern. However, the email from the General Director, which was sent to all employees and 
clearly stated that top management would not have access to the collected responses, appeared 
to be effective. The responses came quickly and throughout the data collection process the 
project team did not receive any complaints from employees. 
The top management at TTT and the Vice Director of the BSP department displayed great 
interests and excitement when they analysed the network visualisations of employees’ 
socialisation. The employees in TTT at this point had familiarised themselves with the 
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procedure of responding to the questionnaire, a sensitive matter and prone to non-responses 
(Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013). On this basis, the project team had acquired the buy-ins 
from top management and employees which were critical for the CAR project. I felt confident 
that employees would continue to support the project in the subsequent action taking stage 
where I would launch the questionnaire again to capture the changes in the InfoSec-related 
networks and InfoSec climate. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described and discussed the research activities in the CAR project’s action 
planning stage. These involved conducting SNA to examine the networks within TTT and 
using the analysis outcome to select InfoSec champions for the InfoSec change program (i.e., 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge). The InfoSec-related networks examined in this stage will 
later be used as a baseline for comparing with the post–InfoSec change program networks and 
to evaluate any changes. 
I adopted the theory of social power bases (French & Raven 1959; Raven 2008), graph theory 
(Barnes & Harary 1983) and opinion leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999) 
to determine the characteristics and interactions that made an employee capable of influencing 
others’ InfoSec behaviours. The Vice Director of the BSP department and I jointly designed a 
questionnaire to collect the network data, and the ERGM method was employed to statistically 
validate the theoretical propositions of those theories. 
Overall, the InfoSec-related networks before the change program were sparse (i.e., had low 
density and had high centralisation) and most of employees received InfoSec support and 
influence from a handful of IT and BSP staff. The top management and Vice Director of the 
BSP department commented that such networks reflected a current command-and-control 
InfoSec management model at TTT which had existed without their knowledge. At the end of 
the action planning stage, the project team and top management reached a consensus on the list 
of identified InfoSec champions for the change program. A summary of this stage’s activities 
is presented in Figure 6.12. 
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Figure 6.12. Summary of the Action Planning Stage  
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Chapter 7: Action Taking Stage—Conducting InfoSec Training for 
the Champions and Implementing the InfoSec Change Program 
This chapter discusses the action taking stage of the CAR project, the diffusion of InfoSec 
knowledge. This stage aimed at preparing the 50 selected champions for the diffusion, through 
a change program following the train the trainers approach, to improve TTT’s InfoSec 
environment. In this action taking stage, the diagnosis section focused on understanding the 
current situation—the champions had never received formal InfoSec training before and 
needed to be prepared for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. The action planning section 
reviewed the relevant literatures to learn about the key elements and approaches for effective 
InfoSec training, and the action taking stage involved carrying out the training. The training 
outcomes were then discussed in the evaluation and reflection sections. The structure of this 
chapter is presented in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1. Structure of Chapter 7 
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7.1 Diagnosis 
In the action planning stage of the CAR project I examined the InfoSec environment of TTT 
before the change program, which aimed at improving InfoSec climate and employees’ 
InfoSec-related socialisation (i.e., their exchanges of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence). 
To that end, top management and I reached a consensus on the identification of 50 influential 
InfoSec champions to diffuse InfoSec knowledge, following the train the trainers approach as 
suggested by the interviewed InfoSec experts in the diagnosis stage (see Chapter 5). 
The sparse networks of the InfoSec-related socialisation, dominated by a handful of IT and 
BSP employees, reinforced the adoption of the train the trainers approach that made use of 
InfoSec champions who would spread InfoSec knowledge. However, the selected InfoSec 
champions had never received any formal InfoSec training at TTT, and thus had varied to no 
InfoSec knowledge. Therefore, the project team decided to design and deliver InfoSec training 
to these champions before they started the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
7.2 Action Planning 
As this stage focused on designing the appropriate InfoSec training materials and delivering 
training workshops to the selected InfoSec champions, the project team which would perform 
the training had to decide on the training content and how the training should be conducted. 
Once the training content and the delivery method were finalised, the project team would 
conduct training for the champions. 
7.2.1 InfoSec Training Content 
Organisational InfoSec programs often aim at improving employees’ awareness of existing 
threats and vulnerabilities within the workplace and increasing their knowledge and confidence 
when handling InfoSec incidents (D’Arcy, Hovav & Galletta 2009; Furnell & Thomson 2009; 
Shaw et al. 2009; Workman, Bommer & Straub 2008). Straub and Welke (1998) stated that 
InfoSec training should educate employees on information about security risks and 
countermeasures. Topics concerning compliance and noncompliance should also be covered in 
InfoSec training. For example, communication about the certainty and severity of sanctions 
were emphasised as a method to deter potential InfoSec violations (Straub & Welke 1998). 
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Later studies suggested that InfoSec training programs should address topics such as InfoSec 
policy, procedures and responsibility (Bartnes, Moe & Heegaard 2016; Karjalainen et al. 2013; 
Straub & Welke 1998; da Veiga & Martins 2015). An emphasis on accountability and 
responsibility during training has been put forward by recent studies which found that 
employees tend to justify their noncompliance by using neutralisation techniques such as 
‘denial of responsibility’, ‘appeal to higher loyalties’ (i.e., justifying a violation of InfoSec 
policy as a necessary requirement for achieving an important task) or ‘metaphor of the ledger’ 
(i.e., using previous good acts as an excuse to justify occasional violations of InfoSec policy) 
(Barlow et al. 2013; Siponen & Vance 2010). Further, research has reinforced that employees 
need to realise the consequences of InfoSec violations (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011; 
Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). Training modules that focus on employees’ moral and ethics 
were also recommended (D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012; Hovav & D’Arcy 2012). 
InfoSec training should help employees recognise the protective measures in the workplace, 
availability and effectiveness (Herath & Rao 2009a). InfoSec training should also boost 
employees’ confidence in using InfoSec measures when necessary in real situations 
(Albrechtsen 2007; Cone et al. 2007; Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila 2014). Being proficient in 
handling InfoSec incidents requires not only improving one’s own knowledge, but also 
effective interactions with others. Therefore, cooperation and collaboration with peers and the 
ability to realise top management’s InfoSec vision are some of the key abilities that need to be 
trained (Bartnes, Moe & Heegaard 2016; Thomson, von Solms & Louw 2006; da Veiga & 
Martins 2015). These skills cover how to report InfoSec incidents and, for the InfoSec 
champions, the diffusion of the learned knowledge to other colleagues; the latter is termed 
‘cascading training’ or train the trainers approach (Bartnes, Moe & Heegaard 2016; Heikka 
2008; da Veiga & Martins 2015). 
The training contents suggested by the reviewed literature were consistent with the interviewed 
InfoSec experts’ recommendations. In addition to the primary objective of improving 
employees’ InfoSec awareness and knowledge through training, the InfoSec experts suggested 
that employees need to be informed about the outcomes of their compliance such as the 
protection of organisational InfoSec, the avoidance of sanctions and recognition and the 
outcomes of noncompliance such as sanctions and loss of productivity and time. The experts 
emphasised that InfoSec accountability and responsibility should be expected in the workplace 
by default, but some employees may fail to realise that and have to be reminded. Although the 
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experts recommended educating employees on the available InfoSec measures in their 
interviews, they did not put emphasis on communicating the measures’ effectiveness. As the 
literature argued for the importance of raising employees’ awareness of the measures’ 
effectiveness (Herath & Rao 2009a; Vance, Siponen & Pahnila 2012), the project team decided 
to incorporate this content and the other topics discussed above into the InfoSec training. 
While there are no one size fits all curricula for InfoSec training programs due to every 
organisation’s unique needs (D’Arcy & Hovav 2008; Karjalainen et al. 2013), advice about the 
design of InfoSec training’s topics can be found in industry guidelines. NIST (Wilson & Hash 
2003) distinguishes InfoSec awareness and training programs, with the former focusing on 
providing information about InfoSec to employees while the latter aims at teaching InfoSec 
skills. In TTT’s context, top management and the project team decided to pursue both 
objectives, raising employees’ understanding about the importance of InfoSec and educating 
them on the basic InfoSec practices such as locking computer screens, checking for anti-virus 
software’s updates and detecting and reporting InfoSec vulnerabilities. 
The NIST guide provides a list of 27 key InfoSec topics such as passwords usage, web usage, 
spam, visitor control and email etiquette, and explains that the selection of InfoSec topics for 
the awareness and training programs should be based on the organisation’s needs assessment 
(Wilson & Hash 2003). To this end, the project team had conducted the risk assessment in the 
diagnosis stage to identify the InfoSec issues and understand the current InfoSec environment 
at TTT. Based on the suggestions from prior studies, the interviewed experts and the NIST 
guide, the project team jointly selected the topics of the InfoSec training program at TTT which 
were then reviewed and approved by top management. Top management and the project team 
decided that the InfoSec training program should cover the following seven topics: 
1) fundamental InfoSec concepts (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability and the 
roles of employees in protecting organisational InfoSec) 
2) InfoSec threats (i.e., types of internal and external InfoSec threats) 
3) malware (i.e., types of malware and their infection mechanisms) 
4) internet usage (i.e., how to detect suspicious websites and tools for assessing websites’ 
safety) 
5) email usage (i.e., how to detect and report suspicious emails) 
6) computers and data protection (i.e., management of physical and electronic files and 
how to backup data) 
7) passwords usage (i.e., how to setup strong passwords). 
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7.2.2 Key Elements for Effective InfoSec Training 
The relevant literature was reviewed to identify the elements of effective training. The four key 
elements for effective InfoSec training were identified to be 1) collaborative learning, 2) critical 
reflection, 3) relevancy and 4) facilitating conditions. These elements are summarised in Table 
7.1 and below. 
Table 7.1. Key Elements of InfoSec Training 
Key element Description References 
Collaborative 
learning 
Training should be conducted 
in groups which facilitates 
sharing of ideas and construct 
collective knowledge among 
learners as well as with 
instructors 
Albrechtsen (2007); Albrechtsen and Hovden 
(2010); Bartnes, Moe and Heegaard (2016); 
Heikka (2008); Karjalainen et al. (2013); 
Karjalainen and Siponen (2011); Puhakainen and 




Learners are encouraged to 
critically reflect on their 
learning which enables them 
to internalise and apply the 
learned knowledge 
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010); Cone et al. 
(2007); Heikka (2008); Karjalainen et al. (2013); 
Karjalainen and Siponen (2011); Puhakainen and 
Siponen (2010); Shaw et al. (2009); Thomson, 
von Solms and Technikon (2006) 
Relevancy Training materials and 
methods should be 
personalised and relevant to 
individual learners or groups 
Albrechtsen (2007); Albrechtsen and Hovden 
(2010); Barlow et al. (2013); Bartnes, Moe and 
Heegaard (2016); Caldwell (2016); Chipperfield 
and Furnell (2010); Cone et al. (2007); D’Arcy 
and Hovav (2008); Furnell and Thomson (2009); 
Heikka (2008); Hovav and D’Arcy (2012); 
Karjalainen et al. (2013); Karjalainen and 
Siponen (2011); McCormac et al. (2016); 
Parsons et al. (2010); Puhakainen and Siponen 
(2010); Shaw et al. (2009); Siponen, Mahmood 
and Pahnila (2014); Siponen and Vance (2010); 
Straub and Welke (1998); da Veiga and Martins 
(2015); Zafar (2013) 
Facilitating 
conditions 
The arrangement of a training 
workshop should take into 
consideration the workshop’s 
atmosphere, the instructor’s 
creditability and 
organisational and national 
cultures 
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010); Caldwell 
(2016); Cone et al. (2007); Herath and Rao 
(2009a); Hovav and D’Arcy (2012); Karjalainen 
et al. (2013); Karjalainen and Siponen (2011); 
Parsons et al. (2010); Puhakainen and Siponen 
(2010); Straub and Welke (1998); Thomson and 
von Solms (1998); Zafar (2013) 
The collaborative learning approach aims at promoting active exchanges between learners and 
instructors during the training process, which allows all training participants to co-discover and 
co-construct knowledge together (Gallivan et al. 2005; Karjalainen et al. 2013; Karjalainen & 
Siponen 2011). This training approach allows the learners to relate to their own InfoSec-related 
experiences and develop shared organisational InfoSec practices, and satisfies the learners’ 
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need to voice opinions and creates an enjoyable learning atmosphere (Albrechtsen & Hovden 
2010; Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). 
The collaborative learning approach follows the principles of social constructivist and 
constructivist learning theories (Karjalainen et al. 2013; Karjalainen & Siponen 2011; 
Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). Constructivist learning theory argues that knowledge is 
subjectively formed by groups of people within a socio-cultural setting (Adams 2006; 
Richardson 2003). Social constructivism as a version of constructivist learning theory 
highlights the social process, such as interactions and dialogues, which contributes to the 
construction of knowledge (Adams 2006; Richardson 2003). In constructivism-based 
pedagogical approaches, learners construct their own knowledge through their active 
participation in a process to make sense of their unique experiences which involve activities 
such as reflection, open-ended investigations and exchanges of ideas within a learning 
community (Adams 2006; Boghossian 2006; Fosnot & Perry 2005). As a result, constructivism 
puts emphasis on the learners, rather than the teacher, as the centre of knowledge (Boghossian 
2006). 
Unlike constructivist theories, behaviourism as a learning theory focuses on the teacher-
directed, instructional and controlled transmission of objective knowledge and emphasises the 
frequent use of tests to ensure learners’ mastery (Murphy 1997; Shepard 2000). Representatives 
of the behaviourist learning theory include instructor-led or computer-based InfoSec training 
and InfoSec campaigns which offer advantages for organisation-wide and standardised training 
solutions (Cone et al. 2007). Given that there were 50 InfoSec champions who needed to be 
trained intensively, the project team deemed the constructivism-based collaborative learning 
approach as suitable and appropriate for such a number of learners. 
The learners’ critical reflection on the learning materials is also a key element for effective 
InfoSec training. Reflection allows the learners to critically analyse the taught InfoSec 
practices, while incorporating their personal experiences which increases their confidence in 
applying the techniques when necessary. Reflection on the learned knowledge also creates 
long-lasting changes (Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). Having learners reflect on their personal 
InfoSec experiences can support their adoption of the InfoSec practices more easily, and the 
reflected experiences can contribute to the group discussion and further facilitate collective 
learning (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010). 
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Relating to familiar and real-world issues enables learners to make personal connections with 
the taught knowledge, supports the development of ownership and mutual understanding about 
how InfoSec should be practiced (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010; Chipperfield & Furnell 2010; 
Furnell & Thomson 2009; Karjalainen et al. 2013; Parsons et al. 2010; Puhakainen & Siponen 
2010). While critical reflection and collaborative learning bring relevant experiences to the 
group discussion, facilitators should tailor the training to match different learning groups. 
Factors such as learners’ proficiency in using computer and whether they are physically bound 
to the work environment should be taken into consideration (D’Arcy & Hovav 2008). This 
calls for a bespoke approach to design InfoSec materials that fit employees’ interests, needs, 
roles or job functions (Chipperfield & Furnell 2010; Parsons et al. 2010). Since the project 
team had conducted the risk assessment in the diagnosis stage, the identified InfoSec threats 
and vulnerabilities in TTT were incorporated into the training. 
Finally, the facilitating conditions are critical for successful InfoSec training. Budget 
constraints and appropriate training modes (e.g., presentation slides, lunch meetings and 
games) are both important when designing InfoSec training (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010; 
Parsons et al. 2010). Training facilitators should engage with learners by using real InfoSec 
scenarios and framing suitable messages for different organisational audiences (Chipperfield 
& Furnell 2010; Cone et al. 2007). The facilitators’ credibility also impacts learners’ attitude 
towards learning (Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). Moreover, national and organisational 
cultures should be considered since these cultural factors could affect learners’ learning styles. 
For example, the Confucian-based cultures of many Asian countries hold that moral plays a 
significant role in deterring undesired behaviours and employees refrain from engaging in 
malicious InfoSec behaviours since they feel the informal pressure from their group norms 
rather than the formal policy (Hovav & D’Arcy 2012). The dominant effect of social norms on 
employees’ InfoSec behaviours had been mentioned by the interviewed InfoSec experts in the 
diagnosis stage. Thus, InfoSec training in such a context should focus on the mechanisms for 
raising employees’ moral consciousness (Hovav & D’Arcy 2012). Understanding the 
organisational culture can reveal additional factors that show how InfoSec training should be 
delivered. For example, there are workplaces where practicing InfoSec can boost one’s self-
esteem and social status (Chipperfield & Furnell 2010). Depending on the local context, the 
training atmosphere can be informal, relaxing and even humorous, where the facilitators mainly 
stay in the background and avoid projecting an authoritative image (Albrechtsen & Hovden 
2010). 
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The four key elements of collaborative learning, critical reflection, relevancy of training 
contents and facilitating conditions established the theoretical background of the InfoSec 
training at TTT and served as the focal theory for this stage, informing the subsequent design 
of the workshop and training materials. Some of these elements are grounded on educational 
theories, such as the collaborative learning and reflection on communally relevant experiences 
that follow the principles of constructivist learning theory (Miller 2007). The element of 
facilitating conditions is suggested by empirical studies rather than based on theories. 
7.2.3 Experiential Learning Cycle-Based InfoSec Training Approach 
The project team proceeded with selecting a suitable training method that satisfied the four key 
elements. Such a training method would serve as the instrumental theory for this stage of the 
CAR project. My review of the literature on InfoSec training did not find many studies that 
provided a detailed and step-by-step instruction to InfoSec training. Karjalainen and Siponen 
(2011) had also conducted a detailed review of 32 InfoSec training approaches and compared 
these against four pedagogical requirements for successful training: 1) explicit psychological 
context, 2) content, 3) teaching method and 4) evaluation for learning. These four requirements 
are explained below. 
Learning theories, such as behaviourism and constructivism, establish the psychological 
context for InfoSec training (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) 
argued that InfoSec training should embrace a group-oriented approach as InfoSec training 
aims at creating communal changes (i.e., the group’s collective ability to perform InfoSec 
behaviours in the complex workplace) rather than individual changes, hence advocating the 
adoption of constructivist pedagogy. On this basis, they discussed that the training content 
should reflect learners’ collective experiences to effectively educate about InfoSec policies 
which will be collectively understood and accepted by the groups. The teaching method in this 
case would also follow collectivist principles, which emphasise collaborative learning and aim 
at delivering communal changes, and so would the evaluation method (Karjalainen & Siponen 
2011). Specifically, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) discussed that evaluation after InfoSec 
training should include learners’ self-evaluation, reflection and continuous dialogues with the 




Figure 7.2. Evaluation of InfoSec Training Approaches 
Adopted from Karjalainen and Siponen (2011, p. 535). 
As none of the reviewed InfoSec training approaches fully met the four described requirements 
(see Figure 7.2), Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) proposed an InfoSec training program which 
follows the experiential learning approach (Gibson 2001; Kolb 1984). The experiential learning 
approach follows the principles of constructivist learning theory (Kolb & Kolb 2011; Yilmaz 
2008). This approach focuses on a process of learning derived from and continuously modified 
by learners’ experiences, rather than the outcomes of learning (Kolb & Kolb 2011; Kolb 1984). 
During that process, learners develop refined knowledge by integrating their unique beliefs and 
ideas with those of other learners through reflection and resolution of conflicts (Kolb & Kolb 
2011). 
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Educators and trainers who adopt the experiential learning approach utilise a four-phase 
process model called ‘experiential learning cycle’. The experiential learning cycle utilises four 
principal learning stages—concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract 
conceptualisation and active experimentation—which aim at enabling learners’ experiencing, 
reflecting, thinking and acting respectively (Kolb & Kolb 2011). The experiential learning 
cycle commences with the learners who have unique experiences (the concrete experience 
stage), and they are then asked to reflect on these experiences by observing different 
perspectives (the reflective observation stage) (Akella 2010; Kolb & Kolb 2011). In the next 
stage, abstract conceptualisation, learners assimilate their reflection into abstract concepts and 
draw implications for actions which are taken in the subsequent stage, active experimentation 
(Akella 2010; Kolb & Kolb 2011). 
The InfoSec training approach proposed by Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) consists of 
learning activities that guide learners through the four phases of experiential learning cycle 
described above. For example, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) suggested focusing on 
understanding employees’ own experiences about InfoSec threats, organisational assets and 
protection mechanisms in the first phase of the experiential learning cycle. These experiences 
hold critical roles since they not only facilitate the activities of the next learning stage, but also 
highlight the importance of InfoSec (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). During the second phase, 
reflective observation, trainers can organise group-based learning activities such as the ‘Think-
Pair-Share’ technique (Barkley, Cross & Major 2005). This training technique in the InfoSec 
context involves having employees work in pairs to develop a joint response about an InfoSec 
protection practice, then sharing responses with other pairs and the rest of the class (Karjalainen 
& Siponen 2011). Employees develop abstract concepts about InfoSec in the third phase by 
analysing the similarities and differences between their shared reflection and the organisation’s 
InfoSec policy (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). The abstract concepts are then discussed 
between the trainers and employees to formulate executable actions (e.g., a new InfoSec policy 
or InfoSec practice) and employees are asked to observe and reflect on their performed actions 
in the fourth phase. Such observation and reflection can be discussed in the next experiential 
learning cycle (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). 
Overall, my literature review provided the project team with information about the key 
elements of effective InfoSec training (see Table 7.1) and a detailed and theoretically-based 
training approach that could satisfy these key elements (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). 
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However, the project team decided not to apply the same training procedure recommended by 
Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) without adjusting it to suit the unique context of TTT and the 
nature of this research project. Therefore, the project team, top management and the champions 
planned to perform four activities in total. 
First, the project team and top management would discuss the necessary adjustments to the 
chosen experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec training approach to fit with TTT’s unique 
work context. Second, the project team would conduct the training program with the 
champions, comprising four workshops and a task requiring champions to prepare InfoSec 
proposals. Third, the project team and top management discussed the InfoSec proposals and 
the diffusion approaches with the InfoSec champions. Fourth, the champions performed the 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge as intended in this stage of the CAR project. 
7.3 Action Taking 
7.3.1 Adjusting the Experiential Learning Cycle-Based InfoSec Training Approach 
The project team and top management discussed the four phases of the experiential learning 
cycle-based InfoSec training program as described above, which resulted in several 
adjustments to the training procedure. The project team and top management recognised that 
the champions or learners had not received any formal InfoSec training before, thus, their levels 
of InfoSec-related experiences were expected to be low and varied. Since the experiential 
learning approach relies on learners’ unique experiences, the champions’ low and inconsistent 
levels of InfoSec-related experiences could impact the training effectiveness. The project team 
then decided to establish a common context for the training by commencing the workshops 
with an introduction of the seven InfoSec topics as the learning objectives (see Section 7.2.1). 
As such, the champions would be encouraged to reflect on any of their previous InfoSec-related 
experiences relevant to the seven topics. For example, their experiences may include situations 
when they found a suspicious website or email, InfoSec threats such as unattended documents 
or a visitor who walked freely and unescorted in the office. The project team, as trainers of the 
workshops, would stimulate discussion by emphasising that any past InfoSec-related 
experiences, regardless of how trivial they might be, would be valuable for the learning process. 
In the second experiential learning phase, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) suggested that 
learners share ideas in pairs, the pairs share ideas in groups of four and, finally, present their 
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ideas to all learners attending the workshop. However, top management would only allow each 
workshop to be run for two hours due to the champions’ tight work schedules. If the project 
team followed Karjalainen and Siponen’s (2011) suggested learning activity, then its procedure 
would need to be replicated seven times for each of the seven InfoSec topics. Such activity 
would not be completed within the allowed two hours, and the project team was also concerned 
that the champions would be exhausted by the repeated procedures. The project team decided 
that, after the brief introduction of the seven InfoSec topics, the champions would discuss their 
past InfoSec-related experiences and ideas in the format similar to a focus group. It was 
important that all champions who attended the workshop would be encouraged to contribute 
their experiences and ideas, while the trainers would facilitate the discussion in the background. 
In the third phase, the suggested learning activity involved the trainers introducing the 
organisation’s InfoSec policies to the learners, then allowing the learners to analyse the 
similarities and differences between their discussed ideas and the InfoSec policy (Karjalainen 
& Siponen 2011). Since TTT did not have any formal InfoSec policy, the project team prepared 
the recommended InfoSec practices based on industry standards and guides (e.g., NIST and 
ISO 27001) and explained these practices to the champions. The lack of official InfoSec policy 
and InfoSec practices could also be used to stimulate the champions’ contributions during the 
workshops, by emphasising that their participation would contribute to the development of 
TTT’s future InfoSec policy and practices. After the best InfoSec practices were introduced, 
the champions compared their InfoSec-related experiences and ideas against the best practices 
and contributed insights to the discussions. 
The fourth phase of an experiential learning cycle focuses on the learners implementing the 
agreed actions and their evaluation of performance through dialogues with the trainers and 
other learners in the next learning cycle (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). To facilitate discussions 
about InfoSec actions, the project team decided to have the champions formulate InfoSec 
proposals which detail their proposed InfoSec solutions to the InfoSec issues in their 
departments. The due date for this activity was set one week after the workshops. The project 
team also mentioned at the end of the workshops that the champions’ roles included diffusing 
InfoSec knowledge to their colleagues. Table 7.2 lists the four phases, their activities, the 
project team’s assessment of their feasibility and the adjustments made to fit the context of 
TTT. 
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Table 7.2. The Modified Experiential Learning Cycle-Based InfoSec Training Approach 
to Fit the Local Context 
Suggested learning activities Feasibility in TTT’s context 
and considerations 
Adjustments to learning 
activities and estimated time 
Phase 1 (Concrete 
experiences) 
Learners form the basis of 
learning by reflecting on their 
individual experiences about 
InfoSec assets, threats and 
protective means. 
The champions had not 
received formal InfoSec 
training before and their 
InfoSec-related experiences 
might be inconsistent and at a 
low level. The project team 
also decided to educate the 
champions about seven 
InfoSec topics (see Section 
7.2.1). Therefore, it would be 
necessary to establish a 
common context for the 
workshop. 
The project team as trainers 
commenced the workshop by 
presenting about the key 
InfoSec concepts which were 
aligned with the seven InfoSec 
topics to be covered in the 
workshop. 
The champions were asked to 
reflect on and to discuss their 
past experiences about the 
presented concepts. 
A brief introduction of the 
seven InfoSec topics was 
conducted in less than 15 
minutes on presentation slides. 
Phase 2 (Reflective 
observation) 
Learners share ideas in pairs 
and pairs share ideas in groups 
of four, then the shared ideas 
are shared with all members 
attending the workshop. 
Each workshop is limited to 
two hours, which is not 
suitable to conduct the 
suggested procedure for each 
of the seven InfoSec topics. 
The champions attending the 
workshop discussed InfoSec-
related experiences and ideas 
with each other and with 
trainers in the format similar to 
a focus group. This ensured 
the workshops to meet the time 
requirement. 
The sharing of InfoSec-related 
experiences and ideas should 
be conducted within one hour. 
Phase 3 (Formation of 
abstract concepts and 
generalisations) 
Trainers explain InfoSec policy 
and InfoSec practices, then 
learners analyse the differences 
and similarities between their 
discussed ideas and the 
explained policy/practices. 
 
TTT did not have any InfoSec 
policy and InfoSec practices. 
Moreover, the champions’ lack 
of InfoSec-related experiences 
may discourage them to share 
ideas. 
The project team introduced 
the best InfoSec practices that 
were based on industry 
standards and guides. The 
champions compared the 
similarities and differences 
between their InfoSec-related 
experiences and the best 
practices. 
Phase 4 (Active 
experimentation) 
Trainers and learners discuss 
ideas and reach a consensus on 
the actions to be taken i.e., new 
InfoSec practices and/or 
The suggested procedures were 
feasible in TTT’s context. 
After the workshop, the 
champions were asked to 
develop InfoSec proposals 
which detailed their proposed 
InfoSec solutions to mitigate 
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revised InfoSec policies. 
Learners are asked to observe 
and reflect on their performed 
actions. The performed actions 
can be evaluated through 
dialogues with the trainers and 
with other learners in the next 
experiential learning cycle. 
the InfoSec issues in their 
departments. 
The project team discussed 
InfoSec proposals with the 
champions after the workshops 
to reach a consensus on the 
proposed InfoSec solutions. 
7.3.2 Conducting the InfoSec Training 
The project team took action and conducted four training workshops with 50 InfoSec 
champions in two days. Each workshop was attended by 11 to 15 champions. Champions who 
worked in the same department were encouraged not to participate in the same workshop to 
ensure diversified experiences for discussion. Table 7.3 presents the numbers and compositions 
of participants in each workshop. 
Table 7.3. Training Workshops and Participants 
Training workshop (# of 
participants) 
Champion ID (1–50) Department Note 
Training workshop 1 
(13 participants) 
1 Accounting   
19 Construction   
20 Construction   
21 Construction   
33 Gamma   
36 Human resource   
37 Human resource   
38 Marketing   
40 Project management   
45 Purchasing   
46 Purchasing   
48 Quality control and assurance   
49 Tender   
Training workshop 2 
(11 participants) 
5 Architect   
16 BSP   
18 Business development   
22 Construction   
23 Construction   
35 Hanoi Online 
41 Project management   
42 Project management   
43 Project management   
47 Purchasing   
50 Tender   
Training workshop 3 
(15 participants) 
6 Architect   
7 Architect   
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8 Architect   
9 Architect   
10 Architect   
11 Architect   
12 Architect   
13 Architect   
14 Architect   
28 Factory Online 
29 Factory Online 
30 Factory Online 
31 Factory Online 
32 Factory Online 
27 Factory Online 
Training workshop 4 
(11 participants) 
2 Accounting   
3 Administration   
4 Administration   
15 After sale services   
17 BSP   
24 Construction   
25 Estimation   
26 Estimation   
34 Gamma Online 
39 Marketing   
44 Project management   
The project team acted as facilitators and opened each workshop with a presentation covering 
the seven selected topics. We briefly explained to the champions the concepts and definitions 
of InfoSec, such as the importance of InfoSec in TTT’s context, the possible routes of 
cyberattacks and online threats on the internet. Real examples of InfoSec incidents and threats, 
documented by the BSP and IT departments and from the risk assessment in the diagnosis stage 
(see Chapter 5), were also included in the presentation slides. 
After the brief presentation about the InfoSec topics, the champions were asked to discuss their 
relevant InfoSec-related experiences. The common experiences discussed by the champions 
included the organisation and safeguard of hardcopies and computer files in the departments, 
internal and external files transfers and information leakage to clients or business partners. 
Based on the discussed InfoSec-related experiences, the project team then suggested the best 
InfoSec practices and let the champions analyse these practices.  
For example, the Vice Director of the BSP department reminded the champions about the 
company’s cloud which offered a secure mean to transfer files internally and externally. 
However, the champions mentioned that besides sending files as email attachments to external 
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recipients in daily work, they also shared files by using personal online storages such as 
Dropbox and Google Drive. Some champions reported that they even saw their colleagues send 
work files to others and external recipients by using the chat function of Facebook. They 
explained the reasons for not using the company’s cloud were employees’ lack of awareness 
about the cloud and the inconvenience caused by poor usability and slow speed. After 
discussing the pros and cons of using the company’s cloud instead of personal clouds such as 
Dropbox and Google Drive, the project team convinced the champions to adopt the company’s 
cloud for future transferring of files and diffuse such information to their colleagues. The Vice 
Director of the BSP department also committed to improve the company’s cloud by addressing 
the feedback from the champions during the workshops. Overall, the atmosphere of the four 
workshops was kept relaxed and open for discussion, where the project team members stayed 
in the background as facilitators and let the champions actively engage in an exchange of 
information and opinions. 
7.3.3 The Champions’ InfoSec Proposals 
At the end of the workshop, the InfoSec champions were given the task to prepare InfoSec 
proposals which suggested the InfoSec solutions that they believed could alleviate the InfoSec 
threats in their departments. A sample InfoSec proposal prepared by the champions in the 
construction department is presented in Figure 7.3. 
By asking the champions to prepare the InfoSec proposals the project team achieved two things. 
First, completing the first part of the proposals about InfoSec issues required the champions to 
critically analyse the InfoSec environment in their departments. This provided them with an 
opportunity to reflect on and review their new knowledge. Second, the learned knowledge 
could be directly applied to generate a list of proposed solutions to mitigate the InfoSec issues 
identified by the champions themselves. Since these solutions were formulated by the 
champions, including the suggestion to provide InfoSec training to other employees, they were 
highly relevant to the champions’ contexts and created a sense of ownership that would 
subsequently encourage the champions to enact the proposed solutions. 
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Figure 7.3. InfoSec Proposal Prepared by Champions of the Construction Department 
Although the due date for submitting the InfoSec proposals was set as one week after the 
workshops, it took a month for the champions of all departments to submit the InfoSec 
proposals. The project team reviewed the InfoSec proposals with the top management and had 
two one-hour meetings with the champions to discuss and clarify the proposals. The proposed 
InfoSec solutions included improvements in the areas of InfoSec infrastructure and employees’ 
InfoSec knowledge. 
The proposed infrastructure-related improvements included the allocation of more secure 
lockers, encrypted USBs and portable drives to the departments and installing CCTV at the 
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construction sites as seen in the sample proposal (see Figure 7.3). Champions also requested to 
adjust the levels of access rights to their departments’ shared network drives. It appeared that 
many InfoSec champions were dissatisfied with the current setup that allowed access rights to 
shared folders across departments. Champions from the construction, HR, sourcing and 
planning departments also suggested more meeting rooms for confidential discussions. The 
champion from the HR department, who was also the department’s director, complained that 
job interviews were sometimes inappropriately conducted at a meeting table in the public area. 
He argued that such discussions in the public area may expose confidential information about 
the candidates and salary. Similarly, the champions from the construction department also 
raised the issue of lacking private meeting rooms and storage for confidential documents at the 
construction sites. Moreover, they explained that the situation at the construction sites was 
risky as the discussions and documents were exposed to contracted workers and business 
partners such as subcontractors and clients. 
There was a debate during a meeting to discuss the InfoSec proposals about whether personal 
devices and software applications such as laptops, portable drives and personal email accounts 
should be used for work purpose. The InfoSec champions of the architect department opposed 
this suggestion as they saw the use of personal devices and software applications as a threat to 
organisational InfoSec. These champions also proposed banning the use of online social media 
in the workplace and restricting access to several suspicious websites. The other champions 
argued that such restrictions would not be an ideal solution and proposed to focus on educating 
employees with proper InfoSec knowledge instead. 
The project team took note of these concerns and consulted top management after these 
meetings. The agreed solution was a long-term strategic plan which aimed at revising the 
budgets to purchase more IT equipment such as laptops, USBs and portable drives for work 
purposes and secure lockers. In future, each department will be allocated secure USBs and 
portable drives kept by the department’s champions. Personal laptops with InfoSec functions 
(e.g., anti-virus software, auto-backup software and remote wipe functions) will be provided 
to employees on demand. 
It was also argued that the IT and BSP departments in the future would look for the technical 
solutions to monitor and manage employees’ personal internet use more effectively, rather than 
banning all non-work activities. Further, the Vice Director of the BSP department initiated a 
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new project to resolve issues pertaining to access rights, especially the management of the 
publicly shared ‘TEMP’ file directory4. 
The champions provided suggestions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge in the meetings. 
For example, champions of the architect and construction departments suggested diffusing 
information about the procedures for managing and processing documents and computer files 
at various levels of seniority. Such information was essential for these departments and their 
employees since they handle large volumes of documents and files daily. The champions of 
the planning and estimation departments proposed to train their colleagues about secure email 
practices, such as carefully checking that the correct recipients were included in the email, 
removing unintended attachments before forwarding emails and developing a clear 
understanding about which information could be disclosed to whom internally and externally. 
Information about dealing with visitors was mentioned in the InfoSec proposals of the factory 
and sourcing departments. Since the factory often invited clients and business partners to the 
manufacturing site to showcase the furniture’s models, mock rooms and decorated spaces, they 
considered the external visitors as a potential InfoSec threat. Specifically, InfoSec champions 
of the factory departments felt concerned that these visitors might take photos of the machinery 
and design models, some of which were TTT’s confidential assets. They proposed training 
their colleagues about visitor control practices, such as requesting external visitors to wait at a 
designated area in the office or to escort the visitors to the intended locations instead of letting 
them freely walk there unescorted. Additionally, the champions proposed to develop a work 
culture where employees would be constantly reminded that no visitors were permitted to take 
photos or record audio inside the factory. 
The champions also reported incidents where employees had forgotten their printed documents 
at the shared printers or recycled papers that contained sensitive information. In this regard, 
champions of the tender and planning departments committed to training their colleagues in 
secure printing practices. The champions of the marketing department were rather creative as 
they suggested using the email calendars to remind staff about performing InfoSec practices, 
                                            
4 TTT created the ‘TEMP’ file directory as a way for sharing files internally; all employees had access to 
this directory, could upload files or create folders and recipients would download the shared files or folders 
from there. Issues related to the ‘TEMP’ file directory were discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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such as checking for new anti-virus software updates or archiving confidential documents 
received during the day in the designated safe locations. 
7.3.4 The Diffusion of InfoSec Knowledge 
In the meetings before the diffusion, three champions expressed their concern that even though 
they were interested in InfoSec matters, they were not confident in their communication skills 
and ability to influence others’ InfoSec behaviours. Some champions also reported that they 
had never prepared training slides before. In response to these issues, the project team and top 
management devised two diffusion methods. First, the champions experienced in delivering 
training volunteered to design the training slides that they believed would be appealing to the 
general audience in TTT. The champions from project management volunteered to design the 
training slides as they had organised large-scale training on enterprise resource planning and 
customer relationship management systemsfor other departments in the past. Second, top 
management agreed that only large departments of more than 10 employees would require the 
champions to conduct formal training sessions. Small departments of fewer than 10 employees 
could organise an informal discussion to review the training slides. The project team and top 
management also requested the champions to occasionally remind their colleagues about 
InfoSec matters during the diffusion period. 
After the two meetings to discuss the InfoSec proposals, the InfoSec champions immediately 
commenced the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge in their own departments for four months. The 
period of four months was decided by the project team and agreed upon by top management 
for two reasons. First, it was decided to fit into the PhD candidature’s allocated time frame of 
four years, with the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge taking place in the third year. By 
completing the diffusion and its evaluation before the end of the third year, I could use the 
fourth year of my PhD candidature to finalise the thesis. Second, expert opinions suggested 
that it would take a minimum of three months to evaluate an InfoSec implementation such as 
the ISO 27001 standard5. 
                                            
5 For example, the British Assessment Bureau, a certification company acknowledged by ISO, suggested 
that an ISO 27001 certification normally takes 3 to 6 months (http://www.british-
assessment.co.uk/guides/iso-27001-beginners-guide/ [accessed 18 September 2017]). Another ISO 
certification body, NQA, advised that an organisation should have their ISO 27001 implemented and fully 
operate for at least 3 months before an evaluation can be conducted (https://www.nqa.com/en-
us/resources/blog/december-2015/your-complete-guide-to-the-iso-27001-standard [accessed 18 September 
2017]). 
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The project team did not interfere in the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. This was 
to ensure that the outcome of the diffusion would accurately reflect the champions’ influence 
on the InfoSec environment at TTT, rather than being pressured by the project team to achieve 
the desired improvements. The outcome of the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge 
will be evaluated in the next stage of the CAR project. Figure 7.4 presents a summary of the 
research activities described so far—the adjusted four-phase experiential learning cycle-based 
InfoSec training, the preparation of and discussion on the InfoSec proposals and the 
champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
 
Figure 7.4. Summary of Research Activities 
7.4 Evaluation 
The workshops were conducted with full attendance of 50 champions appointed in the previous 
action planning stage. Informal discussions between the project team and the InfoSec 
champions after the workshops indicated that the champions enjoyed the workshops. The 
InfoSec champions were glad to see TTT’s serious commitment to InfoSec matters in the 
workplace and confirmed that the workshops had enhanced their understanding about InfoSec. 
At the end of the training program the project team and top management collected InfoSec 
proposals from the champions, which allowed the champions to voice their opinions about their 
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desired InfoSec improvements in their work settings. The champions’ suggestions led to the 
initiations of formal projects which aimed at improving the InfoSec environment at TTT in the 
future, such as a revision of budget to purchase more secure portable devices and equipment. 
The two meetings to discuss the InfoSec proposals facilitated the exchange of concerns and 
solutions between the project team, top management and the champions. Such exchange to 
discuss and achieve a consensus on InfoSec matters between top management and staff had not 
occurred before at TTT. The project team and top management now had a clearer understanding 
about the unique InfoSec issues and desired solutions of each department, while the champions 
acknowledged their critical role in the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge and understood their 
contributions were taken seriously. The meetings also enabled the project team to understand 
more about the challenge that some champions experienced, their lack of confidence in 
communication abilities, and devise two diffusion approaches to assist their diffusion. 
Specifically, the champions may conduct formal training sessions or informal discussions with 
their colleagues in the same departments. After the meetings the champions confirmed that 
they were now equipped with the necessary knowledge for the diffusion and suitable diffusion 
methods. 
7.5 Reflection 
The project team and top management considered this action taking stage as successful as the 
primary objectives to train the selected champions and have them diffuse InfoSec knowledge 
was met. The CAR project was agreed to progress to the next and final stage. The champions’ 
lack of confidence in communication abilities was relevant to the objectives of the CAR 
project, which aimed at carrying out and studying the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. It 
suggested that in addition to the champions’ centrality in social networks, background 
characteristics and social interactions, which were identified in the previous action planning 
stage as important criteria for selecting the champions, organisational skills could also impact 
their potential to exert influence over others’ InfoSec behaviours. On this basis, the meetings 
after the workshops with the champions to discuss their concerns were useful. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
In the action taking stage discussed in this chapter, the project team jointly designed and 
conducted InfoSec training for the 50 champions identified in the previous stage. The training’s 
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purpose was to prepare these champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. To this end, 
the relevant literature was reviewed and identified four key elements for successful InfoSec 
training—collaborative learning, critical reflection, relevancy and facilitating conditions—
were identified. Of the various InfoSec training approaches, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) 
suggested an experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec training approach which satisfied these 
four key elements through the provision of a step-by-step instruction on how to conduct 
InfoSec training. Some of the suggested activities had to be modified to make this training 
approach feasible in TTT’s context. 
Four workshops were conducted for the 50 champions, and the champions developed InfoSec 
proposals which detailed solutions to the InfoSec issues in their departments. The project team 
also discussed the champions’ challenges which could affect the diffusion effectiveness. The 
project team, top management and the champions reached a consensus on two diffusion 
approaches. Specifically, champions diffusing InfoSec knowledge to colleagues in large 
departments could conduct formal training sessions, while diffusion for small departments 
could be in the form of informal discussions. Champions from the project management 
department also volunteered to prepare training materials for the diffusion. 
At the end of this stage the champions had diffused the InfoSec knowledge to the colleagues 
in their departments. The next and final stage evaluated the improvements in the InfoSec-
related socialisation and investigated the formation of an InfoSec climate in TTT. A summary 
of this stage’s research activities is shown in Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5. Summary of the Action Taking Stage 
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Chapter 8: Evaluation and Reflection Stage—Evaluating the InfoSec 
Change Program’s Effectiveness 
This chapter discusses the last evaluation and reflection stage of the CAR project. In the 
diagnosis section the objectives of the iteration were identified. These objectives were to 
evaluate the change program’s effectiveness (the business objective) and to investigate the 
formation of an InfoSec climate (the scholarly objective). In the action planning section, I 
discussed the planned activities—collecting data by using the same questionnaire in the second 
iteration, performing a longitudinal SNA to examine the formation of an InfoSec climate, 
establishing the key performance indicators (KPIs) to evaluate the changes in the InfoSec-
related networks and performing the evaluation. In the action taking section, these planned 
actions were carried out. The outcomes of these actions are reviewed in the evaluation and 
reflection sections. Figure 8.1 summarises the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 8.1. Structure of Chapter 8 
8.1 Diagnosis 
Through the first three stages I conducted a risk assessment at TTT and interviews with external 
InfoSec experts, a SNA to analyse the pre-intervention InfoSec-related networks and identify 
influential InfoSec champions, and trained champions for the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge 
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as part of the change program to enhance TTT’s InfoSec environment. Subsequently, the 
champions performed the InfoSec diffusion for four months, top management launched an 
InfoSec competition event, employees hung InfoSec awareness posters and started to report 
InfoSec issues and the ‘Locky’ malware incident occurred. 
Shortly before the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge top management launched the 
initiative with a company-wide event to increase employees’ InfoSec awareness and 
participation in InfoSec-related activities. A public announcement was posted on the 
company’s Intranet portal which called for submissions of InfoSec vulnerabilities in the 
workplace. Once the project team received the submissions, the submitted InfoSec 
vulnerabilities were compared with those identified from the risk assessment and ranked 
according to their severity and novelty. The employee who submitted the top-ranked 
vulnerability and the department of that employee would be rewarded with a small amount of 
money (AUD 12 or VND 2 million). The top management explained that they launched the 
event to raise all employees’ InfoSec awareness by encouraging them to pay attention to their 
surrounding workplace and seek InfoSec vulnerabilities. Top management also believed that 
such an event would raise employees’ awareness of the company’s InfoSec-related initiatives 
and potentially make them more receptive to the champions’ InfoSec influences. 
Many computers at TTT were also infected by a ransomware called ‘Locky’ seven days before 
the champions carried out the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. This ransomware locked the 
work files on the computers and made them unusable until the victim agreed to pay the hacker 
a ransom. However, the IT and BSP departments made frequent backups of the company’s 
work files and the locked files along with the ransomware could be safely removed. The project 
team observed that the occurrence of this ‘Locky’ malware incident made all employees at TTT 
recognise the real InfoSec threats that could happen to the company. During the diffusion the 
project team received numerous reports from employees and the champions about suspicious 
emails, most confirmed to contain viruses. Moreover, some employees voluntarily hung 
cartoons about InfoSec around the workplace (see Figure 8.2) to remind others about the 
importance of InfoSec. 
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Figure 8.2. Cartoons to Raise InfoSec Awareness in the Workplace 
The cartoon on the top left shows a man standing next to a locker with many locks and the Vietnamese 
message reads ‘vầy cho chắc’ or ‘do like this to make sure’ as a comical reminder to pay attention to 
protecting confidential information. The cartoon on the top right shows a hacker using a computer and the 
Vietnamese message reads ‘bảo mật thông tin’ or ‘information security’ to remind employees about InfoSec 
threats and the importance of InfoSec in the workplace. 
The project team appreciated top management’s launch of the InfoSec event and the voluntary 
action of employees in putting up cartoons as an indicator of their participation with genuine 
interest, rather than solely aiming at the performance of such action in terms of promoting 
InfoSec awareness. These events indicated an overall improvement in the InfoSec environment 
at TTT, but no formal evaluation of the outcome of the InfoSec diffusion and performance of 
the champions had yet been performed. The project team and top management at this point did 
not have any quantitative evidence that supported whether the diffusion had improved the 
InfoSec environment. Moreover, TTT did not have the KPIs for such an evaluation. 
Thus, the objectives of the fourth and final stage of the project were to establish quantitative 
evidence, evaluate the outcome of the change program and identify the forming mechanisms 
of InfoSec climate. Together with the actions performed in the previous stages, considered as 
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successful by the project team and top management, an improved InfoSec environment and the 
identification of the forming mechanisms of this InfoSec climate would allow the conclusion 
of the CAR project. 
8.2 Action Planning 
The project team planned to perform two activities in this stage—identify the forming 
mechanisms of the InfoSec climate to meet the scholarly objective and evaluate the changes in 
the InfoSec-related networks at TTT after the change program. These planned activities 
required launching the same survey that had been used in the action planning stage (see Chapter 
6) to collect data about employees’ InfoSec-related interactions and climate perceptions after 
the change program, then applying SNA methods to examine the changes in these interactions 
and climate perceptions. As part of the activity to evaluate the changes in the InfoSec-related 
networks, the project team would also establish the KPIs of the improvements in the networks 
of InfoSec-related interactions. 
Consistent with my scholarly motivation, I chose theories on the formation of an InfoSec 
climate (Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Schneider & Reichers 1983) as the 
focal theory for this stage. Employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate are formed as a result of 
their socialisation in the workplace, which facilitates the informational and normative 
influences that shape a shared understanding about InfoSec practices and priority (Ashforth 
1985; Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005). 
In this project, employees’ socialisation was represented by networks of the provisions of 
work-related advice and/or organisational updates, personal advice and/or trust in expertise and 
InfoSec advice and/or troubleshooting support. The impacts of the networks of employees’ 
socialisation on the InfoSec influence network had been analysed in the action planning stage 
(see Chapter 6). In this stage I continued to analyse the relationships between employees’ 
socialisation and InfoSec influence, and between InfoSec influence and the formation of 
employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate. 
Leenders (2002) stated that social influence occurs when information is communicated from 
one actor to another actor, and the latter actor adjusts their behaviour, attitude, or belief to 
match the former actor’s behaviour, attitude or belief in that social system. When performing 
SNA, the occurrence of social influence in a social network is hinted when researchers detect 
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clusters of nodes which are tied to each other and have similar attributes, since some of these 
nodes might have matched their attributes with other nodes of the same clusters. However, 
social influence still cannot be accurately claimed due to the homophily effect that can also 
result in a similar phenomenon. Mouw (2006) posited that, according to the principle of 
homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001), people tend to purposely choose the 
people and social groups that they want to be associated with. Such purposive selection of 
nodes to connect with can also lead to the formation of clusters of nodes having similar 
attributes, but does not necessarily imply the occurrence of social influence. In such a situation, 
none of these nodes has changed their attributes to match with connected others—that is, social 
influence did not occur, they simply chose to connect with each other since they had similar 
attributes (i.e., homophily effect). 
In this project’s context, employees whose climate perceptions were already at an elevated 
level might have chosen to socialise with those whose levels of climate perceptions were also 
high. In that case, there is no evidence to suggest that employees’ socialisation has modified 
their climate perceptions because of social influence. Such a phenomenon reflects the selection 
process that determines who people choose to socialise with based on their traits, rather than 
reflecting the changes in people’s traits caused by their socialisation as an effect of social 
influence. 
The central issue here focuses on empirically distinguishing the social influence and the 
selection process to truly understand the phenomenon, requiring longitudinal data that describe 
the changes in the nodes’ attributes over time, from being at one level to another level as a 
result of the nodes’ connections (Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Steglich, Snijders & 
Pearson 2010). Steglich, Snijders and Pearson (2010) addressed this issue by developing the 
SAOM method to simultaneously analyse selection and influence as two separate processes. 
Since its introduction, this method had been adopted by studies in research fields such as 
organisational behaviours (Wölfer & Scheithauer 2014), leadership (Emery, Daniloski & 
Hamby 2010), adolescents’ behaviours (DeLay et al. 2016; Dijkstra et al. 2010; Fortuin, van 
Geel & Vedder 2015) and safety climate (Schulte, Cohen & Klein 2012). Performing SAOM 
utilises the data structures that represent network concepts of nodes and ties based on graph 
theory (Barnes & Harary 1983). As a result, I also used graph theory as the instrumental theory 
for this stage. 
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8.2.1 Overview of Stochastic Actor-Oriented Modelling 
Performing SAOM involves specifying a model with terms that describe the mechanisms of 
network formation or dissolution and then evaluating that model. The SAOM method examines 
changes in the network by decomposing these changes into the mini-steps that occur between 
the points in time when the data is captured, where the employees represented by the nodes 
make a decision to maintain or change one outgoing tie based on their network position and 
attributes (Ripley et al. 2017). Based on the modelled terms that describe the mechanisms 
governing such a decision of the nodes to maintain or change their ties, the statistical 
procedures implemented in the SAOM method produces a probabilistic evolution of the 
network which shows how the network ‘evolves’ from one state to another (Ripley et al. 2017). 
The SAOM method and its accompanying tool require nodal attributes to be in single integer 
form with values ideally deviating only within a range of up to five points (Ripley et al. 2017). 
Studies using SAOM examined binary variables that describe the respondent’s behaviour 
(Dijkstra et al. 2010), whereas psychometric variables such as attitudes and perceptions were 
often averaged and rounded to integer (e.g., Caravita et al. 2014; Putzke et al. 2013; Rambaran, 
Dijkstra & Stark 2013). The process to compute InfoSec climate scores for the SAOM analysis 
is in Appendix E. 
In line with prior studies on InfoSec climate (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & 
Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013) and climate formation (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 
1983), the purpose of conducting a SAOM analysis in this stage was to identify the factors and 
mechanisms that contributed to the formation of InfoSec climate. 
Employees’ socialisation through the provisions of instrumental resources, expressive 
resources and InfoSec support was assumed to lead to InfoSec influence which would 
subsequently shape employees’ climate perceptions. For this purpose, the major effect 
examined was the relationship between the number of InfoSec influencers who exerted InfoSec 
influence over employees and their climate perceptions. It was also assumed the occurrence of 
InfoSec influence and employees’ climate perceptions would be both affected by employees’ 
background characteristics as control variables. Figure 8.3 summarises the theoretical model 
examined through the SAOM method. 
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Figure 8.3. Theoretical Model 
8.2.2 Strategy for Developing Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models 
The impacts of employees’ socialisation and background characteristics on exerting InfoSec 
influence (Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2) and the effects concerning the formation of network ties 
were discussed in the action planning stage (Chapter 6). When performing SAOM analysis, 
researchers may examine various social influence effects which belong to two major groups—
the assimilation effects and the contagion effects (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010). 
Assimilation effects refer to the phenomenon where an actor adjusts their perception score to 
be similar to those of other connected actors, whereas contagion effects describe an actor’s 
tendency to increase their perception score when connecting with other actors whose 
perception scores are high (Ripley et al. 2017). Researchers can further determine whether the 
number of neighbours that the focal actor connects to can impact the assimilation and contagion 
effects. This leads to four possible social influence effects explained below. 
In this project’s context, the average assimilation effect models the likelihood that employees 
will change their climate perceptions to be similar to others from which they receive InfoSec 
influence ties. The average contagion effect models the likelihood that employees will increase 
their climate perception scores to a higher level as they are tied to other employees whose 
climate perception scores are high. 
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The influence mechanisms of matching and increasing climate perception scores were the same 
for the total assimilation and total contagion effects. The difference between the effects with 
the prefix ‘average’ and those with the prefix ‘total’ was that the former effects assumed 
employees’ number of InfoSec influencers did not have any impact on social influence. In other 
words, the social influence effect on climate perceptions would be the same for all employees 
regardless of the total number of InfoSec influencers they had. The total assimilation and total 
contagion effects both assumed that employees’ total number of InfoSec influencers 
determined the social influence effects on their climate perceptions. The formal definitions of 
the four social influence effects and their descriptions are provided in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1. Social Influence Effects in Stochastic Actor-Oriented Modelling 
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Researchers may choose to include any social influence effects in a stochastic actor-oriented 
(SAO) model based on theoretical justifications (Ripley et al. 2017). Ripley et al. (2017) also 
recommended that researchers may employ a backward selection approach which involves 
performing analyses on all social influence effects and retaining the effects that achieved 
statistical significance. However, Ripley et al. (2017) cautioned that including many social 
influence effects in one model could lead to multicollinearity i.e., having multiple predictors 
of an outcome that are highly correlated and non-convergence, meaning that the model fails to 
arrive at a conclusive outcome with reliable results. 
A statistically significant and positive contagion effect implied that employees together 
developed favourable climate perceptions through social influence. A significant and positive 
assimilation effect implied that employees received influences from other employees then 
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matched their climate perceptions which became either more favourable or more unfavourable. 
An InfoSec climate formed when employees have their climate perceptions influenced by 
others (Ashforth 1985) regardless of the influenced perceptions’ nature being favourable or 
unfavourable (i.e., a high or low score). Thus, confirmation of any of the social influence effects 
listed in Table 8.1 would provide evidence for the formation of an InfoSec climate caused by 
social influence. 
Since the InfoSec change program aimed at improving employees’ climate perceptions, the 
confirmation of a contagion effect was desired more than confirming an assimilation effect in 
TTT’s context. Therefore, I prioritised the estimation of the average contagion and total 
contagion effects in this stage. Moreover, I used the weighted version of these effects which 
emphasised the InfoSec influence exerted among employees in the same departments. This 
modelling decision was consistent with the InfoSec climate questions in the survey (see Table 
6.2) and the theoretical scope of climate perceptions which focused on the colleagues and the 
direct supervisors of the respondents (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 
2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
In summary, the plan for this stage was to perform the longitudinal SAOM analysis to identify 
the mechanisms and factors that contributed to the formation of an InfoSec climate, as shown 
in the theoretical model in Figure 8.3. The SAOM analysis required the collection of data about 
the networks and employees’ climate perceptions after the change program by launching the 
questionnaire used in the action planning stage. In line with TTT’s business objective, the 
project team would establish the KPIs of the changes in the InfoSec-related networks and 
perform the evaluation based on these KPIs. 
8.3 Action Taking 
Consistent with the action plan the project team carried out the SNA to perform the two key 
research activities in this stage—examining the formation of InfoSec climate by performing 
SAOM analysis and evaluating the changes in the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence 
networks. Data collection was performed to support the first activity and the project team 
established the KPIs to support the second activity. 
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8.3.1 Data Collection 
The same questionnaire used in the action planning stage was launched after the four-month 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge by the champions. To minimise common method bias the 
following remedies were employed in the design of the questionnaire. I mixed the order of 
questions to avoid sequences of questions that belonged to the same construct and included 
detailed definitions and examples to clarify any potentially vague questions (Podsakoff et al. 
2003). The questions about networks and employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate are in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6. Employees’ background characteristics (i.e., gender, age, 
tenure, seniority and department membership) were extracted from the HR database that 
contained information about all employees at the time of data collection. 
Missing data is problematic for longitudinal network research as it can lead to biased results 
without a thoughtful treatment (Ripley et al. 2017). The whole-network design of network 
research, which focuses on all individuals within a bounded community, is especially prone to 
the risk of having missing data as members of a bounded community such as TTT can enter or 
exit the network between the different points in time of the network analysis (Borgatti, Everett 
& Johnson 2013). Additionally, some respondents who previously participated in the research 
may refuse to participate in a survey collecting network data at a later point. In this context, it 
is worth mentioning that the competitive construction industry in Vietnam has a high turnover 
rate and employees often change firms. The project team was affected by such turnover effects 
and the respondents’ refusals, collecting 230 responses from the survey in this stage compared 
to 264 responses from the previous survey. Specifically, 23 employees left TTT during the 
diffusion period. Of the 311 employees available at the time when the previous survey was 
launched, 47 refused to answer the questionnaire (response rate of 85%). In this stage, 58 of 
288 employees refused to participate in the survey (response rate of 80%). 
The project team, therefore, decided to only select those employees who had cast their 
nominations at both points in time for further analysis. This resulted in a dataset of 152 
employees. Employees who held central positions in the networks such as the IT and BSP 
employees and the 40 remaining champions (10 had left TTT before the second survey was 
launched) were available in this dataset. The removed nodes possessed relatively few ties and 
held peripheral positions; their removals did not significantly affect the nature of the networks. 
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8.3.2 Summary of the Stochastic Actor-Oriented Modelling Process 
I analysed the SAO models by using the R package named ‘RSiena’ (version 1.1-307, released 
12 May 2017) (Ripley et al. 2017), the most developed software package for performing 
SAOM at this time. I computed in the R programming environment the Moran’s I coefficients 
which measured the similarity in employees’ perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours. Before the change program, Moran’s I coefficients of employees’ climate 
perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours were –0.08 and –0.03 
respectively. After the change program, perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours had a 
Moran’s I coefficient of 0.07 while perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours had 
a Moran’s I coefficients of 0.06. The negative values of Moran’s I coefficients before the 
change program and positive values post-program indicated that the InfoSec influencers and 
influenced employees had dissimilar perceptions before the change program, but these 
perceptions became more similar after the change program. 
Next, the Jaccard index indicates the stability of the networks over time (Ripley et al. 2017). 
Ripley et al. (2017) advised that Jaccard indices of 0.3 and above are desirable for the 
estimation process while indices of below 0.1 indicate that performing SAOM on the dataset 
is not advisable. For my dataset, the computed Jaccard index of 0.195 was not above the 
desirable value, but it was not too problematic either. 
Consistent with the modelling strategy, I analysed four SAO models to explain the formation 
of an InfoSec climate by InfoSec influence, which consisted of two contagion models and two 
assimilation models. These four models all had the same effects which described the network 
dynamics (i.e., the forming mechanisms of InfoSec influence ties). The effects that described 
the perception dynamics (i.e., the four types of social influence effects) and the features of 
climate perceptions were modelled separately for each of the four models. The detailed 
modelling process is described in Appendix F. This section summarises the key results of the 
SAO models with regard to how employees formed their climate perceptions as they received 
InfoSec influence from their colleagues in the same departments. 
I started with analysing the average contagion model which posited that employees increased 
their climate perception scores as they received InfoSec influence from colleagues in the same 
department, whose climate perception scores were also high. This model assumed that such 
social influence effect would occur for all employees regardless of the number of colleagues 
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who exerted InfoSec influence over them. The results of this model indicated that such a 
phenomenon did not occur. This outcome led me to explore an alternative explanation which 
assumed that employees’ total number of InfoSec influencers could govern the social influence 
effect. 
I performed the analysis for the total contagion model with such an assumption. This model’s 
results indicated that employees increased the scores of their climate perceptions of colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours as they received InfoSec influence from many colleagues in the same 
department. However, the results did not confirm the same phenomenon for employees’ 
climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours. An unusually large standard 
error of the total contagion effect also suggested that the analysis might have had issues and 
the effect should be re-analysed by using the score test (Ripley et al. 2017). I followed Ripley 
et al.’s (2017) recommendation and performed a score test for the total contagion effect on 
employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours. The score-tested model did 
not have any issues, and the results reinforced that the total contagion effect only affected 
employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours, but not the climate 
perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours. 
I continued to explore the assimilation effects which posited that employees matched their 
climate perception scores with those of other employees from which they received InfoSec 
influence. If the assimilation models confirmed that the average assimilation and total 
assimilation effects also affected only employees’ climate perceptions of their colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours, then such results would reinforce results of the previous contagion models. 
Since the total contagion model had confirmed the impact of employees’ total number of 
InfoSec influencers on social influence, I started with analysing the total assimilation effect. 
The total assimilation model showed many issues and, therefore, its initial results could not be 
interpreted (see Figure F.2 in Appendix F). However, applying the score test resulted in a 
successful analysis of the model with no issues. The score test also confirmed that the total 
assimilation effect only affected employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours, but not of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours, reinforcing the previous findings 
of the total contagion model. 
The fourth model, average assimilation model, was analysed to validate the effect of 
employees’ total number of InfoSec influencers on social influence. I applied the score test 
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again to analyse the average assimilation effect. Results of the score-tested average assimilation 
model indicated that social influence did not affect employees’ climate perceptions when the 
number of their InfoSec influencers was not accounted for. 
8.3.3 The Formation Mechanisms of InfoSec Climate 
Results from the four SAO models confirmed that employees’ total number of InfoSec 
influencers governed both the contagion and assimilation effects. When employees had many 
InfoSec influencers in the same department, they would develop more favourable climate 
perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours to match with those of the InfoSec influencers 
which were also favourable. SAOM analysis also revealed the natural tendencies of employees’ 
climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours through results 
of the linear shape and quadratic shape effects (Ripley et al. 2017). 
The linear shape effect expressed the tendency of employees’ climate perception scores to 
increase over time. Only employees’ climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec 
behaviours had significant and positive linear shape effects across the four SAO models. These 
results implied that employees tended to increase their scores of climate perceptions of direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours over time. The linear shape effects of employees’ climate 
perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours were non-significant in all models, which 
indicated that there were no patterns in the changing directions of these perceptions. 
The quadratic shape effect described the adjustments of the perception scores. I found that 
employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours had 
significant and negative quadratic shape effects in all four SAO models. These negative 
quadratic shape effects suggested that employees, whose climate perceptions were less 
favourable, tended to develop more favourable climate perceptions over time. Moreover, those 
who developed favourable perceptions would decrease their climate perception scores to be 
near the mean score. 
Overall, the key forming mechanisms of InfoSec climate perceptions were as follows. First, 
employees’ scores of their climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours tended to 
increase over time, but only when their previous climate perception scores were low or when 
they had many InfoSec influencers in the same department. This tendency was different from 
that of employees’ climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours, which would 
increase perception scores regardless of the previous scores or the number of InfoSec 
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influencers. In any case, employees’ tendency to develop both climate perceptions to become 
more favourable over time, which implied that the InfoSec climate at TTT had been improved. 
Second, when employees’ climate perception scores were too low or too high, employees 
would adjust their climate perceptions accordingly by increasing or decreasing the scores. This 
implied that climate perceptions were likely to be governed by group norms that favoured the 
formation of consensus rather than developing polarising climate perceptions. 
8.3.4 The Contributing Factors of InfoSec Influence 
The results of the four SAO models confirmed that employees increased the scores of their 
climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours as they received InfoSec influence from 
many other employees in the same departments. Thus, it was important to identify the factors 
that increased the number of InfoSec influencers.  
The SAO models’ results indicated that employees rarely received InfoSec influence from 
other employees, and the InfoSec influence network did not have any specific patterns with 
regard to the reciprocal exerting InfoSec influence. The rate effect of changing the number of 
InfoSec influencers over time was relatively high which implied that the InfoSec influence 
network had been profoundly altered after the change program. 
The significant and positive transitivity effect indicated that the InfoSec influence network was 
transitive, or that employees were more likely to directly receive InfoSec influence from those 
who indirectly exerted InfoSec influence over them. The in-degree popularity and out-degree 
popularity effects expressed employees’ tendency to increase both received and exerted 
InfoSec influence from and over other employees over time. As both effects were positive and 
significant across the four SAO models, they suggested that influential employees tended to 
become more influential and influenced employees were influenced more by colleagues 
through the change program. Since a KPI of the change program was to facilitate InfoSec 
influence through the champions’ diffusion, these results provided the evidence that supported 
the change program’s success. 
Among the effects of employees’ background characteristics on InfoSec influence that were 
included in the four SAO models, the results only confirmed the effects of employees’ 
department membership and champion status. Specifically, employees who worked in the same 
departments tended to exert InfoSec influence over each other. Employees who were 
champions also tended to exert InfoSec influence over more people compared to non-champion 
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employees. All results of the effects mentioned so far, except the effect of champion status 
which had not been previously tested, were consistent with those found in the ERGM analysis 
in the action planning stage (see Chapter 6). The confirmed positive effect of champion status 
on the tendency of exerting InfoSec influence suggested that the champions had emerged as 
new sources of InfoSec influence after the change program. 
The out-in degree assortativity effect expresses the tendency of network actors with high out-
degrees to have ties to other actors with high in-degrees (Ripley et al. 2017). In the context of 
this project, the effect modelled the phenomenon where employees, who received InfoSec 
influence ties from many other employees, would be more likely to receive InfoSec influence 
ties from overly influential employees such as the IT or BSP staff. The results indicated that 
such a phenomenon would be less likely to occur. In other words, employees who already had 
their InfoSec behaviours influenced by many other employees would not receive InfoSec 
influence from overly influential employees. Since the other result indicated that the champions 
were more likely to exert InfoSec influence over time, interpreting these results together 
suggested that employees had received less InfoSec influence from the IT or BSP staff and 
more InfoSec influence from the champions. This served as further evidence of the success of 
the change program. 
The in-degree structural equivalence effect describes the tendency of network actors with 
similar in-degrees to be tied to each other (Ripley et al. 2017). I included this effect in the SAO 
models to capture the phenomenon where influential employees received InfoSec influence 
from each other, such as between the IT and BSP employees. Since the InfoSec influence 
network at TTT had only a handful of overly influential employees, including this effect in the 
models would allow a more accurate description of the observed network and add rigour to the 
models’ results. Consistent with the observed structure of the InfoSec influence network, the 
results confirmed the positive likelihood of such a phenomenon. 
I also examined the effects caused by employees’ similar climate perceptions on exerting 
InfoSec influence. The results indicated that having similar climate perception scores did not 
impact exerting InfoSec influence. This finding reinforced the social influence effects that 
employees received InfoSec influence and subsequently increased their climate perceptions 
scores, rather than having similarly high climate perception scores and then purposively 
choosing to receive InfoSec influence from each other (see the discussion about selection and 
influence processes in Section 8.2.2). 
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Finally, the positive effects of employees’ socialisation through their provisions of 
instrumental, expressive and InfoSec support resources on exerting InfoSec influence were 
confirmed across all four SAO models. The results indicated that employees tended to receive 
InfoSec influence from those who provided them with work and personal advice, organisational 
updates, InfoSec advice and InfoSec troubleshooting support and those whose expertise they 
trusted. Since the champions were tasked to diffuse InfoSec knowledge (i.e., give InfoSec 
advice to other employees), their active diffusion may have enabled them to exert InfoSec 
influence over other employees. Table 8.2 summarises the SAOM findings concerning the 
formation of employees’ climate perceptions and the InfoSec influence as the main forming 
mechanism of the InfoSec climate. 
Table 8.2. Summary of Stochastic Actor-Oriented Modelling Findings 
Theoretical components Findings 
Climate perception of 
colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours 
• Became more favourable when receiving InfoSec influence from many 
InfoSec influencers in the same department, whose climate perceptions 
were favourable 
• Tended to become favourable over time 
• Self-regulated to become less/more favourable when current perception 
was too favourable/unfavourable 
• Unaffected by employees’ gender, age, tenure, seniority and champion 
status 
Climate perception of 
colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours 
• Unaffected by InfoSec influence 
• Self-regulated to become less/more favourable when current perception 
was too favourable/unfavourable 
• Unaffected by employees’ gender, age, tenure, seniority and champion 
status 
InfoSec influence 
• Contributed to the formation of climate perception of colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours 
• Rarely occurred between employees 
• Co-occurred with employees’ socialisation i.e., provisions of instrumental 
resources/expressive resources/InfoSec support 
• Had transitive nature i.e., employees increased the likelihood to exert 
InfoSec influence over each other when there were multiple InfoSec 
influencers between them 
• Influencers became more influential over time; influenced employees 
received more influence over time 
• The likelihood to exert InfoSec influence increased between employees of 
the same departments 
• Champions had higher likelihood to exert InfoSec influence than non-
champions 
• The likelihood to exert InfoSec influence was unaffected by gender, age, 
tenure, seniority and climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours 
8.3.5 Establishing KPIs for Evaluating Network Changes 
As part of the planned activities the project team established KPIs to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. Some of these KPIs—density, average 
196 
degrees, out-degree centralisation, reciprocity and transitivity—were selected since they had 
been evaluated in the action planning stage. The networks to be evaluated for those statistics 
were the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks. 
Network density and degree centrality are often used to assess organisational information 
sharing where increases in these statistics imply active sharing (Hatala & Lutta 2009). To make 
sure every employee in the workplace has access to information after an intervention, Cross et 
al. (2004) recommended examining the distribution of ties (i.e., centralisation) and the 
core/periphery patterns that show the intended ‘go-to’ actors that are actually sought by others 
for advice. 
More recently, Gesell, Barkin and Valente (2013) published the Network Diagnostic Tool 
which lists the meaningful network statistics to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention 
and the recommended thresholds for these statistics. In addition to the common measures such 
as density, centralisation and number of ties (i.e., network actors’ degrees) which were 
employed by prior studies, Gesell, Barkin and Valente (2013) suggested measuring the 
network’s reciprocity and transitivity before and after the intervention. Reciprocity describes 
the ratio of mutual transmissions that reflect strong ties and transitivity measures cohesion in a 
network, and a high level of these two measures indicates that resources can be transferred well 
in the network (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013). 
The project team decided that the change program would be considered as successful if the 
InfoSec-related networks’ density, average degrees, reciprocity and transitivity increased after 
the change program. As the change program focused on diffusing InfoSec knowledge to all 
employees at TTT, the increased density, average degrees, reciprocity and transitivity of the 
InfoSec support network would indicate that there were more ties in the network post-program, 
which represented more provisions of InfoSec support after the change program. Likewise, the 
increases of these statistics for the InfoSec influence network would indicate that there were 
more opportunities for employees to receive the influence which improved their InfoSec 
behaviours. 
In addition to measuring the networks’ overall density, the project team measured within-
department densities which evaluated the internal InfoSec-related socialisation between 
employees in the same departments. The increases of both the overall density and within-
department density would indicate that employees not only elevated their provisions of InfoSec 
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support and InfoSec influence across departments, but also within their own departments. 
Specifically, employees would be more exposed to new knowledge if they received more 
external InfoSec support and InfoSec influence from other employees who worked in different 
departments. Moreover, increasing internal provisions of InfoSec support would mean that 
employees had access to more immediate and relevant InfoSec advice and InfoSec 
troubleshooting support from their colleagues in the same department. The increased exertion 
of InfoSec influence between members of the same department would also imply that 
consistent InfoSec climate and InfoSec behaviours could be reinforced and maintained within 
the departments. Thus, the project team decided on the increased overall density and within-
department density of the InfoSec-related networks as the desired outcomes of the change 
program. 
With regard to the number of outgoing ties or out-degrees of the network actors, the project 
team evaluated the out-degrees of all departments including the IT and BSP departments and 
of the champions. These out-degrees represented the number of employees who reported to 
have received InfoSec support and InfoSec influence from the departments and the champions. 
Specifically, the project team anticipated that the out-degrees of all departments except the IT 
and BSP departments would increase, which reflected that the departments had become more 
active in providing InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence. Similarly, the champions’ 
out-degrees should also increase, indicating the champions had carried out the diffusion well. 
The out-degrees of the IT and BSP departments should decrease, which was in line with the 
change program’s objective to decentralise the IT and BSP employees in the InfoSec support 
and InfoSec influence networks. 
To evaluate the decentralisation of the overly influential IT and BSP employees, the project 
team measured the out-degree centralisation and transitivity statistics of the InfoSec-related 
networks. As high out-degree centralisation measures expressed high variations in the levels 
of providing InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence, a successful decentralisation 
would have such variations reduced (i.e., lower out-degree centralisation). A high transitivity 
measure in this project’s context described the degree to which employees clustered together 
in groups that circulated InfoSec support and InfoSec influence. Higher levels of transitivity 
also indicated that the networks are less hierarchical (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013). As such, 
the project team decided the desired outcomes of the InfoSec-related networks to have lower 
out-degree centralisation and higher transitivity. The network measures as KPIs of the change 
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program, their desired outcomes and the meanings of these outcomes are summarised in Table 
8.3. 









There are more provisions of 
InfoSec support and exerting 
InfoSec influence in the 
network. 
Cross et al. (2004); Gesell, 
Barkin and Valente (2013); 
Hatala and Lutta (2009); Parise 




There are more provisions of 
InfoSec support and exerting 
InfoSec influence within 
departments. 
Decided by project team 
Average degrees Increased 
An employee provides more 
InfoSec support and exerts 
more InfoSec influence on 
average. 




Departments provide each 
other more InfoSec support and 
exert more InfoSec influence. 




Champions provide more 
InfoSec support and exert more 
InfoSec influence. 





IT and BSP departments 
provide less InfoSec support 
and exert less InfoSec 
influence. 




InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence networks are not 
hierarchical and not dominated 
by a handful of employees. 
Gesell, Barkin and Valente 
(2013); Valente et al. (2015) 
Reciprocity Increased 
There are more mutual 
provisions of InfoSec support 
and exerting InfoSec influence 
between employees. 
Cross et al. (2004); Gesell, 
Barkin and Valente (2013); 
Valente et al. (2015) 
Transitivity Increased 
The provisions of InfoSec 
support and exerting InfoSec 
influence are more transitive; 
triads or three-node sets are 
brought together more. 
Gesell, Barkin and Valente 
(2013); Valente et al. (2015) 
8.3.6 Examining the Visualisations of InfoSec-Related Networks 
The second major research activity of this stage was to evaluate the changes in the InfoSec-
related networks and produce the quantitative evidence to assess whether the change program 
was successful. To evaluate the effectiveness of the change program, which involved the 
champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge, the project team examined the visualisations of 
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the networks before and after the change program. Subsequently, quantitative measures of the 
changes in the network structures were evaluated. 
The large number of joiners and leavers at TTT drastically changed the population of 
employees from 311 to 288. Since the samples drawn from the time periods contained both old 
and new members, the project team considered that it would be less meaningful to evaluate the 
change program by including those who had been exposed to the change program but had 
already left, and those who had joined but had not been exposed to the change program. 
Therefore, to arrive at an accurate evaluation of the change program’s effectiveness, we 
compared the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks that consisted of the 152 
respondents who had participated in both surveys launched before and after the change program 
in the action planning and evaluation and reflection stages. These 152 employees were all 
exposed to the effects of the change program commenced in the action taking stage and were 
still working in TTT after the four-month diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
The InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks before and after the change program are 
depicted in Figures 8.4 to 8.7. The sizes of the nodes’ labels are proportional to their out-degree 
centrality, which represent employees who were nominated as providers of InfoSec support or 
InfoSec influencers. The colours denote the nodes’ department membership and the sources 




Figure 8.4. InfoSec Support Network before the Change Program 
The InfoSec support network before the change program was almost completely controlled by 
three IT employees (note the comparatively larger label sizes in Figure 8.4). Consequently, the 
network did not appear to have any distinctive clusters except for the factory and architect 




Figure 8.5. InfoSec Support Network after the Change Program 
The InfoSec support network after the change program displayed considerable changes. There 
were more non-IT employees who emerged from their department as new central hubs of 
InfoSec support such as employee #4 from the factory department, employees #110 and #139 
from the architect department, employee #33 from the project management department and 
employee #6 from the administration department. The new non-IT central sources were 
members of the newly formed large clusters in these departments which were distinctively 
visible. The formation of these clusters indicated that employees now had access to more 
immediate and relevant InfoSec support from local hubs beyond the IT employees, although 
the IT employees still held their active role in providing InfoSec support to other employees. 
The project team and top management considered the emergence of new sources as an 
enhancement of the InfoSec environment compared to the situation before the change. 
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Figure 8.6. InfoSec Influence Network before the Change Program 
The InfoSec influence network before the change program had a sparse structure dominated by 
the IT employees. It resembled the InfoSec support network before the change program. 
However, there were only two IT employees, #132 and #67 (instead of three in the InfoSec 
support network), who controlled the InfoSec influence network. These two IT employees lost 
some of their influence after the change program. The InfoSec influence network after the 
change program, as visualised in Figure 8.7, clearly shows the appearance of new sources of 
InfoSec influence in the project management and architect departments. The number of ties 
between non-IT employees had also increased (e.g., within the architect department and 
between the project management and construction departments) and had created new social 
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cliques (e.g., the estimation department). The project team and top management considered 
these changes as improvements in the InfoSec influence network. 
 
Figure 8.7. InfoSec Influence Network after the Change Program 
8.3.7 Evaluating Changes in the Structures of InfoSec-Related Networks 
The project team found increases of 27 per cent and 17 per cent in the densities of the InfoSec 
support and InfoSec influence networks respectively, and the average degrees of these two 
networks had increases of 27 per cent and 17 per cent. These results implied that there were 
more provisions of InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence after the change program. 
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The increased average degrees indicated that each employee on average had provided and 
received more InfoSec support and influence than before. 
The out-degree centrality of the champions evaluated their abilities to directly provide InfoSec 
support and influence others’ InfoSec behaviours. The project team observed large increases 
of 144 per cent and 93 per cent in the number of employees who reported to have received 
InfoSec support and InfoSec influence from the champions. These results indicated that the 
champions had successfully carried out the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge, establishing 
themselves as the new sources of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence as the change program 
had intended. 
The out-degree centralisation of the networks reflected the variations in the number of outgoing 
ties and it determined whether the network is controlled by a few central network actors (Gesell, 
Barkin & Valente 2013). After the change program the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence 
networks respectively decreased their out-degree centralisation by 36 per cent and 30 per cent. 
This meant that the variations in out-degrees in these two networks had been reduced, and that 
there had been more employees who had high out-degrees of InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence ties after the change program. 
Gesell, Barkin and Valente (2013) argued that centralisation values should be below 0.25 to 
support a finding that actors with overly high centrality in the network had been decentralised. 
The centralisation values of the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks after the 
change program were 0.403 and 0.283 respectively. Although the centralisation values of these 
networks had been reduced, they indicated that both networks were still quite centralised based 
on Gesell, Barkin and Valente’s (2013) threshold. While such a threshold might be desirable 
for other diffusion programs that aim at maximising individuals’ adoption, the project team 
argued that InfoSec support would require some degrees of centralisation (i.e., hierarchy in the 
network). This was to ensure that only some employees such as the BSP or IT staff or the 
champions would provide other employees with InfoSec support, and it would be easier for 
TTT to train these employees to provide InfoSec support of consistent quality. 
Reciprocity of the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks increased by 162 per cent 
and 71 per cent respectively, which indicated that employees mutually exchanged more InfoSec 
support and InfoSec influence after the change program. However, the reciprocity values of 
both networks after the change program were 0.05 and 0.016, much lower than Gesell, Barkin 
205 
and Valente’s (2013) recommended threshold of 0.5. Although the InfoSec-related networks’ 
reciprocity increased as intended, the results suggested that these networks’ reciprocity would 
require further improvements. 
Transitivity describes the tendency of nodes to form small clusters that facilitate the flow of 
resources in ways that all members within those small clusters can evenly receive resources 
(Borgatti, Everett & Johnson 2013; Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Low transitivity implies that a 
network has a hierarchical structure and it is often desirable to increase transitivity to achieve 
better circulation of resources (Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013). The changes in transitivity of 
the networks were interesting. The InfoSec influence network became more transitive, with 
transitivity value increasing from 0.274 to 0.333, while the InfoSec support network became 
less transitive after the change program, with transitivity value decreasing from 0.456 to 0.335. 
The increase in the InfoSec influence network’s transitivity implied that employees received 
more InfoSec influence than before the change program. Since the SAOM analysis’ results 
suggested that employees developed more favourable climate perceptions of their colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours as they had more InfoSec influencers, such increased transitivity that 
facilitated the emergence of InfoSec influencers was desirable. The decrease in the InfoSec 
support network’s transitivity indicated that the network became more hierarchical after the 
change program. Such a hierarchical structure was acceptable as it enabled TTT to control for 
the quality of the provided InfoSec support more easily if employees sought InfoSec support 
from a handful of providers. The decrease in transitivity also suggested that employees after 
the change program had changed their preference to seek InfoSec support from the official 
sources (i.e., the champions and the IT and BSP staff), rather than arbitrarily asking someone. 
Table 8.4 summarises the changes in the InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks. The 
statistics of the network features of these two networks before and after the change program 
are presented along with the change percentage. 
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Table 8.4. Network Changes Reflected by Quantitative Measures 
KPI for network 
improvements 
InfoSec support network InfoSec influence network 
Before After % change Before After % change 
Density (whole 
network) 
0.014 0.017 +27% 0.009 0.011 +17% 




59 144 +144% 54 104 +93% 
Out-degree 
centralisation 
0.626 0.403 -36% 0.404 0.283 –30% 
Reciprocity 0.019 0.050 +162% 0.010 0.016 +71% 
Transitivity 0.456 0.335 –26% 0.274 0.333 +21% 
Within-department density in the context of this project described the connectedness of the 
InfoSec support and influence networks which consisted of only employees in the same 
departments. In other words, these measures reflected the connectedness of 19 networks which 
represented the provisions of InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence within 19 
departments in TTT. An increased within-department density would indicate that employees 
had become more active in providing InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec influence in their 
department after the change program. 
Table 8.5 summarises the changes in the within-department density values of 19 departments 
in TTT. Overall, many departments had more internal provisions of InfoSec support and 
exerting InfoSec influence after the change program. Only two departments had their number 
of internal provisions dropped (the BSP and tender departments). The increased within-
department density values were part of the project team’s anticipated changes, with the 
increases supporting the claim that the change program was successful. The small departments 
of accounting, administration, business development, marketing and sourcing, which all 
comprised fewer than 10 staff, all had their within-department densities increased. Since these 
increases referred to only the internal InfoSec-related socialisation between employees in the 
same departments and the change program involved the diffusion of local champions in each 
department, such increases indicated that the champions had carried out their diffusion well. 
The HR department had the largest increase in their within-department density from 16.7 per 
cent to 100 per cent. This meant that InfoSec support was evenly transferred among all HR 
staff. Large departments such as architect, construction, project management and factory all 
207 
had their within-department densities increased. Even though their increases appeared as small 
(e.g., from 0.4 per cent to 6 per cent for project management, or from 4 per cent to 10 per cent 
for factory), these changes were still considerable in practice given the large sizes of these 
departments. 






Before After Change Before After Change 
Accounting 0.000 0.190 Increased 0.024 0.095 Increased 
After Sale Services 0.071 0.095 Increased 0.071 0.143 Increased 
Administration 0.000 0.250 Increased 0.000 0.083 Increased 
Architect 0.023 0.041 Increased 0.022 0.031 Increased 
Business Development 0.000 0.000 Same 0.000 0.000 Same 
Business Solutions Provider 0.500 0.000 Decreased 0.500 0.500 Same 
Construction 0.037 0.057 Increased 0.023 0.037 Increased 
Board of Directors 0.000 0.000 Same 0.000 0.000 Same 
Estimation 0.050 0.300 Increased 0.150 0.250 Increased 
Factory 0.038 0.098 Increased 0.036 0.055 Increased 
Gamma 0.000 0.000 Same 0.000 0.000 Same 
Human Resource 0.167 1.000 Increased 0.000 0.333 Increased 
Information Technology 0.333 0.500 Increased 0.333 0.333 Same 
Marketing 0.000 0.500 Increased 0.000 0.000 Same 
Project Management 0.004 0.063 Increased 0.011 0.063 Increased 
Purchasing 0.000 0.000 Same 0.000 0.000 Same 
Quality Control and Assurance 0.000 0.000 Same 0.000 0.000 Same 
Sourcing 0.000 0.167 Increased 0.000 0.083 Increased 
Tender 0.500 0.500 Same 0.333 0.167 Decreased 
Next, the project team examined the changes in the departments’ out-degrees—that is, the 
number of employees that had received InfoSec support and InfoSec influence from these 
departments. These out-degrees captured the number of outgoing ties within and between 
departments (i.e., internal and external provisions of InfoSec support and exerting InfoSec 
influence). The increased out-degrees of the departments indicated that the departments had 
been recognised more by all employees as important sources of InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence after the change program. These changes are summarised in Table 8.6. 
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Before After Change Before After Change 
Accounting 0 8 Increased 1 4 Increased 
After Sale Services 4 5 Increased 7 7 Increased 
Administration 2 12 Increased 1 5 Increased 
Architect 29 54 Increased 30 37 Increased 
Business Development 1 1 Same 1 1 Same 
Business Solutions Provider 7 9 Increased 1 1 Same 
Construction 32 50 Increased 22 33 Increased 
Board of Directors 1 0 Decreased 1 3 Increased 
Estimation 2 10 Increased 3 5 Increased 
Factory 16 42 Increased 16 26 Increased 
Gamma 2 1 Decreased 0 0 Same 
Human Resource 2 8 Increased 1 4 Increased 
Information Technology 193 138 Decreased 108 81 Decreased 
Marketing 2 3 Increased 1 1 Same 
Project Management 13 48 Increased 14 35 Increased 
Purchasing 2 1 Decreased 0 0 Same 
Quality Control and Assurance 0 0 Same 0 0 Same 
Sourcing 0 2 Increased 0 1 Increased 
Tender 4 5 Increased 2 1 Decreased 
After the change program, many departments increased their out-degrees in both the InfoSec 
support and InfoSec influence networks. Among these departments, the departments of 
administration, architect, construction, factory and project management had large increases 
(i.e., 10–26 ties) in their outgoing InfoSec support ties. In other words, these departments could 
provide from 10 to 26 more employees with InfoSec support after the change program. The 
departments had also increased their exerted InfoSec influence ties albeit at smaller amounts 
(i.e., 2–11 ties), except the project management department which increased InfoSec influence 
out-degrees from 14 to 35 ties. 
One of the change program’s objectives aimed at decentralising the overly influential IT and 
BSP staff. The out-degrees of the BSP department had a slight increase while their number of 
outgoing InfoSec influence ties remained the same. The IT department had the largest 
decreases in their out-degrees in both InfoSec support and InfoSec influence networks. There 
were 55 and 27 fewer employees than before the change program who reported to have received 
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InfoSec support and InfoSec influence respectively from the IT department after the change 
program. These large decreases in the IT department’s out-degrees indicated that the change 
program’s objective to decentralise the influential IT staff had been achieved. 
Table 8.7 summarises the evaluation of the changes in the InfoSec-related networks. Overall, 
all established KPIs achieved satisfactory results which indicated that the networks of InfoSec 
support and InfoSec influence had been improved after the change program. There were 12 
departments that increased their within-department densities while 14 departments increased 
their out-degrees in the InfoSec-related networks. This meant that employees at TTT received 
more InfoSec support and InfoSec influence from other employees who worked outside of their 
departments than those who worked in the same departments. As such, there were more 
opportunities for employees to learn new InfoSec-related knowledge. 
Table 8.7. Summary of the Evaluation of Changes in the InfoSec-Related Networks 
KPI Outcome Note 




12 out of 19 departments had their within-
department density in InfoSec support and/or 
InfoSec influence networks increased. 







14 out of 19 departments had their out-
degrees in InfoSec support and/or InfoSec 
influence networks increased. 
Decreased out-degree (IT 





Increased reciprocity Satisfactory - 
Increased transitivity Satisfactory 
InfoSec influence network increased 
transitivity, whereas InfoSec support network 
decreased transitivity. Such a decrease was 
acceptable as it enabled better quality control 
over the provisions of InfoSec support. 
8.4 Evaluation 
The change program was decided to follow the train the trainers approach to improve the 
InfoSec environment at TTT, which comprised employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate, the 
provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence among employees. The evaluation in this 
stage found that employees had provided each other with more InfoSec support and exerted 
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more InfoSec influence. The SAOM results indicated that the more InfoSec influencers 
employees had, the more likely they would develop favourable climate perceptions together. 
As the evaluation informed that there were more InfoSec influencers after the change program, 
the InfoSec climate at TTT would subsequently improve over time as well. These findings were 
explained to and acknowledged by top management as practical improvements of the InfoSec 
environment. 
8.5 Reflection 
8.5.1 Reflection on the Champions’ Diffusion of InfoSec Knowledge 
At the beginning of the stage the project team had expected that the InfoSec-related networks 
would be improved after the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. Our expectation and 
confidence were based on our selection of the champions using evidence-based criteria derived 
from the SNA in the action planning stage (see Chapter 6), and the champions had been trained 
and agreed with us on the appropriate diffusion methods in the action taking stage (see Chapter 
7). However, as we did not monitor the champions’ diffusion, so that the champions would not 
feel pressured and the change program’s outcome would reflect the unbiased improvements in 
the InfoSec-related networks, we prepared to perform another iteration if the diffusion did not 
result in any improvements. 
Since the improvements in the InfoSec-related networks were realised at the end of this stage, 
top management agreed to conclude the project without any further actions. Had the project 
continued further, it would be beneficial to conduct in-depth interviews with the 50 champions 
to learn more about their experiences during the diffusion. It would be useful to learn about 
any issues during the champions’ diffusion and the solutions implemented. Such knowledge 
would be valuable for designing future training programs that aim at better preparing the 
champions for their diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
8.5.2 Reflection on the KPIs for Measuring Network Improvements 
The project team established KPIs for the change program that focused on increasing the 
number of network ties (which would indicate the increased provisions of InfoSec support and 
exerting InfoSec influence). However, we believed that increasing the number of InfoSec-
related network ties should not be the only goal for TTT or other organisations. First, changes 
in the InfoSec-related networks should be based on practical needs and aligned with the 
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organisation’s strategic objectives. In this project, our change program’s KPIs were decided 
based on TTT’s specific needs to have the champions emerge as new sources of InfoSec 
support and influence, and to decentralise the overly influential IT and BSP staff. Such 
increases might not always be desirable as there would be potential issues when any employees 
could provide each other with InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support. For example, some 
of the provided InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support might be erroneous and cause more 
InfoSec risks in the workplace. 
Second, the KPIs for measuring improvements in the InfoSec-related networks need further 
refinements, especially to improve the KPIs’ generalisability. More empirical research is 
needed to develop a set of network measures that are meaningful in the wider InfoSec context 
and to decide the recommended thresholds for these measures. For example, if density is 
considered as one of the meaningful KPI that reflects an improved InfoSec-related network, 
then it needs to be specified how much a density’s value should be and at which values should 
the practitioners or researchers increase or decrease the network’s density. 
Table 8.7 reported that not all 19 departments at TTT had increased their within-department 
density values and out-degrees after the change program. If the project’s time frame could be 
extended it would be helpful to investigate the reasons why some departments failed to increase 
these network measures. While there might not be any substantial reasons (e.g., these 
departments simply did not have the opportunities to provide more InfoSec support or exert 
more InfoSec influence during the four-month period), further investigations might reveal the 
challenges that impeded these departments’ contributions to the change program and suggested 
opportunities for future improvements. 
Quantitative measures are useful for evaluating interventions in CAR projects (Davison, 
Martinsons & Ou 2012). The adoption of the SNA methods in this CAR project was effective 
as I could quantitatively evaluate the InfoSec-related networks and present the numerical 
evidence of the improvements to top management. However, I noted that the evaluation only 
indicated the improved InfoSec-related networks at TTT and not the company’s improved 
InfoSec that potentially resulted from these networks’ improvements (such as reducing 
violations of InfoSec policies or mitigating InfoSec risks). It would be useful to investigate the 
relationship between the improved InfoSec-related networks and improved InfoSec. 
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8.5.3 Reflection on the SAOM Process 
When I performed SAOM to analyse the social influence effects, the weighted total contagion 
and weight total assimilation models had some issues in the unusually large standard errors and 
model’s non-convergence, which required the use of the score test to examine the social 
influence effects as recommended by Ripley et al. (2017). While it was unclear what caused 
such issues, I suspected the instability of the InfoSec influence network, reflected by the 
Jaccard index below the recommended threshold of 0.3 (Ripley et al. 2017), to be responsible. 
The change program may also have caused drastic changes in the InfoSec influence network 
and made it difficult for the SAOM analysis to detect the network’s changing patterns. 
The SAOM issues, which may have resulted from the network instability, were inevitable in 
this project as the project team purposely implemented rapid changes to improve the InfoSec 
workplace. We could have collected data about the InfoSec influence network at multiple 
points in time during the four-month diffusion by the champions. This approach would improve 
the stability of the InfoSec influence network by creating a series of snapshots that showed a 
slower transition of the network from an initial stage, where the champions had not been 
recognised by other employees, to when most of them had emerged as prominent sources of 
InfoSec influence. However, I considered this approach as impractical because repeatedly 
responding to the same surveys would be an exhaustive task for employees and lead to a low 
response rate. 
8.5.4 Reflection on the Formation of InfoSec Climate 
The SAOM findings supported the theoretical model about the formation of InfoSec climate 
(Ashforth 1985) and produced new insights into such process. The results confirmed the impact 
of social influence on employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours, but 
not on climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours. The impact of social 
influence on InfoSec climate formation was found to be conditional on employees’ total 
number of InfoSec influencers in the same department. The results also found a tendency for 
both types of climate perceptions to self-regulate and reach a consensus with the workplace 
norms, rather than developing polarised perceptions. 
The InfoSec climate at TTT was formed concurrently with the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec 
knowledge. As such, the champions would have accelerated the formation of the InfoSec 
climate by increasing the number of InfoSec influencers. If this project could be extended I 
213 
would perform another SAOM analysis on the InfoSec influence network and employees’ 
InfoSec climate perceptions after the evaluation and reflection stage. This SAOM analysis 
would allow me to examine a more natural development of InfoSec climate without any 
interventions. 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
Consistent with the scholarly objective to study the formation of an InfoSec climate and TTT’s 
practical need to quantitatively determine whether the change program had produced the 
intended outcome, the project team performed two major research activities in this stage. First, 
we launched the second SNA survey after the four-month diffusion of InfoSec knowledge by 
the champions and I performed SAOM, a longitudinal SNA method, to identify the factors and 
mechanisms that contributed to the formation of InfoSec climate. Second, we determined the 
quantitative KPIs for evaluating the changes in the networks of InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence after the change program. We then examined the quantitative changes in the networks 
and explained the findings to top management. 
The SAOM analysis confirmed the focal theory and produced additional insights into the 
formation of InfoSec climate at TTT (as discussed in Sections 8.3 and 8.5). The evaluation of 
the structural changes in the InfoSec-related networks, based on the KPIs, provided quantitative 
evidence supporting that the networks had improved after the change program. Key 
improvements in the networks included the champions successfully emerging as new sources 
of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence, increased provisions of InfoSec support and exerting 
InfoSec influence and the decentralisation of the IT and BSP staff. The top management 
acknowledged these improvements and agreed to conclude the project. A summary of this 
stage’s research actions is shown in Figure 8.8. 
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Figure 8.8. Summary of the Evaluation and Reflection Stage  
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter revisits the research questions and discusses the contributions of the CAR project 
in three aspects—organisational, theoretical and methodological. It proposes future research 
directions for each of these aspects and concludes by discussing the research limitations and 
final considerations of this thesis. 
9.1 First Research Question 
My first research question aimed at identifying the factors and mechanisms which contribute 
to the formation of an InfoSec climate, asking: 
RQ1: What are the factors and mechanisms that contribute to the formation of an 
InfoSec climate? 
To answer this research question, I reviewed the relevant literature about the forming process 
of an InfoSec climate and organisational climates in general (Ashforth 1985; Chan, Woon & 
Kankanhalli 2005; Schneider & Reichers 1983) and conducted a longitudinal SNA through 
SAOM (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010) to examine the theoretical propositions about the 
formation of an InfoSec climate. In this research, InfoSec climate was represented by 
employees’ perceptions of their colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours (Chan, 
Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
The forming mechanisms of an InfoSec climate included employees’ socialisation with each 
other, which facilitated the InfoSec influence that subsequently led to the development of 
favourable InfoSec climate perceptions. Employees tended to receive InfoSec influence from 
colleagues who socialised with them, especially those who provided them with work advice, 
organisational updates, personal advice, InfoSec advice and InfoSec troubleshooting support 
and those whose job expertise they trusted. Department membership and champion status were 
the factors which indirectly contributed to the formation of InfoSec climate by increasing 
InfoSec influence between employees. Specifically, employees who worked in the same 
department were more likely to exert InfoSec influence over each other, and champions were 
more likely to exert InfoSec influence compared to non-champions. 
I found that employees developed favourable climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours when they received influence from many InfoSec influencers in the same 
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departments, whose climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours were favourable. 
This finding suggested that the number of InfoSec influencers impacted the social influence’s 
effect on the formation of climate perceptions. Moreover, climate perceptions of colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours increased over time if the initial perceptions were less favourable. 
In contrast, receiving influence from InfoSec influencers in the same departments did not 
contribute to employees’ development of favourable perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec 
behaviours. Both types of climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec 
behaviours had a self-regulating tendency. Employees regulated their climate perceptions to 
match with those of the workplace norms, rather than developing polarising perceptions (i.e., 
too favourable or too unfavourable). 
The SAOM analysis also identified the structural mechanisms of the InfoSec influence 
network, which increased the InfoSec influence that subsequently facilitated the formation of 
employees’ climate perceptions. The results indicated that the likelihood for an employee to 
directly exert InfoSec influence over another employee increased when they indirectly exerted 
InfoSec influence over each other via multiple in-between influencers. Further, InfoSec 
influencers tended to become more influential and influenced employees tended to receive 
InfoSec influence from more people over time. Overall, the SAOM analysis confirmed 
Ashforth’s (1985) theoretical propositions about employees’ socialisation and social influence 
which contribute to the formation of organisational climates such as InfoSec climate. The 
SAOM analysis extended theoretical knowledge about the formation of InfoSec climate by 
revealing the contributing effects of employees’ department membership and champion status, 
the InfoSec influence network’s structural mechanisms and the changing tendencies of InfoSec 
climate perceptions. 
9.2 Second Research Question 
By reviewing the behavioural InfoSec literature and applying the problematising technique to 
generate research questions (Alvesson & Sandberg 2011; Sandberg & Alvesson 2010), I found 
that prior studies had focused on employees’ individual InfoSec-related attributes and 
overlooked the interactions and relationships between them (see Chapter 2). Consequently, I 
employed SNA methods throughout this project, emphasising the analysis of interactions and 
relationships between individuals to investigate the formation of an InfoSec climate and to 
improve the InfoSec environment at TTT. This enabled me to explore the applications of SNA 
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methods for improving organisational InfoSec and subsequently answer the second research 
question: 
RQ2: How can SNA methods be used for improving organisational InfoSec? 
I employed the SNA methods in the diagnosis stage to analyse the InfoSec threats and 
vulnerabilities at TTT. Specifically, I visualised the InfoSec risk network based on the risk 
assessment’s results to identify the most prominent threats and vulnerabilities based on their 
degree centrality. The visualisation of the InfoSec risk network and the quantitative centrality 
measures enabled the project team and top management to effectively diagnose the risk 
landscape at TTT. Based on the SNA of the risk network we determined the change program’s 
objectives as focusing on mitigating the issues related to employees’ inadequate InfoSec 
awareness. 
In the action planning stage, I demonstrated the use of SNA methods to evaluate employees’ 
network of provisions of organisational resources and the InfoSec influence network. The 
descriptive SNA enabled the project team to identify influential employees and the 
organisational subgroups based on their interactions with similar people. By analysing the 
visualised InfoSec-related networks, the project team and top management found the 
command-and-control InfoSec management model which had been governing the workplace’s 
provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence. This analysis enabled us to set clear 
objectives for our intervention, which decentralised the overly centralised IT and BSP staff in 
the InfoSec-related networks and increased the network centrality of the champions by having 
them diffuse InfoSec knowledge in TTT for four months. 
The inferential SNA method ERGM was employed in the action planning stage to statistically 
determine employees’ background characteristics and types of socialisation which increased 
their InfoSec influence. In particular, employees’ seniority, department membership, tenure 
and their socialisation through the provisions of instrumental resources, expressive resources 
and InfoSec support were all confirmed to affect the occurrence of InfoSec influence between 
them. The ERGM analysis revealed the unique structural features of the InfoSec influence 
network at TTT which increased the likelihood for employees to exert InfoSec influence over 
each other. By analysing employees’ socialisation in the network form, I calculated employees’ 
network centrality which indicated their influence in the workplace. These descriptive and 
ERGM analyses resulted in a list of criteria to select the suitable InfoSec champions for the 
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diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. In the evaluation and reflection stage I performed SNA 
methods to quantitatively evaluate the changes in the InfoSec-related networks at TTT. Thus, 
I demonstrated that SNA methods have practical applications to support organisational 
management of InfoSec matters. 
I also demonstrated the applications of SNA to examine theories through performing the 
ERGM and the SAOM analyses in the action planning and evaluation and reflection stages 
respectively. In particular, I used the ERGM method in the action planning stage to test 
propositions of the theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) which enabled me to determine 
the selection criteria for the champions. In the evaluation and reflection stage I performed a 
SAOM analysis to investigate a theoretical model which described the forming processes of 
InfoSec influence and of InfoSec climate perceptions over time. As such, I demonstrated that 
the SNA approach has inferential methods which can be used for testing hypotheses and 
produce scholarly knowledge. 
From this research I found methodological contributions concerning the use of SNA methods 
to support CAR projects. Specifically, action researchers benefit from using the quantitative 
network measures to diagnose the problematic situations and to design and evaluate 
interventions. In fact, Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012) emphasised the use of quantitative 
measures to assess the effectiveness of change programs. Action researchers performing SNA 
have access to a toolbox of network-based interventions, such as the intervention implemented 
in this CAR project which used opinion leaders to diffuse InfoSec knowledge. Action 
researchers employing SNA methods have many opportunities to generate novel scholarly 
knowledge, especially in the current context where the network research approach has not been 
widely considered in both the information systems and the InfoSec fields. In the following 
sections I discuss the research contributions of this CAR project, which were categorised into 
organisational, theoretical and methodological (Checkland & Holwell 1998). 
9.3 Organisational Contributions 
The business objective of TTT was to improve their InfoSec environment through stimulating 
employees’ InfoSec-related socialisation which would give rise to a positive InfoSec climate. 
The sections below discuss the practical applications of the applied SNA methods in three 
areas—conducting risk assessments, selecting InfoSec champions and improving InfoSec 
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environments with network-based interventions and network measures, thereby answering the 
the second research question. 
9.3.1 Social Network Analysis for InfoSec Risk Assessments 
The assessment of InfoSec risks is considered as vital for organisational information systems 
(Loch, Carr & Warkentin 1992; Loch & Carr 1991). In addition to serving as a systematic and 
auditable method to identify and mitigate the InfoSec risks (Ashenden 2008; ISO 2017; NIST 
2011; von Solms & von Solms 2004), recent studies found that InfoSec risk assessments which 
involve employees and end-users increase their acceptance of the InfoSec measures to be 
implemented (Spears & Barki 2010). 
The involvement of TTT’s department managers in the diagnosis stage’s risk assessment 
facilitated their subsequent collaboration in the action taking stage, when these department 
managers were appointed as champions to perform the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. They 
recalled the InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities identified in the risk assessment and, 
consequently, contributed their insights concerning these issues during the training workshops 
with other champions. They also actively engaged with top management and the project team 
after the workshops to further discuss the InfoSec threats in their departments and their 
proposed solutions. Thus, an organisational improvement that TTT achieved through 
performing the risk assessment was the transformation of these department managers from 
having little or no awareness of the company’s InfoSec risks to highly aware employees. These 
department managers can also help colleagues in their departments comply with InfoSec 
requirements in the future. Further, all departments in TTT now possessed the documented 
procedures and materials to conduct InfoSec risk assessments. 
The use of SNA methods offers an effective way to analyse InfoSec risks as a network of 
threats, vulnerabilities and departments. In addition to common attributes of an InfoSec risk 
such as likelihood, severity and cost (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2008; Dhillon & Backhouse 
2001; Gerber & von Solms 2005), analysing these risks and their relationships as a network 
provides various centrality measures to evaluate other facets of InfoSec risks. A recent study 
by Fuerstenau and Rothe (2014) applied SNA methods to analyse the information flow between 
unauthorised ‘shadow’ IT systems, which were considered a threat to organisational InfoSec 
(Furstenau et al. 2016; Silic & Back 2014b; Walters 2013). With this exception, my literature 
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review found that SNA methods had not been empirically applied to study organisational 
InfoSec risks. 
As shown in the diagnosis stage, risk analysts can learn about a department’s vulnerability by 
calculating the degree centrality of the node representing a department, which reflects the 
number of vulnerability nodes being tied to a department node. In this case, high degree 
centrality values imply that a department contains many vulnerabilities and is exposed to more 
threats. Similarly, the nodes representing the threats and vulnerabilities are more harmful to 
organisational InfoSec if they have higher degree centrality values. As such, risk analysts can 
evaluate both the potential and immediate severity of an InfoSec threat or vulnerability, 
respectively indicated by their number of connections to other nodes of the same kind or the 
department nodes. A vulnerability tied to many departments has tremendous severity and 
requires urgent attention, and a vulnerability with fewer ties to the department nodes but more 
ties to the threat nodes is potentially problematic. 
Risk analysts can effectively communicate the InfoSec risk network to business executives as 
it comprehensively visualises the relations between the risks and business units such as 
departments. Risk analysts may also explore the similarities and dissimilarities in the patterns 
of nodes in a risk network. I demonstrated the use of Jaccard indices to detect groups of 
departments that share similar threats and vulnerabilities. This analysis allows organisations to 
design and implement group-based interventions which target work units that share common 
InfoSec issues. 
9.3.2 Social Network Analysis for Selecting InfoSec Champions 
This CAR project provided TTT with a group of experienced and knowledgeable InfoSec 
champions who supported the actual and can support future diffusions of InfoSec knowledge 
in the workplace. The successful diffusion in this project supports the adoption of the train the 
trainers or opinion leadership approach to implement InfoSec-related changes in other contexts 
similar to TTT. Based on my network analysis we selected InfoSec champions who met the 
following key criteria: 
• work in the same department with the influenced targets 
• hold middle management positions (e.g., department manager) 
• have high degree centrality and/or Beta centrality in the networks of: 
o InfoSec influence 
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o provisions of InfoSec advice and/or InfoSec troubleshooting 
o provisions of work advice and/or organisational updates 
o provisions of personal advice and/or trust 
The first selection criterion, working in the same department with the influenced targets, 
highlighted the critical role of the homophily effect in facilitating organisational changes. Many 
researchers (Burns & Wholey 1993; Cho, Wang & Lee 2012; Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; 
Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Kraatz 1998; Lewis & Seibold 1998; Rogers 1995) argue that 
homophily or the sharing of similar values and traits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001) 
improves the champions’ promotion of changes by facilitating frequent communication 
between the champions and other community members. 
In line with these discussions, findings from this project’s action planning and evaluation and 
reflection stages confirmed that employees tended to exert InfoSec influence over colleagues 
in the same departments. The evaluation and reflection stage’s examination of the network 
visualisations also showed that the champions gave InfoSec support to and exerted InfoSec 
influence over colleagues in the same departments more than across departments. The 
champions’ diffusion to colleagues in the same departments may have been facilitated by their 
close physical proximity or familiarity with the subcultures of their departments (Becker & 
Sasse 2017; Howell & Boies 2004; Howell & Higgins 1990; Jenssen & Jørgensen 2004). 
The findings from the action planning stage confirmed that employees’ seniority increased their 
InfoSec influence, thus, it justified the second criterion for selecting InfoSec champions. This 
finding is consistent with prior studies’ recommendation about appointing opinion leaders who 
hold managerial positions (Curley & Gremillion 1983; Everett 2010; Spurling 1995). I found 
that employees who held a director position had even higher likelihood of influencing other 
employees’ InfoSec behaviours than that of department managers. However, the project team 
did not select the directors at TTT to be InfoSec champions since they would have little time 
to continuously provide other employees with InfoSec advice and troubleshooting support 
while undertaking their regular duties. 
The third criterion focused on two centrality measures, the out-degree centrality and the Beta 
centrality, which respectively indicated the champions’ direct and indirect InfoSec influence 
or provisions of organisational and/or InfoSec-related resources. In addition to these centrality 
measures, Cross et al. (2004), Valente and Pumpuang (2007) and Liu et al. (2017) suggested 
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recruiting champions based on their betweenness centrality which represents the abilities of 
transferring resources and exerting influence across organisational subgroups. Employees with 
brokerage roles and boundary spanning ability, who have diverse memberships in multiple 
internal networks and link separate organisational clusters together, also have opinion 
leadership (Burt, Kilduff & Tasselli 2013; Cross et al. 2004; Fleming & Waguespack 2007). 
However, we did not rely on these network measures to select the InfoSec champions for the 
following reasons. 
We prioritised selecting champions based on their direct and indirect influence, so that the 
champions could leverage their current influential status and quickly emerge as the new sources 
of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence and the IT and BSP departments decentralised as 
intended. Our selection was also motivated by the action planning stage’s descriptive analysis 
which indicated that the InfoSec-related networks were transitive. Thus, we capitalised on the 
transitive nature of the InfoSec-related networks to facilitate the provisions of InfoSec support 
and InfoSec influence across separate clusters through the champions’ active diffusion. Had 
the provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence at TTT been decentralised at the 
beginning of the CAR project and had there been separate silos of employees, we would have 
prioritised appointing champions based on their betweenness centrality and brokerage abilities 
to connect the silos. As such, our strategy to select the InfoSec champions took into 
consideration the structures of the InfoSec-related networks (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Valente 
2012). On this basis, I recommend organisations to critically select the suitable network 
measures to recruit champions in accordance with the needs and purposes of the change 
programs. 
Degree centrality and Beta centrality as selection criteria for the champions specifically reflect 
the champions’ influence in the three networks which describe their provisions of 1) work 
advice and/or organisational updates (i.e., instrumental resources), 2) personal advice and/or 
trust (i.e., expressive resources) and 3) InfoSec advice and/or InfoSec troubleshooting support. 
These findings support Ibarra and Andrews’ (1993) argument that central employees in 
instrumental and expressive networks have their influential status recognised by other 
employees. Moreover, central employees in the networks of provisions of organisational 
resources frequently communicate with other employees and have a greater chance to diffuse 
innovative ideas, thus, they are suitable for the champion role (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). My 
recommendation to select InfoSec champions, who are central in the network of provisions of 
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InfoSec support, also supports Everett’s (2010) suggestion that InfoSec champions need to be 
able to facilitate InfoSec-related discussions in the workplace. As my research brings forward 
the use of SNA methods to quantitatively evaluate employees’ engagement with other 
colleagues based on their network centrality, it enables an informed selection of InfoSec 
champions, rather than solely validating prior studies’ discussions. 
In addition to the discussed selection criteria, the analysis in the action planning stage also 
found other background characteristics of employees which made them appear as influential to 
other employees. Tenure, age and gender were all confirmed to affect employees’ likelihood 
to exert InfoSec influence, but these characteristics were not used as selection criteria for the 
champions due to their small effect sizes. The confirmed positive impact of tenure on InfoSec 
influence supports prior studies’ suggested criterion for champions (Chrusciel 2008; Howell & 
Higgins 1990; Jenssen & Jørgensen 2004). Conversely, the confirmed effects of age and gender 
on InfoSec influence may have simply reflected the unique workplace of TTT which had more 
young employees and an unbalanced gender ratio. 
Finally, the likelihood for employees to exert InfoSec influence over each other (i.e., their 
potential as an InfoSec champion) was affected by the InfoSec influence network’s structural 
features such as transitivity and the accumulative nature of InfoSec influence. These structural 
mechanisms negated the effects of some employee background characteristics on the likelihood 
of exerting InfoSec influence. Therefore, organisations should take into consideration the 
structures and characteristics of the InfoSec-related networks (e.g., centralised or decentralised) 
when determining the selection criteria for InfoSec champions.  
9.3.3 Social Network Analysis for Improving InfoSec Environments 
The InfoSec literature has cited many benefits of increased InfoSec communication in a 
workplace, such as improving employees’ InfoSec knowledge and compliance, contributing to 
the development of an InfoSec culture and reducing InfoSec-related costs in organisations 
(Ashenden 2008; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat 2010a; Safa, von Solms & Futcher 2016; 
Schlienger & Teufel 2003; Siponen 2000a; Son 2011). Similarly, ensuring employees’ InfoSec 
compliance requires providing them with sufficient access to InfoSec-related resources and 
support (Herath & Rao 2009a; Warkentin, Johnston & Shropshire 2011). However, 
communication gaps between employees and InfoSec staff persist, which leads to InfoSec risks 
such as the development of insecure workarounds or employees’ lack of perceived personal 
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responsibility for InfoSec (Albrechtsen 2007; Albrechtsen & Hovden 2009; Kirlappos, Parkin 
& Sasse 2014). 
My research informed the unexplored use of SNA techniques to improve the InfoSec support 
network and the InfoSec influence network which represent the InfoSec environments. 
Analysing these InfoSec-related networks is important since they inform about key employees 
who contribute to shaping the organisational InfoSec practices, as discussed in the previous 
section. Moreover, analysing the network of provisions of InfoSec support enables 
organisations to improve the InfoSec communication in their workplaces. 
Previous studies have analysed the applications of SNA techniques to improve organisational 
knowledge transfer and develop communities of practice, but not in relation to InfoSec (Cross 
et al. 2006; Hatala 2006). A recommended tactic when devising network-based interventions 
is to check for the overly connected employees and organisational subgroups which reflect the 
network’s level of centralisation (Cross et al. 2006; Cross, Parker & Borgatti 2002; Müller-
Prothmann 2007; Nelson 1988). Understanding network centralisation is important as it 
suggests the suitable types of interventions which will benefit the network. For example, 
Valente (2012) suggests that leader identification tactics, which rely on the use of opinion 
leaders to diffuse information, are especially beneficial for highly centralised networks. 
Conversely, decentralised networks may profit more from interventions delivering changes 
which are tailored for segmented groups (Valente 2012). 
My visual analysis of the InfoSec-related networks in the action planning stage showed that 
the IT and BSP staff were nominated by most employees for providing them with InfoSec-
related resources. The visual analysis further revealed that the InfoSec-related networks only 
had two subgroups, the architect and the factory departments, in addition to the third larger 
subgroup which comprised employees of the headquarters. The small number of highly 
connected IT and BSP staff and a few subgroups clearly indicated that the InfoSec-related 
networks were highly centralised. Although Valente (2012) recommended the opinion 
leadership approach for centralised networks to leverage the influence of highly connected 
people, our change program aimed at decentralising the overly influential IT and BSP staff and 
promoting non-IT champions as new sources of InfoSec support and influence. 
Although having the influential IT and BSP staff take the champion role could maximise the 
diffusion’s effectiveness, it would further increase employees’ dependency on these IT and 
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BSP staff and the network’s centralisation. This argument was in line with Pascale and 
Sternin’s (2005) caution that champions may create unconstructive dependency in a workplace 
and discourage other employees from taking ownership over the changes. Top management 
and the project team agreed that appointing champions who were not overly influential at the 
beginning and helping them emerge as new sources of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence 
offer greater benefits in the long run. For example, these champions can give fast and 
personalised InfoSec support to their colleagues in the same department. They can also further 
contribute to the long-term transformation of the departments into InfoSec-aware communities 
where department members receive direct influence from the local champions to continuously 
improve their InfoSec practices. 
The visual analysis of the InfoSec-related networks also revealed that TTT had been adopting 
the command-and-control InfoSec management model where InfoSec-related resources were 
controlled and distributed to all employees by a handful of IT and BSP staff. We deemed this 
model, which emphasised rule-following InfoSec behaviours (Son 2011) and discouraged end-
users’ involvement (Ashenden 2008; Kirlappos, Beautement & Sasse 2013), as unsuitable for 
the work culture at TTT which favoured mutual understanding and interpersonal influence 
between staff. Moreover, this model had the disadvantages of the IT and BSP staff potentially 
being overloaded with providing InfoSec support, and the potential loss of these overly 
influential staff causing large impacts on the company’s InfoSec communication chain. Prior 
studies discussed that horizontal networks are effective for diffusing social influence and 
facilitating the development of shared meaning, whereas vertical networks are desirable for 
transmitting codified information and authoritative decisions (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Rogers 
1995). As such, our network-based intervention aimed at and succeeded in transforming the 
vertical InfoSec-related networks at TTT into horizontal ones, which was also in line with the 
intention to develop a shared favourable InfoSec climate. 
The command-and-control structure of the InfoSec-related networks, which describes the 
original state of InfoSec communication at TTT before the interventions took place, deserves 
further discussion. Prior studies repeatedly mentioned the issues of insufficient InfoSec 
communication and uncontrolled employees’ development of insecure practices or inaccurate 
understanding about InfoSec (see e.g., Albrechtsen & Hovden 2009; Ashenden 2008; 
Kirlappos, Beautement & Sasse 2013). The initial command-and-control structure at TTT 
indicated that employees identified the technical staff as reliable sources of InfoSec support 
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and InfoSec influence by default. As such, my research agrees with Adams and Sasse’s (1999) 
statement that end-users should not be seen as enemies of InfoSec. In fact, they may be eager 
to cooperate with top management to improve company InfoSec if they receive the relevant 
resources via suitable communication channels. Based on the results of my study, I suggest 
organisations employ push tactics to proactively reach out to employees and communicate 
InfoSec matters to them. Network-based interventions, such as the opinion leader approach 
implemented in this research, effectively serve as push tactics to improve the InfoSec 
environment. Overall, I propose that organisations should devise network-based interventions 
to improve InfoSec communication by performing SNA, while flexibly aligning the 
interventions with their strategic objectives and current structures of the InfoSec-related 
networks.  
9.3.4 Network Measures as New Metrics for Evaluating InfoSec Environments 
Through evaluating the InfoSec-related networks in the action planning and evaluation and 
reflection stages, I examined the use of network measures, such as density, reciprocity and 
transitivity, as new metrics to assess the InfoSec environment. Current InfoSec frameworks 
commonly provide metrics about end-users’ InfoSec which only reflect their individualistic 
characteristics such as InfoSec awareness, perceived accountability, numbers of possessed 
devices, level of access to information systems and training hours (e.g., Chew et al. 2008; 
Huang, Lee & Kao 2006; Kraemer, Carayon & Clem 2009; Ma, Johnston & Pearson 2008; 
Patriciu, Priescu & Nicolaescu 2006; Torres et al. 2006). The network measures examined in 
my research inform organisations about employees’ and end-users’ InfoSec behaviours beyond 
the individual level. As a result, practitioners and researchers analysing InfoSec-related 
network measures can quantitatively evaluate collective InfoSec performance at the work 
group and/or organisation levels. 
Prior studies recommend several important network measures for designing and evaluating 
network-based interventions, which include density, centralisation, reciprocity and transitivity 
(Hatala 2006; Hatala & Fleming 2007; Müller-Prothmann 2007; Parise 2007; Valente et al. 
2015). Gesell, Barkin and Valente (2013) recommended thresholds for these network measures 
which reflect a desirable state of a network after being intervened. For example, Gesell, Barkin 
and Valente (2013) advised that density value should be larger than 0.15, reciprocity value 
should be larger than 0.5 and centralisation value should be lower than 0.25 to support that the 
implemented interventions have successfully built connections between people. 
227 
This research used the network measures suggested by the previous studies to evaluate the 
InfoSec-related networks representing TTT’s InfoSec environment. These measures helped the 
project team make informed decisions about the change program’s goals such as to increase 
density and decrease centralisation of these networks. Although I found the implemented 
change program achieve the anticipated outcomes, the network measures’ values after the 
change program were not at the recommended thresholds suggested by Gesell, Barkin and 
Valente (2013). However, some of these recommended thresholds may not be applicable in the 
InfoSec context. For example, achieving high density values for a network of provisions of 
InfoSec support might be undesirable in practice as it could lead to the dissemination of 
unofficial and erroneous InfoSec support among employees. In such a situation, organisations 
would need to ensure that there are governance mechanisms and standards in place to control 
for the quality of the disseminated InfoSec support. Consequently, the InfoSec governance 
must be sufficiently matured to support the utilisation of such densely connected InfoSec-
related networks. 
9.3.5 Considerations for Implementing InfoSec Programs and InfoSec Training 
The contributions discussed so far focus on the applications of SNA. Considerations for 
implementing InfoSec programs and InfoSec training are discussed below. These 
considerations were drawn from the case study described in the diagnosis stage which consisted 
of interviews with the InfoSec experts in Vietnam, and from the InfoSec training workshop 
designed and conducted for the champions in the action taking stage. 
First, the case study’s findings improved TTT’s understanding of the critical factors and 
methods for implementing InfoSec programs in the context where TTT had never conducted 
any InfoSec-related initiatives before. These findings were crucial for this project as they 
informed the project team and top management about different approaches to implement 
InfoSec programs, of which the train the trainers approach was adopted and subsequently 
improved TTT’s InfoSec environment. Thus, my development of the case study highlights the 
importance and benefits of action researchers serving as the resource people who brings in 
external resources to improve research clients’ problematic situations (Baskerville & Wood-
Harper 1998; Greenwood & Levin 2007; Park 1999). 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the case study suggested critical factors for InfoSec implementation 
in the Vietnamese context such as communication about rewards, sanctions or benefits of 
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InfoSec, many of which were also found in prior studies. Thus, the case study’s findings 
continue to highlight the important roles of these factors in the behavioural InfoSec field. These 
findings also contribute to practice by informing the experts’ strategies to improve their 
companies’ InfoSec, where InfoSec matters were not prioritised by end-users and top 
management. The experts’ insights into the strategies for implementing InfoSec programs in 
Vietnam can also be considered as important for the current body of knowledge where InfoSec 
research in non-Western contexts is scarce (Crossler et al. 2013). 
From the interviews with the experts, it was clear they were aware of end-users’ encountering 
inconvenience when they have to comply with InfoSec policies. The experts understood the 
Vietnamese culture, which they discussed to be collectivistic and hierarchical, and 
recommended persuasive methods which rely on these cultural traits. For example, they 
recommended explaining to employees not only the personal benefits from complying with 
InfoSec policies, but also how their colleagues and the whole company will benefit from their 
individual compliance. The experts further argued that the announcement of employees who 
demonstrate proficiency at InfoSec (e.g., score highly in InfoSec awareness tests or contribute 
to improving the company’s InfoSec) would be effective in the collectivistic Vietnamese 
workplace. They also cautioned about the development of sub-InfoSec cultures within each 
department where employees follow their direct supervisors’ InfoSec practices instead of 
following the organisation’s official InfoSec directives. Similarly, the experts reasoned that 
such development of sub-InfoSec cultures is facilitated by employees’ common perception of 
a large power distance in many Vietnamese firms. 
Overall, I suggest practitioners and action researchers, who conduct InfoSec programs for their 
companies and research projects, to take into consideration the cultural traits of the focal 
environments when designing the programs. Although regulations and personal accountability 
must be followed to ensure InfoSec compliance, persuasive techniques might be more effective 
for convincing employees to voluntarily comply with InfoSec policies, especially in cultures 
similar to the Vietnamese culture. To this end, I suggest practitioners and researchers consider 
the SNA approach to facilitate employees’ networks of InfoSec-related socialisation and 
persuade employees to take up and comply with InfoSec policies. 
The project team applied and evaluated the experiential learning-based InfoSec training 
approach proposed by Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) in the action taking stage. Karjalainen 
and Siponen’s (2011) suggested training approach not only provides a detailed step-by-step 
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training procedure, but also satisfies the critical elements for effective InfoSec training which 
were drawn from my literature review (see Chapter 7). The project team made adjustments to 
the suggested procedures of Karjalainen and Siponen’s (2011) training approach to align its 
feasibility with the limited resources of the CAR project. The recommended three-stage 
discussion, which begins with individual reflections then sharing in pairs and in groups of four 
(Karjalainen & Siponen 2011), was not possible within the allocated training period of two 
hours per workshop. The champions at TTT had neither been formally trained in InfoSec nor 
had they been required to pay attention to InfoSec issues before. As a result, it would have been 
challenging for them if asked to critically reflect on InfoSec matters by themselves. Further, 
while the recommended approach maximises its effect by educating the learners on one or two 
InfoSec practices at a time (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011), the InfoSec training in this CAR 
project covered multiple topics, including InfoSec threats, internet and email practices and file 
management, each of which was in itself complex and contained several concepts. To cover all 
of these InfoSec topics while following the recommended training steps would have required 
more than one workshop per group of champions. Due to the limited time frame of the project 
and the tight work schedules of the champions, some of which were department managers, 
conducting a series of training of workshops was not feasible. 
With these considerations in mind, the project team decided to run the training workshops in a 
fashion similar to a focus group. The experience gained from this CAR project suggests that 
the critical elements for InfoSec training, namely critical reflection and collaborative learning, 
can be achieved by running the workshops in such a fashion. To assist learners unexperienced 
in InfoSec, the trainers will have to take the leading role at the beginning and provide some 
background knowledge to the learners. After that, the trainers can become facilitators and let 
the learners lead their group discussions, while encouraging everyone to voice their opinions 
and maintaining the workshop’s atmosphere to be opened and relaxing. The atmosphere of this 
CAR project’s InfoSec workshops was similar to that of the successful workshops described in 
the study of Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010). In line with the suggestions of the InfoSec experts 
interviewed in the diagnosis stage, having the project team participate in the workshops as 
trainers also provided the champions with rich discussions about internal and external InfoSec 
issues. 
A critical component of the experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec training approach is the 
active evaluation which involves reflective exchanges between the trainers and the learners 
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(Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). This active evaluation involves the use of a ‘learning contract’ 
(Kirkpatrick 2006) formed from the critical reflection and collaborative learning activities 
(Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). In this CAR project the project team asked the champions to 
prepare InfoSec proposals which detailed their departments’ unique InfoSec threats and 
proposed solutions for these threats. The champions were then asked to engage in constructive 
discussions with the project team to finalise the proposals. The InfoSec proposals facilitated 
the exchange of feedback between the project team and the champions, while allowing the 
champions to reflect on the taught concepts and apply them to analyse their local InfoSec 
environments. Moreover, the project team also understood more about the champions’ InfoSec 
environments. 
Although the project team withdrew to the training sessions’ background after providing 
InfoSec knowledge to the champions and encouraged them to lead the discussions, this 
approach may have restricted the champions’ exchanges of ideas and experiences. Another 
disadvantage of this approach is that the focus group discussions may be less effective in terms 
of facilitating the champions’ process of co-discovering knowledge, compared to the ‘Think-
Pair-Share’ procedure recommended by Karjalainen and Siponen (2011). The InfoSec 
proposals containing the departments’ InfoSec issues and solutions, which were prepared by 
the newly trained champions, might be inaccurate due to the champions’ inexperience. 
Nevertheless, we decided that these adjustments to Karjalainen and Siponen’s (2011) training 
approach were necessary for this project where the champions lacked InfoSec knowledge and 
the training’s time was limited. Having the champions prepared the InfoSec proposals provided 
them with an opportunity to critically reflect on and apply the learned knowledge in practice. 
Similar to the development of the case study in the diagnosis stage, the research actions which 
involved adjusting and conducting Karjalainen and Siponen’s (2011) training approach aimed 
to prepare for the major intervention of this CAR project, the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge 
through champions. Thus, a full evaluation of the adjusted experiential learning cycle-based 
InfoSec training, including the champions’ experience during the training, was not the 
emphasis of the CAR project. My observation and informal discussions with the champions 
during the training period suggested that they enjoyed learning about InfoSec matters by 
participating in the training activities. Further, the InfoSec training performed in the action 
taking stage benefitted TTT by contributing the training procedure and materials useable for 
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future training workshops. Table 9.1 summarises the discussed organisational contributions 
and their recommendations. 
Table 9.1. Summary of Organisational Contributions and Recommendations 
Organisational Contributions Recommendations 
• Demonstration of the use of SNA methods 
for InfoSec risk assessment 
• Risk analysts can perform SNA to assess 
InfoSec risks by: 
o Identifying critical InfoSec 
vulnerabilities and threats based on 
network centrality 
o Identifying departments which shared 
similar InfoSec vulnerabilities and 
threats 
o Determining which InfoSec 
vulnerabilities and threats are 
commonly related to each other 
o Determining the common ‘root’ InfoSec 
vulnerabilities and threats 
• Demonstration of the applications of SNA 
for improving InfoSec environment 
• Recommendation of the selection criteria 
for InfoSec champions 
• Organisations can perform SNA to: 
o Examine opportunities for interventions 
through analysing visualisations and 
InfoSec-related network measures 
o Design network-based interventions and 
select suitable ones from prior studies 
o Evaluate interventions based on 
network measures 
o Identify influential InfoSec champions 
• Critical factors and methods for InfoSec 
implementation in Vietnam as a non-
Western context 
• Suggestion of a customised version of the 
experiential learning cycle-based InfoSec 
training approach for small groups of 
employees 
• InfoSec practitioners are advised to:  
o Take into consideration the cultural 
traits of the work environments when 
designing InfoSec programs 
o Consider using the customised 
experiential learning cycle-based 
InfoSec training approach for training 
small groups of employees 
• Persuasive approach to influence the 
employees’ InfoSec behaviours might be 
more effective in cultures similar to the 
Vietnamese culture 
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9.4 Theoretical Contributions 
Throughout the CAR stages I employed multiple focal and instrumental theories to establish 
the theoretical backgrounds for two major research activities, determining the influential 
characteristics as selection criteria for InfoSec champions and examining the mechanisms and 
factors that contributed to the formation of InfoSec climate. The following sections discuss the 
theoretical contributions of these two research activities. 
9.4.1 Exploring the Determinants of InfoSec Influence 
Prior studies have recommended the use of champions for implementing InfoSec 
improvements (Baskerville & Siponen 2002; Furnell & Rajendran 2012; Gabriel & Furnell 
2011; Posey et al. 2014). However, my review of the behavioural InfoSec literature showed 
that there has been little research on how to select InfoSec champions. To address this 
knowledge gap, I adopted the theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) and opinion 
leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999) to determine the influential 
characteristics of InfoSec champions. 
The theory of social power bases posits that an individual can appear as influential to other 
people by demonstrating several types of social powers (Raven 2008), of which this research 
examined the informational, expert and referent powers. I conceptualised employees’ 
projection of these social powers as their provisions of work advice and/or organisational 
updates, personal advice and/or trust and InfoSec advice and/or InfoSec troubleshooting 
support. I analysed these provisions in the form of network ties. Results from the ERGM 
analysis in the action planning stage and the SAOM analysis in the evaluation and reflection 
stage both agreed that these provisions had significant impacts on exerting InfoSec influence. 
As such, my research findings support the theory of social power bases’ propositions about 
these social powers’ effects on social influence. 
The theory of social power bases also posits that individuals can be recognised as influential if 
they possess the social power to reward and/or punish other people (Raven 2008). This social 
power was not examined in this CAR project as there were no formal policies that established 
rewards and punishments for InfoSec behaviours in TTT at the time. I considered this power 
highly relevant to the behavioural InfoSec domain as prior studies have examined the effects 
of rewards and sanctions on both desirable and undesirable InfoSec behaviours (Cheng et al. 
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2013; D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012; Guo et al. 2011; Herath & Rao 2009b; Hovav & D’Arcy 2012; 
Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila 2014; Sommestad et al. 2014; Vance, Siponen & Pahnila 2012). 
However, these studies focused on the nature of rewards and sanctions as organisational 
practices rather than on the organisational members that carry out rewards and sanctions. 
Future studies on employees’ abilities to reward and sanction from a network perspective 
would complement the existing knowledge. Researchers could identify characteristics of 
employees who were nominated by peers as capable of rewarding or sanctioning InfoSec 
behaviours. Similar to this CAR project’s results concerning InfoSec influence, these 
nominated employees may not necessarily hold formal authoritative power and still be 
influential. It would also be interesting to explore the structural features, that is, reciprocity and 
transitivity of the networks of rewarding and sanctioning InfoSec behaviours. 
Next, I followed opinion leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999) to select 
InfoSec champions based on their network centrality. While I did not perform any tests to 
statistically determine the impacts of the champions’ network centrality on their InfoSec 
influence, results from the evaluation and reflection stage’s evaluation indicated that these 
champions had emerged as influential sources in the InfoSec influence network. This finding 
extends opinion leadership theory by suggesting that Beta centrality might effectively serve as 
a centrality measure for selecting influential opinion leaders in addition to the other 
recommended measures of degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality 
(Liu et al. 2017). Future behavioural InfoSec studies are encouraged to perform SNA to 
statistically evaluate the effectiveness of different centrality measures on employees’ abilities 
to provide InfoSec support or to exert InfoSec influence. Acquiring knowledge about the 
impacts of employees’ centrality on these abilities might enable a more accurate selection of 
InfoSec champions. 
9.4.2 Mechanisms and Factors of InfoSec Climate Formation 
Through SAOM analysis I empirically examined the theoretical model which explained the 
formation of InfoSec climate (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983). According to this 
model, the social influence among employees, which is facilitated by their socialisation, shapes 
their shared perceptions of organisational climate (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983). 
In this CAR project, the examined InfoSec climate comprised employees’ perceptions of their 
colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005; 
Goo, Yim & Kim 2014; Jaafar & Ajis 2013). 
234 
There is little research that has explored the formation of an InfoSec climate, much less from a 
network perspective which conceptualises employees’ socialisation and social influence as 
network ties. Jaafar and Ajis (2013) and Goo, Yim and Kim (2014) focused on the outcomes 
of an InfoSec climate (i.e., InfoSec commitment and compliance) rather than on its formation. 
Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) examined the effect of socialisation on InfoSec climate, 
but their conceptualisation of InfoSec climate as a one-dimensional construct was not 
consistent with prior research on organisational climates (Goo, Yim & Kim 2014). Further, 
their conceptualisation of socialisation as employees’ perceptions overlooked the structural 
features of socialisation. Testing the effect of employees’ perceived level of socialisation on 
InfoSec climate perceptions (Chan, Woon & Kankanhalli 2005) provides little insight into the 
underlying mechanisms, such as the structural features, types of socialisation or the 
characteristics of the influencers and of the influenced employees, which facilitate the 
formation of an InfoSec climate. 
My SAOM findings indicated that employees’ socialisation through the provisions of 
instrumental resources, expressive resources and InfoSec support increased the likelihood of 
exerting InfoSec influence which subsequently forms an InfoSec climate (see Chapter 8). These 
findings confirm the theoretical explanations for the formation of organisational climates by 
Schneider and Reichers (1983) and Ashforth (1985), which posit that organisational climates 
such as that about InfoSec can be shaped as a function of employees’ socialisation and social 
influence. The findings extend such explanations by elaborating on the details of the formation 
process of InfoSec climate, especially that the social influence which facilitates the formation 
of InfoSec climate occurred only among members of the same departments, and that the impact 
of social influence on employees’ perceptions of InfoSec climate was affected by the number 
of InfoSec influencers these employees were exposed to. 
The SAOM analysis further contributed new theoretical insights by confirming that social 
influence only impacted employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours. 
The climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours were unaffected by social 
influence. Instead, employees tended to regulate their perceptions of direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours to become more favourable or unfavourable when their own initial 
perceptions were unfavourable or favourable respectively. The climate perceptions of 
colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours also had this tendency to self-regulate. Further, I found the 
development of both types of climate perceptions to follow the workplace norms. Employees 
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favoured adjusting climate perceptions to match with the average level of the workplace and 
they avoided developing polarising climate perceptions. Table 9.2 summarises the theoretical 
contributions discussed in this section and their respective recommendations. 
Table 9.2. Summary of Theoretical Contributions and Recommendations 
Theoretical Contributions Recommendations 
• Examination of the theory of social power 
bases and opinion leadership theory in the 
InfoSec context by: 
o Identifying the non-network 
determinants of InfoSec influence 
o Suggesting the use of network centrality 
measure as selection criteria for InfoSec 
champions 
• The theory of social power bases was 
supported by the ERGM analysis, where the 
power bases were conceptualised in the 
form of network ties between the employees 
instead of their perceptions 
• The increased InfoSec influence and 
provision of InfoSec resources by the 
selected champions, and the SAOM results 
provided evidence supporting opinion 
leadership theory 
• Confirmation and extension of current 
knowledge, which explain the formation of 
InfoSec climate 
• The SAOM results showed that: 
o InfoSec influence network was 
transitive; InfoSec influence 
accumulated over time 
o InfoSec influence developed climate 
perceptions of colleagues’ but not direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours 
o Total number of InfoSec influencers in 
the same departments affected climate 
formation 
o Climate perceptions tended to self-
regulate in accordance with the 
workplace norms 
9.5 Methodological Contributions 
This section discusses the methodological contributions of my research which concern the use 
of SNA methods in CAR projects. Additionally, I reflected on my experience of conducting 
this CAR project and proposed improvements to the CAR process. 
9.5.1 Using Social Network Analysis Methods in Canonical Action Researches 
Designing and evaluating interventions are critical activities in many AR projects as these 
activities provide researchers with the opportunities to improve the focal organisational 
situations and generate scholarly knowledge while doing so (Baskerville & Myers 2004). 
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Similar to my research, AR in the information systems domains have also studied diffusion by 
opinion leaders, but these studies’ selection of opinion leaders and their evaluation of outcomes 
mostly relied on qualitative methods. I discuss some examples of this type of AR below. 
Urquhart and Lennox (1999) studied the diffusion of information that influences farmers’ IT 
adoption, which involved opinion leaders participating in group meetings with the farmers. The 
characteristics of these opinion leaders were rather unclear and the opinion leaders’ 
contributions to the diffusion were inferred through analysing qualitative discussions. 
Börjesson, Martinsson and Timmerås (2006) utilised both push and pull tactics to diffuse a new 
work practice with the assistance of two change agents and nine opinion leaders respectively. 
Börjesson, Martinsson and Timmerås (2006) selected the change agents and opinion leaders 
based on characteristics such as technical competence and social skills and being well respected 
among peers. Their evaluation of the change agents and the opinion leaders’ contributions to 
the diffusion was also based on qualitative analysis. Holmberg et al. (2009) investigated the 
introduction of a new software process improvement initiative in a telecom firm, which 
involved the participation of one of the authors who acted as a change agent. Holmberg et al. 
(2009) deduced from interview findings that the change agent’s participation was critical for 
the diffusion. 
I found that the numbers of opinion leaders, change agents and champions employed for the 
diffusion in these studies were few. Although these studies acknowledged the important roles 
of opinion leaders in supporting the diffusion of innovations, they put little emphasis on the 
selection criteria of the champions. Their selection of the leaders, which claimed to be based 
on the persons’ influence but did not provide any measurement of such influence, may have 
missed important individuals who were more suitable for the opinion leader role. This 
argument also applies to the selection of other diffusion roles such as change agents. 
Consequently, action researchers may not be able to accurately study the phenomena which 
resulted from a diffusion facilitated by ineffective opinion leaders. To this end, action 
researchers may find SNA methods useful in providing the network measures, such as degree 
centrality and Beta centrality, to quantitatively evaluate the potential opinion leaders’ social 
influence. Moreover, using the SNA approach enables action researchers to evaluate the 
potential of as many community members as they can, thus, enabling a selection of a large 
quantity of effective opinion leaders. 
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The SNA approach provides action researchers with a toolbox of numerous network-based 
interventions beyond enabling them to quantitatively select key people for the diffusion. For 
example, Valente (2012) promotes network-based interventions which involve delivering 
tailored changes to segmented groups. Action researchers may perform SNA to detect cohesive 
groups of nodes (i.e., organisational subgroups or cliques) based on their common connections 
(Malliaros & Vazirgiannis 2013). After identifying the groups, action researchers can deliver 
group-based interventions separately or sequentially (Valente 2012). Strategies for network-
based interventions also focus on non-central community members such as using SNA methods 
to identify peripheral or isolated members and perform interventions to bring them to the larger 
communities or to make use of their untapped expertise and knowledge (Cross, Parker & 
Borgatti 2002; de Toni & Nonino 2010; Valente 2012). Action researchers may employ and 
study these various network-based interventions as their studies’ change programs. 
Action researchers may find SNA methods useful for diagnosing the focal situations before 
interventions. The examination of network measures such as density and centralisation, which 
describe the level of interactions between community members, can justify the need for 
performing interventions and assist action researchers in planning the interventions. These 
network measures also provide the quantitative evidence to evaluate the change program’s 
outcomes, in line with Davison, Martinsons and Ou’s (2012) recommendation concerning the 
use of quantitative measures to evaluate CAR’s interventions. Using SNA methods to evaluate 
networks of diffusion informs action researchers about not only the level of adoption, but also 
the patterns of the diffusion. Information about which community members initiated or 
received the diffusion is valuable for measuring opinion leaders’ performance and for planning 
the follow-up actions after an intervention. Such patterns cannot be captured by using a 
traditional survey which simply asks whether community members adopt the changes or not 
and to which level. Cross, Parker and Borgatti (2002) found that showing the network 
visualisations to industry partners as research collaborators was an effective way to instigate 
non-confrontational conversations about overly influential or isolated employees in a 
workplace. In this CAR project, the top management at TTT displayed great interests in 
examining the networks of employees’ socialisation and I found it easy to discuss the networks 
with top management during our milestone meetings. Therefore, I argue that action researchers 
employing SNA methods can effectively communicate the network visualisations to their 
research clients, facilitating collaboration and improving mutual understanding of the 
organisational situations. 
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9.5.2 Reflection on the CAR Approach 
I adopted the CAR approach for this project after comparing it with nine other approaches to 
AR (see Chapter 3) listed by Baskerville and Wood-Harper (1998). Only CAR, action science 
and clinical field work aimed at both organisational development and producing scientific 
knowledge and only the CAR approach enabled an iterative and collaborative research process 
that suited my project with TTT. Collaborative practice research (CPR) (Mathiassen 2002) is 
an approach to AR (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004) that is considered as a variation of the 
CAR approach (Cole et al. 2005). Mathiassen (2002) and Mathiassen and Sandberg (2013) 
describe CPR as an AR approach which focuses on researchers’ close collaboration with 
practitioners through analysis to understand practice, develop new propositions and artefacts 
to support practice and improve practice through interventions. Researchers recognise the CPR 
approach’s methodological pluralism as one of its distinctive features, as it emphasises the 
combined use of collaborative implementation, controlled experimentation and practice 
observations in conducting AR (Barqawi, Syed & Mathiassen 2016; Goldkuhl 2011; 
Mathiassen & Sandberg 2013). 
To go beyond my research project and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different 
AR approaches I compared the CAR approach with the CPR approach below. My comparison 
examines the process model of these approaches, which focuses on three steps, 1) initiating, 2) 
iterating and 3) closing (Iversen et al. 2004). Based on the reflection of my CAR project, I 
provide additional methodological contributions concerning the adoption of the CAR 
approach. 
The CAR approach follows the iterative five-stage process model of Susman and Evered’s 
(1978) approach (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Given that CPR projects can flexibly 
take different forms, I chose to analyse Iversen et al.’s (2004) research as an exemplary 
example of a CPR project, as it is based on Mathiassen’s (2002) original description of the 
CPR approach and Mathiassen was also a co-author of this study. That particular CPR project 
adapted elements of McKay and Marshall’s (2001) and Checkland’s (1991) approaches to AR.  
Checkland proposes an AR approach that begins with the researchers defining a research 
agenda through establishing the research framework (F) and methodology (M) for their 
research (Checkland 1991; Checkland & Holwell 1998). Then, the researchers apply these F 
and M elements to study the phenomena in a real-world problem situation (A) through 
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performing research actions and reflecting on the implemented actions (Checkland 1991; 
Checkland & Holwell 1998). McKay and Marshall (2001) describe their approach’s process 
model as consisting of two overlaid research cycles which represent the researchers’ problem-
solving and research activities that operate in tandem with each other. McKay and Marshall’s 
(2001) process model begins with the researchers identifying the research interests and the real-
world problems, which both contribute to the formulation of an action plan, followed by the 
iterative actions to implement and evaluate the outcomes of such plan. 
Researchers performing CAR initiate the research project by developing an RCA which 
outlines the project stakeholders’ roles and facilitates mutual understanding about the project’s 
essentials such as goals and key actions (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). When performing 
their CPR project, Iversen et al. (2004) also developed a RCA which is in line with the CAR 
approach (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Susman & Evered 1978). The CPR approach 
does not put explicit emphasis on developing such an agreement, and the researchers may 
initiate a CPR project by establishing a collaborative space which provides information about 
the collaboration structure of a CPR project, including details of the stakeholder groups in the 
project and their methods of collaboration (Mathiassen 2002). Researchers can initiate a CPR 
project by identifying a real-world problem and by reviewing relevant literature to come up 
with an action plan (see Iversen et al. 2004). These initiating activities are consistent with those 
described in the AR approaches proposed by Checkland (1991) and McKay and Marshall 
(2001). In this aspect, the CAR approach’s initiating step (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; 
Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012) differs from that of the CPR approach by not putting 
emphasis on identifying the researchers’ research and problem-solving interests, and it focuses 
more on diagnosing the local problematic situation. 
With regard to the iterating step, both the CAR and the CPR approaches emphasise the close 
researcher–client collaboration and the adoption of methodological pluralism throughout the 
iterative process (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012; 
Mathiassen 2002). However, the two approaches have different methods to achieve the dual 
imperatives of AR (i.e., generating scholarly knowledge while improving the focal problematic 
situation) (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Goldkuhl 2012a; McKay & Marshall 2001). 
To ensure the generation of scholarly knowledge while improving the problem situation, the 
CAR approach uses a process model where the evaluation of the intervention’s outcomes and 
the reflection to detect research contributions are iteratively performed (Davison, Martinsons 
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& Kock 2004; Susman & Evered 1978). Moreover, Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012) 
recommend researchers to employ instrumental theories, which include tools and models such 
as data model, balanced score card and selective coding technique, during the diagnosis stage. 
At the end of the diagnosis, the researchers identify a focal theory that provides theoretical 
explanations for the iteration’s anticipated outcomes and guides the research actions (Davison, 
Martinsons & Ou 2012). The adoption of these theories helps the researchers maintain their 
focus on the task to produce scholarly knowledge from the CAR project. The achievement of 
the dual imperatives is further ensured by having the researchers conform with a list of criteria 
for research rigour (see Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004) which serves as an elaborate guide 
for the research activities performed within each iteration. On the other hand, the CPR approach 
provides researchers with a more flexible process model which involves three types of 
activities, namely, 1) interpret collected data to understand, 2) design to support and 3) 
intervention to improve, which respectively produce three types of knowledge, 1) concepts and 
frameworks related to practice, 2) propositions and artefacts to support practice and 3) the 
knowledge about what it takes to implement the interventions that improve practice 
(Mathiassen 2002). 
The CAR approach considers the diagnosis as part of a singular five-stage cycle that constitutes 
an iteration (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Susman & Evered 1978), where the 
researchers interact with organisational stakeholders to investigate the current problematic 
situation. Similarly, Mathiassen (2002) describes both the diagnosis of the problematic 
situation and studying relevant literature as part of the CPR approach’s iterative three-stage 
cycle. While Checkland (1991) also describes an iterative process model that comprises a 
singular cycle in his approach, McKay and Marshall’s (2001) approach has a different iterative 
structure which consists of two interrelated cycles. Researchers who follow McKay and 
Marshall’s (2001) approach instigate a cycle by identifying the research interests and problems 
and by designing an action plan. This cycle then leads to one or more smaller iterative cycles 
where the action plan is revised and executed until satisfactory results can be achieved (see 
Figure 9.1). The diagnosis and action planning stages are in Cycle 1. At the exit point of Cycle 
2, where the researchers iteratively revise and implement actions to achieve satisfactory 




Figure 9.1. Generic Action Research Approach 
Adapted from McKay and Marshall (2001). 
Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) specified in the principle for the CPM that researchers 
who perform CAR need to explain the condition of their exit and the project’s conclusion (i.e., 
the scholarly and business project objectives being met). Moreover, the researchers and the 
collaborating clients are suggested to jointly reflect on the decision to conclude the project at 
the end of each iteration (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Similarly, McKay and 
Marshall’s (2001) process model, which Iversen et al. (2004) adapted for their CPR project, 
also suggested researchers to iteratively evaluate the project outcomes and decide their exit. 
Therefore, I consider both the CAR and the CPR approaches to have similar closing steps. 
Table 9.3 summarises the CAR and CPR approaches’ activities in the three AR steps. 
Table 9.3. Comparison between the Collaborative Action Research and the 
Collaborative Practice Research Approach 
 CAR CPR 
Initiating 
1. Establish the client–system 
infrastructure 
1. Establish collaborative space 
2. Appreciate problem situation 
3. Study literature 
4. Select solution 
Iterating 
2. Diagnosis 
3. Action planning 
5. Develop framework for solution 
6. Design solution 
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4. Action taking 
5. Evaluating 
6. Specifying learning 
7. Apply solution 
8. Evaluate experiences 
Closing 
7. Exit if business and scholarly 
objectives are achieved 
9. Exit 
10. Assess usefulness 
11. Elicit research results 
CAR component adapted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004), Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012), 
Susman and Evered (1978). CPR component adapted from Hansen (2009), Iversen et al. (2004) and Mathiassen 
(2002). 
While both the CAR and CPR approaches have similar goals and activities for the initiating 
and closing steps, I found the iterating step of these approaches have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The CAR approach is advantageous because it emphasises the adoption of focal and 
instrumental theories in every iteration, which assists researchers in producing scholarly 
knowledge while performing the practical interventions (Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012). 
Moreover, researchers performing CAR repeatedly follow a fixed process from diagnosing the 
current situation to reflecting on the outcomes of each iteration. This intensive research and 
problem-solving process enables researchers to constantly improve the problematic situation 
and it maximises the opportunities to generate scholarly outputs through the iterations. 
However, my experience of following the CAR process detects a potential issue that the 
researchers may lose sight of their main objectives when they follow such an intensive process. 
When I diagnosed the situation after the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge, I found 
it tempting, from a researcher’s perspective, to generate more theoretical knowledge by 
adopting additional theories to investigate the champions’ process of diffusing InfoSec 
knowledge and employees’ reactions to the diffusion. However, exploring the diffusion of 
InfoSec knowledge had little relevance to both the scholarly and business objectives of this 
CAR project, and using the limited project time frame for such purpose would be considered 
unproductive. 
The CAR’s list of 31 criteria for rigour (see Section 9.6 below), which guides the research 
activities to achieve the dual imperatives, might be considered as excessive. By attempting to 
satisfy these criteria the researchers might make the CAR project and the researcher–client 
collaboration become overly formal and complicated. Satisfying all of these criteria would be 
challenging for complex projects that involve multiple organisations and stakeholders. 
However, Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004) comment that a CAR project may not 
necessarily adhere to all of these criteria, although they note that failing to meet any of the 
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criteria may raise reviewers’ and editors’ concerns in a publishing context. The exhaustive list 
of the criteria may also effectively serve as a structured guide to ensure that projects carried 
out by inexperienced researchers, as was the case in this project, can achieve rigour. 
On the other hand, the more flexible CPR approach (see Mathiassen 2002) offers the freedom 
and flexibility to accommodate different levels of project complexity. Researchers who 
perform CPR are not required to adhere to any fixed process model (Iversen et al. 2004) and 
CPR projects can flexibly employ the generic AR process (McKay & Marshall 2001) to guide 
the research and problem-solving actions. McKay and Marshall’s (2001) process model 
encourages the researchers to understand the real-world problem of interest and to study the 
literature, which enable them to establish clear objectives before entering the iterative process 
to work in the local context. The CPR approach is thus advantageous in this aspect. However, 
it might require the action researchers to be experienced to ensure research rigour since the 
CPR approach does not provide a detailed guide for rigour, and less experienced researchers 
may omit important activities that would make them unable to achieve the dual imperatives of 
action research. 
On this basis and on my experience of this CAR project, I provide some recommendations to 
further improve the CAR process. Researchers might adapt the initiating activities of the 
generic AR process (McKay & Marshall 2001) to study practice and real-world problems and 
to establish research questions before committing to the CAR project. By doing so, the 
researchers can envision how the potential CAR project will contribute to theory and practice 
and they can maintain their focus on the project’s objectives while engaging and research and 
problem-solving activities in the local situation. 
I established in advance of the CAR project my research interest and questions, which aimed 
at investigating the formation of InfoSec climate and the applications of SNA methods for 
improving organisational InfoSec. My research actions, which were collaboratively performed 
with TTT, tackled different issues in each stage and the stages’ outcomes contributed to 
addressing the established research questions. This approach of establishing the research 
interest and understanding practice in advance of the CAR project requires the action 
researchers to approach suitable collaborating practitioners. The researchers can acquire an 
understanding about the practice and real-world problems of interest by interacting with 
practitioners, potentially through conducting a case study. Problematisation (see Alvesson & 
Sandberg 2011) and gap-spotting techniques (see Sandberg & Alvesson 2010) can be useful 
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for identifying the unexplored research area, based on which the action researchers identify 
their research interests and research questions. 
My second recommendation focuses on the use of theories in CAR projects. Davison, 
Martinsons and Ou (2012) discuss that the instrumental theories should support and 
complement the focal theories. In this research there was also a relationship between the 
different focal theories (i.e., the theoretical model about InfoSec climate formation and the 
theory of social power bases) and the instrumental theories (i.e., opinion leadership theory and 
graph theory)—all focused on the employees’ socialisation. While the complementary roles of 
theories became evident in this CAR project, the current guide to performing CAR does not 
provide any criteria for selecting focal and instrumental theories. I considered and can now 
recommend some selection criteria for theories such as the instrumental theories’ contributions 
to achieving the business objectives, the feasibility of applying the theories in the research 
context (i.e., whether the actual context has the elements prescribed in the theory to explain 
causes and effects) and a potential conflict between the adopted theories and the scholarly 
objectives. 
Researchers may encounter such conflict in a situation where the adoption of a theory would 
effectively solve the problem, yet examining its propositions or reflecting on its applications 
would not produce new knowledge for the research community and beyond. I experienced this 
conflict in the action taking stage where I performed the training for the InfoSec champions; 
the actions performed in this stage were guided by the experiential learning cycle-based 
InfoSec training procedure (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011) and the critical elements for effective 
InfoSec training which were identified from the literature. The end results indicated that the 
training was successful in equipping the champions with InfoSec knowledge and in facilitating 
a mutual understanding about the diffusion tasks between these champions and the project 
team. The training as an intervention produced satisfactory results that contributed to achieving 
the CAR project’s business objective, but a reflection on these results did not offer many 
theoretical contributions. It was also not within the CAR project’s scope to theorise the 
training’s process and outcomes. In fact, it would be reasonable to anticipate that training 
should improve the learners’ knowledge. I felt the adoption of theories for designing and 
implementing the InfoSec training was mainly an attempt to closely conform with the CAR 
approach’s process model, although Davison, Martinsons and Ou (2012) do not suggest that 
every CAR iteration or stage must have a focal and an instrumental theory. Action researchers 
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who perform CAR should be aware of similar situations and to make rational decisions that 
concern the adoption of theories to guide research actions and theorising. I further note that the 
incompatibility between focal and instrumental theories, and between these theories and the 
research context, may create opportunities to discover new knowledge as well. 
Action researchers, especially less experienced ones, should be aware of the uncontrollable 
nature of AR projects and its consequences. In exchange for the opportunities to produce novel 
knowledge from investigating an unexplored research area, I felt anxious and under pressure 
to produce positive scholarly and practical results until the evaluation and reflection stage 
which indicated the champions’ diffusion was satisfactory. While being an inexperienced 
researcher might have contributed to my insecurity, the limited time frame of a PhD 
candidature, which would not allow further iterations to rectify any potential issues after the 
diffusion, was another major cause for such insecurity. My anxiety increased when the 
champions were diffusing InfoSec knowledge, as I wanted to avoid creating biased outcomes 
and, thus, did not want to further intervene and check their performance or remind them about 
the diffusion. These were the uncontrollable factors of this CAR project that emotionally 
affected me as an action researcher. I could have taken contingency actions to ensure the 
generation of knowledge in the event where the champions’ diffusion failed to produce 
satisfactory results, which would include analysing the reasons for such failure. However, if 
the diffusion failed to improve TTT’s InfoSec environment, the business objective would not 
be achieved and thus the project’s conclusion would have to be negotiated with the top 
management. In this regard, I had explained my intention to examine the untried SNA approach 
to improve InfoSec environment in the initial meeting before the CAR project commenced.  
I suggest researchers assess the uncontrollable elements of their CAR projects and develop 
contingency plans for the unexpected during the diagnosis and action planning stages of a CAR 
iteration, something not currently emphasised in the introductory texts to CAR (Davison, 
Martinsons & Kock 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012). I also advise researchers to 
develop a mutual understanding with the collaborating practitioners about the expectations and 
risks of the project as early as possible. In addition to establishing the CAR approach’s 
recommended RCA, it might be beneficial for the researchers to adapt the concept of a 
collaborative space from the CPR approach (see e.g., Mathiassen 2002) to effectively facilitate 
the researcher–client collaboration in a CAR project. Figure 9.2 provides a summary of my 
recommendations to extend the CAR process. 
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Figure 9.2. Extended Canonical Action Research Process Model 
While the CPM provides a step-by-step process for conducting CAR projects consisting of five 
stages, namely diagnosis, action planning, action taking, evaluation and reflection (Davison, 
Martinsons & Ou 2012), my literature review showed that prior CAR projects had not followed 
any structured way to perform these individual stages. In this CAR project, I adopted the CPM 
to guide the research activities within each of those five stages for two reasons. First, it provided 
a consistent structure for describing the research process and reporting results. Second, the 
adoption of CPM within each stage forced me to iteratively diagnose the current situation and 
to plan actions that were motivated by focal and instrumental theories, which subsequently 
created the opportunities to perform relevant actions for the organisational context and produce 
theoretical contributions through continuous reflection. As an inexperienced action researcher, 
I appreciated the mentioned benefits of adopting the CPM to guide the activities within the 
CAR stages, which also helped to alleviate my anxiety when coping with the uncontrollable 
nature of the CAR project. Such extended use of the CPM did not conflict with the rigor of 
CAR described by Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004), and it could further improve rigor 
and contribute to the dual imperatives of action research, i.e., achieving both business and 
scholarly objectives in CAR. It should be noted that this extended use of the CPM may appear 
to be excessive, and its benefits may be found as being outweighed by the time and efforts that 
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the action researchers and industry partners spend on following the CPM within each CAR 
stage. To this end, the development of a structured process to plan and carry out the activities 
within the CAR stages would be beneficial. Table 9.4 summarises the methodological 
contributions and recommendations of this section. 
Table 9.4. Summary of Methodological Contributions and Recommendations 
Methodological Contributions Recommendations 
• Demonstration of the use of SNA methods 
to support the CAR approach in diagnosing 
the organisational situation, as well as 
designing and evaluating network-based 
interventions 
• Provision of recommendations to ensure the 
effective use of SNA methods in CAR 
projects 
• Suggestion to improve the CAR process 
• SNA methods assist the CAR process by: 
o Providing a toolbox of network-based 
interventions 
o Providing the means to diagnose the 
current situations and evaluate the 
interventions’ outcomes 
• Action researchers are advised to consider 
following the recommendations from the 
extended CAR process 
• Less experienced action researchers should 
be aware of the uncontrollable nature of AR 
projects and its consequences 
• The development of a structured process for 
planning and conducting activities within 
each CAR stage would be beneficial 
9.6 Evaluating the Five Principles of CAR 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, CAR projects are suggested to follow five principles to ensure their 
rigour—RCA, CPM, theory, change through action and learning through reflection (Davison, 
Martinsons & Kock 2004). This section discusses my evaluation of the overall CAR process 
concerning these five principles, resulting in further recommendations on conducting CAR 
projects. 
9.6.1 Researcher–Client Agreement 
The principle of RCA focuses on the establishment of mutual understanding between the action 
researchers and the research clients, particularly about the CAR approach and the stakeholders’ 
duties during the projects (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Table 9.5 lists six criteria for 
this principle of RCA. 
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Table 9.5. Criteria for the Principle of Researcher–Client Agreement 
1a 
Did both the researcher and the client agree that CAR was the appropriate approach for the 
organisational situation? 
1b Was the focus of the research project specified clearly and explicitly? 
1c Did the client make an explicit commitment to the project? 
1d 
Were the roles and responsibilities of the researcher and client organisation members specified 
explicitly? 
1e Were project objectives and evaluation measures specified explicitly? 
1f Were the data collection and analysis methods specified explicitly? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
As described in Chapter 4, I explained the CAR approach to the top management at TTT and 
we agreed to perform the CAR project to achieve both scholarly and business objectives (1a 
and 1b). We developed and signed a written RCA which effectively served as a formal 
document that explicitly established the rights and responsibilities of myself as the researcher 
and top management as the research client. The RCA formally recognised the top 
management’s commitment to support the data collection and to protect the respondents’ 
anonymity (1c and 1d). My intentions to collect network data via questionnaire and to perform 
SNA for evaluating the project’s outcome was explicitly specified in the initial meeting with 
TTT, which was in line with my scholarly objective to advance knowledge about the 
applications of SNA methods in the behavioural InfoSec field (1e and 1f). 
Action researchers in the information systems domain have reported numerous benefits of 
establishing a formal RCA, including securing top management’s support, providing 
researchers with the legitimacy to interact with organisational employees, reducing 
opportunisms and encouraging learning, and helping researchers and research clients establish 
mutual understanding about the project (Foorthuis & Brinkkemper 2008; Huang & Martin-
Taylor 2013; Lindgren, Henfridsson & Schultze 2004; Malaurent & Avison 2016). The 
principle of RCA also concerns the clear specification of the collaborative activities between 
researchers and research clients (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). For example, action 
researchers may gain trust from the research clients by providing continuous feedback 
(Foorthuis & Brinkkemper 2008; Malaurent & Avison 2016). Researchers and research clients 
may both participate in the scientific publication process (Barata, da Cunha & Melo Santos 
2016) or develop a research plan and an organisational improvement plan separately (Moe et 
al. 2005). 
The RCA benefitted this CAR project by serving as a formal recognition of the top 
management’s commitment towards safeguarding employees’ anonymity, which increased 
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employees’ confidence when completing the sensitive network questionnaires. Although the 
effect of the top management’s announced commitment on the surveys’ response rates was not 
captured, I believe it mitigated the respondents’ concern about anonymity and motivated their 
participation. Additionally, the collaboration between myself and TTT’s top management and 
the Vice Director of the BSP department was based on mutual trust and understanding. Similar 
to Malaurent and Avison’s (2016) collaborating organisation where research had a high status 
and recognised their AR as non-consultancy, I found the top management at TTT to be open-
minded and receptive to innovations. The General Director at TTT, who represented the top 
management and held the highest authority in this research, allowed me to conduct the CAR 
project without requiring me to frequently report to him and to prepare further formal 
agreements. On this basis, the research client’s trust in myself as the researcher had been 
granted from the outset and this trusting relationship lasted throughout the project. 
The informal collaboration between TTT and I accommodated the dynamic nature of CAR and 
allowed flexible adjustments to the research activities, and it ensured that the research actions 
were decided based on a consensus between the researcher and the research client. If a formal 
research process with detailed documentation had been applied for this project, it could have 
brought adverse effects not aligned with the research client’s preferred collaborating style, 
while producing more paperwork to amend the RCA whenever a change in the activities was 
required. On this basis, I advise action researchers to prepare an RCA that incorporates the 
necessary details of the CAR project, while reasonably accounting for the flexibility of CAR 
and the research client’s preferences. 
With regard to the use of SNA methods with the CAR approach, Borgatti and Molina (2005) 
discuss that SNA has powerful applications in the context of action research, yet they also make 
a cautionary note as top management often want to have access to network data which contains 
sensitive information about employees. As such, I found the principle of RCA especially 
critical for CAR which involves network-based interventions. I recommend action researchers 
employ the measures which were employed in this CAR project to maximise the effectiveness 
of the SNA methods; an RCA may show the top management’s commitment to safeguarding 
employees’ identities during data collection by explicitly specifying that top management will 
not have access to network data or to anonymised data only. 
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9.6.2 Cyclical Process Model 
The second principle focuses on the planning and execution of the CAR iterations by following 
the CPM, which involves five stages—diagnosis, action planning, action taking, evaluation and 
reflection (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Table 9.6 lists the criteria for the CPM. 
Table 9.6. Criteria for the Principle of Cyclical Process Model 
2a Did the project follow the cyclical process model or justify any deviation from it? 
2b Did the researcher conduct an independent diagnosis of the organisational situation? 
2c Were the planned actions based explicitly on the results of the diagnosis? 
2d Were the planned actions implemented and evaluated? 
2e Did the researcher reflect on the outcomes of the intervention? 
2f 
Was this reflection followed by an explicit decision on whether or not to proceed through an 
additional process cycle? 
2g 
Were both the exit of the researcher and the conclusion of the project due to either the project 
objectives being met or some other clearly articulated justification? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
As described in Chapters 5 to 8, this CAR project followed the five-stage CPM without any 
deviation (2a). I also encountered some challenges while following the CPM, which suggest 
improvements to the CPM as discussed in Section 9.5.2. I performed a diagnosis at the 
beginning of each stage to understand the current problematic organisational situations, then 
planned and executed the actions which were followed by the evaluation of the actions’ 
outcomes and a reflection at the end of the stage (2b, 2c, 2d and 2e). The decision on whether 
to proceed through an additional iteration was elaborated at the end of the evaluation and 
reflection stage (2f). I also discussed the achievement of both scholarly and business objectives 
(the latter with the research client) at the end of the evaluation and reflection stage (see Chapter 
8), which led to the conclusion of the project (2g). 
The principle of CPM provided the project team with a structured process to undertake research 
activities that contributed to achieving both the practical and scholarly objectives. As the 
research client had not clearly identified their problem at the beginning of the project, the client 
and I embarked on a joint co-discovery process. This was in line with other AR projects which 
allocated much time to clearly understand the problematic situation (see e.g., Huang & Martin-
Taylor 2013; Lindgren, Henfridsson & Schultze 2004; Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). 
The initial business objective to improve the InfoSec environment was quite vague, which 
provided the challenge to arrive at specific directions for problem solving. To this end, 
conducting the risk assessment and discussing with the department managers at the beginning 
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of the CAR project (see Chapter 5) gave me the essential insights into the problem that TTT 
was facing. While there is no strict rule pertaining to how many iterations should be in a CAR 
project (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012), I advise action 
researchers to thoroughly diagnose the problematic situation with their collaborating partners 
as much as possible, which may require using one full iteration if necessary. This supports the 
researcher’s independent diagnosis of the situation and conforms with the principle of CPM to 
ensure CAR rigour (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). The researcher can make use of the 
diagnosed findings to refine the planned actions and gain more trust and commitment from the 
research client by presenting the diagnosed issues to them. 
9.6.3 Theory 
The third principle focuses on the use of theories to guide research actions and to generate 
scholarly knowledge from CAR projects (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Davison, 
Martinsons and Ou (2012) recommend action researchers to employ focal and instrumental 
theories, which respectively set the intellectual basis for extending theoretical knowledge and 
inform research actions. Table 9.7 lists the criteria for the principle of theory. 
Table 9.7. Criteria for the Principle of Theory 
3a Were the project activities guided by a theory or set of theories? 
3b 
Was the domain of investigation, and the specific problem setting, relevant and significant to 
the interests of the researcher’s community of peers as well as the client? 
3c Was a theoretically-based model used to derive the causes of the observed problem? 
3d Did the planned intervention follow from this theoretically-based model? 
3e 
Was the guiding theory, or any other theory, used to evaluate the outcomes of the 
intervention? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
In line with Davison, Martinsons and Ou’s (2012) recommendation, I employed multiple focal 
and instrumental theories throughout this project (3a). These theories were the theory of social 
power bases (Raven 2008), opinion leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 1999), 
theory of climate formation (Ashforth 1985; Schneider & Reichers 1983), graph theory (Barnes 
& Harary 1983), experiential learning cycle-based approach for InfoSec training (Karjalainen 
& Siponen 2011) and the critical elements for InfoSec training which were drawn from my 
literature review. This project’s domain of investigation and problem setting are relevant to the 
behavioural InfoSec field. This was established through my review of the relevant literature 
presented in Chapter 2. The acceptance of several of my research articles for publications in 
peer-reviewed journals and conference proceedings in the information systems field during the 
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CAR process provides evidence for the project’s relevancy and significance to the scientific 
community (3b). 
The nature of this CAR project was exploratory at the beginning, where I performed a risk 
assessment to diagnose the problematic InfoSec situation at TTT and found the primary issue 
to be employees’ inadequate InfoSec awareness. Many of the identified vulnerabilities were 
about the lack of InfoSec training and InfoSec communication between employees. Based on 
the risk assessment’s result, I used the theoretical model of climate formation (Ashforth 1985; 
Schneider & Reichers 1983) to explain the relationship between the lack of InfoSec-related 
socialisation and the previously poor InfoSec climate at TTT (i.e., employees’ failure to see 
the priority of InfoSec in the workplace) (3c). The main intervention (i.e., the diffusion of 
InfoSec knowledge by the champions) was planned to increase the InfoSec-related socialisation 
and improve the InfoSec climate in line with the mentioned theoretical model (3d). The 
achievement of the scholarly objective through the intervention, which aimed at identifying the 
mechanisms and factors of InfoSec climate formation, was evaluated by examining the 
theoretical model of such formation (3e). 
As the CAR project developed, the decisions to undertake research actions resulted in the 
adoption of further focal and instrumental theories which I had not planned for or considered 
at the beginning of the project. Opinion leadership theory (Liu et al. 2017; Valente & Davis 
1999) and the theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) were incorporated to guide the 
selection of influential InfoSec champions in the action planning stage. This only emerged after 
the diagnosis stage’s evaluation and reflection as described in Chapter 5. Without considering 
the context, the selection of InfoSec champions had little relevance to the initial scholarly 
objective to understand the formation of an InfoSec climate. However, the examination of these 
theories, as part of the action planning stage described in Chapter 6, produced additional 
insights into the applications of SNA in behavioural InfoSec research and contributed 
knowledge to the unexplored area of using opinion leaders for InfoSec management. Therefore, 
I confirm Davison, Martinsons and Kock’s (2004) advice that action researchers should remain 
flexible and genuinely interested in enhancing the organisational situation, which allows for 
making adjustments to the research activities that lead to unexpected discovery of knowledge. 
My experience of the progressive adoption of theories in this CAR project also reflects the 
argument that it is challenging to determine a suitable theory at the beginning of an AR 
(Vidgen, Madsen & Kautz 2004). 
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9.6.4 Change through Action 
The fourth principle focuses on the mutual understanding between action researchers and 
research clients about the organisational situation, its improvement and the undertaking of 
actions to achieve this improvement (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). This principle offers 
a checklist of five questions listed in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8. Criteria for the Principle of Change through Action 
4a Were both the researcher and client motivated to improve the situation? 
4b Were the problem and its hypothesised cause(s) specified as a result of the diagnosis? 
4c Were the planned actions designed to address the hypothesised cause(s)? 
4d Did the client approve the planned actions before they were implemented? 
4e 
Was the organisation situation assessed comprehensively both before and after the 
intervention? 
4f Were the timing and nature of the actions taken clearly and completely documented? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
In the initial meeting and through the diagnosis, which were described in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively, TTT and I established our motivation to improve the InfoSec environment at TTT 
(4a). The major problem was identified as employees’ inadequate InfoSec awareness, and its 
hypothesised causes as determined from the risk assessment described in Chapter 4 included 
employees’ lack of InfoSec-related socialisation and InfoSec training (4b). The plan to address 
the identified problem was to have InfoSec champions carry out a diffusion of InfoSec 
knowledge to increase InfoSec-related socialisation and to provide InfoSec training (4c). The 
diffusion plan, which followed the train the trainers approach, was agreed between top 
management and the project team at the end of the diagnosis stage (see Chapter 5) (4d). The 
InfoSec-related networks before and after the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge were 
comprehensively evaluated by the performance of SNA as described in Chapters 6 and 8 (4e). 
The project’s actions in the four CAR stages were presented in the respective chapters of this 
thesis and a timeline of the project was documented and provided in Chapter 3 (4f). 
To satisfy criteria 4b, 4c and 4d, the project team and top management followed a collaborative 
procedure in each stage to ensure that all actions supporting the main intervention, such as 
determining the selection criteria for champions (see Chapter 6) and designing and 
implementing the training for the champions (see Chapter 7) were thoroughly discussed and 
agreed upon before being carried out. Specifically, I discussed the actions for each stage with 
the Vice Director of the BSP department and, on occasion, with top management either in-
person or in online meetings throughout the CAR project. At the end of the meetings when 
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agreements on actions were achieved, we summarised the agreements in emails and we kept 
these as meeting records. Moreover, the project team orally presented the stages’ outcomes and 
the follow-up actions in the milestone meetings with top management at the end of each stage. 
In these milestone meetings, the project team sought support from top management if needed, 
such as requesting the General Director to announce the commitment towards safeguarding 
employees’ anonymity for the data collection. Top management acknowledged the achieved 
outcomes at the end of the milestone meetings and gave permission for the project to proceed 
further or conclude. 
Although this CAR project did not encounter any major problems with the agreed collaboration 
style between myself and TTT, our communication failed at least once when top management 
decided to launch the InfoSec event without informing me in advance (see Section 8.1). This 
initiative of top management was carried out with the good intention of facilitating discussions 
about InfoSec matters among employees and supporting the CAR project. However, it also 
indicated that top management may not have fully appreciated the importance of maintaining 
effective communication and synergy between the researcher and the research client in a CAR 
project. I recognise this incident as a drawback of the informal collaboration style between 
myself and TTT and action researchers are advised to be aware of this potential issue. 
9.6.5 Learning through Reflection 
The fifth principle focuses on the action researchers’ responsibilities to inform research clients 
about the project’s progress and to report research findings, which may take the form of 
research publications (Davison, Martinsons & Kock 2004). Moreover, this principle covers the 
reflection and learning which concern further actions in the focal context, actions in related 
research domains, theory and the suitability of the CAR methodology (Davison, Martinsons & 
Kock 2004). Table 9.9 lists the criteria for the principle of learning through reflection. 
Table 9.9. Criteria for the Principle of Learning through Reflection 
5a Did the researcher provide progress reports to the client and organisational members? 
5b Did both the researcher and the client reflect upon the outcomes of the project? 
5c Were the research activities and outcomes reported clearly and completely? 
5d Were the results considered in terms of implications for further action in this situation? 
5e 
Were the results considered in terms of implications for action to be taken in related research 
domains? 
5f 
Were the results considered in terms of implications for the research community (general 
knowledge, informing/re-informing theory)? 
5g Were the results considered in terms of the general applicability of CAR? 
Adopted from Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004). 
255 
As described in Section 9.6.4, progress reports were orally presented to top management and 
the project team in the milestone meetings at the end of the stages (5a). Reflections on the 
outcomes of the stages were mainly performed by myself as the researcher and the Vice 
Director of the BSP department and occasionally with top management (5b). Meeting minutes, 
which documented the results and action plan that resulted from the reflection of each stage, 
were sent as emails to the project stakeholders. The research activities and outcomes were 
clearly and completely reported in this thesis and were published separately in the form of 
research publications (5c). Top management at TTT did not require any written reports; the 
project team orally presented the research activities and outcomes to top management in the 
milestone meetings at the end of the stages. 
Throughout this CAR project, TTT received a number of practical benefits such as improving 
their understanding about InfoSec implementation and InfoSec risk assessment, a group of 
experienced InfoSec champions for future diffusion of InfoSec knowledge and increasing the 
InfoSec-related socialisation among employees. TTT can leverage these resources acquired 
from this CAR project to take further actions to improve their InfoSec environment, which 
potentially involve periodically conducting risk assessments and training the next group of 
InfoSec champions (5d). Since the Vice Director of the BSP department participated in the 
research actions and now holds the relevant materials (e.g., risk assessment spreadsheet and 
selection criteria for champions), it is possible for TTT to perform these actions in the future 
without my support. 
Organisational and theoretical contributions to the related behavioural InfoSec domain were 
discussed in Sections 9.3 and 9.4 (5e and 5f). Specifically, my research demonstrated the 
practical applications of SNA for conducting InfoSec risk assessment and improving InfoSec 
communication and influence in the workplace, especially by identifying InfoSec champions 
to diffuse InfoSec knowledge. Theoretical implications included the extension of current 
knowledge about the formation of InfoSec climate, the determinants of employees’ InfoSec 
influence and various future research directions. The general applicability of the CAR 
approach, which encompasses its benefits and limitations in this project’s context, and the 
methodological contributions to the community of action researchers (Davison, Martinsons & 
Kock 2004) are discussed in Sections 9.5 (5g). 
Overall, this project benefitted from adopting the CAR approach, especially from the 
researcher–client collaborative process and the CPM. By collaborating with TTT to achieve 
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the business objective, I received unexpected opportunities to advance knowledge about the 
application of SNA methods in improving an InfoSec environment and about the determinants 
of InfoSec influence. Had this research only analysed the longitudinal formation of an InfoSec 
climate in a workplace without performing any network-based interventions to improve it, such 
opportunities to advance knowledge would not have been presented. Moreover, the CPM 
effectively served as a guideline for the project team to systematically achieve the practical 
goals of each stage and of the iteration, while ensuring the generation of scholarly knowledge 
through reflecting on the focal and instrumental theories. The adoption of a CAR approach in 
this research requests concrete interventions (e.g., the network-based risk assessment and the 
champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge) to improve the organisational situation. Thus, the 
research findings derived from this CAR project might not accurately reflect the phenomena in 
a workplace without interventions. However, performing the interventions enabled me to 
extend on the existing knowledge through reflection on the results of the interventions. 
9.7 Limitations 
The limited time frame had some consequences, which is a common issue of CAR projects 
conducted as part of a PhD candidature (Avison, Davison & Malaurent 2017). As discussed in 
Section 9.5, the evaluation of the intervention performed in this CAR project focused on the 
changes in the InfoSec-related networks, which reflected the increased levels of employees’ 
provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence. I was not able to collect evidence which 
indicated changes in the organisational InfoSec, such as the levels of InfoSec awareness and 
InfoSec compliance, or the number of InfoSec risks and InfoSec incidents. While we expected 
that the improved InfoSec-related socialisation would subsequently improve organisational 
InfoSec, as confirmed in prior studies (e.g., Herath & Rao 2009b; Safa et al. 2015; Warkentin, 
Johnston & Shropshire 2011), it would have been useful to examine the relationship between 
network measures and other non-network metrics about organisational InfoSec.  
I also did not conduct qualitative interviews with the champions after the change program to 
gather rich and in-depth data about their experience during the diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. 
This was due to both the project’s limited time frame and the project’s scholarly and business 
objectives which did not focus on the champions’ behaviours during the diffusion. Had such 
data been collected, this research could have offered further lessons learned concerning the 
champions’ challenges and their responses to these challenges during the diffusion. 
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9.8 Future Directions for Research 
This section outlines the directions for future research based on the organisational, theoretical 
and methodological contributions that were discussed in sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 respectively. 
In line with my recommendation to adopt SNA methods for analysing InfoSec risks, future 
research is encouraged to further analyse InfoSec risk networks in different organisational 
contexts to reveal the common patterns of how the vulnerabilities and threats are tied to each 
other. This can potentially extend theoretical knowledge about the relational nature of InfoSec 
risks. Acquiring such knowledge enables the development of better practices which can 
efficiently and effectively mitigate organisational InfoSec risks by removing those commonly 
identified as the root causes in the risk networks. 
Throughout this CAR project and in section 9.3, I have demonstrated and elaborated on the 
practical use of network-based interventions and network measures as quantitative metrics for 
improving organisational InfoSec. Additionally, I recommended organisations to align their 
network-based interventions with the strategic objectives and current structures of their 
InfoSec-related networks. To this end, it would be desirable to have a framework which 
informs organisations about the strategic advantages and disadvantages of their current 
InfoSec-related network structures, then recommends the suitable interventions to improve the 
organisations’ InfoSec environments. The development of such a framework demands future 
research further investigate InfoSec-related networks in different industries and cultural 
settings and analyse how the unique structures of these networks impact on organisations’ 
InfoSec. 
Consistent with Gesell, Barkin and Valente’s (2013) discussion that the thresholds for network 
measures vary according to the change program’s targets, network-based interventions in the 
InfoSec context might have their unique optimal thresholds for network measures as well. 
Determining these optimal thresholds allows organisations to devise new network-based 
interventions to improve their InfoSec environments. On this basis, my research serves as the 
first study to evaluate InfoSec-related networks based on a set of network measures. Future 
research is encouraged to employ similar measures to further evaluate the InfoSec-related 
networks and accumulative findings from multiple evaluations may reveal the optimal 
thresholds for network measures in the InfoSec context. 
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In addition to network centrality which indicates the influential status of InfoSec champions, 
as discussed in section 9.4, I encourage future studies to examine employees’ brokerage roles 
on their provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence, and on their InfoSec perceptions 
and behaviours. Brokerage roles refer to employees’ advantageous positions in the networks 
which allow them to have access to unique resources and to control the flows of resources 
between groups (Bruque, Moyano & Eisenberg 2009; Burt, Kilduff & Tasselli 2013; Carpenter, 
Li & Jiang 2012; Rowley 1997; Wellman 1983). Employees who can broker organisational 
resources are influential in the workplaces. Unlike centrality measures, which only reflect the 
positions and connections of an employee, brokerage roles take into account employees’ 
department or group memberships. On this basis, social network theory classifies five types of 
brokerage roles in a network—‘coordinator’, ‘consultant’ or ‘itinerant’, ‘gatekeeper’, 
‘representative’ and ‘liaison’ (Gould & Fernandez 1989; Hanneman & Riddle 2005). 
These brokerage roles of the nodes representing employees are visualised in Figure 9.3. The 
shapes of the nodes denote their department memberships—nodes having the same shapes also 
work in the same departments. For example, when employee B bridges the flow of resources 
between employee A and employee C and the three of them work in the same department, then 
employee B is described as holding the ‘coordinator’ role in this situation. As a resource broker 
between employee A and employee C, employee B can hold a ‘consultant’ role, a ‘gatekeeper’ 
role or a ‘representative’ role when there is a same-department relationship between A and C, 
between B and C or between A and B (see Figure 9.3). Finally, when B helps A transfer their 
resources to C and the three of them work in different departments, then B serves as a ‘liaison’ 
for A and C. 
 
Figure 9.3. Brokerage Roles 
Adapted from Hanneman and Riddle (2005). 
I expect that these brokerage roles of employee B will have different impacts on their InfoSec 
influence. Similarly, employees who hold different brokerage roles might also have distinctive 
background characteristics and behaviours. For example, a liaison who can transfer resources 
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across different departments can be assumed to have greater influence than a coordinator who 
can circulate resources only among colleagues in the same department. Gaining the knowledge 
about the impacts of brokerage roles on InfoSec influence may lead to further classification of 
different InfoSec champions. For example, employees with coordinator and gatekeeper roles 
might be selected to be local champions, and employees with consultant and liaison roles might 
be selected to be champions who diffuse InfoSec-related resources across organisational 
functions. 
The project team recognised the importance of non-network factors as we discussed with the 
champions their concerns after the training workshops. Some champions reported that they 
lacked confidence in their communication and leadership skills to influence other employees’ 
InfoSec behaviours. This finding supports the fact that the recruitment of champions for 
information systems-related change programs does not solely rely on their network measures 
(Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Jenssen & Jørgensen 2004). Prior studies about opinion leadership 
have identified important personal characteristics of effective champions which include being 
politically savvy, self-confidence, willing to take calculated risks, energetic and enthusiastic, 
persistent and knowledgeable, just to name a few (Howell & Boies 2004; Howell & Higgins 
1990; Jenssen & Jørgensen 2004; Martinsons 1993). 
In the InfoSec context there has been little research to determine the non-network attributes of 
InfoSec champions. My research findings extend current knowledge about the determinants of 
InfoSec influence and can be used to select InfoSec champions in practice. Of the few studies 
that determine the attributes of InfoSec champions, Martinez-Moyano et al. (2008) identify 
InfoSec champions as end-users who actively reported system problems to systems 
administrators. The roles and required abilities of InfoSec champions can be more 
sophisticated, as Everett (2010) discusses the InfoSec champions’ abilities of being able to 
provide other employees with information and materials about InfoSec matters and to facilitate 
discussions about InfoSec issues. Gabriel and Furnell (2011) argue that some employees 
possess specific personality traits suited for InfoSec champions, such as imagination and 
altruism, and propose to use personality tests to identify champions. 
While I was aware of these non-network factors that can increase an employee’s potential to 
be InfoSec champion, examining these attributes’ effects was outside my research scope. 
Future studies can perform SNA to test hypotheses about the impacts of these non-network 
attributes on employees’ provisions of InfoSec support and InfoSec influence, which are 
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conceptualised as network ties. Further, I noted in Section 9.3.2 that some of employees’ non-
network attributes such as gender and age were negated when the network’s structural 
mechanisms were accounted for. Therefore, future studies are encouraged to replicate my study 
in other work settings to determine selection criteria that remain valid across different network 
structures. 
This research is the first empirical study to employ a longitudinal SNA method to investigate 
the formation of an InfoSec climate. Since climate is argued to be the surface-level 
manifestation of how things are done in an organisation, studying the formation of InfoSec 
climate gives cues to the development of InfoSec culture (Kuenzi & Schminke 2009; 
Schneider, Ehrhart & Macey 2011). These cues help organisations develop InfoSec culture by 
altering the changeable workplace features which impact InfoSec climate such as employees’ 
socialising patterns. Therefore, it is worth pursuing the research direction to explore the 
forming mechanisms of an InfoSec climate from the network perspective. However, the current 
understanding about the formation of an InfoSec climate is still in its infancy. I discuss future 
research directions to extend the theoretical knowledge about InfoSec climate below. 
The research findings in this CAR project about the mechanisms and factors which contributed 
to the formation of an InfoSec climate were examined when the intervention took place. As 
such, the forming process described in this research might not accurately reflect the natural 
formation of an InfoSec climate, which may also occur at a slower rate without the increased 
InfoSec-related socialisation caused by the champions’ diffusion of InfoSec knowledge. I 
recommend future behavioural InfoSec research to analyse the formation of an InfoSec climate 
in a workplace where InfoSec-related socialisation and InfoSec influence are not affected by 
any interventions. Findings from these studies would deepen the understanding about the 
natural formation of an InfoSec climate. 
The finding indicating climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours were 
unaffected by social influence suggests that different types of climate perceptions have their 
unique forming mechanisms. For example, the formation of this climate perception might be 
affected by other types of socialisation which my study did not capture. This climate perception 
may also be influenced by indirect comparison which explains that actors with similar positions 
in the network tend to behave or think similarly, rather than by direct socialisation such as 
provisions of organisational resources (Leenders 2002). Employees might develop their own 
climate perception of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours independently to their colleagues’ 
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social influence as well. Therefore, it is necessary and helpful to determine the alternative 
forming mechanisms of climate perceptions. 
Ashforth (1985) discusses that the formation of an organisational climate can be influenced by 
the corporate culture and the work setting of employees. Employees’ sense-making activities 
and social influence, which contribute to the development of climate perceptions, can be 
affected by the different organisational cultures that determine employees’ values and 
assumptions (Ashforth 1985). Moreover, features of the physical environment such as walls 
and offices can either facilitate or discourage employees’ interactions and other sense-making 
activities which give rise to a shared climate (Ashforth 1985). 
All three offices of TTT (headquarters, architect and factory offices) had an open office space 
with few walls and partitions. Although TTT has a flat organisational culture, the Vietnamese 
culture in general has high collectivism and large power distance which respectively encourage 
achieving consensus and discourage challenging authority (Hofstede 2001). Thus, I argue that 
the confirmed effect of social influence on employees’ formation of climate perceptions of 
their colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours might be affected by TTT’s physically open work 
environment and the Vietnamese culture. Further, the action planning stage’s analysis of the 
network visualisations showed that employees from departments such as project management 
and construction together formed a large cluster in TTT due to their job duties which were 
heavily related to each other. As such, I propose that having related job duties can also 
contribute to the formation of organisational climate, extending Ashforth’s (1985) theory. This 
proposed effect is in line with the theory of homophily which posits that similar individuals 
tend to associate and interact more with each other (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001). 
Future studies should endeavour to empirically validate these discussed effects of national 
culture, physical environment and job duties on the formation of an InfoSec climate. 
In line with Ashforth’s (1985) discussion about the work setting and organisational culture 
affecting the formation of climate, I further posit that the structures of employees’ networks, 
which are the consequences of the physical environment and work culture, can also govern the 
formation of an InfoSec climate. The finding in this CAR project that employees developed 
favourable climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours was confirmed at the same 
time as the InfoSec-related networks had their structural features improved. While there lacked 
the statistical evidence to support the causal relationship between the improved network 
structures and the formation of InfoSec climate, I propose that the formation of a favourable 
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InfoSec climate can be facilitated by the increases in the InfoSec-related networks’ density, 
reciprocity and transitivity and by the decrease in these networks’ centralisation. 
Prior studies have examined the effects of these network structures on various organisational 
outcomes with conflicting results (Balkundi & Harrison 2006). Some argued that having high 
density values can lead to desirable organisational outcomes such as better transfer of 
knowledge and group performance (Bruque, Moyano & Eisenberg 2009; Burt 2000; Reagans 
& Zuckerman 2001; Sparrowe et al. 2001). Others stated that dense networks result in 
redundant knowledge, offer less information advantage and negatively affect productivity 
(Balkundi & Harrison 2006; Burt 2000; Gould 1993; Zhou, Siu & Wang 2010). In the context 
of an InfoSec climate, having high density may or may not be desirable for the formation of an 
InfoSec climate. For example, it can be reasoned that higher density values of the InfoSec 
support network result in more employees exerting InfoSec influence over each other, thereby 
accelerating the formation of an InfoSec climate. Conversely, too much provision of InfoSec 
support may create the common belief that InfoSec is part of the expected background (Furnell 
& Thomson 2009) and employees might stop realising a favourable InfoSec climate in the 
workplace. Analysing the relationship between network structures and the formation of an 
InfoSec climate advances theoretical knowledge about the desirable and undesirable network 
structures in the InfoSec context. 
Currently, there are few studies on organisational information systems which explicitly report 
the use of SNA methods. Action researchers employed SNA methods to improve collaboration 
in software process improvement (Nielsen & Tjørnehøj 2005, 2010) and to develop knowledge 
management systems (Butler et al. 2008). My literature review did not find many behavioural 
InfoSec studies which performed SNA, much less using SNA methods with an AR approach. 
Lee (2010) and Davison (2010) argue that SNA is not even accurately understood by 
information systems researchers as many of them do not use the term ‘social network’ with its 
scientific meaning from sociology. There are an increasing number of studies which focus on 
the use of SNA methods for designing and implementing organisational change programs (e.g., 
Cross, Parker & Borgatti 2002; Gesell, Barkin & Valente 2013; Hatala & Lutta 2009; Parise 
2007; Valente 2012), however, not many of these studies follow AR designs and they put 
emphasis on the practicality of the studied network-based interventions, but not on their 
theoretical contributions. In contrast, AR strives to achieve both the goals of practically 
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improving the organisational situations and generating scholarly knowledge (Baskerville & 
Myers 2004; Davison, Martinsons & Ou 2012). 
The project team for this study evaluated the improvements which focused on the InfoSec-
related networks. Other benefits concerning organisational InfoSec, such as the mitigation of 
InfoSec risks or reduction of InfoSec violations, were anticipated as results of the improved 
InfoSec-related networks which facilitated more provision of InfoSec support and InfoSec 
influence. If employees provide each other with more InfoSec support and influence each other 
to improve InfoSec behaviours, they may become more aware of InfoSec matters and the 
number of InfoSec risks and violations at TTT may decrease. Due to the short time frame and 
limited access to TTT’s records of InfoSec incidents, the evaluation of the intervention’s 
impacts on organisational InfoSec was not possible in this project. If the project’s time frame 
could be extended, it would be useful to study the relationships between the mentioned possible 
benefits and the improved InfoSec-related networks. 
There are, therefore, opportunities to further explore the benefits of combining the two research 
streams—that is, conducting action researches which employ network-based interventions to 
practically improve organisational situations, while theorising these interventions’ process and 
outcome. For example, Valente (2012) discusses that studies involving network-based 
interventions concern not only individual behaviours (e.g., whether the individuals perform or 
receive the diffusion or not), but also the system dynamics which reflect how communities 
respond to the interventions by changing their patterns of interactions. Likewise, researchers 
may arrive at process theories of how champions and non-champions change their interactions 
during an intervention by employing SNA methods in information systems- or InfoSec-related 
AR projects. To this end, my research provides one of the first examples of demonstrating the 
use of SNA methods in an InfoSec-related CAR project, in a context where the methodological 
contributions of SNA methods to InfoSec-related AR have not been fully explored. Although 
the InfoSec training delivered during the action taking stage was not the emphasis of this CAR 
project, future action research can empirically appraise the adjusted experiential learning cycle-
based InfoSec training approach in their contexts as well. 
9.9 Conclusion 
At the end of this CAR project I have achieved my scholarly objective and answered the two 
research questions stated at the beginning of the thesis, which aimed at understanding the 
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formation of an InfoSec climate and exploring the applications of SNA methods for improving 
organisational InfoSec. The research outcomes also satisfied the business objective of TTT to 
improve their InfoSec environment. The CAR project successfully involved all stakeholder 
groups at TTT, including top management, department managers and employees at three 
locations, in an organisation-wide InfoSec change program unprecedented in TTT. The CAR 
project provided the procedures and materials for conducting future risk assessments at TTT 
and a group of champions, who have undergone InfoSec training and experienced in the 
diffusion of InfoSec knowledge, was established. As a result, the CAR project improved the 
organisational situation at TTT and the stakeholders there are prepared to continuously enhance 
the InfoSec environment. 
In terms of organisational contributions, this research demonstrated the application of SNA 
methods for conducting InfoSec risk assessment and for evaluating and improving an InfoSec 
environment with network-based interventions. Moreover, this research offered a list of 
theoretically-based criteria for selecting influential InfoSec champions to diffuse InfoSec 
knowledge in a workplace. This research offered theoretical contributions by extending current 
knowledge about the determinants of InfoSec influence and about the formation of an InfoSec 
climate. My reflection on the process of conducting this CAR project offered methodological 
contributions on the combined use of SNA methods and the CAR approach. I recommend 
action researchers to capitalise on the features of SNA methods to enhance the rigour and 
success of CAR, such as using network visualisations to communicate with the research clients 
or designing network-based interventions and quantitatively evaluating the outcomes with 
network measures. 
My experience of conducting this CAR project suggests the need for action researchers to 
maintain flexibility throughout the research process, which enables the effective combination 
of theories and methods to improve a problematic organisational situation and to produce 
scholarly knowledge. I proposed improvements to the CAR process which involve developing 
a collaborative space and identifying research ideas and real-world problems before 
commencing a CAR project. I also discussed the potential criteria and considerations for 
selecting theories and the need to prepare contingency actions for the undesirable situations 
that might occur in a CAR. For CAR projects that collect sensitive data about employees’ 
networks to perform SNA, the RCA holds a critical role in establishing the researcher–
practitioner agreements and commitments towards safeguarding participants’ anonymity. In 
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this context, an RCA ensures the ethical use of SNA methods and increases the network 
survey’s response rate by improving participants’ confidence in answering the survey. 
As a final reflection of this thesis, I found that conducting CAR offers benefits to researchers, 
academia and the industry. As the action researcher who performed the whole CAR project I 
benefitted from the research process which developed my abilities to effectively liaise with 
industry partners and to creatively employ multiple research methods to achieve both scholarly 
and business objectives. I have also built up a strong collaborative relationship with the industry 
partner which lasts beyond the end of this project. The CAR approach allows theoretical ideas 
and existing tools to be validated in practical contexts while industry partners can improve their 
practices, thus narrowing the gap between theory and practice. 
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Appendix C. Case Study Interview Questions 
The following questions were used as part of the interviews with the InfoSec experts in the 
diagnosis stage: 
1) Please tell me about your experiences in the InfoSec industry and your role in your 
organisation. 
2) How popular or common are InfoSec standards such as ISO, COBIT and ITIL in the 
Vietnamese industry? 
3) Please describe the steps of how you implemented the ISO 27001 standard in your 
company. What are the key factors in each of these steps? 
4) What are the key factors for building an effective InfoSec work environment? 
As the experts answer the above questions, I asked them to elaborate on the important concepts 
that they mentioned. For example: 
• How to motivate employees’ InfoSec compliance?  
• Why do employees refuse to comply with InfoSec policy? 
• What are the pros and cons of different approaches and tools to motivate InfoSec 
compliance? 
• What does the interviewee mean by ‘InfoSec champions’, and how to select these 
champions?  
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Appendix D. Conducting ERGM Analysis 
ERGM involves specifying a mathematical model with terms that potentially explain the 
forming process of ties within an observed network, then evaluating the model and assessing 
the model’s goodness-of-fit. In the action planning stage of the CAR project I analysed three 
models which described the InfoSec influence network and its forming mechanisms. 
The questionnaire (see Table 6.1), which asked the respondents to nominate their ties with 
others, collected data about the observed networks. The observed network of InfoSec influence 
was considered as only one pattern out of many possible patterns, and my goal was to specify 
a model that could be used to reliably create simulated networks that would resemble the 
observed network. To this end, I specified a combination of sensible terms describing the 
forming mechanisms of the observed network. The inclusion of the terms was based on the 
discussed theoretical background (see Section 6.2.1) and the descriptive analysis which showed 
the InfoSec influence network’s distinctive characteristics such as reciprocity, centralisation 
and transitivity (see Section 6.3.1). 
Specification of models 
The strategy for specifying the models was as follows. First, I included the terms that described 
the effects of employees’ background characteristics, which were age, gender, tenure, seniority 
and department membership, on the occurrence of InfoSec influence ties. This model, Model 
1, described the inherent personal characteristics that made an employee influence or have 
InfoSec behaviours influenced by others. 
Second, employees’ socialisation, which was defined through the provisions of instrumental, 
expressive and InfoSec support resources, was included in a second model, Model 2. These 
terms about the effects of employees’ socialisation were specified together with the terms about 
the background characteristics’ effects. Model 2 took into account the socialisation that allowed 
employees to project social powers onto their colleagues and influence their InfoSec 
behaviours, as suggested by the theory of social power bases (Raven 2008) and the mechanisms 
of social influence (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004; Kelman 1961; Leenders 2002). 
Third, I specified a model that combined all the terms of Models 1 and 2 with those about the 
InfoSec influence network’s structural characteristics such as transitivity and reciprocity. This 
model, Model 3, simultaneously evaluated all of the effects caused by employees’ background 
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characteristics, their socialisation and the InfoSec influence network’s structural characteristics 
on the occurrence of InfoSec influence ties. 
The purpose of this strategy for specifying models was to progressively evaluate the effects of 
employees’ background characteristics on InfoSec influence (Model 1), then the background 
characteristics’ effects and the socialisation’s effects (Model 2) then all effects together 
including the structural characteristics’ effects (Model 3). This strategy allowed me to isolate 
the three groups of effects and to detect the critical effects. Specifically, effects that remained 
significant across the models would be the important ones that could impact the occurrence of 
InfoSec influence ties, whereas those that lost their impacts on InfoSec influence due to being 
evaluated with the newly added effects would be considered as weaker effects. 
List of specified terms 
I specified the three mentioned models by using the latest version 3.6.0 of the statistical 
package ‘ergm’ (Hunter et al. 2008), which was implemented in the R programming 
environment (Hornik 2016). The terms used to model the effects of employees’ background 
characteristics and socialisation and the InfoSec influence network’s structural characteristics 
are summarised in Table D.1. 
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Table D.1. Terms Included in the Models 
Model Term Effect 
All edges 
 
This term models the number of directed ties (called ‘edges’ in ERGM) and its result 
indicated the likelihood of occurrence of InfoSec influence ties between pairs of 






These terms model the effect of a nodal characteristic on the occurrence of outgoing 
InfoSec influence ties. The term nodeocov is used to model such effect of numeric 
variables (e.g., age and tenure), while the term nodeofactor is used for 




These terms model the effect of a nodal characteristic on the occurrence of incoming 
InfoSec influence ties. The term nodeicov is used to model such effect of numeric 
variables (e.g., age and tenure), while the term nodeifactor is used for 
categorical/non-numeric variables (e.g., gender and seniority). 
nodematch 
 
These terms model the homophily effect of a nodal characteristic on the occurrence 
of InfoSec influence ties. Homophily effect means that nodes with similar 
characteristic will be more likely to establish InfoSec influence ties than nodes with 
different characteristics. 
The term nodematch is used to model a homophily effect of categorical/non-numeric 
variables (e.g., gender, seniority and department membership), while the term absdiff 







This term models the tendency of two types of network ties to co-occur with each 
other. For example, the likelihood for InfoSec influence ties to co-occur with 
instrumental/expressive/InfoSec support provision ties.  
Model 3 gwodegree 
 
This term models the variation of outgoing ties in the InfoSec influence network. It 
also models the tendency of active nodes, which have many outgoing ties, to 




This term models the variation of incoming ties in the InfoSec influence network. It 
also models the tendency of popular nodes, which have many incoming ties, to 
continue receiving more ties. 
dgwesp 
 
This term models the additional propensity of an InfoSec influence tie between two 
nodes for each shared partner that they have in common. That is, the tendency of 
node A to close triads by sending a direct tie to B, given that there are multiple in-
between C’s that bridge A and B. 
dgwdsp 
 
This term models the two-path pattern between nodes A and B via their shared 
partners. That is, the tendency of node A to maintain its indirect connections to B via 
multiple C’s in between. 
mutual 
 
This term models the tendency of nodes to reciprocate their ties. 
idegree=0 
 
This term controls for the number of nodes having a zero in-degree in the InfoSec 
influence network. These nodes are termed ‘sources’, which refer to the behaviour of 
only sending ties (out-degree > 0) while not receiving any (in-degree = 0). 
odegree=0 
 
This term controls for the number of nodes having a zero out-degree in the InfoSec 
influence network. These nodes are termed ‘sinks’, which refer to the behaviour of 
only receiving ties (in-degree > 0) while not sending any (out-degree = 0). 
isolates 
 
This term controls for the number of isolates which have zero in-degree and out-
degree in the InfoSec influence network. 




After specifying the models with the terms which described the formation of InfoSec influence 
network, the models were analysed by using the Monte Carlo Markov Chain estimation 
approach with interval and burn-in rates set at 50,000 and 500,000 respectively. Geweke 
statistics were examined to check for degeneracy during the estimation process. All terms 
achieved p-values of larger than the statistical significance threshold of 0.05, which indicated 
that there was no degeneracy (Desmarais & Cranmer 2012). I also compared the Aikake 
Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion values of the models and Model 3 
achieved the best performance, with the lowest score for both of these values. 
Goodness-of-fit 
Goodness-of-fit for Models 1, 2 and 3 was computed with interval and burn-in rates relatively 
large at 50,000 and 500,000 to ensure accurate outputs (Goodreau et al. 2008). Figures D.1, 
D.2 and D.3 visualise the three models’ goodness-of-fit evaluated through the distributions of 
key structural characteristics of the InfoSec influence network, which were in-degree, out-
degree, edge-wise shared partners and minimum geodesic distance. The boxplots describe the 
distributions of the simulated networks’ structural statistics generated from the model. The grey 
lines connect the 95 per cent bounds on the distributions, whereas the solid lines represent the 
observed network’s distributions of the four mentioned structural characteristics. 
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Figure D.1. Goodness-of-Fit of Model 1 
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Figure D.2. Goodness-of-Fit of Model 2 
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Figure D.3. Goodness-of-Fit of Model 3 
Of the three models, Model 3 achieved the best goodness-of-fit, as shown in Figure D.3, where 
the solid lines ran through the boxplots in the graphs for the in-degree, out-degree and edge-
wise shared partners. This indicated that Model 3 described well the InfoSec influence network 
in terms of its in-degree, out-degree and edge-wise shared partners. Model 3 could not describe 
well the InfoSec influence network’s geodesic distance, but such discrepancy can be 
overlooked as analysing the network’s geodesic distance was not the focus of this stage of the 
CAR project. 
Robustness check 
While Figure D.3 showed Model 3’s out-degrees and edge-wise shared partners achieved good 
fit, the goodness-of-fit in regard to the model’s in-degrees had some issues. Specifically, the 
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solid line failed to run through the boxplots which represented the distributions of four, five, 
six and seven in-degrees. This indicated that Model 3 could not describe well the observed 
InfoSec influence network’s amounts of four, five, six and seven in-degrees. 
To ensure that the results of Model 3 were accurate despite the misfits of those in-degrees, I 
analysed a model named robustness check model based on Model 3 while controlling for the 
numbers of in-degrees equal to four, five, six and seven. By doing so, I specified this robustness 
check model to have the same amounts of in-degrees as in the observed network. Then, I 
compared the results of the robustness check model with Model 3 to check for any 
discrepancies. The robustness check model was estimated with the same settings (i.e., 
interval = 50,000; burn-in rates = 500,000) and its goodness-of-fit is shown in Figure D.4.  
 
Figure D.4. Goodness-of-Fit of the Robustness Check Model 
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By controlling for the numbers of in-degrees, the robustness check model’s distributions of 
simulated in-degrees achieved excellent goodness-of-fit (i.e., the solid line ran through all the 
boxplots in the graph for in-degree). Table D.2 compares the results of Model 3 and the 
robustness check model. Descriptions of the terms are available in Table D.1.  
Table D.2. Comparison of Results of Model 3 and Robustness Check Model 
Effect (term in brackets) Model 3 Robustness check model 
Occurrence of InfoSec influence (edges) –4.17 –5.05 
Female–influencer (nodeofactor) –0.36 –0.36 
Female–influenced (nodeifactor) –0.15 –0.13 
Same gender (nodematch) –0.03 –0.03 
Same department (nodematch) 0.76 0.75 
Age–influencer (nodeocov) –0.02 –0.02 
Age–influenced (nodeicov) 0.01 0.02 
Different age (absdiff) –0.01 –0.01 
Seniority (nodematch) –0.18 –0.18 
Manager–influencer (nodeofactor) 0.31 0.32 
Director–influencer (nodeofactor) 1.35 1.35 
Manager–influenced (nodeifactor) –0.03 –0.04 
Director–influenced (nodeifactor) 0.38 0.39 
Tenure–influencer (nodeocov) 0.06 0.06 
Tenure–influenced (nodeicov) –0.03 –0.03 
Different tenure (absdiff) –0.04 –0.04 
Instrumental provision (edgecov) 1.93 1.93 
Expressive provision (edgecov) 1.14 1.16 
InfoSec support provision (edgecov) 4.31 4.3 
Out-degree variation (gwodegree) –3.16 –3.18 
In-degree variation (gwidegree) –1.03 0.67 
Triad closure (dgwdsp) 0.5 0.51 
Two-path (dgwesp) –0.07 –0.07 
Reciprocity (mutual) –1.74 –1.77 
Sinks (out-degree = 0) –1.1 –1.11 
Sources (in-degree = 0) –0.95 –0.06 
Isolated nodes (isolates) –0.19 –0.2 
In-degree = 4  –0.07 
In-degree = 5  0.95 
In-degree = 6  2.1 
In-degree = 7  3.45 
Akaike Information Criterion 2609 2598 
Bayesian Information Criterion 2856 2881 
Overall, the two models did not have many discrepancies, except for the terms that described 
the occurrence of the tie (i.e., ‘edges’), in-degrees variation (e.g., ‘gwidegree’) and the numbers 
of zero, four, five, six and seven in-degrees. These discrepancies were expected as controlling 
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for the network’s in-degrees made the estimation process adjust results of the terms describing 
the numbers of in-degrees, which were ‘edges’, ‘gwidegree’ and the controls for in-degrees.  
The main effects of employees’ background characteristics and socialisation on InfoSec 
influence did not have any large discrepancies in results when controlling for the mentioned 
numbers of in-degrees. This indicated that, without controlling for in-degrees, Model 3’s results 
could be meaningfully interpreted although its goodness-of-fit was not excellent. In fact, the 
Bayesian Information Criterion value of Model 3 was lower than that of the robustness check 
model (see Table D.2). This difference in the Bayesian Information Criterion values suggested 
that Model 3 was more favourable than the robustness check model. The final results of the 
three models are summarised in Table D.3. 
Table D.3. Results of the Three Models 
Effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Occurrence of InfoSec influence (edges) –2.96*** (0.40) –4.66*** (0.57) –4.17*** (0.56) 
Female–influencer (nodeofactor) –1.27*** (0.12) –0.83*** (0.18) –0.36** (0.15) 
Female–influenced (nodeifactor) –0.24** (0.12) –0.16 (0.16) –0.15 (0.16) 
Same gender (nodematch) 0.02 (0.12) –0.05 (0.16) –0.03 (0.16) 
Same department (nodematch) 1.10*** (0.09) –0.47*** (0.15) 0.76*** (0.15) 
Age–influencer (nodeocov) –0.09*** (0.01) –0.07*** (0.02) –0.02 (0.01) 
Age–influenced (nodeicov) 0.001 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Different age (absdiff) –0.01 (0.01) –0.02 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01) 
Seniority (nodematch) 0.06 (0.13) –0.27 (0.18) –0.18 (0.19) 
Manager–influencer (nodeofactor) 1.48*** (0.15) 0.72*** (0.20) 0.31 (0.19) 
Director–influencer (nodeofactor) 1.51*** (0.41) 1.88*** (0.46) 1.35*** (0.30) 
Manager–influenced (nodeifactor) 0.30** (0.14) –0.03 (0.19) –0.03 (0.19) 
Director–influenced (nodeifactor) 0.54 (0.47) 0.24 (0.64) 0.38 (0.61) 
Tenure–influencer (nodeocov) 0.23*** (0.02) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Tenure–influenced (nodeicov) –0.01 (0.01) –0.03 (0.02) –0.03** (0.02) 
Different tenure (absdiff) –0.08*** (0.01) –0.05*** (0.02) –0.04** (0.02) 
Instrumental provision (edgecov)  1.98*** (0.21) 1.93*** (0.19) 
Expressive provision (edgecov)  0.91*** (0.22) 1.14*** (0.21) 
InfoSec support provision (edgecov)  5.33*** (0.12) 4.31*** (0.14) 
Out-degree variation (gwodegree)   –3.16*** (0.39) 
In-degree variation (gwidegree)   –1.03*** (0.38) 
Triad closure (dgwdsp)   0.50*** (0.10) 
Two-path (dgwesp)   –0.07*** (0.03) 
Reciprocity (mutual)   –1.74 (1.19) 
Sinks (out-degree = 0)   –1.10*** (0.39) 
Sources (in-degree = 0)   –0.95** (0.44) 
Isolated nodes (isolates)   –0.19 (0.39) 
Akaike Information Criterion 5438 2763 2609 
Bayesian Information Criterion 5584 2937 2856 
Note: **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
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Table D.4. List of InfoSec Champions 
ID Department Gender Age Tenure Seniority INS_Outdeg EXP_Outdeg ISS_Outdeg INF_Outdeg INS_Beta EXP_Beta ISS_Beta INF_Beta 
1 Accounting Female 40 11 Staff 5 3 0 1 13.6 342.3 0.0 1.0 
2 Accounting Female 50 16 Staff 5 4 0 2 10.6 162.2 0.0 400.0 
3 Administration Female 32 8 Manager 27 7 2 5 3647.2 1380.6 7.9 17.9 
4 Administration Female 32 7 Staff 15 7 2 1 1610.6 871.4 4.0 3.0 
5 Architect Female 35 1 Manager 3 3 0 1 376.6 312.8 0.0 1.0 
6 Architect Male 30 0 Staff 1 1 3 0 1.0 1.0 4.0 0.0 
7 Architect Male 31 5 Staff 2 8 5 2 2.7 4644.7 7.0 2.0 
8 Architect Male 30 1 Staff 1 5 0 0 1734.1 1561.9 0.0 0.0 
9 Architect Female 39 13 Staff 1 4 0 0 1.7 3017.3 0.0 0.0 
10 Architect Female 32 7 Manager 22 11 6 8 6111.6 3661.1 2093.8 11.0 
11 Architect Female 34 9 Staff 3 2 0 0 1317.6 1338.4 0.0 0.0 
12 Architect Male 37 16 Manager 3 0 1 0 823.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 
13 Architect Female 26 2 Staff 2 6 0 0 2.8 1773.2 0.0 0.0 
14 Architect Male 36 14 Manager 12 17 5 6 1707.0 10224.0 2091.3 6.0 
15 ASS Female 28 0 Staff 7 3 5 5 15.1 132.5 12.0 16.9 
16 BSP Female 34 4 Manager 0 0 5 2 0.0 0.0 803.5 5.0 
17 BSP Male 30 0 Staff 1 1 1 0 1.7 1.3 2.0 0.0 
18 BusDev Female 29 1 Staff 4 6 4 0 9.3 1001.7 14.9 0.0 
19 Construction Male 42 14 Manager 19 6 1 3 56.3 930.6 790.6 5.0 
20 Construction Female 43 20 Manager 16 10 3 4 2179.3 6814.7 4.0 309.7 
21 Construction Male 31 7 Staff 2 7 0 2 2.0 729.7 0.0 2.0 
22 Construction Male 33 12 Staff 10 10 3 6 19.5 1409.1 3.0 303.8 
23 Construction Female 38 1 Staff 16 4 9 6 31.5 126.4 1595.1 305.2 
24 Construction Female 26 1 Staff 16 7 5 5 22.6 217.6 2384.6 902.2 
25 Estimation Male 29 2 Staff 2 3 1 1 2.5 469.1 3.0 1.0 
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26 Estimation Female 29 7 Manager 8 10 2 5 604.8 1941.9 9.9 1000.0 
27 Factory Male 26 4 Staff 1 2 9 4 1.6 7.7 17.9 5.0 
28 Factory Male 50 15 Manager 10 9 24 20 14.7 65.1 46.8 435.9 
29 Factory Male 39 14 Staff 0 3 5 4 0.0 11.4 13.9 5.0 
30 Factory Female 37 8 Manager 5 7 0 1 8.2 75.3 0.0 1.0 
31 Factory Male 36 7 Manager 10 6 7 4 19.7 47.8 19.9 403.0 
32 Factory Female 31 6 Staff 4 5 2 2 5.6 23.6 3.0 3.0 
33 Gamma Male 33 2 Director 1 1 1 1 1.7 69.9 200.0 2.0 
34 Gamma Female 35 1 Manager 2 1 1 1 2.5 16.1 200.0 1.0 
35 Hanoi Female 34 3 Manager 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
36 HR Female 31 4 Staff 20 7 2 1 7979.0 1243.1 3.0 1.0 
37 HR Male 38 7 Manager 42 3 1 2 10846.8 318.1 2.0 4.0 
38 Marketing Female 37 0 Manager 3 3 0 0 1101.8 179.9 0.0 0.0 
39 Marketing Male 34 9 Manager 7 3 2 2 3857.5 520.9 2.0 2.0 
40 PM Female 36 2 Staff 7 8 2 1 9.3 968.4 1584.1 1.0 
41 PM Female 32 11 Manager 33 11 6 10 3910.8 860.1 3167.2 309.7 
42 PM Female 32 4 Staff 12 6 1 1 32.2 1192.9 4.0 1.0 
43 PM Female 25 2 Staff 2 5 3 1 2.0 342.2 3.0 2.0 
44 PM Female 31 2 Staff 4 5 3 1 5.9 1067.9 5.0 1.0 
45 Purchasing Female 33 1 Manager 2 2 1 1 4.1 2.0 1.0 1.0 
46 Purchasing Female 39 3 Staff 3 7 1 1 12.6 1606.3 1.0 1.0 
47 Purchasing Female 30 3 Manager 6 8 2 0 12.8 1360.7 6.0 0.0 
48 QC Female 34 1 Manager 1 2 0 0 1.0 219.0 0.0 0.0 
49 Tender Female 33 10 Staff 4 3 1 1 16.0 657.5 3.0 2.0 
50 Tender Female 30 2 Staff 4 5 2 1 14.8 911.3 7.0 2.0 
Notes: INS = Instrumental network; EXP = Expressive network; ISS = InfoSec support network; INF = InfoSec influence network; Outdeg = out-degree centrality (i.e., the 
number of nodes that a node sends ties to); Beta = Beta centrality (i.e., the indirect popularity of a node based on its well-connected neighbours). 
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Appendix E. Computing Single-Item InfoSec Climate Scores 
SAOM and its tool RSiena required variables that represented nodal attributes (e.g., behaviours 
and perceptions) to be single items that have integer values (Ripley et al. 2017). As such, the 
latent constructs about employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours had to be converted into the required data format. 
Rather than averaging the items that represented employees’ climate perceptions (see Table 6.2 
in Chapter 6), I performed confirmatory factor analysis (Brown 2006) to accurately calculate 
the single-item scores for each employee that represented their climate perceptions. While the 
averaging method assumes that every item has an equal amount of contribution towards the 
resulting single-item variable, the confirmatory factor analysis method estimates the exact 
amount of loading of each measurement item as part of the latent construct (i.e., perception of 
InfoSec climate). As a result, I could determine which items contributed the most to the 
construct and accurately calculate the construct’s score for each respondent. 
I performed confirmatory factor analysis by using the software AMOS version 20 (Arbuckle 
2011) which specified the relationships between the measurement items collected by using the 
questions listed in Table 6.2 and perceptions of InfoSec climate. The measurement models for 
each construct (i.e., perception of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours and perception of direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours) were specified and evaluated separately. Both models were 
specified and evaluated under the assumption that the respondent’s perception before the 
InfoSec change program affects their perception after the program. The specification of this 
assumption is realistic and another advantage of using confirmatory factor analysis method, 
compared to averaging the items to calculate the single-item scores for each time point while 
ignoring their interdependency. 
The measurement models are illustrated in Figures E.1 and E.2. The oval objects represented 
the latent constructs which were climate perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours at Time 1 (i.e., before the change program) and Time 2 (i.e., after the 
change program). The square objects represented the measurement items or the respondents’ 
answers for the survey questions. The arrows from the latent constructs to the measurement 
items denoted that the unobservable latent constructs were reflected by the observable 
measurement items. The circle objects with a letter ‘e’ were the unobservable errors that 
335 
associated with each measurement item which represented measurement errors. The curved 
arrows between the measurement errors denoted their correlations between the two points in 
time. 
 
Figure E.1. Measurement Model of Perception of Colleagues’ InfoSec Behaviours 
336 
 
Figure E.2. Measurement Model of Perception of Direct Supervisors’ InfoSec 
Behaviours 
A challenge when specifying the measurement models was that the collected data violated the 
multivariate normality assumption, and this rendered the default estimation method in AMOS 
called Maximum Likelihood (Byrne 2010) inappropriate and demanded the use of Bollen–
Stine bootstrapping method (Bollen & Stine 1992). After specifying and evaluating the models 
for perceptions of colleagues’ and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours, I found that both 
models exhibited acceptable goodness-of-fit with Bollen–Stine bootstrap with p-values equal 
to 0.343 and 0.653 respectively. This meant that the specified structures and measurements of 
the climate perceptions adequately reflected the observed data. 
Table E.1 show that there were no issues with convergent validity, except the removal of item 
SUP5 from the model due to its factor loadings of –0.12 and 0.08 for Time 1 and Time 2 
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respectively, which were much lower than the recommended threshold of ±0.35 (Lewis, 
Templeton & Byrd 2005). Reliability of the constructs was assessed by calculating both 
Cronbach’s alpha and coefficient H. The common use of Cronbach’s alpha is prone to 
inaccurate evaluation of reliability, especially in this project as this index assumes the 
measurement model to be essentially tau-equivalent (i.e., all item’s loadings are specified to 
have equal values) (Graham 2006). However, I did not specify the measurement models in such 
a way. In this context, the coefficient H provides a more accurate evaluation of reliability 
(Hancock & Mueller 2001). 
Table E.1. Convergent Validity 
Construct Item 
Time 1 Time 2 
Loading  H Loading  H 







SUP2 0.94 0.95 
SUP3 0.89 0.88 
SUP4 0.83 0.90 
SUP5 Dropped Dropped 







COL2 0.93 0.92 
COL3 0.71 0.69 
COL4 0.83 0.92 
COL5 0.93 0.94 
Acceptable criteria > ±0.35 > 0.70 > 0.70 > ±0.35 > 0.70 > 0.70 
Once the factor score weights of the measurement items were computed from the measurement 
model (see Table E.2), I multiplied these factor score weights with the answers provided by 
the respondents to the measurement items (i.e., SUP 1–4 and COL 1–5) then added them 
together. This calculation created two single-item scores per respondent, which represented the 
respondent’s climate perceptions of colleagues and direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours 
before and after the change program. 
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Table E.2. Items’ Factor Scores of Climate Perceptions at Time 1 (pre-change program) 
and Time 2 (post-change program) 
 COL1_1 COL1_2 COL1_3 COL1_4 COL1_5 COL2_1 COL2_2 COL2_3 COL2_4 COL2_5 
COL (Time 1) 0.236 0.231 0.044 0.08 0.231 -0.035 0.031 -0.011 -0.08 0.032 
COL (Time 2) -0.021 0.022 -0.007 -0.01 0.024 0.134 0.195 0.039 0.178 0.221 
 SUP1_1 SUP1_2 SUP1_3 SUP1_4 SUP1_5 SUP2_1 SUP2_2 SUP2_3 SUP2_4 SUP2_5 
SUP  
(Time 1) 
0.29 0.296 0.155 0.099 Dropped 0.01 0.055 -0.027 -0.02 Dropped 
SUP  
(Time 2) 
0.012 0.048 -0.022 -0.02 Dropped 0.17 0.348 0.156 0.193 Dropped 
I demonstrate the calculation of the climate perceptions’ scores as follows. Let us assume that 
there was an employee A with their responses for the questions about direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours summarised in Table E.3. 
Table E.3. Sample Answers for Questions about Climate Perception of Direct 
Supervisors’ InfoSec Behaviours 
 
Time 1 Time 2 
SUP1_1 SUP1_2 SUP1_3 SUP1_4 SUP2_1 SUP2_2 SUP2_3 SUP2_4 
Employee 
A’s answers 
4 5 5 4 7 6 7 6 
Following the described procedure, the score of employee A’s climate perception of direct 
supervisors before the change program is calculated by summing the products of employee A’s 
answers (see Table E.3) and the factor score weights listed in the fifth row of Table E.2: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒⁡𝐴′𝑠⁡𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒⁡(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡1)
= (0.29 × 4 + 0.296 × 5 + 0.155 × 5 + 0.099 × 4)
+ (0.01 × 7 + 0.055 × 6 − 0.027 × 7 − 0.02 × 6) = 4⁡(𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑) 
Similarly, employee’s A climate perception score after the change program is calculated by 
summing the products of employee A’s answers and the factor score weights listed in the sixth 
row of Table E.2: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒⁡𝐴′𝑠⁡𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒⁡(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒⁡2)
= (0.012 × 4 + 0.048 × 5 − 0.022 × 5 − 0.02 × 4)
+ (0.17 × 7 + 0.348 × 6 + 0.156 × 7 + 0.193 × 6) = 6⁡(𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑) 
The scores were then rounded to the nearest integer to satisfy SAOM’s requirement for data 
(Ripley et al. 2017). 
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Appendix F. Stochastic Actor-Oriented Modelling Process 
The specification of a SAO model to achieve acceptable goodness-of-fit can be described as a 
trial-and-error process where researchers began with including terms that correspond to the 
theoretical model, then evaluate the model’s goodness-of-fit and add terms about the structural 
mechanisms of the network to improve goodness-of-fit if needed. Another reason for such a 
trial-and-error approach is due to the various effects of social influence that can be modelled, 
which include the assimilation and contagion effects (Steglich, Snijders & Pearson 2010). 
During the SAOM process, researchers can decide whether one or more terms should be tested 
with the Wald or score-type tests. Wald tests, which include the use of t-test to determine a 
parameter’s statistical significance, can be performed easily by dividing the produced estimate 
by its standard error (Ripley et al. 2017). However, there are cases where the results may arrive 
at unusually large estimates and/or standard errors, which make the use of t-test inappropriate. 
In these cases, researchers are recommended to test the results by using the score test (Ripley 
et al. 2017). This score test allows the researchers to fix the problematic parameters to a 
constant (i.e., usually zero, which establishes the null hypothesis that the parameter does not 
have any effect) and test the fixed parameters without estimating them. 
The evaluation of a SAO model focuses on three features, 1) the convergence of each term and 
the model, 2) goodness-of-fit and 3) any abnormalities in the produced estimates and standard 
errors. Ripley et al. (2017) recommended that published SAOM results should achieve a 
maximum convergence ratio for the whole model that is less than 0.25, while the convergence 
t-ratio that describes convergence of each modelled term should be less than 0.1. 
All SAO models in the evaluation and reflection stage of this CAR project were estimated with 
stringent settings for the estimation method to produce reliable results. I set the number of sub-
phases at six (instead of four by default) to increase precision and the number of runs in the 
final phase 3 of the estimation at 5000 to increase reliability (instead of 1,000 by default) 
(Ripley et al. 2017). 
Contagion models 
In line with the modelling strategy (see Section 8.3.3), I started with analysing the SAO model 
that incorporated the weighted average contagion effect. This effect described the phenomenon 
where employees increased their climate perception scores as they received InfoSec influence 
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from their colleagues in the same department, whose climate perception scores were high. It 
was worth highlighting that the weighted average contagion effect assumed that all employees 
experienced the same contagion effect regardless of how many InfoSec influencers they had. 
Since there were two types of climate perceptions (i.e., perceptions of co-workers and direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours), the same weighted average contagion effect was modelled 
for each of them. Moreover, I included employees’ background characteristics as control 
variables assumed to impact the climate perceptions. 
The model’s maximum convergence ratio was 0.1209, lower than the recommended threshold 
of 0.25 (Ripley et al. 2017). Moreover, every included term’s convergence t-ratio was lower 
than the recommended threshold of 0.1 (Ripley et al. 2017). These results indicated that the 
model converged well and its results were reliable for interpretation. The estimates and 
standard errors were reasonably small, which indicated that there were no issues with the 
results. 
Table F.1 summarises the results of the weighted average contagion model. The effects 
associated with the climate perception scores of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours and direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours are presented separately in the table. Statistical significance 
was determined by using the t-test (i.e., divide the estimate by the standard error and check 
whether the result is larger than or equal to 1.96) (Ripley et al. 2017). The significance of the 
rate effects was not necessarily evaluated and reported as the changes in the InfoSec influence 
network before and after the change program (see Section 8.3.7) already suggested that the rate 
effect would be positive (Ripley et al. 2017). 
The estimates presented in all SAO models were in log-odds ratios and could be interpreted as 
follows. The estimate of the champion alter effect was 0.44, which described the likelihood 
that an employee would receive InfoSec influence from another employee who held the 
champion role. By taking the exponential of this estimate (i.e., 𝑒0.44), the effect can be 
interpreted that the likelihood for a champion to exert InfoSec influence over an employee was 
1.56 times higher than that for a non-champion. With regard to the weighted average contagion 
effect, the model did not detect employees’ tendency towards higher scores of both types of 
climate perceptions as caused by receiving InfoSec influence from colleagues with high climate 
perceptions’ scores in the same department. This was due to the weighted average contagion 
effects were not significant (i.e., ratio of estimate and standard error was smaller than 1.96). 
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Table F.1. Results of Weighted Average Contagion Model 





Rate of InfoSec influence 8.95 (2.51) –0.01 
Out-degree (likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence) –7.63*** (0.62) -0.02 
Reciprocity –0.7 (0.59) <0.01 
Transitivity (GWESP I -> K -> J) 1.86*** (0.94) <0.01 
In-degree popularity 1.76*** (0.26) –0.01 
Out-degree activity 0.9*** (0.22) –0.02 
Out-in degree assortativity –0.3*** (0.1) 0.01 
Structural equivalence (in terms of in-degree) 0.11*** (0.02) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees in the same department 1.32*** (0.17) 0.02 
Female employees exerted InfoSec influence –0.08 (0.15) –0.02 
Female employees received InfoSec influence –0.15 (0.18) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of the same gender 0.14 (0.14) <0.01 
Old employees exerted InfoSec influence –0.01 (0.01) –0.02 
Old employees received InfoSec influence <0.01 (0.01) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar age –0.55 (0.5) –0.01 
Employees with long tenure exerted InfoSec influence 0.01 (0.02) <0.01 
Employees with long tenure received InfoSec influence 0.01 (0.02) –0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar tenure 0.39 (0.4) –0.01 
Employees with high seniority exerted InfoSec influence 0.1 (0.24) –0.03 
Employees with high seniority received InfoSec influence 0.01 (0.26) –0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with the same seniority –0.05 (0.25) 0.01 
Employees with champion status exerted InfoSec influence 0.44*** (0.13) 0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar CIB 1.2 (1.77) 0.03 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar DSIB –1.18 (0.91) –0.01 
Provision of work advice and/or organisational updates 1.43*** (0.32) 0.02 
Provision of personal advice and/or trust in expertise 1.47*** (0.3) 0.03 
Provision of InfoSec advice and/or troubleshooting support 0.99*** (0.33) –0.01 





Rate of perception of CIB 2.01 (0.44) –0.01 
Linear shape of perception of CIB 0.02 (0.16) –0.03 
Quadratic shape of perception of CIB –0.97*** (0.44) –0.01 
Average contagion by InfoSec influence of same department employees 0.84 (1.52) <0.01 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of CIB –0.01 (0.33) <0.01 
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Effect of age on perception of CIB –0.03 (0.03) <0.01 
Effect of tenure on perception of CIB –0.03 (0.04) –0.01 
Effect of seniority on perception of CIB –0.13 (0.39) <0.01 
Effect of champion status on perception of CIB –0.68 (0.43) 0.01 





Rate of perception of DSIB 2.83 (0.54) <0.01 
Linear shape of perception of DSIB 0.65*** (0.24) 0.01 
Quadratic shape of perception of DSIB –0.42*** (0.11) -0.01 
Average contagion by InfoSec influence of same department employees –0.08 (0.69) 0.03 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of DSIB –0.19 (0.23) 0.01 
Effect of age on perception of DSIB –0.03 (0.02) 0.02 
Effect of tenure on perception of DSIB <0.01 (0.02) 0.02 
Effect of seniority on perception of DSIB –0.16 (0.26) 0.03 
Effect of champion status on perception of DSIB –0.08 (0.25) 0.02 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance; CIB = colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours; DSIB = direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours. 
Since the weighted average contagion effect in Table F.1 did not account for the number of 
InfoSec influencers who exerted InfoSec influence over employees, I accounted for the total 
number of connections and estimated the model again by using the weighted total contagion 
effect for the next model. 
This model converged well with a maximum convergence ratio of 0.1258 and all terms 
achieved convergence t-ratios that were lower than 0.01. Table F.2 summarises the results of 
the weighted total contagion model. All estimates and standard errors were reasonably small, 
except for the weighted total contagion effect on climate perception of colleagues’ InfoSec 
behaviours. The standard error of this effect was rather large (23.41). While all effects had the 
same statistical significance and similar estimates as those of the weighted average contagion 
model, the quadratic shape effect of the weighted total contagion model was not significant. I 
suspected that such a difference might associate with the unusually large standard error of the 
weighted total contagion effect. 
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Table F.2. Results of Weighted Total Contagion Model 





Rate of InfoSec influence 8.88*** (2.57) –0.03 
Out-degree (likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence) –7.69*** (0.71) –0.01 
Reciprocity –0.7 (0.71) –0.01 
Transitivity (GWESP I -> K -> J) 1.88 (1.01) –0.03 
In-degree popularity 1.77*** (0.23) –0.03 
Out-degree activity 0.93*** (0.23) –0.01 
Out-in degree assortativity –0.31*** (0.1) –0.03 
Structural equivalence (in terms of in-degree) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.04 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees in the same department 1.32*** (0.19) <0.01 
Female employees exerted InfoSec influence –0.09 (0.15) 0.02 
Female employees received InfoSec influence –0.15 (0.18) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of the same gender 0.14 (0.14) –0.01 
Old employees exerted InfoSec influence –0.01 (0.01) 0.02 
Old employees received InfoSec influence <0.01 (0.01) –0.02 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar age –0.58 (0.54) –0.02 
Employees with long tenure exerted InfoSec influence <0.01 (0.02) –0.01 
Employees with long tenure received InfoSec influence 0.01 (0.02) –0.03 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar tenure 0.39 (0.42) <0.01 
Employees with high seniority exerted InfoSec influence 0.09 (0.28) –0.01 
Employees with high seniority received InfoSec influence –0.01 (0.35) –0.03 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with the same seniority –0.06 (0.33) –0.01 
Employees with champion status exerted InfoSec influence 0.44*** (0.16) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar CIB 1.31 (1.85) –0.02 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar DSIB –1.24 (0.92) <0.01 
Provision of work advice and/or organisational updates 1.43*** (0.32) 0.02 
Provision of personal advice and/or trust in expertise 1.47*** (0.32) 0.01 
Provision of InfoSec advice and/or troubleshooting support 0.99*** (0.3) –0.01 





Rate of perception of CIB 1.95*** (0.38) –0.03 
Linear shape of perception of CIB 0.78 (2.53) 0.01 
Quadratic shape of perception of CIB –2.8 (7.56) –0.03 
Total contagion by InfoSec influence of same department employees 5.99 (23.41) <0.01 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of CIB –0.23 (0.84) <0.01 
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Effect of age on perception of CIB –0.07 (0.2) -0.02 
Effect of tenure on perception of CIB –0.07 (0.18) -0.01 
Effect of seniority on perception of CIB –0.55 (1.18) 0.01 
Effect of champion status on perception of CIB –1.74 (4.36) 0.01 





Rate of perception of DSIB 2.83*** (0.62) <0.01 
Linear shape of perception of DSIB 0.63*** (0.2) 0.01 
Quadratic shape of perception of DSIB –0.41*** (0.11) 0.01 
Total contagion by InfoSec influence of same department employees –0.03 (0.48) –0.01 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of DSIB –0.19 (0.22) –0.02 
Effect of age on perception of DSIB –0.03 (0.02) <0.01 
Effect of tenure on perception of DSIB <0.01 (0.03) 0.01 
Effect of seniority on perception of DSIB –0.16 (0.25) 0.02 
Effect of champion status on perception of DSIB –0.09 (0.24) <0.01 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance; CIB = colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours; DSIB = direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours. 
Ripley et al. (2017) postulate that when an estimate has an unusually large standard error while 
the model converged well, then the estimate can still be used but not the standard error. They 
further advise that researchers in this case can estimate the model several times and check the 
stability of the estimate and standard error of the problematic term. I estimated the weighted 
total contagion model three times and detected stability in both statistics, which indicated that 
I could continue interpreting the current estimate of the weighted total contagion effect for 
climate perception of colleagues InfoSec behaviours (i.e., a positive value of 5.99), while 
ignoring its large standard error of 23.41. Ripley et al. (2017) also recommend using the score 
test on the problematic effect. I proceeded with the score test on the weighted total contagion 
effects. The score-tested results are summarised in Table F.3. 











Total contagion by InfoSec influence of 
same department employees (perception of 
CIB) 
9.42 <0.01 3.07 2.09 
Total contagion by InfoSec influence of 
same department employees (perception of 
DSIB) 
< 0.01 0.95 –0.06 –0.08 
Note: CIB = colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours; DSIB = direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours. 
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The weighted total contagion effect on climate perception of co-workers’ InfoSec behaviours 
achieved statistical significance (Chi-squared = 9.42; p-value < 0.01), whereas the weighted 
total contagion effect on climate perception of direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours was not 
significant. The values of both one-sided normal variate and one-step estimate were positive, 
3.07 and 2.09 respectively, which indicated that the weighted total contagion effect on climate 
perception of co-workers’ InfoSec behaviours had positive value (Lomi et al. 2011; Ripley et 
al. 2017). The quadratic shape effect also became significant when the score test for the 
weighted total contagion effect was performed, which was consistent with the weighted 
average contagion model (see Table F.1). 
Overall, these results in Tables F.1 and F.3 suggested that the more employees received InfoSec 
influence from colleagues in the same department whose climate perception scores were high, 
the more likely that they would increase the scores of their climate perceptions of colleagues’ 
InfoSec behaviours. In other words, employees’ total number of InfoSec influencers can impact 
the contagion effect on their climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours. This 
explains why the weighted average contagion effect was not significant in Table F.1. 
The results for the weighted average contagion and weighted total contagion effects also 
confirmed that these contagion effects did not influence employees’ climate perceptions of 
direct supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours. In other words, an employee’s perception of direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours did not increase as a result of receiving InfoSec influence from 
their colleagues whose scores of such perceptions were high. The summary of my modelling 
process and its results for the two contagion models is provided in Figure F.1. 
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Figure F.1. The Modelling Process for the Contagion Models 
Assimilation models 
After I had investigated the impact of social influence on the formation of InfoSec climate 
perceptions via the contagion models, I explored alternative explanations by modelling the 
assimilation models. Any consistent findings of the assimilation models would further 
reinforce the findings about the impact of contagion on the formation of InfoSec climate as 
discussed previously.  
Assimilation described the phenomenon where employees adjusted their perception scores to 
match with those of their colleagues in the same department who exerted InfoSec influence 
over them. With the knowledge that the total number of InfoSec influencers can impact social 
influence, I modelled the term weighted total assimilation effect and anticipated that it would 
achieve statistical significance. Table F.4 reports the results of this model. 
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Table F.4. Results of the Weighted Total Assimilation Model 





Rate of InfoSec influence 9.11*** (2.88) 0.03 
Out-degree (likelihood of exerting InfoSec influence) –7.68*** (0.67) –0.17 
Reciprocity –0.8 (0.67) –0.19 
Transitivity (GWESP I -> K -> J) 1.94 (0.99) –0.15 
In-degree popularity 1.81*** (0.25) –0.22 
Out-degree activity 0.95*** (0.23) –0.16 
Out-in degree assortativity –0.33*** (0.1) –0.23 
Structural equivalence (in terms of in-degree) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.27 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees in the same department 1.29*** (0.18) –0.07 
Female employees exerted InfoSec influence –0.08 (0.15) 0.25 
Female employees received InfoSec influence –0.16 (0.18) <0.01 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of the same gender 0.11 (0.15) –0.3 
Old employees exerted InfoSec influence 0 (0.01) –0.1 
Old employees received InfoSec influence 0 (0.01) –0.14 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar age –0.36 (0.56) 0.48 
Employees with long tenure exerted InfoSec influence 0 (0.02) –0.17 
Employees with long tenure received InfoSec influence 0 (0.02) –0.22 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees of similar tenure 0.51 (0.45) 0.34 
Employees with high seniority exerted InfoSec influence 0.16 (0.26) 0.15 
Employees with high seniority received InfoSec influence 0 (0.26) –0.08 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with the same seniority –0.03 (0.25) –0.23 
Employees with champion status exerted InfoSec influence 0.44*** (0.14) –0.06 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar CIB 0.92 (1.67) –0.14 
Exerting InfoSec influence between employees with similar DSIB –1.32 (0.9) –0.01 
Provision of work advice and/or organisational updates 1.44*** (0.32) –0.01 
Provision of personal advice and/or trust in expertise 1.49*** (0.28) –0.03 
Provision of InfoSec advice and/or troubleshooting support 0.99*** (0.33) –0.28 





Rate of perception of CIB 1.78*** (0.32) –0.03 
Linear shape of perception of CIB 4.18 (3.44) 0.01 
Quadratic shape of perception of CIB –9.79*** (2.08) –0.03 
Total assimilation by InfoSec influence of same department employees 624.71*** (1.51) <0.01 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of CIB –0.58 (4.06) <0.01 
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Effect of age on perception of CIB –0.51 (0.43) –0.02 
Effect of tenure on perception of CIB –0.1 (0.64) –0.01 
Effect of seniority on perception of CIB –2.65 (5.93) 0.01 
Effect of champion status on perception of CIB –7.47 (4.06) 0.01 





Rate of perception of DSIB 2.73*** (0.59) <0.01 
Linear shape of perception of DSIB 0.72*** (0.25) 0.01 
Quadratic shape of perception of DSIB –0.35*** (0.09) 0.01 
Total assimilation by InfoSec influence of same department employees 2 (2.92) –0.01 
Effect of gender (female) on perception of DSIB –0.16 (0.23) –0.02 
Effect of age on perception of DSIB –0.03 (0.02) <0.01 
Effect of tenure on perception of DSIB 0 (0.02) 0.01 
Effect of seniority on perception of DSIB –0.21 (0.26) 0.02 
Effect of champion status on perception of DSIB –0.12 (0.26) <0.01 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance; CIB = colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours; DSIB = direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours. 
This weighted total assimilation model had many issues. First, its overall maximum 
convergence ratio was poor with a value of 2.5633, much larger than the recommended 
threshold of 0.25 (Ripley et al. 2017). This meant the model failed to produce the results that 
were reliable enough for interpretation. Second, the produced estimate for the weighted total 
assimilation effect was unusually large at 624.71. Given these results, I followed Ripley et al.’s 
(2017) advice and executed again the estimation process anticipating that the model would 
converge and the estimate and standard error of this effect would be stable enough for 
interpretation. However, the re-analysed model’s results were even worse. The overall 
maximum convergence ratio of the model remained large at 1.838, which indicated the model 
failed to converge again. The estimate of the weighted total assimilation also inflated to 
1133.88, which indicated the result could not be interpreted. These results implied that this 
weighted total assimilation effect could not be examined by the default estimation approach of 
the RSiena statistical package. For such a situation, Ripley et al. (2017) recommend using the 
score test as the only remedy. 
I then applied the score test to examine while setting the result of the weighted total assimilation 
effect at zero, which established the null hypothesis that this effect would not impact 
employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours. Likewise, I did the same 
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for the weighted total assimilation effect on the climate perceptions of direct supervisors’ 
InfoSec behaviours. Examining the Chi-squared values and p-values produced by the score test 
would determine whether these null hypotheses could be rejected (i.e., the assimilation effects 
were significant). The score test’s results are summarised in Table F.5. 
Table F.5. Score Test Results for the Weighted Total Assimilation Effects 





Total assimilation by InfoSec 
influence of same department 
employees (perception of CIB) 
18.46 <0.0001 4.30 13.55 
Total assimilation by InfoSec 
influence of same department 
employees (perception of DSIB) 
1.02 0.31 1.01 2.17 
The Chi-squared value (18.46) and p-value (< 0.0001) of the weighted total assimilation effect 
on employees’ climate perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours supported that this effect 
was significant. Moreover, the one-sided normal variate and one-step estimate of this effect 
both achieved positive values, 4.30 and 13.55 respectively, which indicated that the result of 
this effect would be positive (Lomi et al. 2011; Ripley et al. 2017). The score-tested results 
confirmed that employees tended to match their perceptions of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours 
with those of the InfoSec influencers in the same department, who exerted InfoSec influence 
over them. The weighted total assimilation effect on the climate perceptions of direct 
supervisors’ InfoSec behaviours was not supported (Chi-squared = 1.02; p-value = 0.31). The 
use of the score test made the model achieve good convergence; overall maximum convergence 
ratio was 0.1243, indicating the results were reliable for interpretation. Finally, I applied the 
score test to determine the significance of the weighted average assimilation effect. Table F.6 
summarises the results of this score test, which show that both average assimilation effects 
were not supported (p-values = 0.59). 
Table F.6. Score Test Results for the Weighted Average Assimilation Effects 






Average assimilation by InfoSec 
influence of same department 
employees (perception of CIB) 
0.29 0.59 0.54 18.24 
Average assimilation by InfoSec 
influence of same department 
employees (perception of DSIB) 
0.30 0.59 0.54 12.10 
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Overall, the results of these assimilation models were the same as those of the contagion 
models. Only the climate perception of colleagues’ InfoSec behaviours was affected by social 
influence. Further, employees’ total number of InfoSec influencers in the same department had 
impact on such social influence. The weighted total contagion and weighted total assimilation 
effects both achieved statistical significance in line with my expectation. A summary of my 
modelling process for the assimilation models is illustrated in Figure F.2. 
 
Figure F.2. The Modelling Process for the Assimilation Models 
Evaluating Goodness-of-Fit 
Before the models’ results could be interpreted, I needed to check the extent to which the 
models can describe the actual phenomena. The goodness-of-fit of each model was assessed 
visually by examining the graphs that display the goodness-of-fit of the four network features 
which were the distributions of out-degree, in-degree, geodesic distance and triad census 
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(Ripley et al. 2017). Figures F.3, F.4, F.5 and F.6 show the graphs that evaluated the goodness-
of-fit of the weighted average contagion model, the weighted total contagion model, the 
weighted average assimilation model and the weighted total assimilation model respectively. 
The violin plots in the four smaller graphs within each figure presented the distributions of the 
four network features as simulated by the model. The graphs that showed acceptable goodness-
of-fit had a red line (i.e., statistics of the observed InfoSec influence network) run through the 
violin plots and between the dotted band (i.e., the 95 per cent confidence interval calculated for 
the simulated statistics). Further, a p-value of larger than 0.05 at the bottom of each graph 
indicated acceptable goodness-of-fit of a feature. Overall, all four models achieved good 
goodness-of-fit for all features, indicating these models accurately described the observed 
InfoSec influence network and their results were reliable for interpretation. 
  
  
















Figure F.6. Goodness-of-Fit of Weight Total Assimilation Model 
 
 
